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ABSTRACT 
Despite the assumptions of both the 'modernization school' and Marxist 
theorists that ethnicity was a transitory phenomenon along the path to political 
development, the past few decades have seen a resurgence of ethnic nationalism. In 
recent years a number of explanations has been offered for the persistence and resur-
gence of ethnicity. Within this context, this thesis looks at ethnic separatist politics 
among the Muslim mir~ority populations in Mindanao, the Philippines and in Patani, 
Thailand. It addresses several questions: having regard to the alternative explana-
tions offered for the persistence and resurgence of ethnic nationalism, how does one 
account for the survival of Moro and Malay identity over centuries in the face of 
repeated attempts to inte~rate these ethnic communities into the larger political en-
tities of the Philippines and Thailand? More specifically, what immediate factors 
triggered the recent emergence of armed separatist movements in the two areas? 
Chapters 2 and 3 describe the historical, economic and social background of the Moro 
and the Malay communities. They discuss how these two distinct ethnic communities 
evolved and examine the socio-economic conditions of the communities as minorities 
under the domination of Filipino-Christian and Thai-Buddhist majorities. They 
depict also the history of the Moro and the Malay resistance movements in the 20th 
century, which culminated in the emergence of full-fledged organized separatist 
fronts. The particular role of Islam in creating a sense of ummah (community) that 
distinguished Muslim from non-Muslim communities, and in shaping and legitimating 
the separatist movements both within the Moro and Malay societies and in the con-
text of the larger Islamic world community is explored. 
Beyond these broader questions, the study scrutinizes the form which the 
separatist struggles have taken over time and examines in detail the structure, leader-
x 
ship and ideology of the separatist movements. It suggests that, unlike most revolu-
tionary fronts, the ethnic separatist movements in the Philippines and Thailand have 
been loosely structured, with a broadly-defined programme, and apparently vul-
' 
nerable to factionalism, yet capable of coming together and mobilizing large numbers 
of people under the banner of Islam when their communities felt their way of life 
threatened. The importance of the world Muslim community in sustaining the 
Patani and especially the Moro movements, and in shaping the nature of struggle, is 
studied in this context. An account is also given of the responses of the Philippine 
and Thai governments to the separatist movements and it is argued that attempts to 
solve the problems of ethnic separatism through either socio-economic programmes or 
military action are doomed to failure. 
During the course of this study it is clear that there are both similarities and 
differences between the Moro and Malay separatist struggles. But the basic 
similarities are striking, and suggest parallels also with ethnic separatist movements 
elsewhere in the world. The thesis concludes with some comments on the long-term 
prospects for the separatist movements in the two countries. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1 
Ethnic pluralism has occurred throughout mankind's history. Frequently it has 
been a consequence of conquest. In an analysis of 132 contemporary sovereign states, 
Said and Simmons (1976:10) suggest that only 12 can be considered ethnically 
homogeneous. One may, however, distinguish different types of ethnically 
heterogeneous society, depending on the socio-historical basis on which minority 
communities are differentiated. 
Minority communities might be divided into three major categories. The first 
consists of minority immigrant populations. These are often the result of labour 
recruiting policies during a colonial period; examples include the blacks in the United 
States, tlie Chinese in Malaysia, and the Africans in Guyana. Such populations 
usually have no attachment to specific geographical areas, being scattered throughout 
the territory of their new countries, and their sense of common identity is often weak. 
More significantly, such minorities have no real separatist alternative (for a 
discussion of the separatist option, see Anderson et al. 1967:67-74; Smith 1982:32-36); 
their predominant concern, indeed, is with acceptance within the larger society. 
The second category, represented by groups such as the Aborigines in Australia, 
the American Indians in the United States, and the Innuit in Canada, constitutes 
indigeneous peoples who, as a by-product of colonial settlement, have become a 
minority in their own land. In many cases the impact of colonial settlement has not 
only reduced their populations but has driven them into isolation. Not surprisingly, 
some of the indigeneous communities are fighting for their survival--a struggle which 
Charles Darwin (1979:75-94) has described as the course of natural selection, the 
2 
survival of the fittest. But while demands for landrights and homelands may be 
regarded as a form of separatism, their real purpose is to limit outside encroachment 
on the traditional society. 
The third category of ethnic minority results from incorporating hitherto 
autonomous peoples under an alien authority, or from diminishing the sphere of 
authority of local and regional groups under a policy of unification and centralization 
under a national government (Oberschall 1973:44). Examples include: the Basques in 
Spain; the French-speaking Bernese in Switzerland; the south Tyroleans in Italy; the 
Breton in France; the French in Quebec, Canada; the Walloon and Flemish peoples in 
Belgium; the Outer Islanders, including the East Timorese, in Indonesia; the Karens 
and the Shans in Burma; the Kashmir and the Naga peoples in India; the Tamils in 
Sri Lanka; the Tibetans and the Kazakhs in China; the Kurds in Iraq and Iran; the 
Armenians in Turkey and the USSR; the Eritreans in Ethiopia; the Saharawi m 
Morocco; the Ibo in Nigeria; the Moros in the Philippines; and the Malays m 
Thailand. Such groups normally have strong identification with a specific region and 
regard separation as a political option .. 
It is with this third category of minority that this thesis is concerned. The 
study focuses on the Moro and the Malay minority groups in the Philippines and 
Thailand. For these groups, separatism is perceived not only as having a 
socio-historical logic but also as being a practical possibility because of the 
coincidence of geography and cultural plurality, distance from the centre of authority, 
and the support of sympathetic groups outside the state. 
The Persistence of Ethnicity 
Ethic community or ethnie has emerged and re-emerged at different ::::eriods 
since the early third millennium B.C., and has remained as a socio-cultural 'model' 
for human organization and communication to the present day (Smith 1987:32). An 
ethnic community may be defined as 'a self-perceived group of people who hold in 
3 
common a set of traditions not shared by the others with whom they are in contact' 
{De Vos 1975:9; Hall 1979:xx). This definition assumes that for an ethnic group to 
emerge, there must be some 'primordial' ties around which to build a sense of 
community. These primordial ties include such traditions as common myths of 
descent or place of origin, sense of historical continuity, and distinct cultural 
practices. 
A myth of common descent consists of legends and accounts of communal 
history that come from the collective experiences of successive generations. It 
underlies the sense of belonging and similarity for the participants. It provides a 
rationale and a framework for a growing sense of ethnic identity. Without a myth an 
ethnic group cannot define and distinguish itself from other groups and cannot inspire 
collective action. The second primordial tie is a sense of historical continuity, the 
construction and re-construction of a nation's past from an ethnic perspective, which 
links successive generations. History in this sense tells a story as well as educating the 
participants. The heroes and heroines whose deeds it reveals--for example, the British 
entrepreneur; the·Russian worker, and the Qhinese peasant-embody the virtues held 
precious by a given community {Smith 1987:24-26). Thus history enhances the 
consciousness of ethnicity and deepens the sense of shared identity. A distinctive 
shared culture, real or imagined, is another bond that helps to bind members of an 
ethnic group together and to separate them from outsiders. Religion and language are 
among the common shared cultural phenomena. Other cultural traits such as 
customs, institutions, laws, architecture, music, dress, and food reflect and reinforce 
the differences. The greater the number of differentiating cultural ties, the more 
intense the sense of ethnic identity, and the greater the prospects of ethnic persistance 
(Smith 1987:26-28; 1981:66-68; 1984). Finally, an ethnic community has its 
attachment to a particular territory or 'homeland' which becomes a symbolic 
geographical centre and a means of maintaining group cohesion. Members of an 
ethnic community do not cease to identify themselves with their own group when 
they have lost their homeland and are scattered across the world. For ethnicity is a 
4 
matter of myth, memory and symbol. Some ethnic members maintain themselves by 
sustaining a hope for political independence or for the recapturing of a lost homeland. 
Ethnic group cohesion produces a strong sense of belonging and solidarity, 
which in time of threat or outside pressure can override class, faction or regional 
divisions within the community. At times ethnic solidarity may be overlaid by other 
kinds of loyalties but from time to time, and especially in the face of external enemies 
it will re-emerge in sufficient force and depth to override other types of allegiance 
(Smith 1987:30). 
Prior to the emergence of the modern nation-state, most ethnic communities 
lived in autonomous and mostly homogeneous social environments. The clan, the 
chiefdom, the municipality and the empire represented such autonomous 
socio-political units. The empire was the largest of many kinds of political entity, 
claiming vast reaches of territory and containing peoples of different ethnic origins. 
Because of its size, it inevitably allowed diverse ethnic groups to remain in essentially 
autonomous environments. Indeed, those communities situated far from the centre 
had only vague awareness of imperial law and order. As the empire expanded, it 
became increasingly difficult to maintain hegemony over its periphery. Thus, the 
realm of an overextended empire gradually diminished as the cost of coercing 
allegiance from groups in the periphery exceeded the worth of goods expropriated 
from their areas. Eventually, the imperial system gave way to the new system of the 
'nation-state' (Hall 1979:xvii-xix; Emerson 1960; for an account of state formation 
and pre-existing 'nations', ~eE! Smith 1987:129-173).1 · 
lA 'iiatfoii; refers to a relatively large group of people, with a consciously shared set of 
cultural patterns, symbols and other forms of expressing solidarity, inhabiting a given terr~tory 
and obeying the same laws and government (cf. Rijai and Enloe 1969:143; Linz 1973:37; Pat-
terson 1977:67-69; Anderson 1983:15). A 'state' is defined as a bureaucratic administrative 
unit, which extends over geographical territory, mobilizes forces of violence and possesses 
legitimate authority to use such forces (Weber 1947). Some theorists assume that 'nation' also 
implies collective identity. To the extent that collective identity overlaps with bureacratic 
legal boundaries, a 'nation-state' is said to exist (Olzak 1985:72). 
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The origins of the transition to nationhood can be traced back to the gradual 
unification of the territories of England and of France and later to the emergence of 
unified Spanish, Swedish, and Polish states during the first half of the second 
millennium A.O. In the Muslim world, there also existed some sort of 'centralized 
states' in Fatimid Egypt, Savafid Iran and the Ottoman empire. These unified 
territories gradually were transformed into_ 'national states'2through the impact of 
the revolutions (economic, social and cultural) that occurred in the Western world 
and through the provision of equal legal rights to various strata of people and the 
growth of public education systems (Smith 1987:138; cf. Kohn 1967a, 1967b). 
The emergence of nation-states in Europe provided a skeleton for the 
subsequent development of European colonialism around the world. One of the 
-
significant results of colonial incursion was that it incorporated diverse peoples, often 
against their will, into larger political unions. As a consequence, autonomous ethnic 
communities became, in many cases, 'national minorities'. 3 In order to facilitate 
control of resources, the colonial state could no longer tolerate ethnic preferences for 
autonomy. Ethnic autonomy was considered an oq~tacle to the development of the 
state (Hall 1979:xix). Thus, the cultural-political domination of the core ethnic group 
dictated the forms and content of the social institutions and political life of the whole 
population within its domain (Smith 1987:139) and denied the significance of 
ethnicity. The new allegiance was no longer to the tribe or religion, but to the 
'ideology of the common good', which was based on the idea that diverse communities 
could be brought together in a new system where the state, rather than ethnicity, was 
pre-eminent. 
2 Anthony Smith (1987) employed the term 'national state' to distinguish it from 'nation-
state', as the latter implies congruence and co-extensiveness between the territorial state and 
the ethnic population and culture. In this thesis, however, the two terms are used interchange-
ably. 
3 According ·to ·Arnold and Caroline Rose (1972:2), the term 'national minorities' was 
employed first in Europe to describe the social position of some groups of people in relation to 
the rest of the population. In many countries people of certain cultural backgrounds had 
ancient attachment to a given place, and the land they occupied bore their name. However, 
some groups of people found themselves within political boundaries in which the majority 
group was a different nationality. That is, the territory of a state did not coincide with the 
territory inhabited by the historical nationality groups (cf. Krejci and Velimsky 1981:32-42). 
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However, smce ethnic communities reflect group cohesion founded upon 
traditions and psychological phenomena not shared by others, ethnic behaviour tends 
to be based on particular interpretations of situations motivated by group 
self-interest. Members of ethnic communities find themselves divided in their 
allegiances between loyalty to the state to which they belong and to the communities 
of their birth and upbringing. This divided loyalty has created fertile ground for 
separatism, as many ethnic communities struggle to become nations. 
The emergence of the new nations of Africa and Asia gave rise to a vast and 
variegated literature on what has become known as political modernization and 
development, nation-building and political integration. Characteristic of these 
writings is the view that ethnic and primordial sentiments are temporary 
impediments to the development of modern society, and the assumption that ethnic 
loyalty will fade away and be replaced by cleavages based on :lass and occupational 
status (Weber 1947; Marx 1964; Rokkan 1970). Similarly, there is what sociologists 
call the 'diffusionist' theory of social integration, associated with such distinguished 
scholars as Talcott Parsons and Neil Smelser (see, for ~xample, Parsons and Smelser 
1956); according to which the culture and values of the core group in a society are 
gradually diffused throughout the peripheral areas. For Marxists, too, ethnic and 
cultural conflicts have always been regarded as a transitional phase of capitalist 
society, which in the course of events will be overwhelmed by class struggle. Class, 
according to them, must inevitably become the main basis of division between people, 
replacing such earlier factors of tribe, religion, language and national origin (Birch 
1978:325; Glazer and Moynihan 1975; Nielsen 1980:76). 
Hence, the persistance of ethnic and nationalistic conflicts has been 
characterized either as a manifestation of residual loyalties from an early stage of 
social development, due to dissolve as society beco~es more developed, or as 
essentially a form of economic conflict, though the participants may not recognize it 
as such. Systems of social organization based on ethnic distinctions are seen to 
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correspond to a relatively primitive level of development and to be poorly adapted to 
the demands of modernity. They are destined to be replaced by more adequate 
institutions during the modernization process. 
Central to the argument of the modernization literature is the notion that the 
process of modernization--the spread of a market economy, urbanization, 
bureaucratization, growth of literacy, improved social communications, and so on--
leads to a cultural diffusion that cuts across primordial attachments, producing a 
more or less homogeneous culture within a given geographical territory.4 Karl 
Deutsch (1969, 1966), for instance, maintained that 'when several population clusters 
are united through more communications or more economic activity, then the people 
begin to think of themselves as a country'. This implies that the process of 
modernization in the form of increased social mobilization and change erodes or 
breaks down major clusters of old social and psychological commitments, replacing 
pre-existing ethnic bonds with more functional ties (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), and 
people become available for new patterns of socialization and behaviour (Deutsch 
1961:494). For example, the modern industrial society 't~aches people not to take 
their class position as God-given, but as somehow the result of their own efforts. 
Class status becomes achieved rather than ascribed or inherited' (Deutsch 1970:89). 
The growing sectors of the national economy attract many of the most gifted and 
energetic persons from the minority and tribal groups, leaving these traditional 
communities weaker, more moribund and easier to govern (Deutsch 1963:5). The 
process of modernization, it was argued, will lead to a transfer of primary allegiance 
from the ethnic -group-to the state. 
James Coleman (1960:345), Lucian Pye (1963:10), and Myron Weiner (1967; 
4
'Moderniza.tiori' refers to. a number. of r(!late.d processes of social an_d economic change, 
including industrialization, urbanization, increases in literacy and the provision of education, 
expansion of the mass media, modifications of traditional relationships, rising expectations, 
and so on. Some of these have also been referred to as 'social mobilization' (Milne 1981:83). 
Eminent social scientists, such as Karl Deutsch and Samuel Huntington, have been concerned 
with the political accompaniments of modernization; some of the consequences of this are 
discussed here. 
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Apter 1967) argued that the problems of integration and of creating political 
consensus in the new states was largely a problem of establishing more effective 
channels of communication and transportation so that all segments of the society can 
become 'more closely involved with each other.5 A similar assumption was made by 
Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan in their study of the relationship between social 
structures and party system. They wrote: 
The National Revolution forced ever-widening circles of the territorial 
population to choose sides in conflicts over values and cultural identities. 
The Industrial Revolution also triggered a variety of cultural 
counter-movements, but in the long run tended to cut across the value 
communities within the nation and to force the enfranchised citizenary to 
choose sides in terms of their economic interests, their shares in the 
increased wealth generated through the spread of the new technologies and 
the widening markets (1967:18-19). 
Samuel Huntington (1971:289-290) pointed m the same direction when he asserted 
that modernization is a homogenizing and irreversible process. In his discussions on 
the 'functional necessity' of the family, Barrington Moore (1958:161-163) suggested 
that it is possible for the modernized industrial societies of the world to do away with 
the family and substitute other social arrangements. These functionalist or 
developmental theories tended to view ethnicity as a threat ta the very existence of 
the state (Olzak 1985:73). From this perspective, indentification as 'Moro' or 'Malay' 
clearly competes for the loyalty and commitment with identification as of 'Filipino' or 
'Thai'. 
The Marxist tradition was consistent with these predictions. Its view of the 
historical evolution of capitalist societies reinforced the view that ethnic divisions 
were particularly salient in an early phase of economic organization (Marx 1964; 
1969). In a system of communal property, the major element of production was land 
collectively own by the community. Tribal or ethnic loyalty was therefore essential. 
5The complex tasks of integration involve 'the development of a sense of nationality by 
subsuming various cultural loyalties; the integration of political units into a common ter-
ritorial framework; the greater linkage of the rulers and the ruled; the integration of citizens 
into a common political process; and, finally, the working together of individuals for common 
goals' (Weiner 1967; see Jahan 1972). 
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In contrast, the capitalist system emphasized the separation of the elements of 
production (land, labour and capital) and thus undermined the significance of 
community leadership. Capitalism also entails a growing polarization between those 
who own the means of production and those who do not (Nielsen 1980:76-77; see 
Lijphart 1977:54). Thus, class replaces ethnicity as the fundamental social cleavage. 
In an attempt to synthesize functionalist and Marxist perspectives with respect to 
collective action, Dahrendorf {1969) suggested that both the functionalist and 
Marxist arguments may be roughly summarized as follows: 
Since the criterion of ethnicity is not functionally relevant for the 
allocation of authority in industrial societies, the likelihood that conflict is 
based on ethnic boundaries decreases with modernization (Nielsen 1980:77). 
According to the literature discussed above, the broad process of modernization 
affects all cultures roughly in the same manner and it is irreversible and unilinear. As 
a result, all states composed of diverse ethnic groups will eventually become 
nationally integrated. However, the mounting empirical evidence of ethnic nationalist 
movements around the world (Esman 1977) suggests that both the functionalist and 
the Marxist-models ·are inadequate;· Despite -a .. long experience· -0f multi-ethnicity, the 
integration of diverse social groups into already established political systems remains 
unrealized. Many nation-states face challenges of minority nationalist movements of 
various forms, ranging from the relatively peaceful assertion of separate identity 
seeking for certain degrees of local autonomy to violent activities or civil war 
demanding political independence. In the second half of the last decade, for example, 
there were no less than 117 organized movements for separation and autonomy 
concentrated in at least 44 nations of North and South (Boulding 1979:276). 
Since the middle of the 1960s, the cruder versions of modernization theory have 
been challenged by many scholars. Connor {1972), for instance, maintained that a 
global survey illustrated that ethnic consciousness was on the rise as a political force, 
and that modernization, in the form of increases in social mobilization, appears to 
have increased ethnic tensions and to be conducive to separatist demands. This is 
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because social mobilization fosters ethnic competition, especially in the competitive 
modern sector: 'it is the competitor within the modern sphere who feels the 
insecurities of change most strongly and who seeks the communal shelter of 
' 
"tribalism"' (Melson and Wolpe 1970:1115). Similarly, Enloe (1973:viii) suggests that 
ethnic identity fulfils primary and communitarian needs in a society increasingly 
dominated by complex, large-scale organization. For Geertz (1963:154), social 
mobilization 'does not do away with ethnocentrism, it merely modernizes it'. It has 
even been suggested that 
Ethnic groups persist largely because of their capacity to extract goods 
and services from the modern sector and thereby satisfy the demands of 
their members for the components of modernity. Insofar as they provide 
these benefits to their members, they are able to gain their support and 
achieve their loyalty (Bates 1974:471). 
It has been argued, further, that ethnic solidarity persists because modernization has 
been articulated in terms of converging aspirations: 
People's aspirations and expectations change as they are mobilized into 
modernizing economy and polity. They come to want, and to demand, 
more-more goods, more recognition, more power. Significantly, too, the 
orientation of the mobilized to a common set of rewards and paths to 
rew_ards means, in effect, that many people come to desire precisely the same 
things. Men ent'er irito conflict not because they are different but because 
they are essentially the same. It is by making men 'more alike,' in the sense 
of possessing the same wants, that modernization tends to promote conflict 
(quoted in Horowitz 1985:100) 
The following section examines m more detail some the major theoretical 
perspectives which argue the persistence of ethnic solidarity in modern societies. 
Theoretical Perspectives of Ethnic Solidarity 
Two major theoretical perspectives converge upon the assumption that 
contemporary ethnic solidarity is essentially a product of modernization and is related 
to and legitimated by nationalism. They diverge in their definitions of ethnicity and 
in the elements they identify as instrumental in generating ethnic mobilization. 
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Reactive Ethnicity: Internal Colonialism and the Cultural Division of Labour 
Theory 
Michael Hechter, the chief proponent of the internal colonialism thesis, declares 
that the great nation-states such as Britain and France not only annexed overseas 
colonies in the course of their development and expansion but also incorporated 
diverse 'internal' ethnic communities within their state frontiers (Hechter 1975, 1978; 
Casanova 1963; Stavenhagen 1965; Dos Santos 1970). An internal colpny is said to 
exist when the relationships between the core area, which is normally dominated by 
an ethnic majority, and the peripheral regions, which in many cases comprise 
culturally diverse minority communities, are characterized by exploitation due to the 
uneven progress of industrialization and development (Hechter 1975; Gellner 1973; 
Nairn 1977). The core community attempts to maintain its. superior position by 
institutionalizing the existing inequality. Ethnic solidarity (ethnic mobilization) is 
seen as a reaction of the culturally distinct periphery against the exploitative core. 
The theory predicts reactive ethnic solidarity when economic activity within the 
periphery is concentrated in the hands of the core ethnic majority or whe~ a pattern 
of structural discrimination exists. Hechter calls this arrangement a 'cultural division 
of labour', which he defines as a 'system of stratification where objective cultural 
distinctions are superimposed upon class lines' (1975:30; see Leifer 1981). A cultural 
division of labour occurs 'when individuals are assigned to specific types of 
occupations and other social roles on the basis of observable cultural traits or 
markers' (Hechter 1974:1154). With cultural division of labour, ethnic boundaries 
tend to coincide with the boundaries· of structural differentiation, and there is a basis 
for group action along ethnic lines. 
Hechter {1973, 1974, 1975) also points out that internal colonialism is one of 
the main mechanisms leading to a cultural division of labour. Modernization, he 
argues, does not affect the entire population of the nation evenly, but spreads from 
one or several centres towards the periphery. As modernization is diffused throughout 
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the nation and the periphery is gradually absorbed into the modern system of 
production and exchange, the centre controls development in the periphery in such a 
way that the populations in the periphery are involved in the activities most 
profitable and complementary to the requirements of the centre and the least 
rewarding for the periphery. Specialization of the periphery in such activities leads to 
a pattern of structural discrimination. Whenever the populations of both the centre 
and the periphery can be differentiated by cultural phenomena, mobilization on the 
basis of ethnic boundaries is likely to take place. In other words, ethnic solidarity is 
intensified when cultural and functional lines are concurrent. However, this reactive 
ethnicity model admits that modernization and functional differentiation in the social 
system as a whole are not sufficient to explain the persistence of ethnic solidarity in 
modern societies. Other factors such as historical development must also be taken 
into account. 
Competitive Perspectives of Ethnicity 
Some social theorists attribute the underlying problem of ethnic conflict to the 
competion of diverse ethnic groups for scarce resources. In his study of ethnic conflict 
in Africa and Asia, Horowitz (1971), for example, suggests that a large part of the 
conflict stemmed from the competition between members of different ethnic groups 
for positions in the national bureaucracy and in the armed forces. Likewise, Cohen 
(1969) writes: 
The continual confrontations between the Hausa and Yoruba in 
competition for economic benefits from trade, together with the rapidly 
increasing population of Sabo and the complexity of its social life, led to the 
emergence of a unified 'tribal' administration and leadership (quoted in 
Dulyakasem 1981:15). 
Lieberson (1970:9-10), in his study of ethnic relations in Canada, also demonstrates 
-···-······· 
that competition exists between languages in contact because the optimal conditions 
for their native speakers are usually discordant and because the gains that one 
language makes are to the detriment of the other. 
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Like the reactive ethnicity model, the competitive perspectives model provides 
justifications for the emergence of ethnic mobilization and antagonism in modern 
nation-states. However, both models associate such emergence with quite different 
structural arrangements. For the former, ethnic solidarity emerges when 
modernization generates a cultural division of labour in which a peripheral ethnic 
community is in a disadvantageous position and exploited by the centre. The latter 
relates solidarity to situations in which social mobilization and development spreads 
more uniformly over the national territory, the distribution of occupations and social 
roles in the centre and periphery become more equal, and the cultural division of 
labour breaks down (Nielsen 1980:79-80). In other words, when diverse ethnic groups 
come to compete in the same labour markets and increase their access to similar sets 
of resources, mobilization along ethnic boundaries is most likely to occur (see, Despres 
1975; Young 1976; Hannan 1979; Rothschild 1981; Olzak 1983). There are two 
distinct lines of argument within the competitive perspectives: the split labour market 
and ecological-competition theories. 
Split Labour Market Theory 
Bonacich {1972, 1976, 1979; Bonacich and Modell 1980) argues that split labour 
markets generate ethnic antagonism and ethnic collective action. His central 
argument is that when the price of labour for the same work differs by ethnic group, a 
conflict develops which may result in extreme ethnic antagonism encompassing all 
levels of intergroup conflict, including ideologies, behaviour and institutions. In split 
labour markets, conflic~-- _d~velops among three key classes: business (employers), 
higher paid labour, and cheaper labour. Employers mostly aim at having as cheap a 
labour force as possibl~ to compete effectively with other employers. If labour cos1'are 
too high (for, example, due to union action), employers may turn to cheaper sources, 
importing overseas groups or using indigenous conquered populations. Higher paid 
labour is threatened by the introduction of cheap labour into the market. Employers 
use the cheaper labour class partly to undermine the position of more expensive 
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labour, through strike breaking and undercutting. Wilson (1978) has similarly 
observed that ethnic antagonism is most intense when a labour market is divided 
along ethnic boundaries: for example, when migrating blacks from the South of the 
' 
United States were employed as strike breakers in the expanding industries in the 
North, ethnic antagonism resulted. But in contrast to the cultural division of labour 
model, the split labour market theory stresses class cleavage as the primary 
determinant of behaviour in a labour market differentiated by wage and ethnic 
categories. 
Ecological-Competition Theory 
Hannan (1979) asserts that ethnic conflict is mainly the result of intense 
competition between ethnic groups for the occupation of social niches {see, McCarthy 
and Zald 1977, Tilly 1978; Nagel and Olzak 1982; Pinard and Hamilton 1986). The 
theory suggests that as the process of economic and political development diffuses 
more homogeneously over the national territory and breaks down the cultural division 
of labour, competition between ethnic groups increases {Barth 1969; Despres 1975; 
Banton 1983). This is because the modernization process favours reorganization 
within larger boundaries, rather than along kinship, village, or other small-scale lines 
(Hannan 1979). The major implication of this theoretical perspective is that, to the 
extent that an ethnic population competes with the majority or other minority ethnic 
groups for the same jobs, the resulting niche overlap leads to ethnic competition. 
Under conditions of stable or shrinking resources, this competition results in ethnic 
collective· action- (Olzak -198-5:76):- Meyer and Hannan (1979): arui=Bii:ch: {1978 )'further 
argue that because different internafional ~conomic and political. organizations (e.g., 
EEC; IMF; NATO and UN) emphasize membership, negotiation and power only 
among nation:..states, ethnic mobilization in the postwar period increasingly has 
reflected- demands by sub-national- groups for· self-determination and sovereignty. 
Indeed, the ecological-competition theory defines the causal relation between 
modernization and ethnic mobilization both in terms of raising levels of ethnic 
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competition and . . mcreasmg legitimacy of sub-national and territorial ethnic 
movements. 
In sum, the reactive ethnicity and competition perspective models appear to be 
useful in explaining the persistence and the emergence of ethnic solidarity (Smelser 
1969; Hilton 1979; Verdery 1976) and seem to be applicable to the present situations 
in the Muslim regions of the southern Philippines and southern Thailand. The more 
pertinent models, however, are internal colonialism and the cultural division of labour 
and the ecological-competition perspective. The former affirms that the extent of 
overlap between low cultural status (minority) and low-reward occupations produces 
ethnic mobilization. Although one may argue that the cultural division of labour in 
the Philippines and Thailand is not as clearly visible as that in the developed nations, 
Sow..a.. 
there is no doubt thatAMuslims in Mindanao and in Patani (low cultural status 
e~.-e.Uv.e..o.\.. ~~---'!. -...~ l..i<.: .... ~ 
groups) have §eRe!'a.lly anR engaged in low status occupations as compared to the 
" 
non-Muslim majorities in the two countries. Furthermore, the internal colonialism 
argument describes a historical process in which ethnic lines and occupational 
divisions converge (Hechter 1974, 1975; Nielsen 1980). Such a scenario seems to 
conform to the circumstances of the Moro and the Malay communities of the two 
regions which have been absorbed by the accident of history into the larger Filipino 
and Thai nations. 
The ecological-competition perspective model suggests that the penetration by 
the centre, through economic and political developments, creates the conditions under 
which ethnicity-is:Tegarded as-the mast viable and effective -political-instrument for 
the periphery to oppose the centre. Ethnicity, it is argued, is the most pertinent 
element of social and political organization where there is rapid economic and 
political change,_ where the competition for roles and resources is profound, and where 
achievements rather than heredity determine access to those roles and resources 
(Hannan 1979; Ragin 1979). The structural alterations resulting from the spread of 
modernization from the centre lead to ethnic reactions and mobilization. This model 
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(with only slight modification) has already been tested in the four Muslim provinces 
of southern Thailand and proved workable (Dulyakasem 198i, 1984). 
The split labour market theory is less relevant to the situation in Mindanao and 
Patani because Muslims in these regions do not receive different wages for the same 
work. 
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that modernization and change create 
conditions favourable to a competitive environment and ethnic organization. Our 
question is: under what conditions will an ethnic group choose to take action aimed at 
separatism as opposed to, for example, working for change within the system? Our 
answer is that it depends largely upon the many specific conditions which catalyse 
separatist potential (see Anderson et al. 1967; Smith 1982; McVey 1984). Ethnic 
separatism generally refers to ethnic action aimed at complete withdrawal from 
state-imposed socio-economic and political arrangements. Such action, which is 
frequently a reaction to assimilation attempts at the centre, aims to promote cultural, 
linguistic, religious, geographical and economic autonomy within a specific state or to 
obtain complete political independence. Separatism is, therefore, a particular form of 
ethnic conflict which requires specific conditions to generate separatist action. As 
mentioned earlier, distance from the centre is a first essential condition. Regions on 
the periphery of the pre-colonial states in Africa and Asia, for example, could regard 
separation as a political option whenever a weakening of the centre created the 
opportunity. Those groups near the centre had no separatist option and could only 
hope to change the regime at-the-core (Anderson et al. 1967:71; Smith 1982:32-36). A 
coincidence between geography and cultural pforality is also crucial. In polities like 
Malaysia and Lebanon, where the major ethnic groups are scattered throughout the 
national territory, separation is ·not- a genuine option. The role played by India as 
midwife to Bangladesh illustrated that the prospects for successful separatism could 
be vastly improved by the patronage of a neighbouring country. The breakdown of 
central institutions also provides an opportunity for separation. Finally, in certain 
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cases the separatist aspirations of peripheral areas can be achieved simply by not 
obeying the central authority, but without overt secession. The central government's 
attempts at coercion are often rendered difficult by terrain and distance (Anderson et 
al. 1967:71-74). 
By definition, separatism is also a species of nationalism,6 for it seeks to 
enhance ethnic autonomy and in some cases to gain political independence and 
self-determination. Ethnic nationalism often arises in communities with political 
grievances or discontent resulting from the dominance of ethnic minorities on the 
periphery by the core group as in the cases of the Moros in Mindanao and the Malays 
in Patani. If left unresolved, such grievances are likely to precipitate social 
disturbances and separatist movements. Local ruling elites resent their loss of status 
and the correspondingly increased prestige of officials of the central government. 
Ordinary people resent outside influence on their accustomed way of life and fear that 
the new ruling groups will disturb existing local interests. Thus, they rally behind 
their traditional leaders in movements of resistance and opposition to foreign 
authority. If territory coincides with well-defined boundaries of communal language, 
religion, or some other ascriptive characteristics, the tendency may well be towards 
secession or civil war, threatening the very existence of the state (Oberschall 
1973:44-45). 
Among other factors religion has often played a pivotal role as the 
revolutionary vehicle for separatist movements (for a discussion of the impact of 
religion-- on politics, -see- Lenski--1961). In· particular;- Islam has -been- -an --important 
aspect of many liberation movements including the Moro and the Malay separatist 
struggles. As Louis Gerdet observed, 'the nationalist movements among Muslims are 
essentially Islamic reactions -against alien-domination' (quoted in Aruri 1977:268). In 
6Nationalism can be defined as 'an ideological movement for the attainment and main-
tenance of autonomy, cohesion and individuality for a social group deemed by some of its 
members to constitute an actual or potential nation' (Smith 1976:1). It is both an ideology and 
a movement that aspires to nationhood for the chosen entity (see Smith 1979, 1982; Kautsky 
1971). 
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some instances, Islam has become the fundamental ingredient of the struggles; in 
others, Islamic concepts and symbols are integrated into nationalist dogma to provide 
movements with the necessary religious colouration to make them appealing to a 
wider population. In most cases, Islam and nationalism reinforce each other in their 
rejection of alien rule. 
Islam and Nationalism 
Theories of social movement acknowledge that the emergence of an active 
movement is contingent on the simultaneous existence of several conditions. One 
such condition is a mobilizing ideology, that is, 'an interconnected set of ideas and 
beliefs that provide both a call to and a guide for action by defining what is wrong, 
attributing blame and responsibility, and addressing the ... question of "What is to be 
done?"' (Snow and Marshall 1984:138). The significance of a mobilizing ideology in 
relation to collective action has long been recognized. As Rude (1964:74-75) observed 
with respect to the French Revolution, 'some unifying body of ideas, a common 
vocabulary of hope and protest' was required to tie together the discontents and 
aspirations of the people. In the Baltic states, for example, Robert Miller (1986:57; 
Misiunas and Taagerpera 1983) has noted that 'the most visible sign of revival was 
the burgeoning of the dissident movement--in some cases primarily religious in 
motivation, but in all cases centering on demands for national self-expression and 
resistance to russification'. 
In developing nations, religion is often employed as both the mobilizing ideology 
and the organizational basis for collective action, particularly in response to foreign 
intrusion and cukuraf d.islocaiion. That religion can serve as a vehicle to mobilize the 
masses for revolutionary and nationalist movements is almost self-evident. Abner 
Cohen (1969:210) wrote: 
Religion provides an ideal 'blueprint' for the development of an informal 
political organization. It mobilizes many of the most powerful emotions 
which are associated with the basic problems of human existence and gives 
legitimacy and stability to political arrangements by representing these as 
parts of the system of the universe .... Religion also provides frequent and 
regular meetings in congregations, where in the course of ritual activities, a 
great deal of informal interaction takes place, information is communicated, 
and general problems are formulated and discussed. The system of myths 
and symbols which religion provides is capable of being continuously 
interpreted and re-interpreted in order to accomodate it to changing 
economic, political and other social circumstances. 
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In Southeast Asia, for instance, religion played a dominant role in campaigns against 
the intrusion of different foreign powers. Religious-oriented nationalists and 
xenophobists fought to defend the old order and the religious values and institutions 
it supported. The histories of Indonesia, Burma and Malaysia illustrate this well (see 
von der Mehden 1968; Geertz 1960; Sjamsuddin 1984; Nagata 1984; Federspiel 1985). 
As von der Mehden (1968:147) observed: 
Nationalist leaders in search of an issue with both universal and emotional 
appeal could find none better than religion. Political capital could be gained 
by using religious personnel, incorporating religious ideas into the political 
platform, identifying the party or politician with religion, and capitalizing 
upon minor and major insults to religion. The nationalists had no monopoly 
on efforts to employ religion as a tool; it was used also by such diverse 
groups as colonial administrators and Communist propagandists. 
In Marxist liturature, on the other hand, religion is viewed primarily as a means of 
social control and a source of stability; its mobilizing function is, therefore, 
underplayed (Snow and Marshall 1984:139; see Olcott 1982; cf. Wuthnow 1980). 
In the Muslim world, Islam, as a political ideology, is used for purposes of mass 
mobilization to achieve varying and sometimes very diverse objectives (Ayoob 
1981:5). Through its rituals and institutions Islam mobilizes people for collective 
action. The mosques, for instance, not only provide a comparatively safe place for 
people to assemble, but they are one of the few places where grievances and 
revolutionary ideas can be expressed and discussed. Rituals, such as the Friday 
prayers at the mosques; serve as- an important means of mobilizing the ma.sses. -
Furthermore, the imam (prayer leaders) and other religious functionaries provide 'the 
symbols of integrity and. selflessness that contrasted sharply with the corruption and 
hedonism associated with the centers of temporal power' (New York Times Magazine, 
11 March 1979); the 80,000 mosques in Iran undoubtedly piB.yecl a-decisive role in 
mobilization for the Islamic revolution of the February 1979. 
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A review of Muslim history indicates that Islam has often functioned as a 
mobilizing and radicalizing force in the face of alien domination. For example, Islam 
made it possib!e to mobilize millions of disparate Muslims in Indonesia under an 
' 
organization called Sarekat Islam. Founded in 1929, Sarekat Islam grew and became 
the recognized spokesorganization for Indonesian nationalism (von der Mehden 1968). 
In Algeria, Algerian nationalists utilized religious symbols to mobilize and legitimize 
their war of liberation against the French (Fanon 1965). In Egypt, Nasser was aware 
that the Egyptian people could be best mobilized by associating nationalism with 
Islam. He referred to the Egyptian armed forces as the 'Army of God' and to their 
confrontations as 'battles of purification' (Haddad 1980; Lewy 1974). Even the Soviet 
system, which appeared almost immune to the impact of ethnicity, has been 
challenged by a rising Muslim ethnic self-assertion ( Bennigsen and Lemercier-
Quelguejay 1967; Bennigsen and Broxup 1979; Lapidus 1984; Burg 1984; Wimbush 
1985). Another well-known example of the use of Islam as a mobilizing force for a 
revolutionary movement was the Mahdist rebellion in Sudan in the late 19th century. 
It was led by a man who claimed to be the Mahdi (savior prophesied in Muslim 
tradition) and inspired and legitimized by a concept of jihad (holy war) (see Siddiqui 
1982; Esposito 1980).7 The movement involved the Mahdists' opposition to British 
colonial rule. It succeeded in creating the Mahdist state which, however, was 
ultimately crushed by the British at the turn of the century. Rejecting the British and 
their way of life, the Mahdist adherents were urged to 'put aside everything that has 
the slightest resemblance to the manners of the ... infidels-dress, drum and bugles' 
(quoted in Snow and Marshall 1984:139). 
Muslim revolutionary movements of today, such as those of the-Moros .. in 
Mindanao and the Malays in Patani, have striking similarities with the movements 
7The term fihad (commonly translated as 'holy war') means 'exertion'. Its juridical-
theological meaning is exertion of one's power in Allah and making His word supreme over this 
world. There are four different ways in which a Muslim may fulfull his fihad duty: by his 
heart; his tonque; his hand; and by the sword. It is the fourth meaning that inspires armed 
fighting or war (Khadduri 1964:168-169). 
21 
mentioned above. They are inspired and legitimated in religious terms, and their 
basic conflict seems to have been cultural rather than economic. As Snow and 
Marshall (1984:134) have argued, 'if we examine the rhetoric of revolt, it appears that 
' 
what is at issue, at least in the mind of the dissidents, is not so much one economic 
system versus another, but one culture or way of life versus another'. The conflict of 
culture was also reflected in Khomeini's words when he remarked, 'I will devote the 
remaining one or two years of my life to reshaping Iran in the image of the 
Muhammed .... What the nation wants is an Islamic republic, not a democratic 
republic, not a democratic Islamic republic. Just an Islamic republic ... '(Time, 12 
March 1979; see Khomeini 1981; Algar 1983). Given the fact that Islam does not 
clearly separate religion and politics (Jansen 1979; Laffin 1979), it is only natural 
that Islam, as 'a total and unified way of life', plays its role in all community 
activities, including revolutionary activity. 
What does Islam teach Muslims with respect to revolutionary activity? Islam is 
a religion as well as a socio-political order--deen wa dawla. Ever since the 
establishment of the first Muslim _community in Madina, Islam has always motivated 
Muslims to engage in political struggles, liberation movements, and wars. Its 
primary concern is that Muslims must strive for the betterment of life by dealing 
practically and comprehensively with it in all its essential aspects. Muslims are urged 
to strive, particularly when they are in an under-priviledged position. Those who are 
fighting for freedom or self-determination are regarded as striving in the cause of 
Islam. To borrow Bowles' words, the cause of freedom is the cause of God. 
Islam regards freedom and liberty as the fundamental right of every man. 
According to Khalifa Abdul Hakim (1974:220), th~ Preamble of the. American . 
Declaration of Independence essentially repeats the Islamic thesis. The Quran repeats 
the story of Pharaoh and Moses to emphasize that a great prophet is always a 
liberator. Whenever the weak and the helpless are persecuted, the honest and 
righteous must rise to restore social justice. There is no place in Islam for the 
dictatorship of any individual or group. 
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Additionally, Islam views some Western political ideas and codes of law as 
inconsistent with the sharia (Islamic law). Thus, a struggle is often called to 
preserve the glory of Islam by re-establishing a community based on the sharia. This 
~ . ' 
struggle is considered by Muslims as a dt,vine commandment that cannot be 
disobeyed (Cudsi and Dessouki 1981:5-11). As Khomeini (1981:126) declared, 'it is 
our duty to work toward the establishment of an Islamic government'. 
Another indirect, dimension of Islam in relation to revolutionary action is that 
it serves as a means of defining identity and linking the Muslim community with a 
larger Muslim world. For example, the Islamization of the Moros in Mindanao and of 
the Malays in Patani created a break with older cultures and brought an intellectual 
and rational impetus that set in motion the process of revolutionizing their world 
view 
(Al-Attas 1969:5). Islam supplanted many cultural practices such as eating and 
clothing habits · and ceremonial observances. One of the significant cultural 
phenomena directly effected by the influence of Islam in both regions was the use of 
the Jawi script, and liturgical Arabic entered their languages (cf. Vegar 1979). This 
led to the emergence of a new sense of ethnic identity in each-region that helped to 
distinguish the Moros and the Malays from the Filipinos and the Thais, respectively. 
Also, Islamization resulted in an ideological bond among the Muslims, creating 
a sense of community that transcended local and provincial loyalties. It established 
linkages with outside Muslim political communities that facilitated the Islamic 
struggles (Suhrke and Noble 1977:182). Jamaluddin Al-Afghani (1839-1897) 
characterized Islam as the greatest- bond which linked the Turk with the Arab, the 
Persian with the Indian; and ·the Egyptian with the Maghrebite in opposition to 
European intrusions (quoted in Aruri 1977:267). In this sense, the Moro and the 
Malay communities are part of the 200 million Muslims of the Malay race in 
Southeast Asia. Muslims of the two major Malay nations, Indonesia and Malaysia, 
have been concerned with the situation of their 'unredeemed brethren' under Filipino 
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and Thai rule (cf. Pitsuwan 1982:258-259). These Malays, at the same time, belong to 
the wider world of Islam. If Moros met Berbers at the Kaabah in Mecca, knowing 
nothing of each other's languages, incapable of communicating orally, they 
' 
nevertheless regarded each other as 'brother', because of the sacred Kaabah they 
shared. 
Finally, Islam has been a unifying force and, in the face of imperialistic 
expansion, has provided the spirit for revolutionary action. In Islam, there is 'a moral 
bond, a vital cultural identity that would help rejuvenate the patriotic zeal needed for 
nationalist struggle against the imperialists' (Bayat 1980:99). Aruri (1977:267) has 
also pointed out that Islam provides a basis upon which Muslims come together in an 
effort to create a viable political existence and to confront foreign rule. 
Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis looks at ethnic separatist politics among the Muslim minority 
populations in Mindanao, the Philippines and in Patani, Thailand. It addresses 
several questions. First, having regard to the alternative explanations offered for the 
persistence and resurgence of ethnic nationalism, how does one account for the 
survival of Moro and Malay identity over hundreds of years in the face of repeated 
attempts to integrate these ethnic groups into the larger political entities of the 
Philippines and Thailand? More specifically, what immediate factors triggered the 
recent emergence of armed separatist movements in the two areas? In seeking to 
answer these questions, the study explores the particular role of Islam in creating a 
sense of ummah (community) that distinguished Mulim from. non..,Muslim. 
communities, and in shaping and legitimating the separatist movements both within 
the Moro and Malay societies and in the context of the larger Islamic world 
community. The importance of the world Muslim community in s.t,i,staining the Patani 
and especially the Moro movements, and in shaping the nature of struggle, is 
scrutinized. 
Beyond these broader questions, the thesis examines the form which the 
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separatist struggles have taken over time and looks in detail at the structure, ideology 
and leadership of the separatist movements. It suggests that, unlike most 
revolutionary fronts, the ethnic separatist movements in the Philippines and Thailand 
' have been loosely structured, with a loosely-defined programme, and apparently 
vulnerable to factionalism, yet capable of coming together and mobilizing large 
numbers of people under the banner of Islam when their communities felt their way of 
life threatened. An account is also given of the responses of the Philippine and Thai 
governments to the separatist movements and it is argued that attempts to solve the 
problems of ethnic separatism through either socio-economic programmes or military 
action are doomed to failure. During the course of this study it will be clear that 
there are both similarities and differences between the Moro and Malay separatist 
movements. But the basic similarities are striking, and suggest parallels also with 
ethnic separatist movements elsewhere in the world. It is thus hoped that this study 
will throw some light on the general phenomenon of ethnic separatism, especially 
ethnic separatism among Muslim communities, and in so doing help to provide an 
understanding of the long-term prospects for separatist movements. 
The Fieldwork 
The data collected m this study were two-fold. First, a general survey of the 
existing studies on the Moro and the Malay struggles was conducted. Much of the 
data, particularly on the Moro case, were already collected by Dr. R.J. May, my 
chief supervisor. Other materials, especially information on the historical background 
of the Moros, were obtained from the libraries of the Australian National University 
(ANU) and the National Library in Canberra. This survey was carried-out during IIiy 
first ten months at the ANU. 
Secondly,_ fieldwork-was underta-ken··in: the-Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and 
Saudi Arabia.· From October 1984 to April 1985, the fieldwork was conducted in the 
Philippines. Data were collected through library research, interviews and participant 
observation. The library research was done mostly at the Peter Gowing Memorial 
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Research Centre, at the Dansalan College in the Islamic City of Marawi, Lanao del 
Sur. Some published materials were also collected from the following places: 
University Research Centre, Mindanao State University (MSU), the Islamic City of 
' 
Marawi; libraries of University of the Philippines and of Ateneo de Manila University, 
Manila; and relevant government offices. Many of the fronts' publications, 
documents, and other miscellaneous materials including reports, correspondence, 
pamphlets and other records were obtained by direct contact and communication 
with the leaders of the different fronts in the Philippines and abroad. 
Interviews were conducted with several categories of respondents. Leaders and 
members of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front (MILF), Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization (BMLO), and Moro 
Revolutionary Organization (MORO) were interviewed. Some of the respondents 
were heads of revolutionary committees in different provinces and commanders of 
armed guerrilla groups, camps and villages. They were local leaders who were 
operating the organizations and doing the actual fighting. Other leaders of the fronts 
were interviewed abroad. Salamat Hashim, chairman of the MILF, for instance, was 
interviewed in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Interviews were also conducted with leaders of 
Moro society, including the traditional aristocratic elite, religious elite and secular 
elite. Muslim government officials, including academics, military officers and 
politicians were also interviewed. Non-Muslims too were interviewed, particularly 
academics, government officials, community leaders, and leaders and members of the 
National Democratic Front (NDF) and the New People's Army (NPA). Most of the 
interviews took place in the provinces Of Lanao del-Sur;--La:riao del Norte; 
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, Zamboanga del Sur, Basilan and Sulu, where 
separatist fronts were active. Because this research involved underground political 
activities, a structured questionaire could not be employed; the identity of most of 
the respondents cannot be revealed. Interviews with members of the fronts were often 
conducted either in seclusion or in guerrilla camps. Questions asked in the interviews 
concerning the movements were usually indirect and required careful checking. 
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Data were also gathered by participant observation, mainly by visiting guerrilla 
camps and villages controlled or influenced by different fronts. For example, the 
following participant obsarvations were undertaken in Lanao del Sur: a seven-day 
' 
visit to two guerrilla camps and three villages controlled by the Pundato faction of 
the MNLF; a three-day stay with a group of guerrilla fighters headed by Commander 
Narrah (a non-partisan guerrilla leader); and a two-day observation in a village 
dominated by the MILF. In Lanao del Norte, a two-day visit was made to a village 
and a guerrilla camp operated by the Misuari group of the MNLF. A day each was 
spent in the MILF's Camp Abu Bakar (the front's internal headquarters) in Sultan 
Kudarat and Camp Omar in Maguindanao. A week long tour to Sulu was made to 
observe several villages and a guerrilla camp commanded by the Misuari faction of 
the MNLF. During these participant observations, interviews and group discussions 
were held with leaders and members of the respective separatist organizations. 
From April to July 1985, fieldwork was conducted in the four Muslim provinces 
of Patani, Yala, Narathiwat and Satun in southern Thailand and in the states of 
Kelantan, Trengganu, Perlis and Kedah in northern Malaysia (Malaysia was included 
because it has long been a sanctuary and a base of operation for different Muslim 
separatist fronts). Similar procedures of data collection were used. My fieldwork in 
Thailand benefited greatly from my previous experience; I had conducted research in 
1980-82 for a M.A. thesis. Thai publications and documents, especially those 
concerning Thai government policies towards the Muslims, were obtained largely 
from the following offices: John F. Kennedy Library, Prince of Songkla University, 
Patani; -Centre_ for Administration oL the_ Southern Border Provinces; Education 
Region_ 2, Ministry of Education; Provincial Council for Islamic Affairs; and other 
government provincial offices. Many of the fronts' publications, documents and 
pamphlets were collected from-leaders and members of different fronts~ __ 
During this three-month period, interviews were conducted with leaders and 
members of Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (BNPP) or National Liberation 
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Front of Patani, Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) or National Revolutionary Front, 
Pertubohan Perpaduan Pembebasan Patani or Patani United Liberation 
Organization (PULO), and Barisan Bersatu Mujahideen Patani (BBMP) or United 
. 
Front of Patani Fighters. The interviews took place in both Thailand and Malaysia. 
An interview in Kuala Lumpur with both Ustaz Badri Hamdan (chairman of the 
BNPP) and Ustaz Karim Hasan (then chairman of the BRN) was unique, and 
suggests that the cleavages between the two fronts are not as serious as some might 
think. Another group of subjects interviewed comprised Muslim leaders in Patani 
society, including traditional aristocratic, religious, and secular-educated elites, and 
government officials, such as Thai administrators, school teachers and other civil 
servants. Most of the interviews in Thailand were concentrated in the provinces of 
Patani, Yala, and Narathiwat where the separatists were active. In the four northern 
Malaysian states mentioned, interviews focused mainly on groups of Patani Muslim 
residents and some Malaysian sympathizers. 
With respect to participant observation, several remote villages in the Patani 
region, particuTarly_ _t_hose under the influence of--the movements, were visited. The 
visits lasted several days each. A week was spent in the headquarters of the BNPP in 
Malaysia to observe how the front operates at its highest level. Observations from 
these visits were later contrasted with findings from interviews and readings. 
A month of field research was conducted in Saudi Arabia during April and May 
1986. This research also benefited from my previous visit to Suadi Arabia in 1980. 
Interviews were carried out in Mecca, Madina,_Jeddah and Taif, where the Moro and 
the Malay separatists reside. However, much of the time was spent in Mecca and 
Jeddah where the offices and headquarters of different fronts were located. Interviews 
were also conducted with several officials of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC) and of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) in Jeddah. Several 
important questions concerning the movements were asked of Dr. Abdullah Omar 
Naseef, secretary-general of the Muslim World League in Mecca. These Muslim 
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institutions play an important role in the Muslim minority struggles. The field trip to 
Saudi Arabia was sponsored mainly by the Muslim World League and my research 
was assisted by leaders of the BNPP in Mecca. 
A comment about the languages used in this fieldwork should be made. In the 
Philippines, English was used. Most of the Muslims and non-Muslims involved in the 
research were able to communicate in English. Publications and documents obtained 
were largely in English. In Thailand, the languages employed for interviews and 
discussions were Thai and the Patani dialect of Malay. Since I am a native of the area 
and my early years of schooling were in Patani, I am fluent in both languages. 
Publications collected in Thailand were in Thai, except those of the fronts which were 
in Malay (both Rumi and Jawi). Bahasa Malaysia, in which I am also fluent, was 
used to conduct the research in Malaysia. Publications, documents, and pamphlets 
obtained from different fronts were in Malay, English and Arabic. Malay and English 
languages were employed to communicate with the Moro and the Malay separatists in 
Saudi Arabia. English was used in conducting interviews with Arab officials, for I am 
not fluent in Arabic.: Publications and documents-gathered-in-Saudi Arabia were in-
Arabic, English and Malay. 
Since the research involved underground movements, the initial contacts with 
various fronts in the field, particularly in the Philippines, were difficult, even though 
contacts with certain leaders of the fronts were made in advance. Another difficulty 
was that some guerrilla camps and villages controlled by the fronts, both in 
Mindanao and in Patani, were located in remote and secluded areas; it required much 
effort to reach them. 
In this connection, it should be mentioned that in the course _of the fielciw()rk 
certain differences became apparent between what leaders and members of the fronts 
believed of themselves and of others and what the data suggested. In the case of the 
Philippines, for instance, the fronts believed that the government census deflated by 
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at least half the actual number of the Moro population. The data, however, suggested 
that the government figure was closer to the mark. Also, the fronts viewed the 
cleavages within the struggle largely as ideological differences, rather than 
ethno-cultural divisions; again the evidence pointed to the latter cause more than to 
the former. In. the case of Thailand, the separatists were convinced that most of the 
Malay-Muslims in the Patani region supported their cause, while the data illustrated 
that the majority of the Muslim villagers had lost their faith in them. The contrast 
between the data and the perceptions of the fronts did not make our analysis easy. 
Finally, it is important to note that this study was conducted before the 
displacement of the Marcos regime by the Aquino government in February 1986. The 
thesis thus does not attempt to analyse the situation of the Moro struggle beyond the 
Marcos era (for a discussion of the crisis leading to the displacement of the Marcos 
regime, see May and Nemenzo 1985; Bresnan 1986; Noble 1987). 
Structure of the Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 2 describes 
the historical, economic and social background of the Moro and the Malay 
communities. It discusses how these two distinct ethnic communities evolved and 
were subjected to the imperialistic expansion of foreign powers, and it examines the 
socio-economic conditions of the communities as minorities under the domination of 
Filipino-Christian and Thai-Buddhist majorities. The chapter also contains a 
preliminary discussion of the role of Islam in defining the Moro and Malay identities, 
and·of the conditions that triggered the contemporary arm~d separatist ~o~el'.Tl.e~t~.· 
Chapter 3 investigates the history of the Moro and the Malay resistance 
movements in the 20th century. It describes the early forms of resistance, ma_nifested 
in both politic(l,l and religious antagonisms .. The c4apte_r _illustrates thaLwhile the __ 
governments at the centre pursued their policies of integration, resistance activities 
persisted and grew, resulting in the emergence of full-fledged organized separatist 
fronts in the respective countries. 
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Chapter 4 looks in more detail at the characteristics of the separatist 
movements. It examines the organizational aspects of the struggles, including 
structure, ideology and strategy, and analyses the role of Islam as a source of 
inspiration and legitimacy to the movements. 
Chapter 5 discusses leadership in the Moro and the Malay societies and 
attempts to define not only the dominant leadership groups but also the sources of 
leadership in the struggles. It describes how Islam acted as a mobilizing and unifying 
force in the Muslim societies as well as in their separatist organizations. The chapter 
indicates that certain leadership groups are regarded as important forces for 
sustaining and perpetuating revolutionary action. 
Chapter 6 examines the external dimensions of and government responses to the 
separatist conflict. It discusses, on the one hand, the form and the extent of 
involvement of outside Muslim communities and organizations and, on the other 
hand, the role of Islam in establishing the linkages with the wider Muslim world that 
facilitated and shaped the struggles in both regions. Also, the chapter looks at 
government policies and actions in response to the movements; it illustrates the 
successes and the failures of policies to combat the separatist problem. 
Chapter 7 summarises the general and specific findings about the movements. 
It seeks to account for the persistence of separatist activities and to explain certain 
characteristics of the Muslim separatist phenomenon. These findings are compared 
and--contrasted for. the Moros in. the Philippines and the Malays. in Thailand. This 
concluding chapter also comments on what the movements have and have not 
achieved and contemplates the future of Muslim separatism in general. 
CHAPTER2 
MORO AND MALAY SOCIETIES: HISTORICAL, 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL BACKGROUNDS 
Mindanao and Patani Scenes 
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The incorporation of the Moros1 of Mindanao and the Malays2 of Patani into 
the Philippine and Thai states, respectively, was the end result of centuries of 
struggle. It was accidents of political history which placed the hitherto autonomous 
Muslim communities under alien rules. 
The basic concern of the Muslims, ever since they were conquered, has been to 
ensure their survival as a distinct Muslim u.mmah (community), a community 
committed to its conception of the ideals of Islam. As Gowing (1975:28) has pointed 
out: 
The Muslim minorities in the Philippines and Thailand .... are caught in 
the dilemma of having to reconcile the demands of their rather traditionalist 
conception of faithfulness to Islam with the demands of citizenship in 
modern states in which non-Muslims predominate. 
However, the ever-tightening control that the central governments in Manila and 
Bangkok have been exerting over the areas has made the Muslim efforts to regain 
their autonomous status more difficult, if not impossible, to attain. In fact, many 
1The term 'Moros' in this dissertation refers to Muslims of various cultural-linguistic groups 
in the Mindanao-Sulu region of the southern Philippines. It is derived from the ancient Mauri 
or Mauretania and was sometimes used to denote the Muslim conquerors of Spain. Among 
some Spaniards, in the absence of a more accurate term, t.!le term was loosely used to refer to 
any Muslim. The Moros generally referred to themselves as 'Muslims'. 
2The term 'Malays' applies to Patani Muslims of southern Thailand who are Malays, while 
the term 'Thai-Muslims' means non-Malay Muslims or Muslims who consider themselves as 
Thais. The Muslims in Thailand are divided into two categories: the Malays and the non-
Malays. The Malays form the majority, while the Thais, Pakistanis, Indians, Chinese and 
others constitute roughly 20 per cent of the Muslim population. 
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Muslims feel that the governments have gradually threatened their survival as a 
distinct Muslim community. This, together with other factors, has contributed to 
ethnic tension between Muslims and non,.Muslims which intermittently has erupted in 
local uprisings. The tension also has its roots in the Moro and Malay histories and in 
socio-economic and cultural characteristics that serve to perpetuate a sense of 
separate identity from the mainstream of the Filipino and Thai populations. 
Geographical proximity, cultural affinities and seasonal migration of labourers have 
helped to keep alive a strong identification with neighbouring Muslims of Malaysia 
and Indonesia. Moreover, they all belong to the same Shafiite sect of Sunni Islam, 
the prevalent sect of Southeast Asian Muslims. 
An examination of some of these distinct characteristics of Muslims in 
Mindanao and Patani might therefore provide insights into the present Muslim 
separatist problems. 
Mindanao: History, Economy and Society 
The History 
Mindanao is a variant form of the name Maguindanao, which connotes 
'inundation by river, lake and sea'. The region comprises the principal island of 
Mindanao and a chain of some 369 smaller islands of the Sulu Archipelago. Its area is 
about 37,225 square miles, about 32.6 per cent of the total land territory of the 
Philippines, and it contains 22 of the nation's 73 provinces. 
The Islamized groups of the Indonesian-Malay race (Hooton 1947:639-642) who 
are popularly known as Moros were once the majority inhabitants of the Mindanao 
region. However, as a result of the colonization of Mindanao, the socio-demographic 
status of the Moros has today changed from majority to minority. Table 2.1 
illust!ates the estimated size of the present-day Bangsa Moro in Mindanao. 
The thirteen cultural-linguistic groups of Muslims are concentrated in western 
and southern Mindanao island, the Sulu Archipelgo and coastal areas of southern 
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Table 2-1: Bangsa Moro Cultural-Linguistic Groups in Mindanao 
Group Population 
size(l980) 
Percentage 
of Kindanao 
population 
estimated size 
by Moro respon-
dents {1982) 
Maranao {Malanao) 742,962 6.81 986,197 
Maguindanao 644,548 5.91 1,328,908 
Tausug (Joloanos) 502,918 4.61 1,527,891 
Samal {Sama) 244,160 2.24 656,827 
Yakan 196,000 1.80 124,039 
Sangil {Sangir) 77,000 0. 71 79,595 
Badjao {Samal Laut) 28,536 0.26 22,932 
Kolibugan {Kalibugan) 15,417 0.14 23,954 
Jama Mapun {samal Cagayan) 14,347 0.13 94,305 
Ilanun {Iranun) 12,542 0.12 436,932 
Palawanon {Palawani or 10,500 0.10 10,813 
Pinalawan) 
Kalagan 7~902 0.07 8,907 
Molbog {Melebuganun) 7,500 0.06 9,658 
Bangsa Moro population 2,504,332 22.96 5,310,958 
Source: {National Economic and Development Authority 1980a; 
Abbahil 1983). 
Palawan. Only five (Sulu, Tawi-tawi, Lanae del Sur, Maguindanao and Basilan) of 
the twenty-two provinces have a Muslim majority. In order to appreciate these 
changes, it is necessary to discuss, in broad outline, the history of the Moro region. 
Although most literature on pre-Islamic Mindanao, both Muslim and 
non-Muslim, is ambiguous, the Moros place great importance on the fact that their 
traditional literature, tarsi/as, attests to their having established rights of domain in 
the Mindanao region far back in the pre-Islamic era. Before the coming of Islam, for 
example, Jolo and Cotabato had already become important trading centres. More 
importantly, the Muslims consider themselves as being entirely separate in origin 
35 
from the Christianized Filipinos (Moore 1981:36-40), despite the fact that they are of 
the same race. 
Accounts of the spread of Islam in Mindanao seem no less speculative than 
those from the pre-Islamic period. Nevertheless, it is evident that Islam came to the 
Philippine Archipelago well before the arrival in 1542 of Villalobos and his 
reconnoitring expedition force, who named the islands the Philippines in honour of 
the Emperor Charles V's son Philip, the heir to the Spanish throne (Hall 1981:272). 
Arab merchants and later Muslim preachers who had settled along the trade routes 
between the Red Sea and China were responsible for the spread of Islam in Southeast 
Asia. It is likely that commercial relations between the Muslim empire and the Malay 
world, including the Philippine islands, were established during the expansion of 
Islam from the eighth through the tenth century. 
Chinese sources dating from the Yuan Dynasty (1280-1368) record trade 
activities between China and Sulu. Jolo was a commercial centre to which Arab, 
Thai, Indonesian, and Indian traders also came. It is suggested that Arab traders had 
established their settlements in the Mindanao region at the end of the thirteenth 
century (Majul 1973:63-64). By 1450, a Muslim sultanate had been founded among 
the Tausugs at Buansa (Jolo) by a Mecca-born Arab trader, Syed Abu Bakr (Saleeby 
1913:10-11). Under the direction of Sultan Abu Bakr, the study of Islam was begun, 
political institutions were shaped along Islamic lines, and preachers were sent out 
from Buansa to convert the people of the surrounding areas. At its height, the 
influence of the Sulu Sultanate extended from Basilan and the Sulu Archipelago to 
Palawan, the coast of-southern Zamboanga and Borneo (May 1981:213). 
Fifty years later, the Maguindanao Sultanate was established around the mouth 
of t_h_e Pulangi River on Mindanao island. Sharif Muhammad Kabungsuwan, a 
Muslim preacher of Arab-Malay parentage from Johore, is credited with its 
foundation. From there Islam spread along the coast to the Gulf of Davao and inland 
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to Lake Lanao and Bukidnon. Though no specific date is known for the Islamization 
of the people of Lake Lanao, the Maranao tarsi/as trace their Islamic legitimation as 
well as royal lineage back to the same Sharif Kabungsuwan. In essence, the Moroland 
of the mid-sixteenth century was in the process of becoming part of the wider Muslim 
world of Southeast Asia. Commercial relations and political alliances linked the Moro 
sultanates of the Mindanao-Sulu region with other neighbouring Muslim states. 
The Islamization of Mindanao and Sulu resulted in an ideological bond among 
different groups of people in the region which led to the emergence of a new sense of 
ethnic identity that distinguished Muslim from non-Muslim populations. Islam also 
became a unifying force and, in the face of colonial domination, provided the basis for 
revolutionary action (Al-Attas 1969:8; cf. Majul 1974:6). It was this underlying 
ideology of resistance that conceived a 'holy war' (jihad) against Spanish coloniali~ts 
when they arrived in the Philippine islands with their sword and cross in 1565. 
The objectives of the Spanish colonization of the Philippines were twofold: to 
increase the territorial domains of the Crown and to Christianize the local 
population. These ·objectives:brought the Spaniards into conflict with the Muslims _ 
who had established political and commercial dominance and were spreading Islam in 
Mindanao. Moreover, the bitter experience of the long Iberian crusade (ca. 711-1492 
A.D.) against the Moors led the Spanish to regard the Muslims of this region, whom 
they called 'Moros', as enemies. In the central and northern parts of the Philippine 
islands Islam had had very little impact upon the indigenous inhabitants who were 
mostly animists and nature worshippers (Hall 1981:272-273), and the-Spaniards· found 
it relatively easy to convert them to Christianity. The Christianized natives were 
called 'Indios'. 
In pursuing tlieir goals, -Spanish forces dislodged Muslim communities in 
Manila, Mindoro and the Visayas during the first decade and a half of their arrival. 
They also dispatched a series of military expeditions against the Moros in the 
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Mindan~Sulu region. Since Islam had already taken a firm hold in the Moro area, 
the Spanish imperialistic policy only served to strengthen Muslim resistance and to 
provoke raids of reprisal against the Spaniards. Consequently, the Spaniards and the 
Moros were in an almost continuous state of battle, raid and counter-raid for more 
than 300 years (Majul 1973). Despite a number of military successes, especially after 
the introduction of steam-powered gunboats in 1848, the Spanish forces were not able 
to win the so-called 'Moro Wars'. Thus Spain never actually achieved sovereignty 
over Moroland. Nevertheless, she did succeed in restraining the spread of Islam 
through the Philippine Archipelago. 
Three aspects of the Moro Wars proved to have enduring consequences. First, 
the Spanish deliberately fostered religious antagonism and a derogatory image of the 
Muslims in order to mobilize the Indios to fight wars against the Moros. This created 
a bitter enmity between the two groups, despite the many similarities in their 
socio-cultural heritage. By the end of the Spanish period, a dichotomy had developed 
which was regarded by both sides as inextricable. Indeed, the Moros were viewed by 
the Christian FiUpinos as a 'separate rasa (race), with all that term's ·connotations of 
elementality and primordiality' (quoted in Bentley 1982:62). Secondly, the earlier 
social relations between Moros and pagan tribes who later became 'Indios' were 
strained, though the Muslims had never managed to conquer them (Schlegel 1979a:2). 
Thirdly, beginning in the second quarter of the nineteenth century Spanish 
authorities had begun a strategy that entailed the large-scale relocation of Christian 
Filipinos from the overcrowded and poorer islands in the north to the 
sparsely-populated frontier of Mindanao in order to colonize it by 'proxy'. At the end 
of the Spanish period there had been substantial Christian migration to Moroland. 
Following the defeat of Spain in the Spanish-American war, the United States 
took over the Philippines as successor-to Spain under tlie Treaty-of Paris, signed in 
1898. Included in the Spanish cession was Moroland, even though much of its 
territory had never been incorporated into the Spanish colony. As will be argued in 
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more detail m chapter 3, the change of colonial master brought no major 
improvement m the Moro position. The American government, like the Spanish, 
adopted a policy aimed primarily at incorporating Mindanao into a wider Philippine 
state. The process of integrating the Moros and the Christians of the Philippines, 
however, was not seen by the Americans as a religious matter. The United States 
repeatedly presented its policy as one of greater tolerance of Moro religion and 
customs. It saw its major programmes toward the Moros as entirely secular: 
American laws and notions of justice were imposed; public schools and 
other services were created; land was surveyed and titled; and homesteaders 
were encouraged to migrate from overpopulated northern areas and settle on 
open land in Mindanao(Schlegel 1979b:99). 
From the Moro point of view, these integration programmes were a threat to 
the survival of the Muslim community, and they resisted them with the same tenacity 
and the same sense of religious obligation with which they had resisted the Spanish 
policies. It took. the American military authority in what became Moro Province 
(1903-1913) a whole decade of warfare to 'pacify' the Moros. The subsequent civilian 
administration of the renamed Department of Mindanao and Sulu introduced a 
'policy of attraction' under which reforms were implemented in the Moro region. 
The Commonwealth Government (1935-1946) saw Moroland as a land of 
promise and opportunity. It replaced the policy of attraction with one of political and 
economic integration aimed at integrating Moroland into a future independent 
Philippines. Many Moros were opposed to the policy and wanted no part of the 
Christian Filipino nation (Jubair 1984:65). Consequently, a new wave of 
anti-government activity erupted, and thousands of Muslims died resisting the 
incorporation of Mindanao into the Philippine Republic. Nontheless, when the 
Philippines was granted independence in 1946, Mindanao was included. American 
interests were see11 to be ~est ser:ve.d in an undivided tez:ritory, sacrificing Moro 
interests and aspirations to live in a separate sovereign country. 
As a consequence of decades of integration effort both during the American 
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colonial period and under the Philippine government, some Moros have been 
'integrated' into a larger Philippine national identity, while the great majority of 
them, particularly those in the rural areas, have no real sense of being part of the 
Filipino nation. While the Christian Filipinos look to the West and to Christian 
communities, Moro roots are in Islamic civilization whence they draw their values, 
laws and sense of history. These roots have grown deeper since the resurgence of 
Islam after the Second World War. Many new mosques and madaris (religious 
schools) were built in Moroland; hundreds of young Moros left Mindanao to study in 
the Middle East; Muslim preachers from Egypt and other Muslim countries increased 
in numbers; and Muslim societies such as Ansar Al-Islam, the Muslim Association of 
the Philippines and the Sulu Islamic Congress were organized. Meanwhile the process 
of expropriation and marginalization of the Muslim population reached 
unprecedented intensity, especially after President Marcos came to power. By the end 
of the 1960s, the hostility and distrust which for centuries had characterized relations 
between the ruling Christian Filipinos and the ruled Moros intensified. The resistance 
of the Moro people to these nefarious designs on their homeland had also achieved 
new momentum. This led to a full-fledged struggle for the separation of Mindanao in 
the 1970s. Another important factor behind the rising tension between the two groups 
was the economic exploitation of Mindanao. 
The Economy 
The colonization of Mindanao has contributed to a stea.dy deterioration in the 
ecorioinic conditions of the Moros: The long war with Spain resulted not only in the 
reduction of the Moro population but also in the disrupiiori of their ·economy. For 
example, Spanish attempts to disrupt trade between the Moro sultanates and the 
outside world undermined their relative prosperity. The situation further 
deteriorated during the American period as foreign interests sought to exploit the 
vast agricultural, mineral and forest resources of Mindanao. Resettlement projects 
and restructuring of land rights were introduced in the region as part of this design. 
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From 1912, agricultural 'colonies' (Christian settlements) were established in 
different parts of Moroland. The Moro and other indigenous peoples suffered from 
these arrangements, particularly through the enactment of laws pertaining to land 
acquisition in Mindanao. The Public Land Act of 1919, for instance, declared that all 
lands within Philippine sovereignty were public domain and that ownership was a 
state-granted privilege. This meant that all Moro ancestral landholdings, which had 
been passed on from generation to generation as pusaka (inherited property), were no 
longer valid. The government reserved to itself the power to issue titles to public 
land, possession of which became proof of ownership. Under this act, a Christian 
Filipino could apply for up to 24 hectares of land while a non-Christian was limited 
to only ten. Most Muslims, with the exception of some members of the Muslim elite, 
failed to secure a title to their ancestral lands. Whereas prior to 1912 the Moros 
owned most of the land in Mindanao and Sulu, in 1972 only 30 per cent had land in 
their name. In 1982, the percentage of Moro landowners had been reduced to 
seventeen (Jubair 1984:54-57). 
Some of the Christian_ migrants settled in the present-day provinces of Lanao 
del Sur, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and North Cotabato, displacing numerous 
Muslims in the process. This process intensified during the post-colonial era. By 1975 
there were at least 37 colonies of Christian settlers, comprising 50,247 families and 
involving 695,500 hectares of land (Silva 1979:46-47). In addition to these 
government-sponsored settlers, millions of Christians migrated on their own 
initiative. Through these resettlement programmes and land policies, the 
demographic composition of Moroland has changed so that Muslims have been 
reduced from majority to minority. Table 2.2 compares the size of the Moro and 
non-Moro populations in Mindanao between 1903 and 1980. 
Whereas migrati()n and related land Jaws _were seen by-the-Muslims as 'legalized 
land-grabbing', designed by the colonialists for the sole benefit of the Christian 
Filipinos, the American and the Philippine administrations saw them as serving 
Table 2-2: Estimated Size of Moro and Non-Moro 
Population in Mindanao 
Year Moro Per cent Non-Moro Per cent Mindanao 
population population population 
1903 250,000 76 77,741 24 327,741 
1913 324,816 63 193,882 37 518,698 
1918 358,968 50 364,687 50 723,655 
1939 755,189 34 1,489,232 66 2,244,421 
1948 933,101 32 2,010,223 68 2,943,324 
1960 1,321,060 23 4,364,967 77 5,686,027 
1970 1,669,708 21 6,294,224 79 7,963,932 
1975 1,798,911 20 7,348,084 80 9, 146,995 
1980 2,504,332 23 8,400,911 77 10,905,243 
Source: {National Economic and Development Authority 1980a; 
Gowing 1977, 1979; Abbahil 1983). 
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several purposes. First, they offered a solution to the emerging problems of the 
overpopulated northern islands. Secondly, it was argued that the Moros and other 
tribal groups in Mindanao would benefit from the example of the technologically 
advanced and more industrious Christian migrants. Thirdly, the exploitation of the 
natural resources of Mindanao would add to national wealth and to the profits of 
American investors. Fourthly, the colonies of Christians would tie Mindanao more 
closely to Manila, providing some counterweight to the Moro link with neighbouring 
Muslim nations. Finally, it was believed that through sheer submergence of the Moro 
population the problem of Moro dissidence would be solved (May 1981:21_6). 
Along with these migrants, American and, to a lesser extent, Japanese 
corporations penetrated Mindanao soon after free trade between the United States 
and the Philippines was . instituted. in. 1909. The ma.in industries which began to 
operate during the first few decades of the American occupation were pineapple, 
rubber and coconut processing. Other significant industries which emerged after the 
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Philippines gained its independence included logging, bananas, sugar, coffee, miriing 
and fishing. These industries then, as they still are now, were based on the needs of 
the advanced industrial countries. The production of goods for the export market 
became the major concern of the economy, and large export volumes were seen as a 
measure of development. This has been the pattern of the Mindanao economy. Table 
2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 show the size of cropland and export products in Mindanao. 
Table 2-3: Mindanao Cropland in 1977 (A) 
Export crop Hectares 
Coconut 1,403,896 
Sugar 58,516 
Rubber 49,392 
Pineapple 37,302 
Abaca 64,384 
Coffee· 60,594 
Bananas 27,458 
Fruits 10,843 
Others 39,244 
Total 1,751,629 
Source: (AFRIK Resource Centre 1980). 
Percentage 
of cropland 
40.3 
1.7 
1.4 
1.1 
1.9 
1. 7 
0.8 
0.3 
1.1 
50.3 
As table 2.3 and 2.5 indicate, fifty per cent of the cropland in Mindanao in 1977 
was taken up by export crops; about twenty-five per cent of the total export value in 
the Phiiippines came from Mindanao. The questions this raises are not whether 
Mindanao should produce for export, but rather who benefits from export earnings 
- - . . -
and are domestic resources being allocated so that the needs of the local population 
are being met. Mindanao Report issued in 1980 by the AFRIM Resource Centre in 
Davao City pointed out that Mindanao's economic development, which is being 
stimulated by international corporations, spreads its benefits in an uneven manner. It 
benefits a small number of individuals who comprise the elite. Its principal concern is 
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Table 2-4: Mindanao Cropland in 1977 (B) 
Food crop Hectares Percentage· 
of cropland 
Rice 747,274 21.4 
Corn 744,410 21.3 
Ba.na.nas (non-export) 117,529 3.4 
Root crops 80,686 2.3 
Vegetables 32,906 1.0 
Fruits 10,843 0.3 
Total 1,733,648 49.7 
Source: (AFRDl Resource Centre 1980). 
Table 2-5: Mindanao Export Products in 1977 
Product Value (US$) Percentage of Percentage of 
Mindanao export national export 
Coconut products 337,203,250 43.0 10.7 
Bananas and pineapple 144,680,000 18.6 4.6 
Wood products 143,190,500 18.4 4-.5 
Metallic Minerals 131,670,000 17.0 4.2 
Others 22,702,840 3.0 0.7 
Total 779,446,590 100.0 24.7 
Source: (AFRIM Resource Centre 1980). 
to generate a peripheral type of capitalist growth, which will be dependent on the 
advanced economies of the industrial nations for investment, technical assistance, and 
markets. In agriculture as in industry, the large, medium, and small businessmen 
depend in one way or another on linkages with foreign capital in pursuing their 
activities. Even companies which are one hundred per cent Filipino-owned rely on 
foreign loans to survive. The incentives being offered to attract such investments 
··-· ·-·-. ·-
include political stability, cheap wages, an emasculated labour force and generally 
lower costs of production. The overall effect of externally-imposed economic 
development has resulted in increased polarization between the previledged few and 
the disadvantaged masses (AFRIM Resource Centre 1980; see David 1977). 
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This pattern of economic development disrupted the Moro economic order, by 
replacing subsistence production with export-oriented production, and drove the 
Moros to the economic periphery. The shift from subsistence agriculture to industrial 
or agricultural wage employment should have been accompanied by an increase in the 
standard of living for the population in general. But it did not occur for the Moros. 
First, circumstances made it both unnecessary and unfeasible from the point of view 
of foreign corporations in Mindanao to use the Moro people as their primary labour 
pool. The influx of Christians from the north provided a labour force ample for the 
industries. The colonial entrepreneurs already had a long-standing relationship with 
the Christians of the north and thus preferred them to the Moros (Rocamora 
1981:245-246). Most plantation and company workers are Christians; in such 
ind.ustrial centers as Davao City, Iligan City and Cagayan de Oro the Moros make up 
only a very small proportion of the labour force. Secondly, since the industrial 
corporations in Mindanao are export-oriented, their products are not made for local 
consumption. Consequently, the industries are not concerned with the level of income 
of the local population. Table 2.6 compares Gross Regional Domestic Product 
(GRDP) and per capita income in the Muslim area (Regions IX and XII),3 Mindanao 
and the nation. 
Most Moros still adhere to traditional means of livelihood such as farming, 
fishing and small trade. Tenants and smallholders often fall prey to moneyholders 
who make cash advances at exorbitant interest rates. The prenda (mortgage) system 
of usury usually results in smallholders losing their lands to the usurer. Some Moros 
own land without the benefit of a title. Through government policies and laws, the 
Moros have been steadily dispossessed of their holdings. Most of the wealth in 
Moroland ·is in the possession not of the Muslims but of the Christian Filipinos and 
3The Moro population are concentrated in Wes tern Mindanao (Region IX) and Central 
Mindanao (Region XII) which consist of ten provinces. In 1977 five of these provinces had 
predominantly Muslim populations. Sulu and Lanao del Sur were 99 per cent Muslim; Tawi-
Tawi had 97 per cent; Maguindanao 86 per cent; and Basilan 67 per cent. Other provinces 
with large Muslim populations were Lanao del Norte with 36 per cent and North Cotabato 
with 17 per cent (AFRIM Resource Centre 1980:6). 
Table 2-6: Gross Regional Domestic Product 
and Per Capita Income 
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Average Muslim area Mindanao Philippines 
(Regions IX and XII) 
Peso Peso Peso 
Per capita income (1975) 799 803 1,308 (est.) 
Fa.mi1y income (1975) 5,343• 5,199 5,840 
Per capita GRDP (1977) 959 1,240 1,769 (est.) 
* The average family income which is slightly higher in the Muslim 
area (Regions IX and XII) may be attributed in part to the 
development of the logging and wood products industries, 
agricultural plantations, and the industrial growth of Iligan 
and Zamboanga Cities, most of which are non-Muslim undertakings. 
Source: (AFRIM Resource Centre 1980; National Economic and 
Development Authority 1979, 1980b, 1983a). 
foreign entrepreneurs. The influx of Christian settlers into the Muslim region in the 
last three decades has reduced Moro landholdings to areas below subsistence level in 
most communities {Alonto 1979:59). The Muslims are mostly rural dwellers in a 
subsistence economy. Moro traders find it difficult to compete with the more 
enterprizing businessmen from _Luzon and the Visayas. Moro fishermen have been 
threatened by fishing companies which engage in fishing activities in the Sulu Sea, the 
Moro Gulf and Basilan Strait. Foreign investment in the fishing industry has 
increased over the years, especially since the proclamation of the Fisheries Decree in 
1975 which allows foreigners to invest in fishing. Although there are Moros in the 
government sector, most government offices are dominated by Christians. This state 
of affairs is compounded by the low educational profile of the Muslims. In the field of 
modern education, the Moros are a generation behind the Christians {Tongson 
1973:20). This is mainly because of the lack of proper educational policies suited to 
the temperament and demands of the people. As Glahg (1969:81) wrote, 'how can we 
encourage the Moro children to appreciate school education, to love their Christian 
brothers when all that they read and learn in their books shamefully points to their 
ancestors and forefathers as pirates, bandits and cutthroats?' The Moros are 
perceived as 'good for nothing'; 'the only good Moro is a dead one'. No less than 
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250,000 Moros have already migrated to the Malaysian state of Sabah (Komite ng 
Sambayanang 1981:271), and more than 80 per cent of the male migrants have gone 
to seek employment (Hassan 1978:113) and to escape ftom violence at home. 
It should be noted, however, that the process of Moroland's administrative and 
structural integration into the Philippine state provided the opportunity for some 
Moro leaders, particularly the traditional elite, to retain their past prerogatives and 
position of dominance and became part of the national elite through national and 
local elections and appointments to high government positions. They allied 
themselves with Manila and were regarded by many separatists as 'collaborators' 
with an 'oppressive regime' and as part of the problem in Moroland (Mastura 
1980:112; Gowing 1979:57). 
In the view of many government officials, it was inevitable that Moroland 
would be at a disadvantage in certain aspects. While the Indios submitted to the 
colonial masters and were laying the foundations for economic growth, the Moros 
wered~vo_ting; th_ei~ ~e~?11rces to fighting against colonialism. Nevertheless, they 
stress that the government is trying hard to uplift the economic condition of the 
Moro community: at least 31 presidential measures have been passed, and millions of 
pesos have been allocated for development projects in Mindanao-Sulu (see chapter 6). 
The government's effort, however, has had limited success. Very little of what is 
given is of direct benefit to the Moros and some of the funds appropriated for projects 
in Moro areas, such as roads and schools, find their way into the pockets of dishonest 
local po~iticia_ns (Gowing 1979:185). Moreov~r,_ the unpreparedness of the Muslims for 
change, particularly the detachment of lands from the - traditional system of 
community and clan ownership, and the fear of displacement and domination by the 
non-Muslims, have caused them to resist Manila's efforts. Indeed, one commentator 
has been led _to conclude that the Moro community remains so economically stagnant 
.. - - - . . - ·-
that ' ... many believed that the Moro people were more developed during the Spanish 
days than at present' (Jubair 1984:65). 
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The Society 
Islam has been an important component in the 'chemistry' of Moro society. It 
'introduced many of its features to the Moro people of various cultural groups and 
developed them into a single society distinct from those non-Muslims in the 
Archipelago. Before the advent of Islam, for example, the Moros were divided among 
numerous timuways(headmen). Islam transformed these timuways into the 
datus(men of rank), and the powerful datus of large barangays(communities) 
developed into the sultans of Moro society. 
At the time of Spanish contact, Moro society consisted of three social classes: 
aristocrats, commoners or freemen, and slaves. Ideally, aristocrats were the 
descendents of Syed Abu Bakr and Sharif Kabungsuwan, the first sultans of Sulu and 
Maguindanao respectively. Aristocratic status was hereditary, though some gained 
status by their own personal skills and attributes. In this category sultans and datus 
were the two dominant ranking aristocrats. The lesser noble in the aristocratic class 
was called dumatu. Second -in social sfanding were the commoners who constituted 
the major portion of the Moro population. They were farmers, fishermen, sailors, 
artisans, etc. The indentured freeman or debt-bondsman ( ulipun) was considered the 
lowest rank in the Maguindanao system. Commoners were also followers ( sakops) of 
sultans and datus and owed their loyalty and service to them (Gowing 1979:52). In 
return, they received protection and shelter from their sultans and datus when 
needed. Moreover, commoners enjoyed a certain measure of social mobility. For 
instance, _a -successful nakuda -(leader of trading expedition) could obtain ·enough -- -
wealth and followers to improve his social status. The lowest class was the slaves 
(baniaga). They were mainly obtained by taking captives in wars or raids. Slaves 
were- regarded as the property -of their masters;' Ma.le slaves -normally worked in the. 
fields while females performed household tasks - and occasionally became the 
concubines of their masters. Since Islam does not encourage slavery, it was possible 
for slaves to earn their freedom by arrangement with their masters. Former slaves 
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and their descendents blended into general society and eventually became commoners 
(For a comprehensive discussion on Moro socio-political organization, see Stewart 
1977: 276-306; Beckett 1982; Warren 1982; Saber 1976). Thomas Kiefer 
' (1972a:23-30) has suggested that in the middle of the last century the population of 
the':Sulu Sultanate was approximately 400,000, of whom about one or two per cent 
were in the aristocracy; ten per cent were slaves; the rest of the people were 
commoners (tau way bangsa). 
Melvin Mednick (1957:43-46) characterized the Moro political structure as a 
pyramidally arranged hierarchy of authority. At the top of the hierarchy was the 
sultan or ra1a(ruler), the head of state from whom all authority was derived. In each 
political unit (district) there was a panglima (sultan's personal representative) 
serving as chief administrator. Assisting him in different administrative duties were 'a 
nakib who was in charge of military matters, a laksmanna who was the panglima's 
messenger, a perkasa who was his ai"d-de-camp, a b£ntala who was the district 
supervisor of priests, and so forth' (ibid.:44). The sultan also formed the rumah 
bechara (House of Discussion) comprising a group of po.werful aristocrats or datus. 
Members of the rumah bee hara 's council performed different duties and held various 
positions ranging from that of prime minister to that of inspector of weights and 
measures. 
Paralleling the political hierarchy was the structure of religious authority. At 
the top of the hierarchy was also the sultan. He thus functioned as the head of both 
religious and pol-iticaLauthorities;. Under· the' sultan was a qadi -(judge) ::who_ was his 
religious supervisor and the chief authority in matters of Islamic laws (sharia). Qadi 
was one of the most powerful authorities in the Moro society. Under certain 
circumstances,. for -example., a··qadi"· could override-decisions of the sultan (£b£d.). At 
district level, the pandita, a man well versed in the Quran and the Prophetic 
traditions, served as religious advisor to the panglima, the district chief. There were 
also religious functionaries who commanded considerable influence in the society. 
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They were the Imams (prayer leaders) of different community levels. The most 
influential imam was the one who was appointed to the sultan's mosque, and the 
least influential ones were those of the local village mosques. Each imam was 
assisted by a khatib (preacher) and bilal (prayer caller)~ The imam, khatib, and bilal 
are the principal personnel of the mosque. In the early years of Islam, a ruler, ho 
This practice was a ered under the Abb ids; Anbasa bin 
vernor of Egypt (85 -856 A.D.), was th last ruler to con 
among those 
ght at the same time old other religiou positions such as 
especially to conduct alat. The developm 
the imam. 
of bilal (pray r caller)4 was establi ed in the first ye r of Hijrah. 
crier used 
It should be reiterated that although the Moros constituted a single society and 
nationality, they comprised different ethno-cultural groups, as indicated in table 2.1. 
The Maranao, Maguindanao and Tausug were the major groups, constituting 
seventy-five per cent of the total Moro population. The development in social and 
political structure of the three was similar but not identical. The po3ition of 
panglima in the Sultanate of Sulu, for- instance; carried certain prerogatives and 
powers which differed somewhat from those exercised by the panglima in the 
Sultanate of Maguindanao (Gowing 1979:45). It is believed that the institution of the · 
sultanate and the formal offices under it --w-ere- more devefoped in Sulu than m 
Mindanao (Majul 1964:3}. Not all Moro groups had sultans and the number of 
4The office of bilal was named after Bilal bin Ribah, an Ethiopian black slave who became 
the first prayer caller or muazzin. 
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sultanates varied. For example, the Tausug had only one sultanate; the Maguindanao 
had three major sultanates; more than forty sultanates were identified among the 
Maranao, fifteen of which were considered preeminent {Saber 1974, 1976). The Moro 
' 
sultanates were also characterized by a kinship system which polarized loyaties and 
interest along blood lines. It caused rivalries and dissension. As discussed in chapter 
3, these loosely knit sultanates were not always united during their struggle against 
colonial powers. 
In contemporary society, Moros have managed to retain some of their 
traditional socio-political structure. The datuship, for instance, has remained a 
powerful institution and has been able to adapt itself to the political machinery of the 
modern Philippines (discussion of the contemporary Moro society with emphasis on 
leadership is provided in chapter 5). 
It is important to note that the foundation upon which Moro society was 
established is Islam. All laws with the exception of some traditional customs were 
essentially within the bounds of the sharia. And most authorities, from the sultan to 
village headman, were persons of religious inclination. Thus, Moro society was 
governed by Islamic and customary laws and religiously-inclined leaders. Because of 
this strong religious inclination, the Moros have been less ready to absorb and' adopt 
more modern ways of life, even after their inclusion into the Philippine nation. Many 
Moros regard the structure of the Filipino government, its codes of laws and political 
ideas, as inconsistent with the sharia. 
Patani: History, Economy and Society 
The History 
Although the Malay-Muslims comprise only about three per cent of Thailand's 
fifty million predominantly Buddhist population, they constitute a large majority in 
the four southern provinces of Patani, 5 Narathiwat, Yala and Satun, previously 
known as Patani Raya or Greater Patani. 
5
•Patani' is the Malay version; 'Pattani' is transliterated from the Thai spelling. In this 
thesis, 'Patani' is employed. 
--
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Patani was historically the ancient Malay kingdom of Langkasuka (Chinese: 
Lang-ya-hsiu). Founded sometime in the first century A.D., Langkasuka was 
considered one of the important commercial ports for Asian mariners, especially those 
' 
who sailed directly across the Gulf of Siam from the southern tip of Vietnam to the 
Malay peninsula (Teeuw and Wyatt 1970:1-2). When the major powers in the region, 
such as the Cambodian empire of Angkor, the Mon empire of Pagan, and the 
Srivijaya, intervened in the peninsula's affairs, the small states struggled to keep their 
independence, either maintaining a precarious existence or disappearing from sight. In 
the case of Langkasuka, the kingdom gradually disappeared and was replaced by the 
kingdom of Patani. 
The Hikayat Morong Mahawangsa (Kedah Annals) attributes Patani's 
foundation to people from Kedah, while Phongsawadan Muang Patani {Chronicles 
of Patani) gives credit to a ruler from an unidentified Kota Mahligai. In Sejarah 
Kerajaan Malayu Patani (History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani), Ibrahim 
Shukri suggests that a ruler of an inland city of Kota Mahligai developed a small 
coastal village into a bustling port at the expense of the former. Subseq!J.ently, Kota 
Mahligai was abandoned in favour of the new city, which was Patani. The date of 
this event is not certain. Tome Pires, a Portuguese who passed through Malacca in 
1511 wrote of Patani as though it had been in existence before 1370. On the other 
hand, the region still was identified by Chinese sailors as Langkasuka at the time of 
the voyage of Admiral Cheng-ho around the year 1403. 
Patani has been held to be one of the cradles of Islam in Southeast Asia. The 
initial contact of Patani with Islam was undoubtedly a by-product of Arab trade with 
China. Arab and Indian merchants had settled in the commercial centres of Patani by 
the end of the twelfth century, intermarrying with the indigenous people and forming 
the nucleus of a Muslim community. More than three centuries after Islam had spread 
into the area, the court of Patani was converted to Islam. The kingdom of Patani, it 
is believed, was officially declared as an Islamic state in 1457 ( ibid.:75; Shukri 
n.d.:34). 
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The adoption of Islam by the court of Patani was a result of several factors. For 
one, the king of Patani was cured of his illness by a Muslim preacher, Shiekh Said or 
Safi-uddin, who then converted him to Islam. Other likely motives were economic and 
' political. For example, Islam provided a means for claiming certain trading privileges 
with Gujarati, Arab, Persian, and Turkish traders who controlled much of Western 
commerce in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (Weekes 1978:253). Van Leur has 
suggested that the Malacca dynasty adopted Islam to gain the patronage of the 
Muslim merchants (Majul 1962:375-376). He has also pointed out that some of the 
coastal chiefs and the aristocratic families utilized Islam as a political instrument to 
secure their independence and to bring about a confirmation of the legitimacy of the 
rulers interested in establishing their own kingdoms as they were in conflict with the 
central authority of Majapahit. Moreover, Islam was used as an instrument to bring 
about a confirmation of the legitimacy of the rulers interested in establishing their 
own kingdoms (ibid.:376-377). According to Syed Hussien Alatas, Van Leur failed to 
note that 'Islam has an "individuality of its own" and that, therefore, it served to 
satisfy some of the deep aspirations of the people'(ibid.:381). Thus, the adoption of 
Islam by the Patani courtiers might have also been because of aspirations by the 
Patani folk for new values and life styles which the new faith offered. 
The Muslim kingdom of Patani grew both in population and m prosperity. 
'Patani', writes Newbold, 'was once the largest and most populous of the Malay 
states on the peninsula' (1971:67). It was described as an important commercial 
centre for Asian as well as for European traders. The kingdom comprised two major 
Muslim dynasties: the Patani Dynasty (?-1688) ···and the Kelantan Dynasty · · 
{1688-1729). 
The outbreak of civil war in 1729 set Patani in chaos; Sultan Alung Yunus, the 
last ruler of the Kelantan Dynasty, was killed. The civil war dragged on for a long 
period, until an aristocrat from Dawai, Mayo, was able to unify Patani and establish 
himself as Sultan Muhammad. Sultan Muhammad ruled Patani until it fell under 
Thai control in 1786. 
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Ever since the establishment of Muslim dynasties the kingdom of Patani seems 
to have experienced alternate periods of independence and Thai control. At times 
when it was under Thai suzerainty, the sultans anci sultanas were obliged to send the 
. 
Flower of Gold to the Thai court as a tribute and a sign of loyalty. They were also 
required to provide military aid when requested by the Thai king. At times when the 
kingdom of Patani was strong, it was felt that subservient status as a vassal state of 
the Thai kingdom was unreasonable and intolerable. Consequently, revolts against 
the Thais to restore Patani's sovereignty occurred from time to time. The earliest 
happened between 1630 and 1633 during the Siamese reign of King Prasat Thong. 
Another bid for freedom, before surrendering to Thai rule in 1786, came with the 
collapse of Ayuthaya following the Burmese conquest in 1767 (Haemindra 1976:199). 
After Patani was conquered, a series of rebellions erupted between 1789 and 1791 
after which the ruler of Patani, Tengku Lamidin, was captured. Dato Pengkalan was 
appointed by Thai authority as Lamidin's successor, but in 1808 he also rebelled. 
Faced with recurring rebellions, Thailand decided to reduce Patani's strength 
by applying a policy of divide and rule. In 1816 the Patani region was divide<! __ into 
seven provinces: Patani, Nhongchik; Raman, Ra-ngae, Saiburi, Yala and Yaring. 
However, the policy of divide and rule did not promote political stability and failed to 
bring about effective control over revenue collection and taxation of the area. Most of 
the rajas found themselves dissatisfied and distressed under the increasing control of 
Bangkok. Encouraged by disruptions in Kedah, then also a vassal state of Siam,6 the 
indigenous Patani rulers revolted against Thailand in 1832. They were defeated; 
nevertheless, there was yet another abortive revolt in ·the region six years-later: -- -- - -- --
In time, however, the territorial division of Patani resulted in its weakening and 
becoming more dependent on Bangkok. - A reversal of the policy of sending Thai 
oificials to rule Patani- proved- to be effective in reducing· disorder -in -the region~ -
6Thailand was called Siam until 1939 and also from 1946 to 1949. In 1939 and again in 
1949 it was changed to Thailand, a name which carries a certain note of Thai-people 
nationalism and irredentism. 
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Thereafter, Bangkok was able to deal with the provinces on an individual basis and a 
peaceful atmosphere prevailed for several years. 
The peace was broken' when King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910) introduced the 
policy of administrative centralization known as the thesaphiban system, which 
aimed at exerting greater direct control from Bangkok. In 1901 Thailand regrouped 
the seven provinces of the Patani area into one administrative unit called 'Area of the 
Seven Provinces' (boriween chet huamuang) and placed it under the control of a Thai 
Area Commissioner (khaluang boriween) who was responsible directly to the Ministry 
of the Interior. Tribute was no longer required but the treasuries of the Malay 
provinces had to be handled by the Revenue Department as in other Thai provinces. 
By 1906 the area of the seven Malay Provinces was administratively reorganized into 
a 'cirle' ( monthon) called Monthon Patani. The Monthon Patani incorporated the 
seven provinces into four larger provinces: Patani, Bangnara, Saiburi and Yala.7 A 
district of Kedah was also incorporated into Thai territory and named Satun 
Province. Kedah, on the other hand, was ceded to England together with Perlis, 
Kelantan and Trengganu in -accordance with the Anglo-Siamese Treaty signed-- ~p. 
March 1909.8 
This administrative reorganization of the region ultimately forced the local 
Malay rajas and the indigenous ruling elites to acknowledge Thai authority. When 
Great Britain recognized Thai sovereignty over the area in 1909, the former kingdom 
of Patani was completely dominated by Thailand in the same way as other states in 
Asia, Africa and Latin America were colonized by the major powers in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. 
7Bangnara Province was officially renamed Narathiwat Province on 10 June 1942. Saiburi 
Province was dissolved and incorporated into Patani Province on 16 February 1931. 
8The present Malaysia-Thailand border was established by an Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 
1909 which resulted in the transfer of the Thai suzerainty over Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis, 
Trengganu, and the islands of Langkawi from Thailand to Great Britain. The British, in turn, 
renounced extraterritorial rights in Thailand and acknowledged Thai sovereignty over the 
Provinces of Patani, Narathiwat, Yala and Satun. 
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Because the Malay-Muslims differ from the Thai-Buddhists in many respects--
ethnically and culturally--and because they were forced to become citizens of a state 
with which they could not identify, they resented Thai rule. As efforts were made by 
the Thai government to assimilate them, resentment developed into political 
resistance and separatist movement with sporadic insurrections and a series of 
abortive revolts. 
The Economy 
In spite of its relatively small size, the Patani region is rich in natural resources. 
It consists of many fertile plains and valleys and fishing grounds, both along the 
coasts of the South China Sea in the east and the Andaman Sea in the west. The 
mineral deposits include tin, gold, wolfram, manganese and natural gas. Despite these 
natural resources, the economy of the Malay-Muslims is presently in a very 
unsatisfactory condition when compared to the rest of the nation. According to Ladd 
Thomas (1975:7-8) real income of the Muslim villagers has decreased precipitously 
since the mid 1950s. Table 2.7 shows the differences in average Gross Provincial 
Product (GPP) and per capita income among the Patani area, the Southern region 
and the nation. 
Average 
GPP (million US$) 
Per capita (US$) 
Table 2-7: Gross Provincial Product 
and Per Capita Income in 1980 
Patani region 
(4 provinces) 
152.28 
481-41 
Southern region 
(14 provinces) 
253.56 
616.96 
Nationwide 
(73 provinces) 
406.06 
619.78 
Source (Office of National Socio-Economic Development 
Commission, Thailand, 1980) 
The majority of the Muslims in the four provinces live in villages along the 
coasts, scattered through the alluvial rice lands, and, more sparsely, in the rugged 
57 
rubber-growing interior. Table 2.8 indicates the distribution of the region's 
population. 
Table 2-8: Population Data 
Province Area Population Ku slim Rural 
(sq. mile} (per cent) (per cent) 
Pa.tan! 812 467,621 77 91 
Na.rathiwat 1,799 469,735 78 87 
Ya.la. 1,821 291, 166 63 76 
Sa.tun 1,076 179,565 66 89 
Total 5,508 1,408,087 Average 71 86 
Source: (National Statistical Office 1982; Sia.mban 1985}. 
Most of the Malay-Muslims are self-employed. They earn their living through a 
combination of rice farming, fishing, rubber tapping, and working on their own 
smallholdings where they frequently plant rubber, coconut, and other tropical crops 
such as rambutan and durian. 
Rice cultivation had been one of the main occupations of the Malay village~s. 
They produced enough rice for their own family consumption. This situation is, 
however, no longer true. Growing population pressure on cultivable land has resulted 
in a steady decrease in size of average rural landholding (Thomas 1975:7-8; 
1982:157-158). In addition, rice farming in the Muslim provinces is almost entirely at 
the mercy of the climate. Irrigation systems remain inadequete, though they have 
been introduced by the government. The Malay farmers, therefore, do not produce 
enough rice for. local us'e. The majority ·of Muslim villagers purchase their daily rice 
requirements form the Chinese and Thai 'middlemen'. 
Rubber and coconut are two major plantation crops in the region. However, 
large rubber and coconut plantations are often owned by Chinese and Thais. 
Most Malays own small plantations and find it difficult to survive the 
low prices they receive from middlemen, the price fluctuations of the 
international market, and the competition of synthetic rubber. 
I 
I'. 
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Horeover, some Muslim rubber plantation owners have not been able to participate in a 
government rubber replanting programme designed to raise the level of production because of 'the 
lack of trust and communication between the government officials and the Malay people' (Pitsuwan 
1982:20). 
Fishing is another important occupation of the Muslims in the coastal provinces 
of Patani, Narathiwat and Satun. A considerable volume of fish from the area has 
been exported to Malaysia and neighbouring provinces each year. With the 
introduction of a large-scale fishing industry in the region, however, the Muslim 
villagers have been pushed out of the fishing occupation. While the Malay fishermen 
still use small fishing boats (perahu kolek and traditional means of fishing, the 
Chinese and Thais, who have more capital to invest, introduce into the provinces 
large commercial-type fishing vessels equiped with more modern technology that can 
drag huge nets behind them and sweep the waters of all fish. The Malay fishermen 
also depend on the Chinese businessmen to determine the price of their catch. 
These occupations of the· Malay-Muslims, furthermore, are seasonal in nature. 
For example, rubber tapping can be engaged in for only about six months in a year. 
In rice farming, the farmers actually work in their paddy fields for not more than 
three months; fishermen can go out to the sea for less than seven months. Hence, 
most Muslim villagers live at a subsistent level of existence and find themselves in a 
very difficult economic situation. Some respondents estimate that about 200,000 
Mus1irhs :of this ·region ·:presently seek temporary employment in Malaysia and 
Singapore. Some have left the provinces in pursuit of employment opportunities in 
Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries (Interview, several Muslim villagers, teachers 
and government officials in Narathiwat, May 1985). 
On the other hand, the Chinese, who constitute less than six per cent of the 
total population in the four provinces, own and operate most of the business concerns 
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(Thomas 1975:7). The Thais are mostly government officials, but some are also 
merchants and plantation owners in the area. The Thais and the Chinese own most 
of the tin mines and the large rubber and coconut plantations, while most of the 
' Malays are village fishermen, rubber smallholders and tappers, small-scale farmers, 
small shopkeepers, vendors and labourers. Very few have been admitted to the Thai 
civil service, and even fewer own and operate large-scale businesses or plantations 
(ibid.). 
In the last two decades the central government has recognized that increasing 
separatist activities as well as banditry in the Muslim area are closely related to the 
general deterioration of its economic condition. Several government programmes 
designed to improve the socio-economic "condition in the provinces have been 
initiated. Under some programmes, for example, rubber plantation owners are given 
incentives to replace the old rubber trees with a higher yielding variety. Livestock 
raising has been encouraged extensively. Roads, schools and other public utilities 
have been constructed (see chapter 6). An irrigation system as well as projects to 
control flooding have been started. In an effort to improve rural life, Mobile 
Development Units· under the - guldance ·of a Community Development Officer 
(patthanakorn) are sent out to the rural areas to help development work (Haemindra 
1977:103). All these programmes are aimed at enhancing the Muslim minority 
population's loyalty to and empathy towards the Thai government. 
However, certain programmes are viewed by the Malay-Muslims as having 
negative.effects on.them.::·For instance, the· Sarit administration (-1957-1963) initiated 
a project to redress· the population,, imbalance between the Thai-Buddhist and the 
Malay-Muslims in the- Pa-tanr -region;·-- -The· -project is --called· nikom sangton-eng 
(Self-Help Colony). Under this-project, the government provided 18 to 25 rai (7 to 
10 acres) of land to each family of qualified settlers. Since 1961, some 100,000 
Thai-Buddhists from different parts of the country have been relocated to the four 
provinces. The Thai government's target is to transfer at least 650,000 Thais into 
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the Muslim area (Journal of Muslim World League, April 1981; see Che Man 
1985:103). The project is seen by many Muslims, especially the separatists, as a 
scheme to submerge the Muslim population and to make the Patani region a 
predominantly Buddhist area. 
Be that as it may, the efforts by the central government to remedy the 
deteriorating condition of the economy in the area have so far met with limited 
success. Reasons for this include: inefficient and irresponsible local government 
officials; the inadequate funds provided; and perhaps the complicated nature of the 
economic problems. The failure has left many Malay-Muslims with the impression 
that they are not only being ignored, but are being exploited by the Bangkok 
government. As Pitsuwan (1982) suggests, 'since the early 1960's when the central 
government embarked upon a full-fledged national development program, more efforts 
have been directed towards the construction of infrastructure to harvest and exploit 
the natural riches of the area'. 
The Society 
The indigenous 'pre-modern' society of early Langkasuka was gradually 
transformed to a more complex one when it was exposed to the major religions of 
'highly developed' cultures stch as Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam. The Islamization 
of Patani supplanted much of the existing Hindu-Buddhist culture and shaped the 
area into the tanah Melayu (the lands of the Malays) in the peninsula. Thus the 
nature of the socio-political stJ.".ucture of J>atani was typical of the Malay society. 
--· - • • - - - ·'' : • : .•· : : ...... c.:._-_ - ·:_ • -• - • 
The Patani community, like those of the Malay communities in the peninsula, 
was generally divided into two basic social classes: the rulers and the ruled. The 
following general discription of the Malay society by Gullick (1958:66) applies also to 
Patani. The apex of the ruling class was the sultan, the head of state and the point 
of reference by which, directly or indirectly, the members of the ruling class 
determined their relative status. The ruling class comprised persons of both royal 
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and non-royal descent. The royal members of the ruling class were aristocrats who 
were related to the sultan by blood and were able to aspire to the throne or lesser 
royal offices. They bore a title as a personal prefix to their name to signify different 
' 
royal ranks. The following titles, in descending order, were founded in Patani siciety: 
Tengku or Tuan, Nik, and Wan. If a woman of royal descent married a commoner, 
her child no longer bore the r?yal title, and the marriage was regarded as a 'social 
degradation' to the woman. But the royal title could be transmitted to children of a 
male of royal descent by his non-royal wife. 
The royal members of the ruling class were religious leaders and functionaries 
and officials of high rank who were absorbed into the ruling class because of their 
ability and merit. Some of them carried titles' such as Dato' Seri, Dato' and To' to 
-
symbolize their authority. Sheikh Said, the Muslim who converted the ruler of 
Patani to Islam, for example, was given the title of Dato' Seri Raja Faqih. 
The subject class was basically divided into three categories of people: subjects 
(ra'ayat), debt-bondsmen (orang berhutang) and slaves (hamba). The subjects were 
men of common birth of all occupations. They were also followers of the sultan and 
the aristocrats of high rank. The system was based on mutual need. While a subject 
needed a strong benefactor, an aristocrat needed on his side a private army 
(ibid.:104). The relationship between subjects and rulers in Malay society is best 
demonstrated by the following expression-although in this case not from Patani: 
I was one of the Mahraja Lela's followers. I must do what he bids me. I 
.am his ra'ayat (subject). I would not dar~ to resist him (q~oteci inZ:bid.:_65), 
The subjects were led and controlled by the ruling class. It was difficult for them to 
rise into the ruling-class;· only those of exceptional' ability such as religious learned 
men. (orang alim) and successful traders (orang kaya or nakuda) were absorbed. into 
the ruling status. 
The second category of subject class was debt-bondsmen. A debtor who could 
not repay his debt on time was brought to the house of the creditor (usually members 
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of the ruling class) and became a debt-bondsman. He was bound to take any order 
and do any work his creditor might demand, until his debt was paid. Since his work 
and services did not reduce his debt, the right of his redemption existed only in 
' 
theory (ibid.:99). The institution of debt-bondage therefore was used by members of 
the ruling class as a means of obtaining followers to increase power and prestige. 
The lowest group of subject class was slaves. There was no dif-
ference in the nature of the work which the slaves and the debt-bondsmen 
did for their masters, and the former could under certain circumstances 
also regain their freedom by arrangement or by some act of grace on the 
part of their masters. Since Islam prohibits the enslavement of Muslims 
by other Muslims, slaves in Patani society were mainly aborigines (orang 
sakai) and non-Muslim captives of wars. 
At the height of its power, the Patani political system, like other Malay states 
m the peninsula, was influenced by Islam ~d the earlier kingdoms of western 
Indonesia. At the top of the hierarchy was the sultan, the head of government in 
state and religious matters. In each territorial district (daerah) there was a prince or 
a chief who represented· the sultan as local ruler. His consent was required for 
important decisions such as the declaration of war and the signing of treaties (Bonney 
1971:9-10). On the state (neger£ level, there was a hierarchy of officials who ran the 
government under the direction of the sultan and princes of the royal house. Among 
the principal officers were the following. The bendahara (prime minister) was the 
executive head of government. The bendahara family was often the kingmaker that 
influenced the selection of a new sultan. The temenggong (minister of war) was 
responsible for maintaining order and functioned as the chief of police and the master 
of cerem~nies at the royal court. The laksamana ·(admiral) was the commander of 
the wa~ships. ·The bendahari (treasurer) controlled all revenue and·looked after the 
sultan's'pafaccs arid equipment. The shahbandar (harbour master) was trusted with 
the management of the markets and warehouse and of keeping check on the weights, 
measures and coinange in use (Gullick 1958:7-8; 1981:11-18; Bastin and Winks 
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1979:16-21). Below them were different titled nobles whose positions stemmed from 
privileged association with the royal family. A meeting of these officials and nobles 
constituted a council of Majlis Bechara (Assembly of Discussion) in which decisions 
were made by consensus (Andaya and Andaya 1982:47). 
There was also a hierarchy of religious authority. As ecclesiastical head, the 
sultan had on his side a mufti (chief judge) as principal religious counsellor. The 
mufti was the highest state official in religious fatwa (religious ruling) and Quranic 
interpretation. Fatwa issued by mufti could override decisions of the sultan if such 
decisions were incompatible with the sharia. Under the mufti was qadi, a man well 
versed in Islamic law. The qadi functioned as Islamic judge of the district and as 
religious adviser to the district head. There were imam, khatib and bilal of various 
mosques who were religious functionaries of different degrees of influence in the 
community. The most influential imam was that of the state mosque. In addition, 
Patani of the 19th and early 20th centuries was dominated by pondoks (traditional 
Islamic schools)9 which provided Muslim villagers with religious education, 
scholarship and · moral guidance. Almost all aspects of community life revolved 
around pondok and mosque. To'guru or, in Thai version, to'khru (traditional 
religious teachers) and ustaz (non-traditional religious teachers) who taught in 
pondok were among the most influential leaders in Patani society (cf. Winzeler 
1974:265-268). The Patani Sultanate, like that of the Moros, was a religious-oriented 
society. It was founded upon the shan·a and the existing pre-Islamic customary 
practices (adat) and was governed by religous-inclined Muslims. 
Following the incorporation of the former Patani Sultanate into the Thai 
nation-state at the beginning of this century, a step was· taken ·by the Bangkok 
government to bring the Muslim area into the national system. Table 2.9 illustrates 
the territorial administrative units of the Patani region. 
9 A pondok is a traditional private Islamic school, offering both basic and advanced Islamic 
studies. Instruction is in Malay and, for advanced courses, in Arabic. It is normally owned 
and administered by a well-versed and respected traditional religious teacher. 
Province 
Patani 
Narathiwat 
Vala 
Sa tun 
Total 
Table 2-9: Provincial Administrative Units 
of the Muslim Provinces 
Number of 
district 
8 
10 
6 
4 
28 
Number of 
sub-district 
3 
2 
2 
7 
Number of 
commune 
111 
70 
53 
34 
268 
Number of 
village 
570 
431 
281 
239 
l,521 
64 
Number of 
dwelling 
71,622 
81,092 
47,363 
26,329 
226,406 
Source: (National Statistical Office 1982; Siamban 1985). 
Because the Malay-Muslims had no experience with the Thai system of 
government, it was necessary, it was argued, to place them under Thai-Buddhist 
bureaucracy. The traditional leaders of the former Patani Sultanate were removed 
and by-passed in the establishment of the national political structure in the region. 
To this day, very few of the government bureacrats are Malay-Muslims, although it 
has been long an expressed policy of the central government to recruit more Muslim 
officials to deal with the four provinces (Suthasasna 1984:237). For instance, there 
has never been a Malay Muslim appointed as governor of the four Muslim provinces, 
except Governor Termsak Smantarat who was appointed as Governor of Patani for a 
short period of time after the Muslim disturbance against the Thai government in 
Patani in 1975. Of twenty-eight district and six sub-district officers in the four 
provinces, only two and one respectively are Malay-Muslims. And there are two 
Muslim mayors from the total of seven municipalities in the region. To some 
Muslims, the Bangkok go:vernment has imposed_upon them a system of governmental 
adm_inist:r:ation which represents only the interests of Thai-Buddhists. Along with 
administrative integration, there have been government efforts at cultural and 
economic integration to counter the centrifugal forces of regionalism and ethnic 
nationalism. On the one hand, the Muslims have been under constant 
pressure from different government integration policies and programmes. 
On the other hand, they are isolated from the mainstream of Thai social 
mobility and have become under-privileged minorities. 
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That isolation is also reinforced by the Muslims' social and cultural situation. 
The majority of the Malay-Muslims are rural dwellers in kampung (villages). Most of 
the villagers' affairs-ceremonies, feasts and economic pursuits-assume religious 
' 
significance and involve only people of the same faith. The Muslim social circles are 
therefore confined within their own community. To broaden their social web would 
mean to associate themselves with the Thai-Buddhists whom they consider as 
incompatible as 'oil and water'. Intermarriage between members of the two societies 
is therefore uncommon. 
The occasional interpersonal relationship between the Malays and the Thais, 
especially government officials, often produces unpleasant experiences. This is rooted 
in the cultural discrimination which the Thais have developed with regard to the 
Muslims and in the nature of the Islamic consciousness of the Muslims (Gowing 
1975:31). The Malays are popularly referred to as khaek (alien or visitor) which they 
resent for they are in fact neither aliens nor visitors. They have inhabited the region 
they occupy for centuries. Officially, the Malays are called 'Thai-Muslims', a 
deliberate effort to blur their true identity-Malay-Muslims. The equally unflattering 
attitude from the Muslim side is that the Thai-Buddhists are considered as kafir 
al-harb (non-believers of first category) against whom war, according to Islamic law, 
is permissible. The Thai bureaucrats are sometimes referred to by the Muslims as 
to'na (master) which implies colonizer. 
The language barrier is another cultural characteristic that causes the two sides 
to remain segregated. Despite the fact that the Thais have dominated the 
. . . 
bureaucracy in the Malay pro~inces for. more than eight decades, very· few 
bureaucrats understand and speak the local language. Likewise, the Malay villagers 
are t~~- proud ofthefr- own cultuial heritage to learn Thai:· and to accept it as their 
language. Consequently, official contacts and me~tings -between Thai offiCials and the 
Malay villagers require mediation and 'linkage'. The government main 'linkages' are 
kamnan (commune headman) and phuyaiban (village headman), the two lowest 
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officials in the government administrative hierarchy. Most of the 268 kamnan and 
over a thousand phuyaiban in the four provinces are Malay-Muslims whose selection 
has to be approved by District Officer of the Thai bureaucracy. These Muslim 
' kamnan and phuyaiban fail to create strong links between the government and the 
villagers, due mainly to the general distrust of the Malay villagers toward the 
government officials. With such weak 'linkages', the gap between the two separated 
communities remains; their mutual misunderstandings and prejudices continue. 
In contrast, Thai-iuddhists and Chinese (either Thai citizens or resident aliens) 
have become socially integrated. These non-Muslims, who constitute about 
twenty-eight per cent of the region's population are mostly found in towns where the 
latter primarily engage in business, from shopkeepers to owners of bus companies, and 
the former serve as civil servants, from school teachers to governors. In some 
provincial and district towns such as Y ala, Satun and Betong, they form the 
majority. One or two Chinese or Thai families are sometimes found living in a village 
with the rest of the Muslim villagers. They usually own small plantations or some of 
the fishing boats; they may also function as fish merchants, buying the catch from 
Malay fishermen and selling it to the towns. Considerable social interaction takes 
place between these urban-based Chinese and Thai-Buddhist communities, in part 
because of the compatible nature of their customs and religious beliefs but mainly 
because the Chinese, unlike the Malays, are willing to be integrated into Thai society. 
Almost all of the Chinese have learned to speak Thai and have Thai names. 
Intermarriage between the two population groups is very common. 
The Mindanao and Patani Scenes Compared 
The Islamization of, and the establishment __ of Mwdim 1mltanates in Mindanao 
and Patani can be regarded as one of the significant historic~! ~v~mts of the regions. __ 
It led to the emergence of a new sense of ethnic identity that distinguished Muslim 
from non-Muslim communities. It became the root cause of the Moro and the Malay 
resistance movements against foreign domination (see chapter 3) and later of 
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separatist struggles against the Filipino and Thai rules (see chapter 4). The two 
regions, however, differ in some aspects. While Mindanao consisted of a number of 
ethno-cultural groups and sultanates, Patani had only one sultanate within a single 
' 
ethnic group. Perhaps, this can be explained by the fact that the spread of Islam in 
Mindanao was contained by the Spanish colonial campaigns and thus it was unable to 
develop to its fullest extent in order to completely transcend the local and provincial 
identity of different Moro groups. The existence of many Moro sultanates and 
different ethno-cultural groups caused divisions within the Moro resistance 
movements; it might be argued, however, that such divisions have been a source of 
weakness as well as strength. Perhaps, the Moros were able to resist Spanish 
campaigns for more than three centuries precisely because they were not united under 
one single group. In contrast, the Patani sultanate, despite having no ethnic division, 
suffered many defeats during its resistance campaigns against the Thai kingdom. 
The economies of Mindanao and Patani have been dominated by non-Muslims 
since the beginning of this century when the regions were formally incorporated into 
the Philippines and Thai states. Much of the wealth in Mindanao belongs either to 
Christian Filipinos or foreign investors. Export-oriented development has not 
elevated the position of the Moro population. Similarly, most of the wealth in Patani 
is in the hands of Chinese and Thais. Unlike Mindanao, 'land-grabbing' in Patani is 
not so obvious because the extent of migration and resettlement has not been so 
great. In addition, there were very few multinational corporations operating in 
Patani. Nevertheless, most Moros and Malays remain in the subsistence economy 
and adhere to traditional means of livelihood. 
The traditional ·Muslim societies in Mindanao and Patani were ·similar· in ·many· 
aspects, though they were not identical. The two had basically similar political and 
social structures, which were essentially founded on Islamic principles and the existing 
pre-Islamic Malay traditions and customs. The most significant contrast between the 
two societies is that the Moros political institution of datuship remains strong in 
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modern Philippine society, whereas the religious institution of pondok and religious 
leadership is still influential among the Malays in Patani. As mentioned earlier, the 
Spanish colonial campaigns contained the development of Islam in Mindanao, while 
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allowing the pre-Islamic political institutions to flourish. On the other hand, Islam in 
Patani was able to grow because Thailand's main concern, unlike that of Spain, was 
not religious conversion but political domination. When Patani was last conquered 
by the Thai kingdom in 1786, the Thais attempted to weaken the Patani political 
institution of the rajaship; in 1816 the Thais succeeded in dividing it into seven 
smaller ones, and in 1909, when Patani was formally incorporated into Thai state, 
those smaller institutions of the rajaship were replaced by the Thai bureaucracy. 
A central theme of this study is that the Muslim communities in the Philippines 
and in Thailand make use of their history, culture and social conditions, with myths 
and symbols, to consolidate their struggles, to ensure the persistence of their dar 
al-Islam, and to develop and choose the course of their opposition to government 
integration efforts and to the overall political atmosphere of their respective 
countries. In order to fully appreciate their endeavours, this thesis will first compare 
the history of their resistance movements. 
69 
CHAPTER3 
HISTORY OF MUSLIM RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS 
IN THE 20TH CENTURY 
The Muslim armed resistance movements in Mindanao and Sulu and in Patani 
have important places in the history of the Philippines and Thailand, respectively. 
The Moros fought Spanish colonialism for over 300 years and resisted the military 
strength of the United States for almost half a century .. More significantly, they have 
posed a serious challenge to the Philippine government through their guerrilla 
activities and organized liberation fronts, particularly since the late 1960s. Similarly, 
the Malay-Muslims of southern Thailand persistently opposed the Thai control of the 
Patani area since it first became Siam's vassal state at the beginning of the 
seventeenth centur_y_. _W~en Patani was finally _incorporated into Thai territory three 
centuries later, a series of uprisings and armed movements against the Thai 
government followed and these provided the basis from which organized separatist 
fronts emerged at the end of the 1950s. 
This chapter provides a historical account of the Moro and the Malay resistance 
struggles from the beginning to the middle of this century, before they were formed 
into organized fronts. 
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The Moro Resistance Movement 
Resistance to the American Regime, 1899-1946 
The transfer of sovereignty over Moroland from Spain to the United States did 
not render the Moros less vigorous in their resistance to colonialism. Thousands of 
them fought and died resisting the American policy of incorporating their homeland 
into the Philippine state. 
Military Occupation {1899-1903) 
This period represented the initial contact of American colonizers with the 
Bangsa Moro people. The American efforts to gam Moro recognition of its 
sovereignty over Mindanao and Sulu and to keep the Moros out of the 
Philippine-American War (1899-1901) which was being waged in the northern islands 
of the Archipelago contributed to the signing of the Bates Agreement in August 1899 
between Brigadier General John Bates of the United States Army and Sultan Jamalul 
Kiram II of Jolo and four of his ruling aristocrats. The essence of the agreement was 
that the Moros acknowledged American sovereignty and pledged to help suppress 
piracy and arrest individuals charged with crimes against non-Moros. In return, the 
United States agreed to protect Moros from foreign intrusions and to respect the 
authority of the sultan and other chiefs. 
At first, the Moros seemed to be content. with these arrangements because the 
United States followed a policy of strict non-interference (Miller 1982). After the 
Philippine-Amarican War was over, American military leaders believed that it was 
necessary to implement a policy of direct control over Moroland. 
To the Moros, the move posed a threat to the survival of their community. 
Resistance to the military occupation occurred in a number of places. For instance, 
Panglima Hassan and his men fought American soldiers in Sulu in 1901. Hassan's 
resistance was inspired by the belief that the continued American presence would 
adversely affect Moro authority, especially his own authority as a panglima (district 
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chief) who commanded considerable influence among the datus of Jolo Island. Hassan 
was also convinced that resisting foreign domination was a sabilillah (struggle in the 
way of Allah) and used the concept to rally his supporters (Tan 1977:22).1 
In Lanao, one of the more significant Moro armed struggles was the battle of 
Bayan in May 1902. The conflict was caused mainly by the hostile attitudes of some 
of the Maranao sultans and chiefs towards American military activities. They accused 
the Americans of attempting to change their religion and to enslave their people. The 
Sultan of Bayan, assisted by the Sultan of Pandapatan, the Datu of Binadayan and 
Moro fighters from different neighbouring barangays such as Bacolod, Butig and 
Maciu, engaged the 27th Infantry Company and the 25th Mountain Battery. More 
than 300 Muslims, including the Sultans of Bayan and Pandapatan, died in the 
battle. The American casualties numbered 10 killed and 41 wounded (Gowing 
1977:86-87). There were other instances of Maranao resistance to the military efforts 
to bring Lanao under American rule. In June 1902 Datu Tungul and followers of 
Sultan Binibayan attacked troops near Camp Vicars, resulting in the death of the 
sultan. A series of assaults by the Muslims followed. Between September and October 
1902, Sultans Ganduli and Tanagan fought American soldiers; the sultans and more 
than a hundred Moros died (Tan 1977:21). 
Resistance to the American military occupation was organized mainly by the 
Moro aristocrats who saw the American presence as a threat not only to their 
position and prestige but also to the Muslim community. The concept of jihad 
therefore justified their-actions. 
1Samuel K. Tan's The Filipino Muslim Armed Struggle, 1900-1912 gives comprehensive 
accounts on the Moro armed resistance struggles from 1901 to 1941. However, the book has 
been strongly criticized by G. Carter Bentley (1978) (and Bentley's review has been equally 
strongly criticized by Tan (1979)). 
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Moro Provi"nce ( 1903-1913) 
A change of American policy from non-interference to direct control resulted in 
the establishement of Moro Province. Moro Province was organized and designed to 
make preparation for the integration of the Moro people into a future Philippine 
state, to which the Philippine Bill of 1902 was committed. The Province, divided 
into five districts-Zamboanga, Lanao, Cotobato, Davao and Sulu-came under a 
policy of direct rule. President William McKenley in 1899 stated 'that the Philippines 
are ours, not to exploit but to develop, to civilize, to educate, to train in the science 
of self-government' (quoted in Harrison 1922:36). 
As. part of the programme to 'develop', 'civilize' and 'educate', the American 
system of government and concepts of justice were introduced. Well-ordered 
provincial and district governments were organized. Schools and hospitals on the 
Western model were built. Agriculture and commerce were expanded. Certain 
practices of the Moros, such as slavery, were made illegal. Furthermore, Filipino 
Christians from the northern provinces were encouraged to migrate to Moroland. It 
was also essential from the American point of vie~ that the Moros be brought into 
the taxation system. The cedula (head tax) and other forms of levies such as 
export-import duties and vessel registration fees were imposed. 
This policy of direct control unilaterally abrogated the Bates Agreement and 
resulted in disruption of the socio-political structure and customs by which the Moros 
had lived for centuries. The creation of provincial and district units of government 
whose officials enforeced laws and regulations weakened the power and position of the 
Moro leaders. The American public school system undermined the Moro pandita 
schools. The parcelling out of lands to Christian settlers not only took from the 
Moros their major economic resource but also obstructed their traditional practice of 
ancestral landholding. From the Moros' point of view, the creation of Moro Province 
meant the imposition of laws and customs of foreigners and of kafir (infidels). It 
constituted a serious threat to their distinct Muslim ummah. 
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Moros under the Moro Province were administered by Generals Leonard Wood 
(1903-1906), Tasker Bliss (1906-1909), and John Pershing (1909-1913). They were 
viewed by the American authorities as 'savages' wh~se laws and customs were not 
worth preserving. Thousands of Moros died fighting the American troops. 
When General Wood passed anti-slavery legislation and replaced the agama 
(religious) courts with the Western system of jurisprudence, Panglima Hassan again 
gathered his warriors and with the support of Sultan Kiram II defied the government 
of the Moro Province in October 1903. The sporadic engagements of Hassan's men 
with the American soldiers continued until Hassan died in March 1904. Wood 
described Hassan's defiance as an expression of Muslim discontent. 
Datu Usap, who strongly opposed the cedula and was also sympathetic to the 
cause of Panglima Hassan, resisted the authorities. Usap's resistance was influenced 
by a religious preacher, Hajji Masdali, who persuaded him to rebuild his old cota 
(fort) and sold him ant£ng-anting (charms) to render the fort and his people 
invulnerable (Gowing 1977:158; Tan 1977:29). In January 1905 Datu Usap rebelled. 
Major Hugh Scott, who played a -major role in def.eating Hassan, assaulted Usap's fort 
and ended the rebellion. The datu died in the fighting and Hajji Masdali was 
captured and deported to Singapore. 
Datu Pala, a supporter of Hassan who had retreated to British North Borneo, 
returned to Jolo Island and called for a jihad against the Americans. The call for a 
holy war was also triggered by Wood's anti-slavery policy, which deprived the Moro 
leaders of their privileges and sources of wealth. In May 1905 the American soldiers 
fought a series of battles with Pala's forces. Datu Pala was killed but his men 
continued to resist until they were defeated and dispersed at the end of the year. 
Pala's relatives, supporters and the datus who objected to American policies 
grouped together on Bud Dajo. The battle of Bud Dajo between the American forces 
of about 790 men and more than a thousand Moros occurred in March 1906 and 
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lasted for two days. More than 600 Muslims died (Gowing 1977:161). It was one of 
the bloodiest battles during Wood's term as governor of the Moro Province. 
In Lanao, there were frequent armed attacks on the American troops and on 
Christian settlements throughout the years 1903 and 1904. A series of campaigns by 
Capt. Pershing did not stop the disturbances. An area of especially strong resistance 
was Taraca. In spring 1904 the American troops finally surrounded Taraca fort; many 
Muslims died and several powerful datus and panditas (religious learned men) 
surrendered (ibid.:154-155; Tan 1977:21). The lesson of the Taraca battle brought a 
temporary peace to Lanao. 
In Cotabato, Datu Ali of Kudarangan, who not only refused to obey the 
anti-slavery law but also believed that the 'infidels' would force Muslims to become 
Christians, mobilized the people of the Cotabato Valley to revolt against the 
Americans. In March 1904 Wood's troops succeeded in destroying Ali's main fort. 
However, Ali changed his strategy from conventional to guerrilla war. The guerrillas 
constantly raided the Cotabato -Valley, keeping the area- in a-disturbed state. Finally; 
a battle between Ali's men and the 22nd Infantry Company under Capt. Frank 
McCoy took place in October 1905 near Simpetan. Datu Ali and no less than one 
hundred of his men were killed. 
When General Tasker H. Bliss succeeded General Wood m April 1906, the 
battle of Bud Dajo had just ended and the scattered pockets of Moro resistance 
seemed to be exhausted. General Bliss saw the opportunity to win the Moros by 
peaceful means and .to move ahead in civil affairs. He wrote: 
The authorities forget that the most critical time is after slaughter has 
stopped. Then is when we need here men of influence and power to get the 
people started in the right way, to get them to cultivate theh'·fields, and 
make them understand that peace is better for them than war (quoted in 
Gowing 1977:170). 
While governing Moroland with a firm hand, General Bliss devoted his efforts 
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to education of the Moros and Pagans. He believed that the major means by which 
they could be brought into the mainstream of Philippine social d.nd political life was 
education (Gowing 1981:17-21). 
It would be misleading to suggest that General Bliss did not value military 
power and see it as important in maintaining peace and order in Moroland. In fact, he 
increased the number of Moros in the Philippine Constabulary, feeling that Moro 
Constabulary officers and men were helpful in field operations against outlaws 
(Forbes 1945:109-111). During his three-year term as governor of the Moro Province, 
there were no major acts of Moro resistance or rebellion. His period was known as the 
'era of peace'. 
The absence of major armed struggles, however, was not proof of Moro 
endorsement of American rule. Rather, it was because the Moros were exhausted after 
a period of vigorous resistance against Wood's administration. More importantly, 
Bliss's 'velvet glove' approach was less repressive than Wood's 'mailed fist' policy and 
required less vigorous resistance. As Faruki (1983:9) suggests, 'violent repression only 
moves ethnic movements to more and · more extreme positions and greater 
radicalization'. 
The relative peace in the Moro Province continued after Brigadier General John 
J. Pershing became governor in 1909. General Pershing spent much of his time 
attempting to improve social and economic conditions in the province. His emphasis 
was on the development of the region's agriculture, especially to increase the variety 
and· output of.commercial crops. A special effort was made to develop the potential 
of Cotabato and Lanao whose agricultural resources were largely under-exploited. 
Pershing was also interested in developing mining.and manufacturing. 
In social affairs, General Pershing's educational programme aimed at training 
the Moro children to embrace American social values and to be productive 
participants in the economic life of the region. More significantly, the General 
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believed that peace and order were vital for social improvement in Moroland and that 
real peace would not occur until the Moros were disarmed. 
The disarming of the Moros had been discussed during the terms of Generals 
Wood and Bliss, but it failed to materialize. The arguments were: since the Moros 
identified the possession of weapons with their manhood, depriving them of their 
arms would mean violent resistance; most weapons in Moro hands were obsolete and 
used mainly for hunting; and it would be unfair to deprive the law-abiding Moros of 
their protection from lawless Moros. General Pershing, however, felt that the 
disarming of the Moros was necessary, and it was time, he reckoned, 'to teach the 
Moros the meaning of government' (Gowing 1977:235). On 8 September 1911 
Pershing issued Executive Order No. 24, effecting the disarmament of the Moros in 
the Moro Province. 
Although Pershing promised payment for all arms surrendered, many Mo.ros 
opposed the disarmament order. Clashes erupted between government troops and 
Moro armed bands who refused to turn in their weapons. In December 1911 more 
than one thousand Moros, led by Ujaji and Jailani, took their positions on Bud Dajo. 
in defiance of the government disarmament's policy. Because the incumbent 
Republicans feared that the Democrats would make political capital out of any major 
battle with the Moros, acting Governor-General Newton Gilbert asked General 
Pershing to call off his plan to assault the hostile Moros on Bud Dajo. Complying 
with Gilbert's wish, Pershing negotiated with the Moros and was able to persuade 
most of them to. abaiidoii. the riiouiitairi and· to return borne: Some hardcore Moros 
fled into the jungle to continue their defiance, but they were captured later. 
In. Lanao, the Army and Constabulary units .immediately dispersed the 
Maranao groups opposing the disarmament. Several thousand firearms were collected, 
including high-powered rifles. In Cotabato, Datu Alamada of Pedatan, a sympathizer 
of Datu Ali, and several hundred of his followers resisted the disarmament. His group 
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was later driven into the interior, while some datus helped the government m the 
collection of arms. 
In early 1913 the Moros of Lati Ward in Sulu, who were always hostile towards 
the .disarmament policy, engaged the government forces in fierce cota battles. As 
more and more government troops came to fight them, nearly all of the population of 
Lati Ward, most of them unarmed villagers, retreated to Bud Bagsak. Negotiations 
between the government and the Moros on the mountain continued for months. They 
finally agreed that all Moros should return to their homes and turn in their arms. In 
return, the government would withdraw its troops from that area. Several Moro 
leaders, including Naqib Amil, Datu Jami and Datu Sahipa and their followers, 
however, refused to comply with the agreement. On 11 June 1913 General Pershing 
ordered his troops to fight them. The famous battle of Bud Bagsak lasted for five 
days. It is variously estimated that from 500 to 2,000 Moros were killed 
(i"bi"d.:238-242). With the exception of a few disturbances such as Datu Sabtal's 
resistance to tax collection in August and October 1913, peace returned to Moroland. 
·Department of Mi"ndanao and Sulu {1914-1920} 
On 15 December 1913 the Moro Province was reorganized into the Department 
of Mindanao and Sulu to reflect the wish of the Democratic Party to speed up the 
movement towards Philippine independence in accord with the principle of 'the 
Philippines for the Filipinos'. Frank W. Carpenter, a civilian, was appointed governor 
of the Department. H~s main tasks were to unify Mindanao and Sulu with Luzon and 
the Visayas, to transfer the control of Moro affairs from Americans to Filipinos, and 
to continue the socio-polical development of the Moro people with the aim of 
accelerating the course of their integration. 
Because the ability of the Moros to resist had been weakened during the Moro 
Province period; Governor Carpenter was able to withdraw most of the United States 
Army units, except some garrisons of Philippine Scouts, from Moroland and leave the 
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maintenance of peace and order to civilian responsibilty. The unification of the region 
with the rest of the Philippines was accelerated by extending to the Department the 
jurisdiction of the Insular government. A policy of 'Filipinization' was pursued by 
giving Filipino Christians greater power in the administration of Moroland. Many 
Moros resented these changes and adhered tenaciously to their traditional ways while 
others yielded to the government programme of integration. The abdication of Sultan 
Jamalul Kiram II of Sulu from his temporal power in March 1915 was a classical 
example of Moro submission. 
After President Woodrow Wilson signed Public Act No. 240 (the Jones Law)2 
in August 1916, the Philippine Legislature assumed legislative control over Mindanao 
and Sulu. Anxious to take over the American burdens in the affairs of the Moros, 
Filipino officials under Carpenter's supervision carried out 'the policy of attraction' 
which stressed the improvement of Moro welfare in order to further their integration 
(Thomas 1971:45-82). 
Although the period of government under the Department of Mindanao and 
Sulu was generallyc-peaceful;,therewere· instances of Moro disturbances. In 1917, the 
datus of the Bayan area defied the government. They refused to turn in their arms, to 
permit their children to attend public schools, or to allow officials to survey their 
land. Cota fights between them and Constabulary and Scout units erupted. The 
hostile datus, panditas, and most of their men died in the battles. Their defeat 
strengthened the government control of Lanao. In October of the same year, Datu 
Ambang of Kidapawan iii Cotabato gathered his people and invited several datus to 
carry out 'God's co:nllnarid' tO fight the infidel Ahi.ericans arid ·Filipirios: When the · 
governor of the province was informed of the matter and ordered the government 
forces to meet any serious outbreak, . the movement lost its momentum (Tan 
2The preamble to this act stated that the United States was determined to relinquish 
sovereignty over the Philippines and to recognize its independence. It also acknowledged the 
willingness to give Filipinos the greatest possible responsibility in governing their domestic 
affairs so as to prepare themselves for the control of the independent Philippines. 
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1977:31-32). There were several other minor incidents and resistance activities against 
the government, but these were quickly suppressed. 
The six-year administration of the department of Mindanao and Sulu was a 
period of acceleration of Moro integration into a united, self-governing Philippines. 
With the abolition of the Department, the effective years of American administration 
in Moroland came to an end. The administrative and legislative control of the Moros, 
through the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes, was firmly in the hands of Christian 
Filipinos. 
Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes (1920-1937) 
Act No. 2878 of the Philippine Legislature formally abolished the Department 
of Mindanao and Sulu in February 1920. The administration of Moroland was 
assumed by the Department of the Interior, exercising its powers through the Bureau 
of Non-Christian Tribes. Though American officials continued to play important roles 
in administering the affairs of the Moros, the region was now under the control of the 
Insular government_ which, with respect to domestic matters, was largely in the hands 
of Christian Filipinos. The Philippine Legislature, for instance, had power to 
disapprove the appointment of provincial governors and other key officials made by 
the American governor-general and to appropriate funds for programmes in 
Moroland. 
Aside from certain leaders who were willing to cooperate with the Manila 
authorities for their own personal interests, the Moros as a whole preferred to live 
under the American government than to be controlled by Filipinos whom they 
considered their old enemies. For them, it was one thing to assent to the government 
of Americans who defeated them in many battles, but it was another to yield to the 
rule of Christian Filipinos who, as troops under the Spaniards, had never effectively 
defeated them despite attempts over 300 years (Gowing 1979:168). Moreover, the 
Moros believed that Christian Filipinos, influenced by centuries of Spanish 
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domination, had hidden motives to stamp out their religion and traditions. The 
Filipinos also needed their land for economic and territorial expansion (Thomas 
1971:133). In 1921 the Moro leaders in Sulu presented a petition to the president of 
the United States requesting that Sulu be governed separately from the rest of the 
Philippines. In 1924 another petition by a delegation of Moro leaders at Zamboanga 
was addressed to the United States Congress. It expressed the Moro desire that 
Mindanao and. Sulu be made a territory of the United States (Gowing 1979:168-169). 
Their desire to be separated from the Philippine nation suggested that the 
centuries-old Moro-Filipino animosity, despite outward appearances and reassuring 
words, remained strong. The desire of the Moros went unheeded, however. Moro and 
Filipino communities were incorporated. 
The Moros also expressed their discontent through armed resistance, though 
they no longer had the strength to offer the same threat they had to the Americans 
up to 1913. In Lanao, numerous clashes were reported between government troops 
and Moros. At Sisiman in 1921, Datu Amai Binaning and several of his followers died 
in a battle with Cons~~bulary soldiers to oppose compulsory government education. 
In 1923 the Muslims of Tugaya organized armed uprisings in defiance of taxes, 
education and exactions for road construction. Fifty-four of the Maranao Muslims 
lost their lives (Gowing 1979:170; Tan 1977:42). In the same year, the Moros in 
Ganassi took revenge against the brutality of government soldiers; several Muslims 
died in the engagements, including their leader Saruang. Datu Pandak, a sympathizer 
of Saruang, defied the government in the following year. Pandak's movement 
provoked both religious and political antagonisms and raised the fighting spirit of 
many Maranao people. But the movement disintegrated soon after Pandak was killed 
(Tan 1977:32,42). 
In Cotabato in 1923, Datu Santiago and his men, some of whom were 
Constabulary deserters, attacked government troops around Parang. They objected 
to the cedula, the maltreatment of the Muslims by Philippine Constabulary, and the 
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abuse of some school officials who had been forcing Santiago to repair school facilities 
without compensation. The unrest lasted one year and cost more than cne hundred 
Moro lives. The datu f!nally surrendered ( ibid.:41-42). 
The Acbara resistance erupted in Pata Island, Palawan, in May 1923. It was 
attributed to the cedula, compulsory education and land surveys. Acbara, a trader, 
was also influenced by a religious preacher, Hatib Sihaban, who wanted to drive out 
the Americans and Christian Filipinos in order to establish a government 'responsible 
only to God'. Acbara told his followers that it was God's wish that the Muslims resist 
the government. In June, his group fought government forces; he and thirty-two of his 
followers were killed. Another disturbance with a similar religious element was 
reported in 1924 in Bucas Island off the eastern coast of Mindanao. A rnan calling 
himself 'Imam Mahdi' (Messiah) convinced some Muslim villagers that their mission 
was to fight against foreigners and unbelievers. 'Imam Mahdi' and his people killed 
ten soldiers before they were suppressed (ibid.:32-33). In Balete, Agusan, seven 
soldiers were killed in an ambush by a group of Muslims related to the Mahdi's 
movement, but governme~~ reprisals put an end to the dissidents. 
The United States Cong·ress put on record in 1926 the petition sent to it in 1924 
by Moro leaders who expressed their intention to declare themselves an independent 
Moro Nation should the United States grant independence to the Philippines without 
provision for rentention of Moroland under American rule (see above). The Bacon Bill 
of 1926 also proposed that Mindanao and Sulu be retained under the American flag. 
In this political at!Il()Sphere, Datl! Tahil, v.:_ho was disappointed at not being 
appointed governor of Sulu, defied the government. He demanded the reduction of 
cedula and land tax, and the privilege of carrying weapons. In January 1927 his fort 
at Patikul was attacked by government troops, who killed thirty to forty of his 
followers. Datu Tahil surrendered (ibid.:39-40). 
Despite the attempts of Moros to resist integration, the official policy of the 
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United States remained always to incorporate Moroland into the Philippines. To that 
end, the United States Congress passed the Tydings-McDuffie Independence Act in 
May 1934 to establish a Commonwealth in which Filipinos would function with full 
power over internal affairs. The Moros were decidedly against the formation of the 
Philippine Commonwealth, which they considered as the last step toward their 
dependence. In the same year, a series of armed incidents occurred in Lanao. Amai 
Milon and Dimakaling were among the leaders of the disturbances. They opposed the 
Constabulary practice of false arrest and the imposition of a fine on parents whose 
children were not in school. These armed bands were again defeated ( ibid.:42). At the 
same time, 200 Moro leaders signed a letter drafted by a religious leader, Hadji Abdul 
Kamid Bogabong, and sent it to the governor-general. They insisted, ' a law be 
passed that our religion, Islam, taught by Prophet Mohammad be not changed, or 
curtailed in any way and that we must not be forbidden to observe our religion' 
. (quoted in Thomas 1971:253). In 1935 Bogabong and 119 Maranao leaders addressed 
another letter to President Franklin Roosevelt expressing their concern about the 
future of the Muslim community under the government of Christian Filipinos, 
particularly the· ina.Intenance- of their religion and customs. They declared 'all 
practices ... of Islam should be respected because these things are what a Muslim 
desires for .... Once our religion is no more, our lives are no more' (quoted in Glang 
1969:17). Nevertheless, the Commonwealth government was inaugurated m 
November 1935. The regime was to be granted complete independence in 1946. 
Philippine Commonwealth (1935-1946) 
After decades of resisting the· American efforts to include their homeland in the 
Philippines, some Moro leaders realized that their resistance was pointless. Gradually, 
they accepted the new situation which they were powerless to change and sought to 
make the best out of it. Arolas Tulawi of Sulu, Datus Menandang Piang and Blah 
Sinsuat of Cotabato, and Sultan Alaoya Alonto of Lanao were elected delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention of 1934 by their Muslim brothers. With many votes 
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coming from Christian constituents, the Moro provinces approved the new 
constitution. It was the first time the Moro people had participated in a Philippine 
nationwide election. However, only two Moros, Datu Ombra Amilbangsa in Sulu and 
Datu Sinsuat Balabaran in Cotabato, were elected as members of the National 
Assembly in 1935. They became the only voices speaking for the interests of Muslims 
in the Commonwealth. It is not surprising that the advancement of the Moros came 
last in national priorities for Moroland. 
But President Manuel Quezon spoke of giving the Moros the best government 
and of his administration's devoted interest in their welfare and advancement 
(Thomas 1971:263-264). The Moros found it very difficult to identify specific 
government actions to this effect. On the contrary, their sense of alienation was 
deepened by the effort of the Commonwealth to put an end to the special treatment 
they had received under American rule. For example, the National Assembly repealed 
the Administrative Code for Mindanao and Sulu which had given the Moros certain 
exemptions from national laws, and the Moro Board, which had been established to 
settle some Moro disputes accordi~g to Islamic and traditional laws, was abolished. In 
1937 the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes, which had attempted to meet the special 
requirements of the Moros administratively, was replaced by the Office of 
Commisioner for Mindanao and Sulu (Gowing 1979:176-177). The Office's primary 
concern was the development of Mindanao for the immediate benefit of the 
Commonwealth as a whole (Thomas 1971:271). The Commonwealth government, 
furthermore, ended official recognition of the civil title held by Moros as expressive of 
their traditional social system. It also refused to acknowledge the successor to Sultan 
Jamalul Kiram II, who died-in i936~ More signific~ntly; the -Comrrioriwealth regime 
markedly reduced social and economic programmes specially designed for the Moros. 
The development efforts in Moroland were conducted largely by and for the benefit of 
the Christian settlers and foreign entrepreneurs (Gowing 1979:176-178). 
Again some Moros expressed their discontent toward the government through 
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armed struggle. The more serious armed conflicts between Muslims and the 
Philippine Commonwealth were in the form of cota fights and occurred largely in 
Lanao during 1936 to 1941. Many of the scattered cotas around Lake Lanao were 
destroyed. During the Japanese occupation (1941-1944), however, most Moros 
supported the anti-Japanese war effort (Thomas 1977). This was due to the harsh 
treatment of their subjects by the Japanese, which offset the bad experience the 
Moros had had with the Americans and Christian Filipinos. It also suggests that the 
Moros were not anti-American or anti-Filipino per se; they resisted all forms of 
external power that threatened their community. 
In sum, the armed resistance movements that occurred during the American 
regime, ranging from full-scale battles to minor incidents, were motivated by the 
presence of the Americans and Filipino Christians who were considered a threat to 
the position of Islam and the interest of the Muslims. The Muslims had always 
resisted any effort by non-Muslims to challenge their traditional position. Two other 
outstanding features of the Moro resistance should be mentioned. First, the Moro 
struggles were characterized . by the a_bsence of consistent and effective coordination 
and cooperation among different Muslim ethno-cultural groups and with other 
non-Christian tribes. This was explained by the fragmented nature of the Moro 
society and the mutual suspicion and distrust among the various ethnic groups. The 
rivalries and dissension among Muslim leaders and the kinship system which 
polarized loyalties and interest along blood lines prevented the Moro communities 
from forging a unified resistance to the powerful outside forces (Tan 1977:60-61; 
1982:61-69}: :Secondly, :the Jess vigorous armed resistance during the periods of civil 
administration (1914-1934.). and the Commonwealth government (1935-1946) as 
compared to the era of the military regime (1899-1913) was due mainly to the fact 
that the Moros had been largely disarmed and pacified and were exhausted. In 
addition, the nature of the civilian administration was less repressive and more 
tolerable than that of the military regime. Hence, it received a less forceful response 
from the Moros. 
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Resistance to the Philippine Government, 1946-1968 
Moroland was structurally integrated into the Republic of the Philippines which 
was proclaimed on 4 July 1946. The 'Moro Problem'3 inherited by the new Republic 
was the transfer of allegiance from traditional community ties to a larger state as a 
new political entity. The Moros who constituted a nationality distinct from, and older 
than, that of Christian Filipinos possessed a strong sense of group consciousness. 
They continued to assert their identity as Muslims. Many refused to regard 
themselves as Filipinos. As Giang (1969:21) wrote: 
The term Filipino can only refer to a segment of our people who bowed in 
submission to the might of Spain. Certainly, the Muslims do not fall under 
the category of Filipino. Being a historic people, the Muslims therefore 
cannot but reject the generalization that the word Filipino applies to them 
as well. Because when the word Filipino is applied to a segment of our 
people, the implication is that the word Filipino was derived or at least 
named in honor of King Felipe II, from whom the Philippines was named 
after. The name or term Filipino can only be applied, therefore, for those 
people who were once subjects of Spain. This is a historical fact which 
cannot be disputed. In so far as the Muslims are concerned, the appelation 
Filipino does not have any meaning to them. That is the reason why they 
resent the i.dea of being just called a Filipino. . 
This problem of conflicting loyalties was further compounded by a deepening sense of 
religious awareness due to the resurgence of Islam and by a deepening sense of 
deprivation because of the government's policy of integration. 
Deepening Sense of Islamic Consciousness 
One of the significant factors that welds Moros of different ethno-cultural 
groups together is their religion--Islam. It has a powerful social and spiritual hold on 
them _and_ be.comes. the symbol of- their selfhood. This is not to say that Islam has 
been able _to forge an unfragmented Moro community, but it has become one of the 
3Saleeby (1913:23) defined the Moro problem as that of finding the 'method or form of 
administration by which the Moros and other non-Christians who are living among them, can 
be governed to their best interest and welfare in the most peaceful way possible, and can at the 
same time be provided with appropriate measures for their gradual advancement in culture 
and civilization, so that in the course of a reasonable time they can be admitted into the 
general government of the Philippine islands as qualified members of a. republican national 
org a.nization '. 
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major ruling forces in the historical development of the Moros, a force that motivated 
them to resist the Spanish conquistadores and the American soldiers. 
The general resurgence of Islam in the Muslim World after the Second World 
War (Gowing 1979; Mastura 1980; Ayoob 1981) had a significant affect upon the 
Moros, notably in enhancing an atmosphere of religious and cultural awareness. Since 
the early 1950s, Muslim preachers from different parts of the Muslim World have 
come to Mindanao and Sulu, on an official as well as an individual basis, to 
contribute to a strengthening of commitment to Islam in Moroland. This is because 
the majority of Muslims in Southeast Asia, including the Moros, were seen as still 
adhering to certain pre-Islamic practices that are considered unislamic (see Gowing 
1969). At the same time, Islamic institutions and universities, such as Al-Azhar 
University and the Islamic University of Medina, provided scholarships to young 
Moros. Table 3.1 indicates the number of scholarships to Moro students by various 
Muslim countries through the Philippine government during the years 1977 to 1981. 
In addition to the above students, a number of scholarships was given to Moro 
students through non-government channels. __ 
- --
-· 
Table 3-1: Number of Moro Students Given Scholarships by 
Muslim Countries, 1977-1981 
Country Number of Students 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Egypt 10 17 7 1 
Indonesia 4 1 
Kuwait 3 2 4 2 3 
Libya·· 1 4 
Saudi Arabia 55 54 82 31 57 
United Arab Emirates 4 2 3 
Total 69 77 102 36 63 
Source: (Pangandaman 1983). 
Moro leaders were invited to participate in the conferences and seminars of 
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various Muslim bodies, while an increasing number of Muslim villagers performed 
their haj in Mecca. During the years 1978 and 1980, for example, there was a total of 
4,498 moros performing their haj (Pangandaman 1983:248).4 As a result, Islamic 
consciouness among the Moros was manifested in a proliferation of Islamic 
institutions such as mosques, madaris, and Muslim associations. These Muslim 
institutions strengthen the sense of Moro nationalism and solidarity (Gowing 
1979:187). The term Bangsa Moro (Moro Nation) emerged as an identifying name 
for the native Muslims of Mindanao and Sulu. Some of the Moro Islamic institutions 
served to secure international contacts and to obtain assistance from the Muslim 
World (Pangandaman 1983:130-132,136). 
In 1983 there was a total of 987 Islamic schools (madaris) and 3,095 religious 
teachers ( ustaz) with 132,811 pupils in the thirteen provinces of the autonomous 
regions (Ministry of Muslim Affairs 1983:14).5 Most of these madaris offer Islamic 
courses that involve instruction in the Quran, the performance of rituals, and the 
basic principles of Islam. There are a few Muslim institutions of higher learning that 
provide advanced courses in Islamic studies. T~e Jamiatul Philippine Al-Islami in 
Marawi City and the Philippine Muslim College in Jolo are instances of such 
institutions. Certain madaris and institutions maintain close contacts with 
educational centres abroad. These contacts enable them to obtain occasional financial 
donations and scholarships from foreign nations. 
Some ustaz functioned not only as religious teachers in religious schools but as 
Muslim preachers (du-ah); most were recruited by the Islamic call centres of different 
4Two factors make a hajji respectable in the eyes of the Mor-0. village_!8. First, a hajji is 
viewed as a fortU:n-a:te individual in the sense--that God has honoured him to be among those 
who are able to fulfill all five essential religious duties. Secondly, most- hajjis on their return 
home are expected to improve their religious and social activities and habits and to become 
'better' persons. Such improvements gain respect from the people, though there are hajjis 
who are condemned for failure to act as expected. 
5Ustaz is an honorary title given to a teacher or muddarris. Traditionally, ustaz connotes a 
teacher with an Arabic-educated background who has attended local or foreign Arabic in-
stitutes. Presently, most teachers who teach in madaris are known as ustaz. 
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Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Libya and Kuwait, to preach the words of 
Islam in the Philippines. According to some preachers interviewed in Marawi and 
Cotabato cities in November 1984, there were more than one hundred Moro 
preachers, most of whom were graduates of universities in the Middle East, employed 
by various Muslim countries. Table 2.3 shows yearly salaries and allowances of Moro 
preachers working under various Islamic call centres. 
Table 3-2: Salary of a Moro Preacher Under Different Islamic 
Call Centres 
Islamic call centre 
and country 
Al-Awqaf, Kuwait 
Al-Awqaf, Qatar 
Al-Azhar, Egypt 
Darul-Ifta, Saudi Arabia 
Darul-Kaarif, Saudi Arabia 
Islamic Call Soc~ety, Libya 
Estimated annual salary and allowance 
(US$) 
6,000 
3,000 
2,400 
3,750 
3,000 
3,150 
Rabitat Al-Alam Al-Isla.mi, saudi Arabia 3,750 
--
Source: (Interviews several Muslim preachers in 
.Marawi and Cotabato Cities, November 1984). 
The revitalization of Islam has helped not only to heighten the religious 
solidarity of the Moros but also to sharpen the sense of 'difference' between them and 
Christian Filipinos. Moros prefer to be called 'Muslim' to emphasize their belonging 
to a different religion. They refer to the Manila government as 'the Christian 
government'c to which no true Muslims owe allegiance (Gowing 1962:62). They view 
their sultan and datus as representing an institution of Islam and interpret the 
government's refusal to recognize its authority as rejection of their religion. In a 
Preliminary Report of the Special Committee·to Investigate the Moro Problem, the 
Philippine !fouse of .Representative (1956:68) suggested: 
Any move to deny the authority of his sultan, or to curtail his freedom as 
an individual in a Muslim state would make him believe, in his own ignorant 
ways, that it is an affront on his religion. And he does not hesitate to do 
away with such curtailment even if it must cost his life. 
89 
The Moros, furthermore, became more articulate in defence of the faith as they 
became more knowledgeable about the doctrines and duties of Islam. Their concern 
was the preservation of their community and the elevation of their Muslim identity. 
' 
They remained little interested in national goals, despite the efforts of the 
government to promote 'Filipinism' among them. Moro leaders such as Senator 
Domocao Alonto of Lanao del Sur developed close associations with Muslim 
organizations beyond the Philippines and Muslim politicians were speaking about 
forming an Islamic party (Gowing 1979:187). This growing awareness of the need to 
defend Muslim community, and concern about Christianization prompted by religious 
missions and secular institutions which promoted Christian culture, were among the 
factors that triggered the Kamlon rebellion (Tan 1982:68).6 Another factor 
contributing to the Kamlon resistance, as revealed by Kamlon to Secretary of 
National Defence Ramon Magsaysay, was the fear of the changes which tended to 
benefit the Christian immigrants rather than th.e natives (ibid.:116). These changes 
deepened the Moro sense of deprivation. 
Deepen£ng Sense of Depr£vat£on 
As a young Republic, the Philippines was facing many challenges to 
nation-building. They included, for example, establishing economic viability, 
recovering from the devastation of the war, and coping with the predicaments of 
minorities. 
- -· 
6Kamlon, who led a rebellion against the Philippine government during the first half of the 
1950s, was a devout Muslim. He was-a hajji (a title which is conferred only-on those who have 
performed the ha3), well-versed in Quran reading, and a frequent contributor to the construc-
tion.of mosques (Tan 1977:114). With an estimated 300 followers and local supporters, Kam-
lon fought government troops from early 1951 to mid 1952. At the end of July 1952, he and 
fifty of his followers laid down their arms after. a series .of peace gestures, but they soon 
returned to the hills charging bad faith on the part of the government. Four months later, 
Kamlon and some of his followers surrendered and were sentenced to life imprisonment, but 
they were immediately granted parole and some 12,000 hectares of land in Tawi-Tawi. In 1953 
Kamlon went back to his armed struggle when he was charged with violating his parole. In 
1954 the government employed the Jolo Task Force (JOT AF) and the Sulu Air Task Group 
(SATAG) in an attempt to suppress the Kamlon disturbance. The government operations cost 
many Moro lives. Kamlon surrendered in 1955 and remained in prison until he was pardoned 
by President Marcos in 1968 (Tan 1977:115-117). 
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A multifaceted policy was devised by the Philippine government in the early 
post-independence period to promote social and economic development and to render 
permanent the political integration of the Moros. The instrument for carrying out 
' 
this policy was the Commission of National Integration ( CNI), established by the 
Congress in 1957 under Act No. 1888. The accomplishments of the CNI, however, fell 
far short of its objectives for reasons which included mismanagement of funds and 
suspicion of the government's real motives. The CNI was never well received by the 
Moros who feared that the true goal of integration and development was the 
destruction of Muslim identity (May 1984:429; cf. Tamano 1969). The government's 
limited concessions to the religious and cultural demands of Moro nationalism were 
seen as temporary expedients. 
Thus, Moro expectations about the benefits of participating in Philippine 
society as Muslims (Suhrke and Noble 1977:181) were shattered by their perceptions 
of real and imagined social and economic deprivation, increasing political 
disadvantage, competition with Christian migrants for land in their homeland, 
interference through the heavy hand of the government in__local affairs, and fear of 
Christianization (Gowing 1979:187). Such perceptions contributed to a deepening 
sense of alienation among the Moros and to the persistence of the resistance struggles 
and unrest in the region. 
In Sulu, for instance, the disturbances which were common in the postwar 
period were stimulated by factors related to socio-economic ills. The restriction of 
trade with Borneo, the occupation by Christians of available agricultural land, and 
strong competition from Christians in fishing resulted in limited opportunities for 
employment (cf. Philippine Senate 1963:5). It forced some desperate Muslims to turn -
to illegitimate employment such as smuggling and banditry;- As the government 
attempted to suppress them and other rebellious Muslitr..s, complaints of military 
abuses against innocent civilians became common. Moro resentment against the 
government for its general neglect of the province and the sense of deprivation 
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intensified. In 1961 Datu Ombra Amilbangsa introduced the Congress House Bill 
5682 calling for 'Granting and Recognizing the Independence of the Province of Sulu' 
(Gowing 1979:188). The bill produced no concrete result, but it symbolized the Moro 
' 
discontent. 
In Mindanao, migration and competition for land had been the major elements 
contributing to unrest. The Philippine government sought to relieve severe population 
pressure in Luzon and the Visayas by encouraging migration to Moroland (for an 
account of resettlement programmes, see Silva 1979:39-55; Gowing 1979:189-191). As 
table 2.2 indicates, the non-Moro population in Mindanao increased from 2,943,324 in 
1948 to 7,963,932 in 1970. The policy also offered solutions for political and economic 
difficulties of the north. For example, the resettlement of the landless Huks in 
Mindanao under the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) programme was partly 
to disengage the Hukbalahab Rebellion in Luzon (see Kerkvliet 1977). The 
concessions made to corporations and individuals for plantation production of export 
crops, logging, and mining benefited the national economy but brought little benefit 
to the Moros. 
On the contrary, migration, the occupation of lands by outsiders, and the 
goverment's land laws had serious negative social and economic consequences on the 
Moros. The newcomers were active commercially and politically. The economic 
disparity between Moros and Christian settlers became apparent. The communities of 
settlers became centres of trade linked by arteries of good roads, while the Moro 
communities remained isolated (Gowing 1979.~189)-The Philippine Senate Committee 
on National Minorities .(1971~22).J:eported that- u.p to 1971 there was not a single 
irrigation project in any municipality where Muslims- constituted a majority. In the 
words of George.{1980:122)~ 
Two decades after the Philippines became independent, Muslims in 
Mindanao were a devitalized people, their economic condition stagnant, 
their social traditions in jeopardy, their laws and customs in danger of 
disintegrating. 
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Faced with this threat, some Moros resorted to violence, and 'little wars' between the 
Christian settlers and the Moros mushroomed. One powerful force was a philosophy 
that was exclusively economic; another was deeply social-religious (ibid.:120). 
The conflict in Moroland deepened after Ferdinand Marcos became president in 
1965. The Moros were bitter about the so-called 'Jabidah Massacre' (see chapter 4) in 
March 1968 and viewed it as demonstrating the low regard the Marcos 
administration had for their lives. In May, Datu Udtog Matalam announced the 
formation of the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM). His avowed objective-was 
the creation of the Islamic Republic of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan (MIM 1968:1). 
The motives attributed to the organization of MIM included Matalam's anger at the 
Corregidor incident and his aversion to the deteriorating general socio-economic 
condition of the Moros (Noble 1976: 408-409). 
In the final analysis, the Moro resistance that occurred during the American 
regime may be seen as a natural response to foreign domination. 'Foreign 
domination,' states Smith (1971:66), 'is always perceived to be oppressive'. Apart 
from political and economic oppression, the struggles were motivated by the desire to 
preserve the Muslim community as a distinct entity having its own territory, political 
institutions and ethno-cultural integrity. Ibn Taymiyyah, a Muslim Philosopher of 
the thirteen to fourteenth centuries, suggested that 'the Muslims must maintain their 
distinct identity as a religious community and take extreme care not to merge 
themselves into other religious groups by imitating or associating themselves with 
their ways., customs, festivals,:. beliefs;- etc.'. (Khan .1973!36). For Islam, which is the 
guiding force of the community, is the raison d'etre of Muslim existence as a people. 
As a religion or ideology, it links Muslim lives to some larger and more enduring 
purpose and gives meaning to their existence. Any demand that this ideology be 
surrendered is intolerable. 'It would represent a kind of psychological death harder to 
contemplate than biological death' (quoted in Gowing 1977:323). It is this concept of 
'psychological death' and the jihad which promised Muslims great rewards in the 
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hereafter that rendered the Moros less discouraged by their defeats and loss of lives in 
defending the ummah. 
The Malay Resistance Movement 
Resistance to Thai Integration Efforts, 1899-194 7 
From 1899 onwards, Thailand under King Chulalongkorn (Rama V) gradually 
integrated its tributary states and outer provinces into the thesaphiban system of 
provincial administration (see chapter 2). The partial integration of some of the 
tributary states such as the Seven Malay Provinces (khaek chet huamuang) was not 
satisfactory to Thailand. It wanted to exert more control over such states in order to 
secure the Kingdom's territorial integrity against increasing pressure from France and 
Great Britain. It was also desired to ensure the provinces' loyalty and to exploit more 
effectively their revenue and manpower resources (Bunnag 1977:137). 
When the newly created Ministry of the Interior ( mahatthai) issued the 
'Regulations Concerning the Administration of the Area of the Seven Provinces', and 
when it became clear the position of local rulers ( chaomuang) would be replaced by 
Thai appointees, the Malay rajas turned to their Malay colleagues under the British 
for help. In 1901, Tengku Abdul Kadir Qamaruddin, Raja of Patani, appealed to Sir 
Frank Swettenham, the British governor of the Straits Settlements in Singapore, for 
intervention in Patani's grievances. London, however, chose not to interfere in 
Thailand's policies in Patani. Any interference from the British would have tarnished 
Thailand's role as a buffer state between French Indochina and British India. 
Moreover, the British had a plan to include the .Malay. .states of Kedah, Trengganu, 
Kelantan -arid Perlis:, which were Thailand's dependencies at the :time,. into her 
domain- (Pits:uwan 1982:31). The British naturally did not want to antagonize 
Thailand over the affairs of Patani. 
Failure to obtain support from Britain did not discourage the Malay leaders of 
Patani from continuing their opposition to the concerted effort of the minister of the 
interior to centralize the existing administration. The resistance was coordinated by 
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Tengku Abdul Kadir who attempted to organize a movement that could draw more 
oppressive measures from the Thais in order to spark violent uprisings against the 
policy of reorganization of the Seven Provinces (ibid.:51). 
The first collective resistance movement began when the Malay rajas refused to 
concede their power as chaomuang of the Seven Provinces. They ordered their 
subordinates to boycott all meetings with Thai authorities and directed· the newly 
assigned Thai-Buddhist bureaucrats in the provinces not to perform official functions. 
Joining the nobility in defying Bangkok were Muslim religious leaders who believed 
that submission to an un-Islamic regime without resistance was not permissible in 
Islam. In Saiburi, for example, religious leaders supported Tengku Abdul Kadir 
Nilebai (Phraya Suriyasunthornbowornphakdi), Raja of Saiburi, in protesting against 
the religious court being set up by the Thai aut."1orities. In Raman, religious judges 
and village headmen resigned in protest against the enchroachment of Bangkok. The 
Thai government had to resort to force to restore order (ibid.:54-55). 
Muslim resistance to Thai integration efforts failed, however. Tuan Tengah 
Shamsuddin, Raja of Legeh (Ra-ngae) was deposed from his posit-ion in 1901,and was 
exiled to Songkhla. The deposition of other rajas followed in 1902, but they were 
given fixed pensions as compensation. All functions of the Seven Provinces were 
gradually transferred to Thai bureaucrats (Haemindra 1976:203). The traditional 
state ritual of sending Bunga Mas (Flowers of Gold) to the Thai king every two and 
a half years to affirm their loyalty was no longer required because the Malay 
Provinces were then considered an integral part of the' Thai state. · Later; they were 
regrouped into four southern provinces. 
In 1903, Tengku Abdul Kadir, the former Raja of Patani, was arrested and sent 
to prison in Pitsanulok province. He was released after spendir.g thirty-three months 
in prison and having pledging to refrain from politics. Tuan Tegnah was permitted 
to return to Ra-gnae after having promised to comply with the government 
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'Regulations' (i"bid.:202-203). Despite their pledges, Tengku Abdul Kadir and his 
associates nevertheless managed to organize a series of resistance movements and 
uprisings in the region. 
Aside from the political transformation of the Seven Provinces from that of 
tributary municipalities to ordinary Thai provinces, the most important measure 
towards integration taken by Bangkok in this period was the replacement of the 
sharia and customary laws (adat) with Thai laws, except in matters concerning 
marriage and inheritance. Whereas administrative and financial measures caused 
strong resentment among the former ruling class whose power and interests were 
directly affected, the abolition of the shar£a and adat stirred the deepest feelings of 
the Muslims in general, for every Malay-Muslim considers that his religious 
commitments, which are based on the sharia and customs, are 'the axis of his whole 
existence, his faith is what he lives for and would quite willing to die for' (Geertz 
1968:111). 
During the reign of King Wachiravut (1910-1925), the resistance movements 
intensified· as the-· effect of Thai control over Malay society increased. Most of the 
unrest was essentially motivated by the desire to regain self-rule as a Muslim 
community. Indeed, from the very beginning of the incorporation of Patani into the 
Thai kingdom in 1902, Muslim resistance took both political and religious forms. The 
involvement of religious leaders in the struggles to regain the political power of the 
nobility was a case in point. Rebellions led by charismatic religious leaders, To' Tae 
in f910 and Hajji Bula in the following year, were furth~r instances, of-religious, 
hostilities (Ministry of Interior 1967:8). 
In 1915, Tengku Abdul Kadir retreated to Kelantan, which by then was under--
British rule (Nik Mohd. Salleh 1974:39-40). From there he continued to provide 
leadership for resistance movements with the assistance of the Raja of Kelantan, 
Sultan Muhammad IV. The most serious uprising inspired by Tengku Abdul Kadir's 
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efforts to resist Thai rule occurred in 1922 when the Thai government took another 
major step towards Muslim integration by promulgating the Compulsory Primary 
Education Act in 1921. The Act required all Malay-Muslim children to attend Thai 
' 
primary schools. It was introduced to promote the use of Thai language among the 
Muslims (Haemindra 1977:92). 
The Malay-Muslims regarded this act as part of a programme of 'Siamifying' 
the Patani people and stamping out their religion and culture. For them, it was 
crucial that their young children were not exposed to education that would divert 
their attention from the teachings of Islam. As a reaction to the government's 
enforcement of compulsory Thai education and to the alleged funneling out of the 
area of a large share of the revenues collected from among the Malays, the former 
Malay nobility and some religious leaders ordered the Muslim villagers of Ban 
Namsai, in Mayo district, not to pay taxes and rent on land to the Thai government. 
In 1922 the villagers of Ban Namsai clashed with the military and police forces. The 
rebellion resulted in many casualties and the execution of several Muslim leaders 
(Fraser 1966:203; Pitsuwan 1982:57-58). In the following year, Thai authorities w~re 
accused of closing the Muslim vernacular and Quranic schools, resulting in another 
outbreak of protests. These resistance movements required substantial Thai forces for 
their suppression. 
The outbreaks in 1922 and 1923 forced Bangkok to reassess its integration 
policy. King Wachiravut issued new guidelines for dealing with the Muslims in an 
attempt_to, lessen, conflict.fa the prQvinces. These were aimed mainly at redressing 
some -of the· government regulations ana practices that appeared inconsistent with the 
teachings of Islam. Taxation of the Muslim villagers was also minimized. Bangkok 
became aware of the emerging sense of Malay nationalism among the people in the 
northern states of Malaya and of their willingness to exter1d support to their 
bretheren across the border. More importantly, it was perceived that there was a real 
threat of losing Patani to Britain if policies of political and cultural integration 
towards the Muslims were carried out indiscriminately. 
97 
The government's approach of cultivating political loyalties through sustained 
efforts of economic development and political participation, particularly after 
Thailand underwent a constitutional change i:i 1932, gradually created a sense of 
' 
national belonging among the Malay-Muslims. Muslim willingness to participate in 
the Thai national political arena was demonstrated by the fact that three of four 
members of parliament elected in the four Malay provinces in the general election of 
1937 and 1938 were Muslims (Siamban 1985). Another illustration was the return to 
Thailand from Kelantan of Tengku Mahmud Mahyuddin, the youngest son of the 
former Raja of Patani. 
Some Muslim leaders believed that they could gam concessions from the 
government and maintain their Muslim identity by participating in the existing 
system, while others, who were doing so, sought to buy time until their bargaining 
power increased. The Patani leaders realized that they could no longer depend on the 
support they used to receive from their colleagues in the northern states of Malaya, 
due to the political control achieved by the British over them. In addition, Tengku 
Abdul Kadir, who had been the central figure in rallying support for Patani since __ 
1915, died in 1933. Indeed, a fifteen-year period (1923-1938) of less vigorous pursuit 
of cultural suppression by the Thais was matched by equally less forceful resistance 
by the Muslims. 
Under the ultra-nationalist government of Phibun Songkhram, from 1938 to 
1944, the relatively peaceful situation in the former Muslim provinces ended. 'The 
posture, .of restrained~ _-participation adopted by. the Malay-Muslims_ since the 
establishment of the parliamentary system had now turned to a policy of overt 
confrontation' {Pitsuwan 1982:90); as the government promulgated the Thai Custom 
Decree (Thai ratthaniyom} in-1939 in_an attempt to-change the cultu-ral practices of 
the minority communities and to refashion tlie soeial habits of the entire population. 
Under this decree, the Malay-Muslims were forbidden to dress in the Malay fashion. 
More significantly, the use of the Malay language and certain practices of Islam were 
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outlawed (Fraser 1966:203). In some cases, Muslims were compelled to worship 
Buddhist idols (Na Saiburi 1944; GAMPAR 1948:3). 
Phibun's policy of forced assimilation resulted in widespread resentment among 
the Muslims. Thousands left the region to find refuge in the Federation of Malaya 
and in Saudi Arabia. The refugees comprised largely the former ruling house and 
religious leaders ( GAMP AR 1948:6). After Thailand joined the Japanese and declared 
war against the Allies in 1942, Japan placed the former Thai dependencies, Kelantan, 
Trengganu, Kedah and Perlis, which were ceded to Britain in 1909, under Thai 
administration. The transfer brought immediate benefit not only to Thailand but also 
to Patani. The Muslims of Patani were once more able to renew their ties and share 
their problems with their brethren. 
Tengku Mahmud Mahyuddin took the opportunity to carry on his father's 
struggle. He returned to Kelantan to organize the Muslims of Patani who had become 
refugees in Malaya. At the same time, he joined the British and Malay anti-Japanese 
efforts _in order to_ gain _supp9rt from. them. Jn .. 1944 Tengku Abdul Jalal Tengku 
Abdul Muttalib, a member of parliament and son of. the late Raja of Saiburi, 
submitted letters of protest to the Phibun and Khuang governments regarding Thai 
policy of forced assimilation (Na Saiburi 1944). Disappointed with the result of his 
efforts, he left for Kelantan and joined Tengku Mahyuddin's struggle. 
At the close of the Pacific War in 1946, some Patani leaders hoped that 
Tha_i~a~d, would l>~ trea.t~d ¥- -~ defeated belligerent by the Wes tern Allies and that 
the former Muslim province~ (!f _ J>atani, Yala, Narathiwat and Satun might 
consequently become part of_ British Malaya. With that hope, Tengku Mahmud, 
Tengku Abdul Jc¥al, and other. Muslim leaders formed Gabungan Melayu Patani 
Raya or the Association -of Malays of Greater Patani (GAMPAR) in Malaya. At 
about the same time, Hajji Sulong bin Abdul Kadir bin Muhammad Al-Fatani, a 
renowned religious teacher and president of the Provincial Council for Islamic Affairs 
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(Majlis Agama Islam) also organized the 'Patani People's Movement' (PPM) in 
Patani. This was the beginning of a long difficult struggle for autonomy and 
independence that has persisted to the present day. 
Struggle for Autonomy after the Second World War, 1947-1959 
The attainment of independence by some subject peoples of Southeast Asia after 
the Second World War had aroused nationalistic aspirations among the Muslims in 
the region. The Patani Malay nationalists who resented Thai control over the four 
provinces organized GAMPAR in British Malaya with its principal offices in 
Kelantan, Kedah, Penang and Singapore. Although GAMPAR was headed by former 
princes, with Tengku Mahmud Mahyuddin as its president and Tengku Abdul Jalal 
as its deputy president, its aim was no longer to fight for the restoration of power to 
the former indigenous rulers. GAMP AR's main objective was to strive for irredentism 
of Patani with the Malay states on the peninsula. As the Sunday Tribune (14 March 
1948) reported, 'hundreds of Malay refugees from the southern provinces had held a 
meeting in Kota Bahru, Kelantan, and had unanimously decided to demand the 
separation of the four southern provinces from Siam and then linking them up with 
Malayan Federation'. 
In Patani, Hajji Sulong, Hajji Wae Semae Muhammad (president of a Muslim 
association of Patani called Semangat ('Zeal')), and one hundred other Muslim 
leaders mobilized the Patani Muslims under the banner of the PPM (Bangnara 
1976:106). The PPM was linked with GAMPAR and Semangat and was supported by 
different groups of Muslims. This was the first time that the leadership of a resistance 
movement of such magnitude was dominated by the religious elite. It marked an 
important change from the earlier struggle which was led largely by former 
aristocrats. 
On 3 April 1947 the PPM under the leadership of Hajji Sulong presented a set 
of demands to the government of Thavan Thamrongnavasawat (Whittingham-Jones 
1947). Its objective was to lay the foundation for an autonomous Patani state 
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consisting of the four Muslim provinces. On 9 September of the same year, incidents 
flared up in Kampung Belukar Samok, Bacho district, Narathiwat. Police units burnt 
the village, causing forty families to lose their homes (Bangnara 1976:100-101). On 16 
January 1948, Hajji Sulong and his associates, including Hajji Wae Semae, were 
arrested and charged with treason. Their arrest produced a strong reaction among the 
Malay-Muslims and in February uprisings erupted in several places; in one of these, 
eight policemen were killed in a clash with Muslim villagers near Kampung Resab, 
Patani (Straits Times, 5 and IO March 1948). 
The situation in Patani continued to deteriorate when Phibun returned to 
power on 8 April 1948. On 26 April 1948, a revolt occurred in Kampung Dusun Nyor 
in Ra-ngae district, Narathiwat. The revolt was believed to have been instigat'ed and 
organized by a religious teacher, Hajji Abdul Rahman (To' Paerak), and some 
nationalist leaders who fled from the destroyed Kampung Belukar Samok. These 
instigators included Hajji Mat Karang, Che Senik Wan Mat Seng, and Zakaria Lalo. 
The fight against Thai police forces, which lasted two days, cost many lives. It was 
estimated that 400 Malays and 30 policemen were killed in the battle (Bangnara 
1976: 120). It resulted, moreover, in the flight of some 2,000 to 6,000 Muslims to 
Malaya (Straits Times, 29 and 30 April 1948). The Dusun Nyor Revolt, as it was 
known to the Malays, was the most serious uprising since the arrest of Hajji Sulong. 
Although the Thai government succeeded in suppressing the revolt, the political 
situation in the provinces remained critical. An estimated 250,000 Patani Muslims 
signed a petition requesting the United Nations _to pre_side over the s_eparation of the 
four Muslim provil1ces _and its subsequent: irredentism with the newly-formed 
Federation of ~~_l_(lya (Far East~rn _$conorriic Reyie:w, 20-2~ J_µn~_198())_._Faced with 
this situation, the Phibun government declared a state of emergency in the Muslim 
area and sent three regiments· of special police to Narathiwat, ostensibly for the 
purpose of 'combatting the Communists' (S£ngapore Free Press, 28 July 1948). 
The Muslim leaders who fled to M~laya had rallied behind Tengku Mahmud, 
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the leader of GAMPAR. For his part, Tengku Mahmud made a series of appeals to 
the United Nations urging the Security Council to investigate Thai administration in 
Patani and to organize a plebiscite (Haemindra 1976:214). Strong protests were sent 
' 
to different international organizations such as the Asia Relations Organization and 
the Arab League. Calls for support were addressed to Muslim countries such as the 
states of the Arab League, Indonesia and Pakistan ( ibid.:224_). 
Meanwhile, Muslim unrest in the region received increasing publicity in the 
Malayan press. The Muslim demands for autonomy or irredentism with the 
Federation of Malaya were supported by active Muslim sympathizers in various 
states in Malaya. On the other hand, Britain denounced the Patani Muslim demands 
and, in November 1948, raided GAMP AR's office in Singapore (Suhrke 1975:197). 
-
British Prime Minister Attlee, who was eager to increase Thai rice exports, was not 
willing t;.o risk offending the Thai governmemt. He contented himself with making it 
understood that Britain expected a just solution to the Patani case (Thompson and 
Adloff 1955:161; Whittingham-Jones 1948). In January 1949 an Angl~ Thai 
agreement for joint -control of the border was made. With this tacit agreement, 
Suhrke. (1975:197) concluded, 'the irr~dentist-separatist conflict was effectively 
neutralized on the intergovernmental level'. 
The long-drawn-out trial of Hajji Sulong and his group ended on 24 February 
1949. The court dismissed charges of treason, but imposed a seven-year prison 
sentence upon them for slandering the government in pamphlets distributed to the 
local population (Haemindra~1976: 224)~ However, they were imprisoned for only 
forty-two months and were released in 1952 (Ministry of Interior 1967:10). Two years 
later, Hajji Sulong, Hajji W ae Semae and Che Sahak Yusof were requested by the 
police intelligence chief in Songkhla, Pol. Lt. Col. Bunlert Lertpricha, to report to 
him for consultation. On 13 August 1954 the three, together with Hajji Sulong's 
eldest son (as interpreter), went to Songkhla as requested; but they were killed in 
Songkhla (To' Mina 1980 and 1981). 
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With the condemnation of GAMPAR by Britain, the Anglo-Thai cooperation 
for joint control of the border, the execution of Hajji Sulong and his group, and above 
all the failure of the Malay leaders (whom Britair. accepted as representatives in the 
' 
1946-47 negotiations leading to the independent Federation of Malaya) to endorse the 
Patani case, the opportune moment for incorporation of Patani into Malaya seemed 
to have passed. This caused the Patani leaders and their Malay sympathizers to 
modify the irredentist aim. On the one hand, the irredentist problem would seem to 
have been contained. On the other hand, some Muslim nationalists and religious 
leaders felt that their goal had been modified and upgraded to a higher target with 
the hope of restoring the independence enjoyed by Patani in the olden times. Their 
new goal was also stimulated by a deepening sense of Islamic consciousness due to the 
resurgence of Islam. 
Deepening Sense of Islamic Consciousness 
Like the Moros, the Malay resistance struggle was enhanced by an atmosphere 
of religious and cultural awareness. Such atmosphere was stimulated by the 
resurgence of Islam in the Muslim World and by Patani's historical role as 'a cradle 
of Islam' in Southeast Asia. Patani was perhaps the most important region in the 
Malay peninsula in the 19th and early 20th centuries for religious education and 
scholarship and had the largest and most famous religious schools (pondoks) 
{Winzeler 1974:266). There are no records establishing when the first pondok in the 
region was founded, but among the earlier and more well-known pondoks were 
Pondok. Dala, Pondok Chuwuk, Pondok Berming, and Pondok Bendang Guchil 
{Interview, several ta' guru and ustaz in Patani and · Narathiwat provinces,. May. 
1985). 
Most of the earlier pondoks were established by religious scholars who had been 
trained at one of the three famous masjid {mosques): Al-Haram in Mecca, 
An-Nabawi in Madina and Al-Azhar in Cairo. These mosques, apart from being 
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places of worship, functioned also as institutions of le.Giing where selected uiama 
A 
(learned men) taught everything from the fundamentals of the Islamic religion to 
doctrine, Sufi mysticism, history and Arabic (see Hajji Salleh 197 4:89). It is believed 
' 
that pondoks were founded to follow the educational system of these acclaimed 
Islamic institutions. Apart from religious education, the objective of the pondok was 
to inculcate morality based on Islamic principles, such as the principle that every 
Muslim has a duty to cultivate rationality (aka/) and to avoid irrationality (na/su). 
Thus, pondoks were viewed as an institution which provided both Islamic knowledge 
and moral guidance. Furthermore, pondok education was a basic requirement for all 
aspiring to become religious scholars, persons who are influential and respected within 
the Patani Muslim community. 
Since the resurgence of Islam after the Second World War, pondoks and 
mosques in Patani increased in number. Although they were subjected to certain 
government controls (see chapter 6), they played a dominant role in strengthening 
the sense of Islamic consciousness and Malay identity. Table 3.3 shows the number of 
mosques and pondoks in the four Muslim provinces. 
Table 3-3: Number of Registered Mosque 
and Religious School in the Patani Region 
Province Mosque Religious School Religious teachers Student 
(1985) (1984} (1984} (1984) 
Patani 450 82 429 16, 132 
Narathiwat 382 55 393 11,161 
Yala 236 50 303 9,543 
Sa tun 118 15 90 - 3,251" -
Tota.1· 1,186 202 1,215 40,087 
Source: (Education Region II 1984; Siamban 1985). 
In addition, many young villagers were sent abroad to continue their religious 
education. Some received scholarships from different Islamic institutions in the 
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Middle East. Meanwhile, more and more Muslim villagers made their pilgrimage to 
Mecca, enhancing their Muslim identification as they become hajjis. In contrast to 
the situation in Mindanao, however, very few foreign Muslim preachers came to 
' 
Patani, and fewer funds were provided by outside contributors. This was due to two 
factors: some Muslim countries were more satisfied with the level of Islamic education 
in Patani than they were with that of Mindanao; and, secondly, Muslim leaders in 
Patani were less well known internationally because most of them were not 
recognized by Thai authorities. The resurgence of Islam, nevertheless, had raised 
religious consciousness among Muslims in the region and sharpened the sense of 
'difference' between Malay-Muslims and Thai-Buddhists. Like the Moros, the Malays 
became more articulate in defence of Islam and more concerned with the preservation 
of their community. This was illustrated by Hajji Sulong's famous demands presented 
to the Luang Thamrong Government in 1947. The demands were: 
1. The appointment of a single individual with full powers to govern the 
four provinces ... this individual to be local-born in one of the four provinces 
and to be elected by the people. 2. Eighty per cent of government servants 
in the four provinces to profess the Muslim religion. 3. Malay and Siamese 
to be the official languages. 4. Malay to be the medium of instruction in the 
p-rimary schoolsL_ 5. Muslim law to be recognized and enforced in a separate 
Muslim court other than the civil court ... 6. All revenue and income derived 
from the four provinces to-be utilized within them. 7. The formation of a 
Muslim Board having full powers to direct all Muslim affairs under the 
supreme authority of the head of State mentioned in (1) (Whittingham-
Jones 1947). 
During 1958-1960, full independence of the region was justified by referring to 
the grandeur of Patani history and the teachings of Islam. Books to this end, such as 
History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani by Ibrahim Shukri and Light of Security 
by Hajji Sulong were published. Leaflets were widely distributed to the villagers to 
raise their political consciousness. Indeed, the provinces continued to be beset by 
Muslim activists whose -objective- was no longer to. become part of the Federation of 
Mai.aya but to gain complete independence. By the end of 1959, a national liberation 
movement was organized by Tengku Abdul Jalal, the former deputy head of 
GAMPAR (BNPP 1981a:5). The organization was called Barisan Nasional 
Pembebasan Patani (BNPP) or National Liberation Front of Patani. 
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The Moro and the Malay Resistance Movements Compared 
An examination of the history of Moro and Malay resistance movements reveals 
some striking similarities. For one thing, the two had comparable political objectives: 
' to resist the incorporation and integration of their communities into the Philippine 
and Thai political systems. The roots of resistance lay in the establishment of Muslim 
sultanates in Sulu in 1450 and in Patani in 1457, which led to the emergence of new, 
distinct Muslim communities. The Moro resistance to Spanish subjugation, the 'Moro 
Wars', began in 1565 and lasted till 1898 when the American conquest of Mindanao 
took place. The Patani resistance to Thai efforts to subjugate it also started at the 
close of the sixteenth century and continued until the end of the nineteenth century 
when Patani was formally incorporated into the kingdom of Thailand. 
There were, however, differences in the circumstances of the two areas. While 
Spain succeeded in containing Islam, in Patani Islam continued to flourish. Though 
Thailand managed from time to time to reduce Patani to vassalage, Patani was 
considered to be one of the Islamic centres in Southeast Asia in the nineteenth 
century. This -is partly because-Thailand's interest was mainly in the expansion of her 
political domain, whereas the goals of the Spaniards in the Philippines were to gain 
both territory and religious converts. 
There were also differences between the two struggles in that the Moro 
resistance movements, especially in the 20th century, often confronted both the 
government and separate local Christian forces. The Malays, on the other hand, 
seldom engaged with forces other than those of the government. This ~~y be exlained 
by the social dichotomy and enmity between the Christians and the Muslims in 
Mindanao which resulted from Spanish a·nd American colonial policies, particularly 
migration policies during the American and the Philippine rules. Thus the Moros, as 
compared to the Malays, seemed to face larger forces and more protracted battles 
throughout the history of their resistance. 
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The Moros and the Malays perceived their resistance efforts as both political 
and religious, and thus political and religious leaders were often involved in the 
movements. Moreover, both leadership groups believed that their involvement was to 
comply with the teachings of Quran and Hadith (the Proph~tic traditions) 1 In 
Thailand, religious leaders gradually dominated the Patani resistance movements as 
the former nobility lost their influence among the Malay villagers. The traditional 
political leaders in Mindanao, however, remained strong and continued to lead the 
resistance. 
During the first quarter of this century, the Moros fought to retain their power 
and to prevent their incorporation into the Philippine state, while the Malays strove 
to regain the power they had lost by virtue of the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909. It 
was not -until after 1920 that the government of Moroland was under the Christian 
Filipino administration created by the American 'Filipinization' policy. And the 
actual inclusion of the Moro community into the Republic of the Philippines occurred 
in 1946. This time factor is not insignificant. The longer the community is 
incorporated, the greater the opportunity the government has to cope . with its 
integration problems. Perhaps it· was because of the· time factor, among other things, 
that Thailand appeared to be more successful in dealing with the Malay resistance 
activities than the Philippines was with the Moros. It is also perhaps relevant that 
the deepening sense of deprivation which we have described for the Moros was not 
paralleled in Patani. The formation of the BNPP at the end of the 1950s was not so 
much a reaction to Thai government actions against Patani but a result of the 
demonstration effect. from the neighbdtirlng- Malay nations; ·Indonesia and Malaysia,. 
which gained their independence in this periOd. 
The. ability and- capaeity of the Moro- and the Malay communities to resist 
integration were affected substantially by external intervention and by· the internal 
1 There are fifty-four verses in the Quran on matters concerning jihad (fighting in the ca.use 
of God), and there are a.t least 283 Hadith regarding the subject related by Al-Bukhari, one of 
the most authoritative sources on the Prophetic traditions. 
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characteristics of the Muslim societies. Failure to prevent incorporation was 
influenced, to a large extent, by the interv:-tion of the Western colonial powers: 
Jo. 
without the interference of th~ United States in Mindanao and of Great Britain in 
' Patani, the two communities might not have been set upon their present courses of 
history (see chapters 2 and 6). Also, the Moro and the Malay societies were 
characterized by internal disunity. In the case of the Moros, the absence of 
cooperation and coordination among various resistance forces was compounded by the 
existence of different ethno-cultural groups within the Muslim community. Although 
there was no ethnic division within the Patani society, cleavages between religious 
and non-religious leaders and within the religious leadership group, especially between 
traditional and non-traditional religious leaders, contributed to the disunity of the 
resistance units. Furthermore, some Muslim leaders were willing to collaborate with 
the government for personal interests. 
Another similarity of Muslim resistance in the two countries was that the 
movements persisted and became transformed. Their persistence was primarily the 
resp·onse to continued integration efforts which threatened-their Muslim identity. The 
extent of this response seems to have corresponded with the degree of repressiveness 
of government policies. Both the Moro and the Malay resistance movements changed 
over time, depending on internal and external intervention and stimuli, from 
unorganized resistance movements to highly organized fronts demanding autonomy or 
independence, and from organized fronts to qualified participation. 
The most outstanding parallel between the two Muslim movements, how~ver, is 
that Islam became the primary rationale for their resistance to integration. This will 
become more evident as we discuss the contemporary separatist movements of the 
Moros and the Malays in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER4 
MUSLIM SEPARATISM: THE MOROS 
AND THE MALAYS 
108 
In the prev10us chapter it has been shown how the Moro and the Malay 
resistance struggles developed. It described the early manifestation of political and 
religious antagonisms which grew to full-fledged organized separatist fronts as the 
governments at the centre pursued their policies of integration. This chapter looks 
more closely at the outcome of these processes. More specifically, it examines the 
characteristics of the separatist movements and the role of Islam as a source of 
inspiration and legitimacy. 
The Moros 
The war between the Moros and the Marcos government started approximately 
a month after the declaration of martial law in September 1972 (Noble 1976:405). 
Like other Moro wars in the past four centuries, it was motivated by an endeavour to 
defend Islam, bangsa {nation), and homeland. The war was precipitated by the 
government's acceleration of integration programmes during the 1950s and 1960s that 
brought significant numbers of Filipino Christians into Mindanao {see chapter 3 ). 
Among the immediate significant events that led to the f<?rmation of organized fronts 
and to the war of liberation were the Jabidah Massacre (Corregidor Incident) in 1968, 
the Manili Massacre in 1971, elections of 1971, and the declaration of matial law in 
1972. 
Details of the Jabidah Massacre are less than clear because of conflicting 
reports. However, between twenty-eight and sixty-four Moro recruits out of a large 
number undergoing guerrilla warfare training in Corregidor Island were massacred in 
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late March 1968 by Philippine Army men. The Training was allegedly m secret 
preparation for Philippine military operations in Sabah-code named 'Operation 
Merdeka'. 'Operation Merdeka', as explained by some Moros, was an attempt by 
' Manila to split Islamic ranks and provoke a war between Sulu and Sabah. The cause 
of the execution was never made public by the Philippine government. According to 
the lone survivor, Jibin Arola, the 'trainees were shot because they refused to follow 
the order to attack Sabah' (quoted in Jubair 1984:73). Knowing the possible impact 
of the leakage of this secret plan, the military authorities executed the entire 
company so that none survived to tell the story (ibid.; see also Lucman 1982). The 
Jabidah Massacre had two important political consequences. First, the Moros were 
angered at the disregard for their lives shown by the Marcos government. Secondly it 
inflamed the Malaysian government of Tunku Abdul Rahman, which, having made 
compromises to Marcos' desire to establish diplomatic relations, saw itself 'stabbed in 
the back' by the Philippines (Noble 1983:46) which not only pursued Macapagal's 
claim to Sabah, but also trained the Moros to 'invade' it (the Philippine claim to 
Sabah is discussed in chapter 6). Two months after the Jabidah incident, Datu Udtog 
Matalam founded the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM). Its manifesto 
(Appendix C) accused the government of pursuing a policy of 'extermination' of the 
Muslims. The Malaysian government of Tunku Abdul Rahman responded to the 
incident by promising the Moro leaders, especially Rashid Lucman, to help train and 
to provide arms to the dedicated young Moros (Lucman 1982:2). In 1969 the first 
group of young Moros (comprising sixty-seven Maranaos, eight Maguindanaos and 
fifteen Suluanos), who were recruited by Lucman and the MIM, were sent to Malaysia 
for military training. 
From mid-1970 to 1971, violence began to erupt in Lanao del Norte, Cotabato 
and Lanao del Sur between Muslims and Christian settlers. The Muslim groups, 
identified as 'Barracudas' and 'Blackshirts' were allegedly linked with Congressman 
Ali Dimaporo in Lanao del Norte and with the MIM in Cotabato, respectively. The 
Christian groups known as 'Ilagas' ('rats') were allegedly linked with Governor 
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Arsenio Quibranza of Lanao del Norte and with Hongo settlers, Tiruray tribal people 
(see Schlegel 1979b) and Constabulary units in Cotabato. By the end of 1970, 
fighting between these rival groups had resulted in many casualties, disruption of the 
' 
economy, and mass evacuation. More than 30,000 Muslims, Christians and Tirurays 
had been forced to leave their farms (McAmis 1974:46; Stewart 1972). 
The most publicized incident after the Jabidah Massacre was the Manili 
Massacre. It occurred in June 1971 when about sixty-five Muslims, men, women and 
children, were murdered by Ilagas at a mosque in Barrio Manili, North Cotabato. To 
the Muslims, the Manili incident carried special weight because it took place in a 
mosque compound. It was seen as an act of religious humiliation. As Ali Treki of 
Libya stated, 'we believe the conflict is now a religious war' (Philippines Herald, 8 
July 1972). When the late Libyan Information and Foreign Minister, Saleh 
Bouyasser, was informed about the killing of the Muslims during his visit to the 
Philippines in 1971, he took the initiative to meet the Moro leaders. It was as a result 
of this meeting that, on the one hand, Bouyasser recommended to his government 
that it should help the Moro people, and, on the other hand, a declaration of unity 
was signed among different groups of Muslim leaders. Cries of 'genocide' began to be 
heard from Moro leaders. 
The hostilities between the Muslims and Christians in the region escalated 
greatly as the November 1971 election drew near. The number of evacuees on both 
sides increased to 50,000 (Gowing 1979:194). When the elections were over, political 
power in parts of Moroland had shifted from Muslims to Christians. This shift 
stimulated the two sides to increase their hostilities and thus attracted the attention 
of overseas Muslim states (Noble 1976:410; Gowing 1979:195). In 1972, the 
atmosphere in Mindanao was tense as sporadic clashes between Ilagas and Philippine 
Armed Forces, on the one hand, and Barracudas aud Blackshirts, on the other, 
occurred here and there. 
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The imposition of martial law on 21 September 1972, together with the 
government's attempt to disarm the populace, precipitated the 'war of liberation'. As 
Noble (1976:411-412) summarized it: 
Marcos' declaration of martial law broadened the base of support and 
determined the timing of the resort to warfare by the core-group of Muslim 
radicals. Three characteristics of martial law were critical. First, the 
centralization of the regime left power almost exclusively in 'Christian' 
hands: Marcos, his family and associates; 'technocrats' in Manila; and the 
military. Second, by restricting the range of legitimate political activity the 
regime left as options only the acceptance of the regime and its promises, or 
anti-regime revolutionary activities. Third, the regime's immediate moves to 
collect guns from civilians meant that compliance removed the potential for 
an eventual resort to force. Thus both Muslims who had been frustrated 
under the old system but had been able to channel their frustration into 
nonviolent political activities, and opportunists ready to seize any chance to 
achieve immediate goals--for power, wealth, or pride--became willing to join 
the radicals. 
a 
The Moro war of liberation began in the lslmic City of Marawi1on 24 October 
A 
1972 when a force of several hundred men (comprising seven different groups of 
Maranao youths led by traditional and secular elites) attacked the headquarters of 
the Philippine Constabulary in the city and seized the Mindanao State University 
campus (McAmis 1974:52-53; Hermosa 1980:7-8). The rebels appealed for Muslim 
support by reasoning that 'since the Spanish times the government of the Philippines 
had always been against the Muslims and that it is necessary to overthrow the 
government so that there would be no rest;rictions on the practice of Islam' (Gowing 
1979:196). The clashes between the government forces and the Moro groups lasted 
twenty-four hours. The government regained control of the city and the rebels 
withdrew to the hills. The unrest subsequently spread into rural and urban areas 
throughout the Moro provinces; and th«! Moro liberation struggle began. 
1on 15 April 19801 the Sangguniang Pampook approved the Marawi City government's 
proposal to change the name Marawi City into Islamic City of Marawi. 
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As the issue of the Muslims in the Philippines captured the attention of leaders 
m various Muslim countries, the Islamic Directorate of the Philippines (IDP) was 
organized (after the visit to Mindanao of the Libyan Foreign Minister Bouyasser) to 
serve as a centre for receiving assistance for the Moros. The IDP's organizers were Dr. 
Cesar Majul (chairman), Macapanton Abbas (secretary), Senator Domocao Alonto, 
Senator Mamintal Tamano, Congressman Salipada Pendatun, Congressman Ali 
Dimaporo, Congressman Rashid Lucman, Datu Mama Sinsuat, Sultan Amilkadra 
Abubakar, Mrs. Zorayda Tamano, Abdul Karim Sidri, Musib Buat, Farouk Carpizo, 
and Nur Misuari. They signed a declaration of unity which 'declared the readiness of 
the Muslims to defend Islam, the Homeland and their people against all forms of 
agressions against the Ummah' (MNLF 1982:7). 
The Moro Liberation Fronts: MNLF, BMLO, MILF, and MORO 
There exist five -Moro underground groups currently active in the southern 
Philippines: the Misuari and Pundato factions of the Moro National Liberation Front 
(MNLF); the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization (BMLO), recently renamed 
Bangsa Muslimin Islamic Liberation Organization (BMILO); the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF); and the Moro Revolutionary Organization (MORO). In 
order to understand the essence of the Moro struggle, it is essential to investigate how 
the fronts have emerged. 
Emergence of the 1\!!NLF 
The u_ncertainty and fears generated in the aftermath of the Jabi-dah Massacre 
in 1968 created a new urge among the Moros to search for alternatives to secure the 
ummah. To the Moros, the Filipino Christian government had proved to be 
insensitive to their demands and unwilling to ensure protection of their lives (Asani 
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1985:306). Amid this state of uncertainty many organizations emerged, including the 
MIM, Ansar El-Islam and Union of Islamic Forces and Organizations. The MIM 
aimed at bringing together the Moro provinces as an independent Muslim state. It 
had the effect of raising the Moro struggle to a more advanced level. But its strength 
was limited because the organization revolved around only a few aristocratic political 
leaders. The MIM disintegrated when Datu Matalam surrendered to the government 
in December 1972. 
This period also saw Muslim youths and student activists beginning to assert 
their demand for better treatment of the Moro people. For example, Nur Misuari, 
who later became chairman of the MNLF, was an officer of the Kabataan Makabayan 
(Patriotic Youth), a radical student group in Manila which applied a Marxist analysis 
to the Philippine situation and advocated a revolutionary struggle against feudalism, 
capitalism and imperialism (Shoesmith 1983). Macapanton Abbas, who later served 
as sectetary of the BMLO, was leader of the National Union of Students of the 
Philippines (NUSP) from 1967-1969; Salamat Hashim, who became chairman of the 
MILF, was one of the active leaders of the Philippine Students' Union in Cairo; he 
returned_ to the _Philippines in 1970 with the intention of working to restore Islam 
among the Muslims (Giang 1976:7; Jubair 1984: 77-78). 
The MNLF was formed in 1969 by a group of young secular-educated Moros 
who were among the recruits sent to Malaysia for military training. During their 
training, a seven-member committee of the front, with Nur Misuari as chairman and 
Abul Khayr Alonto as vice-chairman, was organized without the knowledge of Sultan 
Lucman and other leaders who recruited them. This was because the younger 
generation of Moro leaders like Nur Misuari, Otto Salahuddin and Ali Alibon wanted 
to dissociate the MNLF from- the traditional aristocratic elites- whose leadership was 
viewed as feudal and as 'a party to the oppression being waged against the Bangsa 
Moro people' (George 1980:201-202). 
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At the convention of the Moro Youth National Assembly in Zamboanga City, 
as mentioned above, Misuari and other younger generation leaders agreed to a 
resolution that the Moros would strive for 'a federal state' and they stood as 
candidates in the elections for the delegates to the constitutional convention of 1971. 
This suggests that the MNLF leaders were at this stage not ready to expose their own 
front. Instead, they attempted to pursue their struggle through legal channels and to 
test their strength against the traditional leaders by contesting the elections. They 
failed to win the contest. 
Having arranged the foreign training, Congressman Sultan Rashid Lucman 
organized the BMLO when the first batch of ninety trained guerrillas returned to 
Moroland in 1970 (BMLO 1978:1). The BMLO considered itself to be an umbrella 
organization of all the liberation forces. Sultan Rashid Lucman was head of the 
Supreme Executive Council, Macapanton Abbas secretary, Udtong Matalam Jr. head 
of Military Committee for Kotawato, Ab .ul Khayr Alonto for Ranao, and Nur 
..... 
Misuari for Sulu (MNLF 1982:7). Misuari and Alonto used the BMLO as a 
.. foundatfon in strengthening the MNLF. 
The unity of the Moro leaders seemed to have been achieved at least 
temporarily after the Islamic Directorate of the Philippines (IDP) was formed in 
1971. Sultan Abdul Rashid Lucman, Senator Domocao Alonto and Senator Salipada 
Pendatun went to Libya as representatives of the Moro people and met Muammar Al 
Qadhafi to secure Libya's assistance to the Moros. Qadhafi then promised them that 
he would provide ,-all forms of assistance' to the liberation movement (ibid.). ·· 
After martial law was declared in September 1972, Macapanton Abbas went to 
Jeddah to present the Mere case to the OIC. He submitted a 200-page rePQrt _()n the 
Moro struggle to Tunku Abdul Rahman, the OIC secretary general. In about the 
same period, Misuari went to Libya to follow up the promises of the Libyan 
government. He took this trip as an opportunity to introduce the MNLF to the Moros 
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and Muslims abroad. Soon after Misuari returned to Libya, Salamat Hashim joined 
him and other MNLF leaders. Together, they were able to convince the Libyan 
officials, who came to Sabah to deliver financial assistance to the Moro movement, 
that the assistance should be given to the MNLF. How they were able to do so is not 
clear. One can only speculate that perhaps a revolutionary government like that of 
Libya would rather see young energetic leaders like Misuari and his group, as opposed 
to the old traditional elite and politicians, lead a revolutionary struggle. 
Besides, the MNLF was ideologically more in tune with Libya More importantly, the reputation for 
probity of some old traditional elite and politicians was poor. Maybe the Libyans simply wanted their 
fund used effectively, rather than risk its being spent for personal schemes. The BMLO leaders, 
particularly Sultan Lucman and Macapanton Abbas, however, accused Misuari's group of 'betrayal' and 
'counter-revolution' (MNLF 1982:7; Lucman 1982:4-6). In Lucman's words (1982:4; BMLO 1978:1): 
I was informed later by Minister Saleh Bouyasser, while in Tripoli, that 
the letter sent to me was sent upon the instructions of President Qadhafi to 
meet Treki immediately in Sabah because he was bringing with him the 
money I requested. That money was amounting to US$3.5 millions. I was 
not able to meet Treki because Salamat translated the letter written in 
Arabic and upon knowing the contents, they, Misuari, Salamat, and some 
Sulu pseudo-leaders went to Sabah to meet Treki, informing Treki that I 
was not able to come because the Philippine government did not allow me to 
go out of the country but instead authorised the group to meet him, which 
__ was a lie. 
Be that as it may, the cleavage between younger generation and traditional 
aristocratic leadership groups finally came into the open. Misuari and his group 
moved to Sabah and then to Tripoli and officially formed the MNLF Central 
Committee (see table 5. 7). The front issued its manifesto (Appendix D) on 28 April 
1974. With financial assistance and arms supplied from Libya and Sabah, the MNLF 
began to take overall charge of the armed conflict in Moroland by-providing weapons 
and other supplies to the Muslim groups which were already at war with government 
forces and to those who wanted to join the struggle. At the same time, it exerted its 
efforts to gain recognition from the OIC. In a way, the MNLF was· viewed by 
repressed Muslims, who needed a front as instrument to fight the encroachment of the 
Filipino Christians, as a vehicle of jihad. 
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While the MNLF carried out its armed struggle, the BMLO leaders, Sultan 
Lucman, Macapanton Abbas and others, who failed to secure assistance from Libya, 
agreed to 'co-operate' with the Marcos government. They argued that their purpose 
was 'to inject the rationale of the Moro struggle into government policies in order to 
lay the basis of the legitimacy of the Bangsa Moro Struggle' (MNLF 1982:9). For 
example, in 1973 Macapanton Abbas, Gibril Ridha, Napis Bidin and others joined the 
Presidential Task Force for the Reconstruction and Development of Mindanao 
(PTF-RDM), created, among other things, to restore peace and order in the Moro 
region and to implement selective amnesty and rehabilitation ( ibid.:10; Mastura 
1984:248). In an attempt to promote further divisions within the Moro leadership, 
President Marcos acknowledged Sultan Rashid Lucman as the 'Paramount Sultan of 
Mindanao and Sulu' in May 1974. In June of the same year, Sultan Lucman and other 
Moro leaders organized a conference on 'Government Policies and Programs for 
Muslim Mindanao' which was financed by the government (MNLF 1982:11; Ansar 
El-Islam 1974:1~e conference, which was held at Mindanao State University on 
4-6 June 1974, adopted a resolution demanding autonomy. More significantly, the 
document of this resolution, which was signed by twenty thousand Moros, was 
attached to the report of the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission ( QMC) 2 to the 
meeting of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM) in Kuala Lumpur in 
the same month. It was this QMC report that became the basis for the Kuala 
Lumpur Resolution No. 18 (see Appendix J) urging the Philippine government to 
undertake a political and peaceful solution to the Moro problem through negotiations 
with the Moro leaders, particularly the MNLF (ICFM 1974). Since the conference 
was designed by Ma:niia' to 'draw support from Moro leaders, particularly t~aditional 
elite and Muslim government officials, its resolution demanding autonomy 
disappointed the government. As a consequence, President Marcos labelled Sultan 
Lucman and some other Muslim leaders as his opponents (MNLF 1982:11). In 1975 
2The OIC meeting in Libya in 1972 adopted a resolution to investigate the 'plight of the 
Muslims of Southern Philippines' and created the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission com-
prising Libya, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and Senegal. It was ratified by the Islamic Summit of 
1973. 
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Lucman, Pendatun and Abbas left the Philippines for Saudi Arabia where they 
attempted without success to unite with the MNLF. Abbas left behind him the 
PTF-RDM which was eventually incorporated into the Southern Philippines 
Development Administration (see chapter 6). 
At the Sixth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Jeddah in July 
1975, the MNLF under the leadership of Misuari was given formal recognition by the 
OIC, despite the fact that Lucman and Abbas were the ones who originally submitted 
the Moro case to the OIC under Tunku Abdul Rahman. The OIC was convinced that 
the MNLF was dominating the leadership of the Moro struggle. Resolution No. 18 of 
the Fifth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in Kuala Lumpur in 1974 urged the 
Philippine government to negotiate with representatives of the MNLF. Libya, which 
played an important role in the Moro movement, supported the MNLF, and 
President Marcos sent a delegation headed by his executive secretary, Alejandro 
" 
Melchor, to Jeddah in January 1975 to negotiate with the MNLF leaders. 
The MNLF was able to convert sporadic clashes between the Moros and the 
Marcos regime to a 'conventional war' which became the Philippines' most serious 
internal conflict since the Communist-led Hukbalahap rebellion of the late 1940s. 
The ability of the MNLF to escalate the war during 1973 and 1976 and to stalemate 
it was considered a significant success, though the toll of the war was tremendous. 3 
The MNLF gained international attention, particularly from member countries of the 
OIC, and forced the Philippine government to concede by signing the Tripoli 
Agreement (see chap_ter 6). The rapid ascendency of the MNLF, however, can be 
attributed not so much to effective organization as to a combination of factors. Prior 
3 According to Khan (1979:14-17), the Moros under the MNLF leadership were fighting 
against the Philippines armed forces of about 200,000 men in June 1976. Between 1969 and 
1976 the costs of war were considerable. In Cotabato, the death toll was -:?stimated at about 
20,000; the number of wounded at 8,000; and the number of displaced at 100,000. In Lanao 
provinces the figures were 10,000, 20,000 and 70,000; in Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, 10,000, 8,000 
and 100,000; in Zambaoanga 10,000, 10,000 and 40,000; and in Basilan 10,000, 8,000 and 
40,000 (cf. Hussin 1981:257-260; cf. Miranda 1985). There was hardly any Moro province that 
had not been effected adversely. The loss of properties was estimated to have cost from 300 to 
500 million pesos. 
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to the MNLF's take-over of the leadership of the struggle, the Moro resistance against 
the Marcos regime had been carried on by various independent groups, especially in 
Lanao, Cotabato, and Sulu. The MNLF's princioal contribution was to consolidate 
these existing forces. They included not only armed guerilla units, but also most of 
the villagers in the war-effected areas who seemed to be directly or indirectly involved 
in the struggle. The response of some Muslim countries to the plight of Muslims in 
Mindanao was also a major factor contributing to the front's success. 
But the MNLF's success was short-lived. Hopes for the implementation of the 
Tripoli Agreement were shattered. President Marcos insisted on holding a plebiscite 
on the essential provisions of the agreement itself. When the plebiscite produced the 
result he expected, Marcos 'implemented' the agreement as he chose (Noble 1984:9). 
The cease-fire collapsed and fighting resumed in late 1977. In March 1980, a 
spokesman of the Philippine foreign ministry issued a declaration renouncing the 
Tripoloi Agreement as 'null and void' (Misuari 1981:2-3; 1983a:3), though the 
government later denied this renunciation. In response, the MNLF officially 
announced the assertion of its original position of self-determination and 
independence at the Third Summit of the Islamic Heads of States in Mecca in 
January 1981 (Misuari 1981:4). The struggle of the MNLF continued. 
Organi"zati"on 
The uprismg of an unorganized mass determined to change the immediate 
circu_mstances of their Jives_ is a frequent event in the initial stages of revolutionary 
movements. A study of revolutionary _mot_ivation suggests that spontaneous forces of_ 
peasants, workers, students or minorities can be suddenly galvanized into collective 
action- by a wide variety of incidents and circumstances. The spontaneous actions of 
th.e mass are not necessarily aimed at revolutionary change, but may be aimed only 
at the redress of immediate grievances. It is the function of revolutionary 
organization, leadership, ideology, and subsequent events to provide the movement 
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with a more general purpose and revolutionary direction (Greene 1974:60-62). The 
role of organization, then, is essential to the realization of revolutionary goals. 
Spontaneity may indicate the potential power of revolutionary sentiment, but only 
organization can give it lasting consequence. 
From a conventional standpoint, the strength of revolutionary oranization is 
measured by the extent to which it institutionalizes the recruitment and training of 
its cadres, establishing mechanisms for their continuing indoctrination in the norms of 
the movement, maintains channels of communication that facilitate feedback from 
the rank-and-file to the leadership, and constructs functionally specific 
suborganizations charged with clearly defined tasks. A 'strong' revolutionary 
organization maintains a clearly established chain of command and has a minimum of 
factional conflict. And a revolutionary organization is likely to be strong if its 
ideology is a coherent and highly articulated system of values connected to 
prescriptions for revolutionary action. History is filled with instances of unsuccessful 
revolutions that failed to meet these criteria for revolutionary organization ( ibid.65). 
In the case of the Moro liberation organization, some: of th_ese criteria .are 
absent. The MNLF, for instance, did not experience the normal process of 
organizational development by which the machinery of organization becomes 
institutionalized. Instead, the front was created instantly as a regionwide network of 
organizations in an attempt to consolidate the various existing Moro forces that were 
fighting against the Marcos regime. Such organisation was not possible without the 
outside assistance of Muslim leaders such as Qadhafi of Libya and Tun Mustapha of 
Sabah. This external assistance contributed to the front's rapid ascendancy as well as 
to a dependence upon foreign support. 
It is unrealistic to suggest that the MNLF was a well structured organization, 
with a clearly established chain of command running from the top of the 
organization's hierarchy to the bottom, comparable to that of the National Liberation 
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Front of South Vietnam (NLF) (cf. Pike 1966). Even during its most active period, 
from early 1973 to late 1977, the effective structure of the MNLF was not as it was 
constituted on paper (Appendix E). 
The basic components of the MNLF organizational structure consisted of a 
central committee, headed by a chairman chosen among its memebrs, and provincial 
committees. The Central Committee, officially formed in Libya in 197 4, functioned 
as the 'executive' body of the front. It comprised about thirteen members (MNLF 
1982:12) and different bureaux or committees which performed various duties (cf. 
Noble 1976:412; cf. Hassan 1981:253-256). The identity of the Central Committee 
members was not generally known, except for certain senior leaders (see table 5.7). 
This was due to the nature of the underground movement, to the constant change of 
individual members, and to the fact that the Committee was run by a few 'strong' 
leaders. Unlike most conventional revolutionary organizations, the MNLF Central 
Committee operated outside the Moro homeland. Its leaders directed their efforts 
mainly at cultivating external support, leaving the task of fighting and organizing to 
local leaders. It was l~gely the achievement of the Central Committee that the front 
continued to receive support from certain Muslim countries and to be recognized by 
the OIC. 
In the homeland, provincial revolutionary committees were established in 
different Moro provinces. They were divided into three groups: Sulu, Kotawato, and 
Ranao. The grouping coincided with the three major ethno-cultural groups: Suluanos, 
Maguindanaos and Maranaos. Three strong leaders_oLthe front, Misuari, Hashim and 
Alonto (later Pundato), also came from the three respective ethnic groups. The major 
functions of the provincial committees were to consolidate the existing Moro armed 
groups within the province, to recruit and train Moro fighters, and to fight the war . 
.:Jut the border-lines differentiating Moro groups fighting under and outside the front 
remained fluid (Noble 1976:412). 
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Members of provincial and barrio committees and of armed units of various 
sizes of the Bangsa Moro Army (BMA) were regarded as members of the front. The 
members covered by such groups were estimated to have ranged from 15,000 to 
30,000. In addition, more than fifty per cent of the Moro population were claimed by 
the fronts to support their cause (Murad 1982; Pundato 1984). However, if one 
defines a member as one who signs an undertaking to the organization and thereafter 
regularly pays his subscription (cf. Duverger 1976:62-90), then the MNLF had no 
members. It had no formal system of registration or of any regular collection of 
subscription, except alms provided by villagers. On the other hand, Muslim villagers 
were viewed by the front as its members because they were potential active 
participants of the movement. Despite the fact that members of provincial 
committees and commanders of different armed units were men of different 
backgrounds, the majority of them were drawn from the leadership group that was 
dominant in their respective areas. Thus, in Lanao, committee members and unit 
commanders comprised largely traditional aristocrats whereas in Sulu they were 
commoners. In other words, the movement was led and supported by the local elite. 
The MNLF was a loosely· knit organization. It did not manage to bring into its 
structure all the Moro groups fighting the Marcos government or to control the 
behaviour of many groups under it (Noble 1976:415). The front was unable to 
construct a clearly established chain of command. 'One of the flaws in the MNLF 
leadership structure is that there seems to be a wide gap in communication between 
the Central Committee and the Field Commanders', writes Madale (1984:181). Each 
provincial committee acted on its own initiative. Links among them were also weak, 
though they occasionally· reinforced each other in battle. The Central Committee 
conteiit.ed Itself with-- setting broad policy outlines and organizing external support, 
leaving local leaders to make their own decisions. 
One of the difficult tasks confronting the movement was logistics. Its supply 
depot was in Sabah where weapons, military equipment and other supplies from 
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foreign supporters were received. From Sabah, weapons, ranging from carbines and 
rifles to machineguns and mortars, and other defence equipment were shipped to Sulu 
and Mindanao by sea. Some of the shipments failed to reach their specific 
destinations and Misuari was accused of distributing supplies in favour of Suluanos 
(Madale 1984:181; BMLO 1978:1; MNLF 1982:9). The difficulty, however, lay in the 
fact that adequate and efficient transportation and communication systems were very 
difficult to organize. Those who did not receive adequate supplies of arms from the 
MNLF sometimes managed to gain access to weapons from some government troops 
whose morale was low. 
At the height of its power, the MNLF's financial support came mainly from 
external sources. The government of Libya provided the largest share (Lucman 
1982:3-5; BMLO 1978:1) w_hile the Sabah state government of Tun Mustapha allowed 
the Moro fighters to be trained in Sabah and helped the front in soliciting and buying 
weapons. Another major external source of finance was the Islamic Solidarity Fund 
(Interview, officials of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, Jeddah, 25 and 26 
May 1986; Pundato 1984:1-5.).4 In addition, some government agencies, foundations 
and companies in Muslim countries contributed funds to the MNLF in the form of 
zakat (alms). Such support is legitimate and sanctioned by Islam; for it is obligatory 
for every Muslim to give zakat to, among others, ~hose who struggle in the name of 
Islam. Internal financial support to the movement was also mainly in the form of 
zakat. Many villagers provided their alms to the movement in kind, such as rice, 
crops and animals. 
The MNLF placed the responsibility for recruitment on the shpµlders of the 
provincial revoltionary committees. Recruitment into fighting units often involved 
the manipulation of religious and nationalist sentiments. Potential recruits were 
4The Islamic Solidarity Fund was one of the subsidiary organs of the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference. It was founded in 197 4 to meet the needs of Islamic communities by 
providing emergency aid and the wherewithal to build mosques, Islamic centres, hospitals and 
educational institutions. 
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reminded of their religious duty to participate in the jibad. As the Quran (IX:41) 
urges, 'Go ye forth {whether equipped) lightly or heavily, and strive and struggle, 
with your goods and your persons, in the Cause of God. That is best for you, if ye 
{but) knew'. They were also normally advised of their maratabat (honour) by a 
warning that 'a man who has lost his bangsa {identification with ancestors) has no 
maratabat'; and 'a man without maratabat is nobody' {Saber, Tamano and Warriner 
1974:233). Since the war was between two clearly defined groups, Muslims versus 
Christians, the screening process of recruitment was less complicated. Many young 
Muslim villagers who were willing to fight were given arms and basic military 
training. Some villages in the remote areas were converted into training camps. Many 
fighters and commanders were trained in Sabah. Selected individuals were also sent to 
Libya, Syria, Egypt, and training camps of the Palestine Liberation Organization 
{PLO). Recruitment was a relatively open and easy task. Many Muslims had been 
forced into fighting by the war itself {Noble 1976:414) and the Moros in general were 
strong in religious and nationalist sentiments. Indeed, the MNLF enjoyed popular 
support. Mass mobilization was usually undertaken not only by leaders of the front, 
but also by different leadership groups in the Moro communities. The strength of"the 
Movement therefore does not lie in the quantity of its armed recruits alone: the 
potential mass support when circumstances arise must also be taken into account. 
Fragmentation of the Movement 
The breakdown of the Tripoli Agreement shook the credibility of the MNLF 
leadership, allowing the cleavage which had always existed within the Front to 
emerge {Noble 1978:3-'4). Salamat Hashim's group was first to fissure from 
mainstream MNLF. The split began when Hashim, a member of the Central 
Committee and chairman of._the Committee for Foreign Affairs,- attempted to take . -· 
over the chairmanship of the MNLF by challenging Misuari at a meeting in Mecca in 
December 1977. The attempt was supported by Sultan Lucman of the BMLO, 
Domocao Alonto of Ansar El-Islam and Pendatun of the Muslim Association of the 
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Philippines (MAP). Misuari refused to recognize the election which resulted in favour 
of Hashim as chaiman; he discredited Hashim as incompetent and insubordinate and 
accused him of treachery to the MNLF (Noble 1978:5; George 1980:263). The MNLF 
leadership issue also became entangled in a wider intra-Arab dispute. While Egypt 
was in favour of Hashim, Qadhafi described him a:ii.gent of President Sadat. In his 
A.. 
letter to the Secretary General of the OIC, Dr Gaye, Hashim (1977:2) gave the 
following reasons for the take-over: 
Mr Misuary, who assumed the MNLF Central Committee Chairmanship, 
plunged the MNLF in a deep leadership crisis, due to multifarious reasons 
among which are: 'I. The MNLF was being manipulated away from Islamic 
basis, methodologies and objectives and fast evolving towards 
Marxist-Maoist orientations. 2. Instead of evolving towards harmonized, 
unified and collective leadership the Central Committee has evolved into a 
mysterious, exclusive, secretive and monolithic body, whose policies, plans, 
and decisions and dispositions--political, financial and/ or strategic--became 
an exclusive preserve of Nur Misuari ... 3. This mysterious, exclusive, and 
arrogant nature of the MNLF leadership resulted into confusion, suspicion 
and disappointments among the members of mujahideen in the field 
resulting in the loss to the cause of a great number of fighters'. 
In March 1984, Hashim's faction became a separate organization called the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) (Personal communication with Muammar Qutb, 
Head of the MILF_i_n Mecca~ Saudi Arabia, 29 March 1984). It saw no hope for future 
control of the MNLF leadership or for reconciliation with the Misuari faction. In 
addition, Hashim, a religious-educated aristocrat, wanted to emphasize the Islamic 
orientation of his group by detaching it from the MNLF which be regarded as a 
left-leaning organization. 
In March 1978, Abul Khayr Alonto, vice-chairman of the MNLF, and his 
followers surrendered' 'to the gove-rnh:i.ent. One of the reasons given was that Misuari 
had :r~itioved himfroir1 t'f1e MNLF -Ce~tral Coiriinittee because he w~not in favour of 
Misuari's manoeuvering for complete independence (George 1980:263; NMRC-MNLF 
1978:1-8). Perhaps Alonto, as an aristocrat, also disagreed with Misuari's persisting 
view on the need for revolutionary change of Moro traditional society. The exit of 
Hashim and Alonto gave the opportunity for Dimasankay Pundato, chairman of 
Ranao Revolutionary Committee, to be promoted to vice-chairman of the MNLF. 
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In March 1982, however, Pundato announced the formation of the MNLF 
Reformist Group. Before his announcement, Pundato and some forty-four others 
submitted a nine-point reform proposal (Appendix F) to Chairman Misuari. The 
proposal was rejected, and Pundato and his men were dismissed from the Front 
(Interview, Commander Iqra Shiekh Mokhtar, Chairman, Ranao Sur Revolutionary 
Committee, Lanao del Sur, 17 December 1985). In June of the same year, the 
Reformist Group met in Tawi-Tawi and adopted resolutions rejecting Misuari's 
leadership and calling for autonomy instead of independence (Appendix G ). 
The BMLO re-emerged following the breakdown of the Tripoli Agreement. 
Rashid Lucman saw the possibility of forging unity among the different Moro forces. 
In December 1977 the BMLO signed the 'Declaration of Principles and Covenant of 
Unity' with the Hashim faction, Ansar El-Islam and the MAP (BMLO 1978:1; 
Lucman 1982:7). This lasted until April 1978 when Hashim failed to join Lucman and 
Pendatun (the leader of MAP) in an attempt to initiate unity talks with Misuari's 
faction during the Ninth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in Dakar, Senegal 
(Lucman 1982:6; George 1980:262). In 1_~79 an effort, assisted by the World Muslim 
League (WML), to establish a united front between the BMLO and Misuari's and 
Hashim's groups also failed. The most publicized unity attempt was made under the 
auspices of World Muslim Congress (WMC) in January 1983 in Karachi, Pakistan. 
The effort again failed because the so-called 'Peace and Unity Dialogue of Filipino 
Muslims' was dominated by traditional elite, Muslim officials of the Autonomous 
Regions, and a number of surrenderees (WMC 1983). The leaders of the three major 
factions--Misuari, Hashim and Pundato--boycotted the meeting. In his telegram to 
Habib Chatti, the OIC secretary general, Misuari (1983b:l) wrote: 'this meeting if 
pushed through will undermine Islamic Conference's peace mediations to solve the 
problem of our· people .. ;. MNLF therefore condemns this undue interference i11 _our 
internal affairs most vigorously'. The Karachi meeting was the last unity attempt 
attended by Rashid Lucman and Salipada Pendatun. They died in 1984 and 1985 
respectively. 
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Why did these unity efforts among different groups of Moro forces fail? 
Basically, every attempt at unity has been seen as benefitting one group more than 
another. Unity has been attempted among groups of unequal strength and the 
stronger group has seen no advantage in uniting on an equal basis with weaker 
groups. Disunity within the Muslim world has also contributed to the difficulty of 
uniting the Moros. 
Disunity or factionalism however is a source of strength as well as weakness. 
While factionalism weakens the struggle in many ways, it also provides a spirit of 
competition among the factions. Each group seems to try hard to strengthen itself by 
concentrating on building camps and organizing recruits. Although military activities 
have been reduced to sporadic clashes, each major faction should be better prepared if 
'war' should return to Sulu, Cotabato and Lanao. 
If ideology is defined as 'a blueprint for an alternative social system, a goal for 
which men can risk their lives in violent combat' (Enloe 1973:232), then Islam must 
t-o\.\Js,\iW\<;,I 
be the only foundation of ~ i~eology. For there is no social system other than 
Islam for which Muslims are allowed to die. All Moro liberation forces, except the 
MORO, are founded on a similar basis of ideology--Islam. Furthermore, Islam has 
become the national identity of the Moros; it is the most powerful symbolic means of 
mobilizing support and of legitimizing sanctions for revolutionary action. But despite 
their similar ideological foundation, the fronts bear their own distinct characteristics. 
The Misuari-led MNLF, for instance, is known as a 'left-leaning' nationalist faction 
because of its uncompromising commitment to revolutionary armed struggle against 
Manila domination of Moroland; because some of its leaders have advocated 
egalitarianism and because of Misuari's early links with Kabataang Makabayan; and 
because the group has chosen to maintain close ties with Muslim revolutionary 
governments such as Libya, Syria, Iran and Algeria. Leaders and supporters of 
Misuari's group come largely from non-aristocratic nationalists and young activists. 
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The Manifesto of 1974 (Appendix D) commits the MNLF to a war of national 
liberation aimed at establishing 'an independent Bangsa Moro Republik' and to 'a 
democratic system of government which shall not allow or tolerate any form of 
exploitation and oppression of any human being by another or of one nation for 
another' .. In the words of Nur Misuari (1984:~7), 
The armed struggle of the MNLF is a revolution for national salvation 
and human justice .... Like the struggle of our forefathers, our armed struggle 
today is a jihad for national salvation from colonialism, except that while 
they fought off external aggression, today we are fighting against colonial 
injustices, exploitation and tyranny imposed from within ... And it goes 
without saying that the MNLF and the Bangsamoro Revolution are fighting 
for justice, as our cause is just and legitimate .... In this sense, therefore, the 
armed struggle of the Bangsamoro people is an instance of jihad. Jihad is 
the path of struggle of Muslims, either in the moral, ethical, spiritual or 
political realm, to bring about a positive transformation of the inner self and 
the socio-economic and political order. 
Misuari's aim of transformation of Moro society as an ultimate objective 
beyond winning independence,, however, brought the MNLF 
into direct conflict not only with the Muslim aristocratic elite but commoners whose 
deep-rooted communal loyalties were held as important to their self-identity 
(Shoesmith 1983:5). Critics suggest that the Front has been allied with the 
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New People's Army (NPA) since 
1975. My interviews in 1985 with Commanders Solitario and Narrah, heads of Ranao 
Norte and of a non-partisan group in Lanao del Sur, respectively, and with 
Commander Gadil, aid de camp to Misuari, have confirmed otherwise. Solitario told 
me that one of the reasons for which Commander Nur Khan, chairman of Davao 
Revolution.ary Committee, surrender~d in 1985 was that he was unable to withstand 
the pressures from both the government forces aD:d. the Communist insurgents. 
However, Commander Akilha, Narrah's deputy, suggested that local unit 
commanders of the MNLF and NP A, whose units happened to be operating in the· 
areas adjacent to one another, normally sought a mutual sanctuary agreement, 
allowing them to retreat into each other's territory when pursued by government 
forces. Such arrangements, however, are regarded as unofficial individual 
understandings. The MNLF has hesitated to associate itself with the CPP /NP A. 
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Misuari has stated: 'we do not have any formal contact with them because they are 
preoccupied with their own war in the North and the Visayas and we are engaged in 
our war in the South (A1ahardika, August 1980). Recently, Misuari has been quoted 
as saying that he would not hesitate to join forces with the New Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (NAFP) ('new' to differentiate it from the old Armed Forces ~f the 
Philippines (AFP) under the Marcos regime) against the NPA groups (New Sunday 
Times, 16 November 1986}. The MNLF leadership belie".es that Communism is 
incompatible with Islam, and that association with the communists would weaken its 
relationship with the Muslim world {Noble 1984:11). 
The MILF, MNLF-Reformist and BMLO may be characterized as conservative. 
The MILF leadership is derived largely from tr~ditional aristocratic and religious 
elites who are concerned with the promotion of Islam and the preservation of 
traditional Moro society. In his handbook, The Bangsamoro Mujahid, Hashim 
(1985:51) declares that 'the ideology of the MILF is La illaha ilia Allah Muhammad 
rasul Allah' ('There is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah'). 
This illustrates that the MILF g_~ves priority to promoting Islam. Hashim (ibid.:52) 
writes, 'the core of our political and social program is the Islamization of the 
Bangsamoro people'. The MILF views the objectives of non-Islamic or 
Marxist-oriented groups as alien to Islam and refuses to co-operate with them 
(ibi"d.:26). The faction commands loyalty from its leaders' followers and their clans. It 
also has support from conservative Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
Pakistan, Malaysia and Kuwait. The nature of the support given by these countries includes financial 
assistance, place of sanctuary, and moral backing. 
The MNLF-Reformist Group, like the MILF, employs the Quran and Hadith as 
its basic source of reference. Its ideological orientation and programmes are executed 
within the guidelines of Islamic teachings. It aims af establishing an Islamic society 
within the Moro provinces by means of gradual implementation of the sharia. The 
main effort is to activate political negotiation with the Philippine government on the 
basis of the Tripoli Agreement. If this effort fails to bring the government to the 
130 
negotiating table, its further action would be to step up military activities in order to 
put pressure on the government and to draw the attention of the Muslim nations. 
However, the Reformist Group differs from the MILF in the sense that the former is 
dominated by traditional and secular-educated leaders, consisting mainly of Maranao 
aristocrats, the latter by traditional and religious elites, consisting of Maguindanao 
aristocrats. This is due partly to the educational backgrounds and personal 
preferences of the top leaders of each group. For example, the MILF prefers a leader 
to be well versed in Islamic jurisprudence and have a good understanding of Islam 
( ibi"d.:38). The Reformists' main international contacts include Malaysia and Saudi 
Arabia. 
The BMILO (BMLO), under the chairmanship of Dr. Yusoph Lucman,5 has as 
its objective to make Islam supreme within the Philippine state. As Lucman explains, 
'our objective is not the establishment of an autonomous or independent state or any 
other worldly gains', but to return to the jihad and to work for the restoration of 
Islam {BMILO 1984a:l; Arab News, 9 November 1984). Like the MILF, it stresses the 
promotion of Islam. Unlike th~ -MILF, the BMILO does not emphasize armed 
organization. Its leaders also reject 'Moro' as the identity of the Muslims in the 
southern Philippines. Their main argument is that 'the name "Moros" was given to 
the Muslims by the enemies of Islam, the Spanish Christian invaders with the 
objective of insulting the MINSUPALA Muslims' (BMILO 1984b:l). They prefer to 
be known as Bangsa Muslimin of MINS UP ALA (Interview, Jamil Y ah ya, secretary of 
the BMILO, Mecca, 17 April 1986). 
The -- three-way. factional- split between Misuaxi, .. Hashim .. and -Pundato also 
reflects lines of ethno-cultural background and personal loyalty._ The split coincides 
with the three major ethno-cultural div:i.sions. The Maguindanaos and_ the Maranoas, 
- - --= -~ : : - . : - : "...: : : : ._ - . 
5when Sultan Lucman died, his cousin, Dr. Yusoph A. Lucman, took over the BMILO 
leadership a.s chairman with Jamil D. Ya.hya as its secretary (BMILO 1984a:l; Arab News, 9 
November 1984; Friday Times, 25 March 1985). Nurdin Lucma.n, a son of the late Sultan, is 
also an important BMILO leader. The three top leaders of the BMILO operate in three dif-
ferent bases: Yusoph in Cairo; Jamil in Mecca, and Nurdin in the Islamic City of Marawi. 
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who incline towards preservation of the Moro traditional system, are supporters of 
Hashim and Pundato, respectively. The Suluanos, many of whom advocate 
egalitarianism, are behind Misuari. The ethno-cultural boundaries, however, are not 
rigid. Crossing ethnic boundary lines is not uncommon. It causes or is reinforced by 
personal loyalties or ideological orientations. Personal loyalties seem to have been 
dominant; leaders and followers haye fought and surrendered together. Only the 
leaders are really conscious of adhering to an ideology; the followers are conscious 
only of being Muslims and feeling discriminated against as Muslims (Noble 1978:4). 
The Moro Revolutionary Organization (MORO) was founded in 1982 by young 
Moro activists and students. It is supported by the CPP and under the direction of its 
political arm, the National Democratic Front (NDF). Its manifesto (Appendix H) 
calls for armed revolutionary struggle, though it has yet to organize its own armed 
units. MORO appears to have been created as a Communist attempt to penetrate the 
Moro communities. 
After the Marcos regime was replaced through a four-day bloodless revolution 
m February 1986, the new government under President Corazon Aquino tried to 
negotiate an end to the protracted Moro war. In September 1986 President Aquino 
met the MNLF leaders and further talks were held in Jeddah in January 1987 
between Aquilino Pimentel, a member of the Aquino Cabinet, and the MNLF Misuari faction. 
The Jeddah sessions produced no pact, but the two parties agreed to start formal 
negotiations when Misuari dropped his long standing demand for independence. 
Negotiations for full autonomy of the five southern islands (Mindanao, Basilan, 
the Sulu group,_Tawi-Tawi and PaJ_a:wanl~_demanded by the MNLF will meet many 
_problems.: F.or jnst~l!_ce, _<1:1:1t_OP:O_Il_lY f?r ~he_ region_ -~ill be 'subject to democratic 
processes', which means that it must win the consent of Mindanao's Christians, who 
constitute about seventy-seven per cent of the population of the region. The 
autonomy demanded by the MNLF may have serious legal implications because the 
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new constitution ratified in February 1987 has its own provisions for the creation of 
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Furthermore, the 
Jeddah negotiation failed to include the MILF, the rival faction of the MNLF. As 
Salamat Hashim, chairman of the MILF, declared, 'the Jeddah meeting does not have 
any binding effect on us' (Asiaweek, 18 January 1987). Just a week after the Jeddah 
meeting, the MILF launched a three-day attack against the government, resulting in 
at least 30 killed and 57 wounded (Canberra Times, 17 January 1987). Despite these 
obstacles, the chief government negotiator, Aquilino Pimentel stated, 'I believe it can 
truly be said that this conference is a momentous step towards the formulation of a 
just and lasting peace' (qanberra Times, 10 February 1987). Similarly, the chief 
MNLF envoy, Habib Hashim, reflected, 'the path to peace is long, arduous and 
thorny, but it is a path that we have willingly chosen' (ibid.). 
Field Studies 
Between October 1984 and May 1985 I visited several camps and 'liberated' 
villages controlled by the MNLF-Misuari Faction, MNLF-Reformist Group, and 
MILF. In order to provide some substance to the more general accounts of the 
factions described above, the foilowing paragraphs report on some of these visits. 
The MNLF-Reformist Group, Lanao del Sur 
In mid November 1984 I spent eight days with a guerrilla unit of the Ranao Sur 
Revolutionary Committee (RSRC) of the MNLF-Reformist Group. Perhaps because I 
am a Malay Muslim, the Maranao mujahideen accepted me like a brother. 
The RSRC was headed by Commander Iqra, a Maranao aristocrat and M.A. 
graduate in International Relations from a university in the Philippines. I travelled 
·with Commander Iqra and a group of fifteen armed guerrillas to· several 'liberated' 
villages around Lake Lanao. In some villages we saw guerrillas and villagers working 
in their fields, growing a variety of crops; to the eyes of outsiders, guerrillas and 
villagers are indistinguishable. In every village we visited, the villagers were very 
co-operative and hospitable. 
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We crossed Lake Lanao by motorboat to a village where more guerrillas and 
commanders from neighbouring villages joined us. In this village I spent four days 
living with a group of about thirty guerrillas and commanders. The guerrillas were 
typical young Moro villagers who were trained as fighters. I was informed that most 
fighters were allowed to return to their respective villages as reserves after completion 
of several months training. They can be called to active duty when required. 'In the 
case of emergency', remarked Commander lqra during our conversation, 'we can 
easily mobilize 10,000 fighting men'. As for the commanders, many had left school to 
join the struggle during 1972 and 1976. Some were recruited and trained in Libya and 
Malaysia. The guerrillas and commanders were mostly equipped with light 
conventional weapons including MI4, MI6Al, M1819Al and Russian AK 47 rifles, 
Ml carbines, M1911Al and other types of pistol, M79 grenade launchers, and 
shotguns. Unlike other underground revolutionary movements, the Moro guerrilla 
units did not employ unconventional weapons such as homemade bombs and other 
explosive devices. Instead, they attempted to manufacture simpler conventional 
weapons such as M79 grenade launchers. 
Apart from fighting men, regular villagers also played their various roles in the 
movement. I was told that many farmers contributed ten per cent of their crops to 
the Front. Some villagers voluntarily became informers. Strangers or soldiers 
entering the villages could not escape their notice. The strength of the Front, 
therefore, cannot be measured by counting the units of guerrillas, but must also take 
into account the potential force of villagers. Table 4.1 shows the potential stronghold 
of the MNLF-Reformist Group as assessed by its chairman. 
The RSRC's activities have been mainly to consolidate-supporters. Fighting is 
avoided unless -necessary.-Accordin.g to. Commander lqra, in many viHages people of 
different categories, such as farmers, students and vendors are organized into a 
so-called 'united fronts'. Seminars and workshops are held in different madar£s in the 
villages and ustaz and lawyers are invited to speak on various topics regarding the 
Table 4-1: Potential Muslim Supporters Claimed by 
MNLF-Reformist Group in 1984 
Province 
Basil an 
Davao del Sur 
Lanao del Norte 
Lanao del Sur 
North Cotabato 
South Cotabato 
Sulu 
Tawi-Tawi 
Za.mboanga del Norte 
Za.mboanga del Sur 
Average 
Source: (Pundato 1984:4). 
Potential Muslim supporters 
(per cent)* 
40 
45 
50 
90 
20 
65 
20 
90 
95 
35 
55 
* The percentage distributions are based on the total 
potential Muslim supporters in each province. They 
are about sixty per cent of the total Muslim population, 
considering fifteen per cent are with the government and 
twenty-five per cent a.re neutral. 
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struggle. In some cases, Muslim foreigners are also invited to observe the committee's 
general meetings and to give a talk to the villagers. Mass meetings, which usually 
take place in the village mosques, are often called to generate feelings of togetherness 
among mujahideen and villagers. In an attempt to become self-sufficient, the RSRC 
directs the mujahideen and the villagers to put more effort into their economic 
activities; to grow more crops and to raise more animals. 
With respect to military activities, there had been no major clash between the 
RSRC units and the government forces since August 1984, when the RSRC sent its 
units to help a non-partisan group led by Commander Narrah fighting the Philippine 
Constabulary in Lumbaa Bayabao and Maguing, Lanao del Sur. One minor clash 
occurred in Marawi City a few weeks after I left the group, when a unit of about eight 
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guerrillas encountered government soldiers as they attempted to collect alms from 
Muslims in the city. Three guerrillas and two soldiers died in the fight. During my 
visit, I did not see new recruits in training, but I was told that recruits are 
occasionally trained in several of the remote villages. Some of the RSRC leaders 
admit that the conflict between the various factions of the movement weakens their 
struggle. When asked what the main cause of the split was, Commander Iqra replied, 
'because the Moros do not have the same degree of faith in God'. The RSRC is a 
Maranao group of the MNLF-Reformist. The committee leaders, consisting mainly of 
secular-educated Maranao aristocrats, make their decisions independently, following 
the general directions of the Central Committee based in Sabah. 
The MILF, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao and North Cotabato 
With the help of the Reformist Group, I had no difficulty in making contact 
with the MILF leaders in Marawi City. In early January 1985, I was given the 
opportunity to meet a group of about twenty-five armed guerrillas who came down 
from Camp Busrah to a nearby village in Lanao del Sur. The group was led by Ustaz 
Abdul Aziz, Vice-Chairman for Military Affairs of the MILF. The Ustaz and several 
other leaders with him were graduates of Al-Azhar University in Egypt and other 
institutes of higher learning in the Middle East. Most of them were ustaz teaching in 
madaris in the villages; some were du-ah employed by the centres of the Islamic call 
in different Arab countries. Several guerrilla commanders were still fresh from their 
overseas training, especially from Pakistan. With them was an officer of the PLO, 
apparently visiting them. 
The majority of the group at Camp Busrah are Maranaos. The camp was built 
in an attempt to create a 'prototype community' based on the sharia and to uplift 
Islamic consciousness among the Maranaos. They believe that the strength of the 
Moro struggle is basically proportional to the degree of Islamic consciousness of the 
Moro people. They and their families in the camp attempt to follow Islamic teachings 
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as strictly as they can. When asked about the schooling of their children, they said 
that they had built several madaris in different villages for them. 'Our children need 
to know two things: to understand Islam and to know how to fight', commented one 
commander. 
Despite their preoccupation with the preaching of Islam, the group at Camp 
Busrah was also fully armed and well trained. The types of weapons used were 
similar to those of the RSRC mentioned earlier. Camp Busrah is also a training 
ground for new recruits, particularly those from villages in the two Lanao provinces. 
Leaders at Camp Busrah retain their close contact with religious groups in Muslim 
countries. Several Maranaos are said to be able to secure places in universities and 
high schools in the Middle East through these contacts. More importantly, certain 
madaris in the villages are believed to have been built from foreign funds obtained 
through the efforts of these leaders. They also seem to produce disciplined 
commanders, some of whom are selected for further training overseas. 
In mid January 1985 I visited Camp Omar in Maguindanao and Camp 
Abubakar in North Cotabato. Arrangements- were made by two senior.~religious 
leaders in Cotabato City for my visit to the two camps. From Cotabato City, it took 
many hours of driving to reach Camp Omar. We were welcomed by at least thirty 
armed guerrillas and by more than fifty people fetched from nearby villages. Unlike 
Camp Busrah, Camp Omar was not actually intended as a model community, but 
rather as a guerrilla training ground. It was equipped, in addition to the regular light 
arms such as M16 and Russian AK 47 rifles, with weapons including M1919A4 
machineguns and M2 infantry mortars. Conventional communication equipment such 
as walkie-talkies was used. 
Camp Omar was commanded by a group of young military commanders of 
lower rank than those of Camp Busrah. Judging from the names of commanders 
introduced during our meeting, several are Maguindanao aristocrats. They seem to 
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take direct orders from leaders in Camp Abubakar or in Cotabato City. Camp Omar 
was filled with crops such as corn and cassava; mujahideen and young trainees were 
encouraged to grow crops and to take part in economic activities which ~orrespond to 
the concept of self-reliance promoted by the front. 
As in Camp Omar, a number of guerrillas and villagers gathered in Camp 
Abubakar on the day we were supposed to visit. Unfortunately, due to a 
misunderstanding, we arrived at Camp Abubakar in the afternoon of the next day 
and no one was expecting our arrival. We passed the outer and inner entrance 
checkpoints of the camp and stopped in the middle of the school playground. As we 
got off our 125cc motorcycle, I saw two men approaching us, but no sign of other 
activities. The camp was quiet. There were several shedhouses constituting a 
madrasa and rows of ten to twenty huts made of bamboo. At one side of the school 
playground a curtain of forest stretched to the foot of the mountains a few hundred 
metres away. On the other side there was a stream running through the camp. I was 
told that many families lived in the camp and their children were taught in madrasa 
by two ustaz employed by a __ centre of the Islamic call in the Middle East. After about 
fifteen minutes there were about forty men and women gathered in a shedhouse of the 
madrasa. Half of them were guerrillas and commanders and they were fully armed. Al 
Haj Murad, chief of staff of the MILF was unable to join us, however. 
Camp Abubakar in North Cotabato is the internal headquarters of the MILF. It 
is the largest of the seven existing camps of the MILF. The remaining camps are 
0amp Omar: in Maguindanao, Camp Khalid in South Cotabato, Camp Othman in 
Bukidnon,- Camp Salman in Zamboanga de! Sur, Camp Busrah and Camp Ali _in 
Lanao del Sur. All these camps and other 'liberated' villages operate under the 
general guidelines of Camp Abubakar. As internal headquarters, it functions as a link 
between the Central Committee based in Pakistan or in Saudi Arabia and the various 
camps and provincial committees in Moroland. This, as leaders at Camp Abubakar 
pointed out, is the decentralized nature of the 'consultative and collective leadership 
system' practiced by the MILF. 
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Camp Abubakar is dominated by members of the religious elite ( ustaz) and 
religious oriented Maguindanao aristocrats whose mission is generally to strengthen 
the military and economic power of the front, to establish revolutionary committees 
in the provinces specified by the Tripoli Agreement, and to upgrade the Islamic and 
political consciousness of mujahideen and the Moro people. A Five-Year Plan has 
been initiated to build up military strength. Moro villagers from fourteen to 
thirty-five years of age are recruited and trained locally and abroad. Simpler types of 
conventional light weapons such as M79 grenade launchers are said to be 
manufactured. Attempts are also made to promote economic self-sufficiency. Some 
mujahideen and villagers are encouraged to engage in farming and in small-scale 
business activities. 
While strengthening the organization, leaders and commanders at Camp 
Abubakar and Camp Busrah, who constitute the core members of the Central 
Committee, have at the same time expressed their willingness to negotiate with the 
Philippine government on the basis of the Tripoli Agreement. As soon as they feel 
strong enough _to step up_~ their military activities in order to bring about the 
negotiation; they; like the leaders· of the RSRC, will not hesitate to do so. 
The MNLF-Misuari Faction, Lanao del Sur and Sulu 
In late December 1984, I made a two-day visit to a typical small Moro farming 
village in the foothills of the mountains in Lanao del Norte. Commander Solitario, 
Chairman of Ranao Norte Revolutionary Committee (RNRC), and a unit of twelve 
_arrpe<:f g~errillas welcoliled. u~ Cl.lld !5howed !JS arou~d .. t.h~ vHlagj:!. The villagers were 
very friendly and hospitable. 
The RNRC is a Maranao group of the Misuari Faction. It consists largely of 
Misuari loyalists and young Maranao nationalists, particularly those who had spent 
some time as students or workers in Libya. Commander Solitario, a secular-educated 
Maranao, is himself a close friend of Misuari and had spent a period of time in Libya. 
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Links between the RNRC and the Central Committee in Libya, therefore, have been 
quite strong. The group continues to receive a financial allocation from the Central 
Committee. Nevertheless, the RNRC makes its own local decisions based upon the 
general policy guidelines of the front. 
The immediate strategy of the RNRC was to keep military activities at low key, 
avoiding unnecessary clashes and maintaining minimum active forces, while waiting 
for certain changes in the Philippine political scene. Many guerrillas returned to their 
normal life as farmers, students and even government employees. The activities of the 
group during this 'waiting period' seemed to be concentrated on stepping up political 
propaganda against the Marcos regime, including publication and distribution of 
Suwarah Moro (Voice of the Moros). Suwarah Moro was not only directed against 
the government; it was also an attempt to disseminate the faction's political stance 
among the Maranaos. Nevertheless, the RNRC did not hesitate to participate in 
battles and sent its guerrilla units to fight in the sporadic battles between 
government soldiers and the joint forces of the Moro factions which took place in 
Lurnbaa Bayabao and M~guing, Lanao- del Sur,_during June and August 1984 
(Solitario n.d.; Christian Conference of Asia News, 15 October 1984; Malaya, 16 
August 1984). 
A seven-day trip to Sulu was made in early January 1985. When I arrived, my 
friend, 'Wati', told me that there exist two 'governments' on the island of Sulu: the 
Manila government, which controlled the capital city of Jolo, and the 'MNLF 
government' which ruled the countryside. In other words, the MNLF-Misuari faction 
had solid support from the Tausug villagers in Sulu. As we drove through the 
outskirts of Jolo, scores of armed men in green uniform were seen walking along the 
unpaved road. They were identified as either guerrillas or villagers. Such scenes 
seemed to confirm Wati's observation. The island is divided into zones, with groups 
of villages commanded by different leaders. Some zones built their guerrilla camps; 
others did not. There are at least thirteen guerrilla camps of the MNLF-Misuari 
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faction throughout Moroland (Far Eastern Economfr Review, 11 September 1986). 
Except for a few groups of bandits, villagers within these zones are under the 
influence of the front and the villages are considered to be 'liberated' areas. Though 
one may see government soldiers on routine patrol in these villages, the soldiers dare 
not to interfere in the village affairs. 
I visited a village at the outskirts of Jolo. It was under the command of 
Commander Gadil, a former aid de camp and a close friend of Chairman Misuari. 
Commander Gadil, a young secular-educated Tausug, returned from Libya in 1983 
and assumed his present position as commander of one of the 'liberated' zones. He 
and ten of his fully armed guerrillas welcomed us and provided us with hospitality. As 
in other 'liberated' areas, we wandered around the village without fear or hesitation. I 
was informed that Commander Gadil's responsibility was not so much the upgrading 
of villagers' political consciousness, but to consolidate different leadership groups such 
as traditional, non-traditional and religious elites within the movement. Attempts 
were also made to build a closer relationship between members of the organization 
and Muslim government e~ployees~ To increase the number of fire-arms in his group, 
Commander Gadil occasionally bought weapons from certain weapon dealers such as 
M16 and AK 47 rifles at US$ 600-800 for the former and US$ 1,100-1,300 for the 
latter. 
Commander Gadil had several small fighting units of eight to ten men on active 
duty. The units are kept small for purposes of mobility and economy. Each 
individual unit is an autonomous entity which is free to choose- its own methods -of 
c-0mbat.c- Such autonomy is said to have several advantages. For example, fighters 
are not hampered by a set of conventional tactics, and they may 'discover' useful 
fighting techniques (Moore 1981:94-95). This unconventional approach to warfare 
has-contributed to the Moros' reputation for being unpredictable and deadly warriors. 
Like Commander Solitario, Commander Gadil retained his close contact with 
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Chairman Misuari. While consolidating the front and keeping the villages under its 
influence, he was also adopting a policy of wait-and-see, waiting for the Marcos 
regime to be replaced before making any serious political or military commitments. 
Concluding Remarks 
The Moro people are warriors. They have been at war for more than three 
hundred years and have many times fought without a formal organization or under 
united leadership. In the contemporary struggle, the MNLF was the first to establish 
an organized front with an administrative hierarchy including a policy-making body 
and local operational units. In practice, however, the hierarchical structure of the 
organization gives way to the vagaries and flux of village life. It is one thing to 
organize and direct the central and provincial committees and quite another to unite 
and control the thrust of a mass movement consisting of different ethno-cultural 
groups. The MNLF is therefore a loosely organized front, unable to control the 
behaviour of the various factions or to establish a clear chain of command. Even 
during the height of the movement, the organization's policy-making body, the 
Central Committee, contented itself with furnishing broad policy outlines, giving the 
locaf .leaders the power fo make their own decisions. Its major function was to 
consolidate existing groups of Moro fighters by supplying them with weapons and 
funds received from various sources. 
As the front's resources decreased and fighting declined to sporadic clashes, 
especially after the Tripoli Agreement, local groups received less in funds and supplies 
than they used to. The organization became even more loosely knit and finally 
.. 
fissured. In other words, the Moro fighters of different groups were absorbed into the 
orbit of the MNLF leadership not by virtue ofiis institutionalized ·and- cohesive 
system of organization but because of its resources and a conviction of a common 
cause. For example, there were no exact criteria of the front's membership. It had no 
~achinery of enrolment; admission was accompanied by no official formalities. Only 
the adherent's activity within the front could determine the extent of participation. 
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As the MNLF fissured into three factions, the liberation movement was 
weakened. All factions now concentrate on consolidating power, while avoiding 
unnecessary encounters with the government forces. Additional provincial 
committees, for instance, are organized, and more camps are built. Seminars and 
mass meetings are held to reinforce the c<:immitment of members and to generate 
group loyalties and some degree of common ideology. Economically, the factions seek 
to develop their self-reliance by directing mujahideen and villagers into economic 
activities. 
Despite their similar strategies, the maJor factions are led by three different 
leadership groups. The MNLF-Misuari faction, which is said to be the strongest, is 
dominated by secular-educated non-traditional leaders. Many of the central and 
provincial committee members and military commanders are drawn from this 
leadership category. Religious leaders, such as ustaz and du-ah, rank second, while 
members of the traditional aristocratic elite come third. The MILF, the second 
strongest, is led by religious-educated traditional and non-traditional leaders. The 
secular-educated aristocr~ts are less influential. In the case of the MNLF-Reformist 
group, its committee members and guerrilla commanders come mostly from the 
secular-educated traditional and non-traditional elites; religious leaders rank next. 
Unlike the Suluanos and Maguindanaos, who generally adhere to their own 
ethnically-based factions, the Maranaos are less cohesive in support of the 
Maranao-based front. They tend to join different groups on the basis of their 
ideological orientations and personal loyalties. In the final analysis, while the three 
groups are )o_osely knit fr011ts, -~,~eir strength lies in the fact that they are 
ethnically-based organizations whose leadership reflects the leadership of their 
respective co_mmu_nities. _ 
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TheMaJays 
Before discussing the nature of the Malay separatist struggle, it is necessary to reflect briefly 
on the Thai government policies of integration that precipitated separatist conflict in the Patani 
region. 
Realizing that the compulsory education policy initiated in 1921 and the cultural assimilation 
programme of 1939 failed to substantially promote the spread of Thai education and culture among 
the Malay-Muslims, the government of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat promulgated in 1961, in 
connection with the overall strategy of national integration, a programme of 'educational 
improvement' in the four provinces. The aim was to transform the traditional Muslim religious 
schools (.pondoks) into registered private Islamic schools (rongrian aekachon sonsasana Islam). 
Although the converted pondoks remained 'private', they were subjected to government regulation. 
The programme was designed to lay a solid foundation of Thai education and language among the 
Muslims in order to 'create and improve Thai consciousness, cultivate loyalty to the principal 
institutions such as the nation, the religion and the monarchy .. .' (quoted in Pitsuwan 1982:194). 
Under this programme, all registered pondoks were required to teach a government-designed 
curriculum with the Thai language as the medium of instruction. Many secular and religious 
textbooks were issued by the Ministry of Education.6 This interference by the government had a 
disturbing effect on the Malay-Muslim community. It destroyed the traditional pondok system, 
renowned for its religious scholarship, but the government-controlled pondoks gradually faded 
away since they could no longer satisfy the Malay community with the quality of religious 
education and moral cultivation. In 1984 there were 348 registered Islamic 
6Mistakes ~ften made in some of the government religious textbooks, perhaps due to the 
inexperience of Thai officials in the Islamic subjects. In 1980 the Ministry of Education dis-
tributed a religious textbook containing several drawn p~traits of the Prophet Muhammad 
(S.A.W.) which is categorically prohibited in Islam (Office:the Committee on Education 1980). 
Such a blunder on the part of the Ministry of Education resulted in many protests against the 
Thai government by Muslim leaders and Muslim governments. 
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schools but only 202 were functioning (Education Region II 1984:36; see table 3.3). 
They are being replaced by Thai public schools. As a result, more and more of the 
younger generation of Malays are being sent to Malaysia, Pakistan and Arab 
countries for their Islamic as well as secular studies. Many Patani Muslim students 
overseas receive financial assistance from foreign sources and develop an increased 
sense of antipathy towards the Thai state. These foreign students are potential 
leaders of the various separatist fronts. 
In addition to its educational programme, the Sarit government initiated a 
project called nikom sangto-eng to redress the population imbalance in the Muslim 
areas as discussed in chapter 2. The determination of the Thai government to carry 
out these assimilation programmes together with the 'internal colonial' characteristics 
of the existing socio-economic and political structure of the Muslim society described 
in the previous chapters explain the rise of separatist politics and the emergence of 
different liberation fronts. 
The Malay Liberation Fronts: BNPP, BRN, PULO and BBMP 
There are four major Muslim underground groups currently active in the four 
southern border provinces of Thailand. They include the Barisan Nasional 
Pembebasan Patani (BNPP) or National Liberation Front of Patani; Barisan 
Revolusi Nasional (BRN) or National Revolutionary Front; Patani United Liberation 
Organization (PULO) or Pertubuhan Perpaduan Pembebasan Patani; and Barisan 
Bersatu Mujahideen Patani (BBMP) or United Fronts of Patani Fighters. As 
discussed in chapter 2, Malay resistance transformed from a movement largely 
------- --------- -· 
organized-- around members of the Malay ruling elites to one with a broad base of 
popular ~upport. This transfor~~tion re~ulied in -flie--iormation of GAMPAR in 
Malaya and the PPM in the Patani region. The two organizations coordinated their 
operations closely. Their struggle, however, had been confined to political activities, 
with only sporadic outbursts of violence, such as the uprisings in Kampung Belukar 
Samok in 1947 and in Dusun Nyor in the following year. When the GAMPAR and 
PPM leaders died in 1953 and 1954 respectively, the organizations disintegrated. 
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Drawing former members of the disintegrated GAMPAR and PPM, Tengku Abdul 
Jalal (Adul Na Saiburi), former deputy. leader of GAMPAR, formed the BNPP in 
1959 (BNPP 1981a:5). 
The BNPP leadership comprised both traditional aristocrats and religious 
leaders. Its pattern of resistance became more ideologically-inclined; its objective was 
no longer autonomy or irredentism but restoration of independence. The preferred 
strategy also was widened to include not only political activities but also armed 
guerrilla warfare. Idris bin Mat Diah, alias Pak Yeh, a renowned gang leader in the 
a. 
Muslim provinces, joined the front and became guerrilla leader. Surrounded by 
"' 
Muslim gang leaders, former bandits and outlaws, Pak Yeh began his guerrilla 
operations in the four provinces. From the early 1960s, armed clashes with the 
government forces occurred intermittently. 
The early 1960s also saw Muslim religious students, particularly those who 
studied in Malaya, join the BNPP. Some of these students, such as Badri Hamdan, 
Abdul Fatah Omar, Hannan Ubaidah (present leaders of the BNPP) and others, 
continued their studies in Al-Azhar University in Cairo. While in Cairo they formed 
an organization known as Rumah Patani (House of Patani) which became the 
BNPP's overseas base. In Mecca an association called Akhon (Brothers) was 
organized by Patani students and workers aimed at promoting education of Patani 
Muslim youths. However, Akhon soon became a training ground for young Patani 
activists who supported the liberation politics back home. Many of the present 
leaders of the BNPP in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan are former leaders of the 
dissolved Akhon. 
At the same time, cleavages among the Muslim activists emerged. The BNPP's 
ideological commitment at this early stage was not as clear as it is today. Although 
its objective was to gain independence, the idea of restoring a sultanship was still 
floated by some of its leaders and supporters, especially the former aristocrats. This 
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left the impression that should the struggle of the BNPP succeed, the Patani 
sultanate might be restored. The more progressive Muslims, such as Ustaz Abdul 
Karim Hassan and his colleagues, admirers of Sukarno of Indonesia, hesitated to join 
the BNPP. In March 1963 Ustaz Karim and his group formed the BRN with the aim 
of establishing a Republic of Patani (interview, Ustaz Karim Hassan, Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia, 12 June 1985). The main factor contributing to the emergence of the BRN 
was ideological differences. 
The BRN leaders placed emphasis more on political organization than guerrilla 
activities. Their strategy was to penetrate the pondoks. Because the chairman 
himself was the headmaster of an Islamic school, the task of penetration was not very 
difficult for the BRN. Within five years (1963-1968), the BRN was able to influence 
several of the Islamic schools, especially in Narathiwat and Yala provinces. In 1968 
Ustaz Karim and other BRN leaders went underground. There had been little 
military activities throughout the 1960s except sporadic encounters of the BNPP's 
guerrilla units which at this stage were treated by the Thai authorities as bandit 
gangs rather than as di_~ciplined armed insurgent units. 
Also in 1968 the third front, the PULO, emerged (PULO n.d.:1). The PULO 
was first organized in India by Tengku Bira Kotanila (Kabir Abdul Rahman), a 
graduate in Political Science from Aligarh Muslim University, anda4~roup of Patani students at the 
same university.Soon after the formation of PULO, Tengku Bira moved to Mecca and 
focused his recruitment efforts primarily on young, non-committed Patani Muslims 
by stressing secular nationalism,.and differentiating- :PULO from BNPP's orthodox 
Islam and BRN's 'Islamic socialism'. The PULO also cultivated its support in the 
homeland, in Malaysia and among Patani students in different Arab countries. 
When Tengku Abdul-Jalal, chairman of the BNPP, died in September 1977, the 
Central Committee elected Ustaz Badri Hamdan to lead the front. 7 Badri Hamdan 
7Badri Hamdan, now in his early 50s, is a graduate of Al-Azhar University in Cairo and a 
former lecturer at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok. 
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has brought several changes to the organization. He has, for example, attracted many 
religious graduates of the Middle East universities to form a more aggressive, Islamic 
leadership cadre and has penetrated Islamic schools to broaden the base of popular 
support. In 1985 eighteen Islamic schools were claimed to have been administered by 
the BNPP {information obtained from the BNPP headquarters, Malaysia, 19 
February 1985). Under the present leadership, more systematic political and military 
training is organized. Moreover, religious-educated leaders dominate the BNPP; the 
non-religious leaders, such as secular-educated and former aristocratic elites, seem to 
have gradually moved away from the front, especially those who have leadership 
ambitions. In 1985 Wahyuddin Muhammad, former vice chairman of the BNPP, and 
several other leaders formed the BBMP. 
Although the fronts differ in many ways, they all view the Thai administration 
as a colonial power with which no compromise is possible and emphasize 
independence through armed struggle {Haemindra 1977:86). From the early 1970s, 
the fronts conducted guerrilla activities. Each organization developed its sphere of 
influence in different __ areas throughout the provinces. Muslim villagers who lived 
. within these spheres were directly or indirectly involved in the activities of the fronts. 
They were often reminded of their obligation to be involved in the struggle and were 
cited the Had£th that says, 'the best of the believers is he who fights in the cause of 
Allah with his wealth and his life' {narrated by Bukhari and Muslim). Even though 
not all Muslim villagers were influenced by the fronts, most of them were aware of 
the secessionist politics. 
At. the height of their guerrilla activities {1970-1975), the term 'invisible 
governments' was used by some Muslim villagers to describe the fronts; the provinces 
of Patani, Yala, and Narathiwat were sometimes referred to as the 'free region' 
(£b£d.:88j-. ·The BNPP, BRN and PULO were conducting ambushes and attacking 
police checkpoints and government installations. Extortion, especially from rubber 
and coconut plantation owners, and kidnapping for ransom were also part of their 
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activities. Local Thai businessmen had to pay 'protection money' in order to live in 
peace. Terrorism was often used to remind the villagers and the government of the 
fronts' existence (for an account of violent activities in the Muslim provinces during 
1976-1981, see Satha-Anand 1987). 
During 1968 and 1975 the Bangkok government launched a series of military 
operations against Muslim 'terrorist' activities. The operations were code-named 
'Special Operation for the Four Southern Border Provinces', 'Ramkamhaeng 
Operation', and 'Special Terrorist Campaign in. the Three Border Provinces' 
(Megarat 1977:21-22). They used Police Special Forces of the Ninth Zone and 
required large scale recruitment of Buddhist and Muslim volunteers. The operations 
were also incorporated into regular army and police force operations in the area. The 
result of this seven-year campaign was as follows: 385 clashes with Muslim 
'terrorists'; 329 terrorists dead; 165 surrendered to Thai authorities; 1,208 arrested; 
1,451 weapons of various types, 27,538 rounds of ammunition, and 95 grenades 
captured by the authorities; and 250 terrorist camps destroyed (ibid.). The then 
Police Captain Megar:~t, one of the participants in the operations, made the following 
comments: 
If we look at the statistics, we like to believe that our operations were 
successful, and the terrorists should have been entirely wiped out. On the 
contrary, several terrorists remain active; new leaders who are unfamiliar to 
us have appeared. In fact, we have conducted campaigns against them since 
1905. Yet, they can still exist (ibid.). 
Indeed, the Muslim separatist movement continues to operate, and the conflict 
appears to have deepened and escalated. The murder of five Muslim youths, allegedly 
by Thai soldiers, in December 1975 sparked the largest demonstration in the history 
of Patani. Thousands of Muslims gathered-a:t .the Patani Central Mosque each day 
'tor- forty-five consecutive days. Du~i~g thi~- p~riod at least twenty-five other Muslims 
were Hlled ·and som~ forty injured, again allegedly by Thai armed forces (Suthasasna 
1976:127-128). This demonstration, however, can also be viewed as related to the 
general political awareness during a three-year interlude of democracy (1973-1976) in 
Thailand. 
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Some separatist leaders interpreted this demonstration as an express10n of 
Muslim anger against Thai-Buddhists. They believed that this anger could be 
manipulated and directed 'correctly' to support the struggle. More importantly, 
perhaps, they assumed that popular support was always potentially present and that 
this event was an example of the people's support for the issues the fronts struggled 
for. Thus, they decided not to devote their relatively weak resources to domestic 
mobilization at the present time. In fact, since the mid 1970s, all three fronts have 
placed greater emphasis on obtaining external recognition and support. Because of 
this external emphasis, there has been a lull in activities in the region. Nevertheless, 
the fronts continue to engage in guerrilla operations to make their presence known 
(Che Man 1985:108). According to a Thai parliamentary commission's report, there 
were 161 armed clashes between the so-called terrorists and bandits and Thai 
authorities in the three provinces of Patani, Yala and Narathiwat during November 
1978 and October 1979. 
Externally, the fronts successfully mobilized Patani students and workers rn 
foreign lands, partic_ularly in Maiaysia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan. In 
Malaysia, many Patani students applied for Malaysian citizenship; upon completion 
of their education, they usually took up positions in Malaysian officialdom and 
continued to support or carry out the struggle. These Patani Malays abroad played a 
significant role in establishing contacts with the authorities and political parties of 
other countries. They were anxious to be recognized by Muslim countries as fighting 
in the cause of Islam and preserving the Muslim ummah, and not as bandits nor 
Communists. 
The initial step toward Arab recognition was made when Arab newspapers and 
magazines in several countries in the Middle East began to publish articles and stories 
~~ou~ _t~e struggle of the Patani Muslims in southern Thailand. In July and August 
1976, for example, one of the largest Libyan daily newspapers, Al-J£had, published a 
series of articles for forty-three consecutive days describing the activities of the 
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guerrillas in Patani and the problems facing them. Several books in Arabic on the 
Patani movement appeared, including Patani: A Difficult and Concealed 
Revolutionary Movement by Muhammad Warieth and Islamic Government in 
Patani by Dr. Rauf Saliby. Journalists and Muslim officials started to visit the 
Patani region to obtain first hand information. This publicity and personal 
observations contributed to greater Arab awareness and sy_mphathy for the 
Malay-Muslim cause. 
Organization 
Like those of the Moros, the Malay liberation fronts are loosely structured 
organizations, even though complex organization charts are constructed on paper. 
The constitutions (]>!!rlembagaan) of the BNPP, PULO and BBMP, for instance, 
devote many sections to the structure of their respective organizations (BNPP 
1981b:12-21; PULO n.d.:3-5; BBMP n.d.:3-7). The BRN exhibits a similar complex 
organizational structure, though it publishes no documents on the matter. (Appendix 
I ilh~strates the organizational structures of the fronts.) 
The basic components of the fronts' organizational structure are the central 
committee (Ma11is Tertinggi), provincial committee (Ma11is Wilayah) and working 
committee of the foreign branch (Ma11is Cawangan). The central committee, which is 
headed by a chairman or a secretary-general (PULO), is the heart of the organization. 
Important policies and appointments are made by this body. It comprises about 
thirteen to twenty-five members and different sections which perform various 
functions (BNPP 1981b:12-13; PULO n.d.:3; BBMP n.d.:3-4). All members of the 
centr~.l committe_e are app<>inted by thE! chairman or secretary-general. Except in the 
case of the BBMP, which h~ neither ehairman nor secretary-general, the members of 
the central committee-are-appointed by the congress (Majlis_ Muja,hi<ieen). The head 
of each section and his deputy are ex-officio members of the central committee. 
Table 4.2 shows the current members of the BNPP central committee. Members of 
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the BNPP central committee are dominated by religious leaders, most of whom were 
educated in the Middle East. This pattern occurs also in the BRN and PULO. The 
BBMP leaders, however, are drawn primarily from secular and religious teachers who 
were educated in Malaysia and Indonesia. 
Table 4-2: Members of the Central Committee of the BNPP, 
Effective on 3 August 1986 
Badri Hamdan 
Muhammad Noor 
Saif ullah Siddik 
Head 
Abdul Wahab 
Muhammad Ismail 
Shahrir Abdullah Head 
Ibn Al-Walid Al-Khalid 
Portfolio 
Chairman and Head 
of Military Section 
Deputy Head of 
Military Section 
Vice-Chairman and 
of Islamic Call Section 
Secretary 
Treasurer 
of Economic Section 
Head of Political 
Section 
Hannan Ubaidah Head of Interior Section 
Salahuddin Tarmizi Head of Foreign Section 
Zukifli Abdullah Head of Information Section 
Arifin Abdullah Head of Education Section 
Ja.maluddin Ismail Head of Youth and Welfare 
Saifuddin Khalid Special Duty to the Office 
of the Chairman 
Classification 
Religious teacher 
Secular teacher 
Religious teacher 
Secular teacher 
Religious teacher 
Religious teacher 
Religious teacher 
Religious teacher 
Lawyer 
Religious teacher 
Religious teacher 
Religious teacher 
Religious teacher 
Source: (BNPP 198lb; Personal communication with Badri Hamdan, 
chairman of the BNPP, 6 August 1986). 
* All names mentioned inothis table are pseudonyms used by 
the individuals concerned. 
Despite the fact that the central committee of each front operates inside the 
Malaysian border, it still plays a major role in carrying out local activitie$. Unlike 
those of the Moros, the provincial committees take direct orders from the central 
committee. Thus, the activities of the armed guerrilla wing of each front are directly 
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under the supervision of the military section of the central committee which is 
responsible for the overall guerrilla operations and recruitment. Guerrilla recruitment 
is normally initiated by guerrilla leaders who propose individual candidates to the 
military section. The names of the selected candidates are then submitted to the 
chairman for approval. For example, Article 20, Section 8 of the BNPP's constitution 
states, 'Permission must be obtained from the military section to recruit armed 
fighters' (BNPP 1981b: 35). Recruitment of guerrillas is also made by different 
section heads and members of the provincial committees; they recommend the 
qualified candidates to the military section for further action. 
Ordinary members and supporters of the fronts are usually recruited from 
various categories of the Muslim population by members of the fronts. Caution is 
taken by all fronts to avoid infiltration by unwanted persons such as government 
agents, drug addicts and individuals having ideologies inconsistent with Islam. In the 
case of the BNPP and BRN, recruiters are primarily religious teachers who control 
the Islamic schools in the provinces. They recruit teachers, students and Muslim 
·villagers in the vicip.ity of their schools. 
The fronts have yet to develop specialized training programmes for different 
functions such as propaganda and intelligence. Generally, the fronts perform two 
training programmes: military and political. Guerrillas are trained locally and 
abroad. Local training is conducted by local guerrilla leaders in remote areas in the 
foothills of the mountains. Local training is, however, not scheduled regularly; it 
depends mainly on the budget and the demand. Arrangements are also made with 
Muslim- £ountries. such as .Liby~._@d Syria for military training. A group of young 
guerrillas from the various fronts is from time to time sent abroad for the purpose. In 
1985, for instance, a group of BNPP fighters was given several months military 
trairiing ·in 'Afghanistan: (interviews, several guerrillas returning from Afghanistan, 
Malaysia, 6 May 1986). 
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Political training is conducted by religious teachers from religious schools. 
These religious teachers are normally high ranking leaders of the fronts. In the case of 
the BNPP, political training is in the form of orientation. Selected groups of ten to 
fifteen recruits are provided with food and lodging for two to three weeks. During this 
period, lectures on different topics are given by the BNPP leaders and invited 
religious teachers. The programmes are aimed at familiarizing the recruits with the 
objectives, ideology and discipline of the front. The recruits return to their respective 
villages and will be asked to perform certain duties such as recruiting, collecting 
information and serving as carriers. The programmes started in 1979 (I observed 
training programmes in May 1981 and in June 1985). 
Financial resources come mainly from the contributions of local and foreign 
members and supporters. Contributions are regularly made by members who hold 
permanent jobs. In the case of the BNPP, each full-time employee contributes 
according to his capacity from US$4 to US$80 monthly. Ordinary members are 
required by the constitution to pay a due of US40 cents monthly (BNPP 1981b:21; 
1982). In addition,_ members are encouraged to provide food and other necessities to 
guerrillas when the units move to their vicinities. 
A second source of funds is from voluntary and non-voluntary local supporters. 
Voluntary supporters are Malay-Muslims of various occupations who support the 
fronts because they believe in the struggle or because they want to protect their own 
interests. About sixty-five du-ah who are employed by the centres of Islamic call, for 
instance, contribute seventeen per cent of their salaries to the BNPP monthly 
(interviews, several du-ah, Narathiwat, Thailand, June 1985). The non-voluntary 
~contributors, who are mostly non;..Muslims, include local -businessmen, plantation 
owners and shopkeepers. 
A third source of income is members overseas, especially in Saudi Arabia and 
Malaysia. The BNPP, PULO and BRN receive regular contributions collected from 
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about 15,000 Patani workers in different cities in Saudi Arabia. Patani workers in 
other countries contribute similarly. Many Patani Muslims who reside in Malaysia 
contribute money and knowledge to their preferred fronts. 
But the fronts' maJor source of finance is contributions made by various 
agencies, organizations and wealthy families in Muslim countries. Most funds are 
given in the form of charity. The BNPP, for example, has obtained a fatwa (religious 
ruling) from Sheikh Abdul Aziz lbn Baz, president of the Department of Scholarly 
Research and Religious Ruling of Saudi Arabia, saying that the front has met the 
requirements for acquiring charity. The BNPP, therefore, has been collecting alms in 
Saudi Arabia. It is believed that the BNPP has also received some donations from the 
Islamic Solidarity Fund through the Islamic Development Bank (IDB). The 
authorities of the IDB deny it, but admit that the IDB has allocated several 
scholarships for Muslims in Thailand (interviews, IDB authorities, Jeddah, Saudi 
Arabia, April 1986). The Muslim World League, too, often makes donations to the 
BNPP. But the primary source of income of the BNPP is said to be the Al-Auqaf 
{Welfare DepartII)._ent) and Islamic· Call Society in Kuwait. 
The fronts spend substantial amounts of their income on operations and 
management. A fairly good portion of their finance is used for welfare purposes such 
as building schools for the children of mujahideen (BNPP 1981c, 1981d). 
The fronts share certain common objectives: to fight for the independence of 
Patani; to establish a state and a society based on Islamic values and way of life; to 
_pro,rnp~e. Islam.and preserve Malay identity and culture; and to respect and abide by 
the UN Charter (BNPP 1981b; PULO n.d.; BBMP n.d.). All fronts stress the Islamic 
obligation of jihad and Malay nationalism. Despite sharing common objectives, the 
fronts differ in ideology. The BNPP is a conservative group committed to orthodox 
Islam. As stated in its constitution, 'the basic political ideology of the BNPP is 
based on Al-Quran, Al-Hadith and other sources of Islamic law' (BNPP 1981b: 4-5). 
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In contrast, the BRN is a more radical group and is most outspoken in its opposition 
to the feudal institution of the sultanship. It has often been stated that the BRN 
ideology is 'Islamic socialism'. In the early 1970s the BRN was believed to have 
cooperated with Rashid Maidin's faction of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) 
(Asiaweek, 4 April 1980). However, neither Maidin's faction nor the BRN has ever 
made any public comments on the matter. When I interviewed Ustaz Karim, then 
chairman of the BRN, in June 1985 he denied any cooperation between his 
organization and the CPM. Because there has been no public statement by the front 
on ideological matters, it is difficult to explain what is meant by 'Islamic socialism'. 
Some Patani Muslims argue that there is no such thing as 'Islamic socialism' or 
'Islamic capitalism'. This is because Islam, as a system in itself, can only retain its 
original property when it does not blend with non-Islamic systems; if it does, it can 
Iio longer be regarded as Islam. Nevertheless, a BRN spokesman explains that 'Islamic 
socialism is more or less similar to what was practised in Egypt under Gamal Abdel 
Nasser' (interviews, several BRN leaders, Patani, February 1980). 
The constitution of PULO states, 'ideology of this organization is based on 
IBANGTAPEKEMA · which means Islamism, statehood, nationalism, and 
humanitarianism' (PULO n.d.:2). The constitution further explains that Islam, 
democracy, equality of opportunity, and humanitarianism constitute the 
socio-political and economic principles of the front (ibid.). Ideologically, the PULO 
stands in the middle between the conservative BNPP and radical BRN. However, it 
often sways either way to suit its purpose. The basic ideology of the BBMP is also 
lsl~mic (BBMP n.d.:1). sin~~ it W~S founded only in 1985, it is too early to discuss 
the nature of the organization or to predict its future performance. As a new 
organization, the BBMP concentrates on propaganda activities, distributing 
documents and pamphlets to gain acknowledgement of its existence. Calls for 
meetings with leaders of other fronts have also been initiated by the BBMP in an 
attempt to find a common ground for cooperation (BBMP 1986). 
156 
In addition to ideological differences, members and supporters of the fronts also 
come from different groups of people. The BNPP leaders and supporters are 
generally conservative religious teachers, intellectuals and members of well-off 
families. It is common knowledge among the Patani liberationists that the BNPP is 
an organization of the 'upper class'. Many of its members are of the opinion that 
socialism and liberal democracy are inconsistent with Islamic teachings. The BNPP 
revolves around conservative Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Malaysia 
and Pakistan. The BRN draws most of its leaders and supporters from the liberal 
religious elite and nationalists who believe that Islamic socialism is the most 
appropriate form of government. The BRN seeks close ties with liberal Muslim 
countries such as Algeria, Syria and Libya, but concentrates its activities in Malaysia 
and Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, leaders and supporters of the PULO come 
primarily from young militant nationalists and former gang leaders. The.front is more 
at ease with militant Muslim states such as Syria, Iran, Algeria and Libya. Its 
guerrillas are from time to time sent to be trained by the PLO (Arabia, August 
1982). The PULO's attraction to the PLO is, however, less a result of common 
ideological inclination than the PLO's militancy. 
Although the Malays are not divided along ethno-cultural lines like the Moros, 
factional conflicts within the Malay struggle occur on the basis of ideological and 
class differences as discussed above. Several attempts have been made to unite or at 
least to work together in facing the common enemy. The most significant attempt at 
unity was initiated by the World Muslim League in 1979, when the BNPP and PULO 
-signed a short-lived· agreement to coordinate their military operations. During this 
period of coordination, the fronts were reportedly fielding considerable numbers of 
armed guerrillas. In late 1979 a Thai parliamentary commission on southern Thailand 
identified 84 different armed groups in.the four provinces of Patani, Yala, Narathiwat 
and Songkhia (Far Eastern Economic &view, 20-26 June 1980). After a year of 
coordination, the two fronts could no longer find any common ground to enable them 
to compromise their differences. They terminated their agreement. A recent attempt 
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at unity was made in June 1986, when the BBMP invited the other three fronts to a 
meeting in Kuala Lumpur to discuss possible common ground for cooperation and 
unity among them (BBMP 1986:1-2). The BNPP refused to accept the invitation, 
accusing the newly created BBMP and the recently installed BRN and PULO leaders 
of seeking to gain recognition through the unity forum. 
In recent years, the fronts have also been plagued by internal rifts. In 1980 the 
top two leaders of the BRN, Ustaz Karim and Hajji M., were unable to compromise 
their differences on several issues. Their disagreement divided the BRN into two 
factions. In 1984 Ustaz Karim was forced to hold an election in which he lost his 
leadership to younger generation leaders, Che Muda and Cikgu Peng. Che Muda was 
elected as chairman while Cikgu Peng was appointed as chief of staff. However, Ustaz 
Karim still considers himself to be the leader of the BRN; he and his followers have 
dissociated themselves from the newly installed leaders (interviews, Ustaz Karim, 
Kuala Lumpur, 12 June 1985). This means that the front has split into three groups. 
In early 1981 a cleavage occurred within the PULO between a group that 
favoured cooperation with bandit groups and those who opposed it. The dispute 
resulted in the expulsion of many leaders of the latter from the organization and 
divided the PULO into two factions. Also in 1981 a rift within the BNPP emerged 
between a group of religious teachers loyal to Badri Hamdan and those secular leaders 
who revolved around Wahyuddin Muhammad, Badri's deputy. The cleavage reached 
its peak when the latter formed the BBMP in 1985 (BBMP n.d.). Thus, the BNPP, 
_whi_ch had:hitheto managed to keep internal division u°:der control, fi~sured. 
Apart from ideological differences, the fronts also differ in tactics and in 
strength. From the late 1960s to the mid 1970s the BNPP organized a comparatively 
strong guerrilla group called the National Liberation Army of the Patani People 
(NLAPP). It consisted of several hundred men recruited from different areas of the 
provinces. The BNPP become rather well-known as a result of the NLAPP's militant 
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activities, though the front was at the same time weakened by the loss of members 
and supporters in battles, arrests and surrenders. Consequently, the BNPP leaders 
today feel that they have not only to recoup the front's strength, hut also to gather 
together more support before launching another phase of militancy. The current 
emphasis is therefore on political organization and developing external political 
contacts rather than conducting insurgent activities. Whether or not this stance has 
led to a further weakening of the front is debatable. Nevertheless, the BNPP still 
claims to have several small units of seven to fifteen guerrillas stationed in various 
districts in the provinces of Patani, Yala and Narathiwat. They are armed with 
conventional weapons including Ml carbines, M14, M16 and AK 47 rifles, M1919 
machineguns, M79 grenade launchers, shotguns, pistols and homemade bombs. The 
guerrillas were commanded by Pak Yeh until he died in 1984. Presently, all guerrilla 
units are under the centralized command of the military section headed by Badri 
Hamdan, chairman of the central committee. Under Badri Hamdan guerrillas are 
trained more regularly and better fighters are produced. This is because the BNPP in 
recent years has received greater financial assistance from abroad. The BNPP, 
moreover, has -been able to secure overseas grants for certain Islamic schools and 
mosques in the provinces. 
Under Ustaz Karim's leadership the BRN placed emphasis on widening the base 
of internal support while organizing some guerrilla units. Although the BRN had 
fewer fighting units than either the BNPP or PULO, a well-equipped guerrilla group 
of the BRN was active in the mid 1970s. The group disintegrated when its courageous 
leader; -Cikgu ·Din Adam, was killed in 1977. The front also formed several small but 
active units of urban guerrilla forces. But the BRN under the leadership of Ustaz 
Karim was better known for its ability to mobilize support through the Islamic 
schools. 
Of the three fronts, the PULO was most militant. It adhered to Mao's political 
thought that 'political power comes out of the barrel of a gun' (Mao and Guevara 
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1962:13). When the BNPP leaders began to emphasize organizational work, the 
PULO accused the BNPP of being weak and stalling on liberation. The PULO did 
not hesitate to cooperate with bandit groups so as to create as much trouble for the 
Thai authorities as possible. It is not surprising that PULO was constantly in the 
news, being accorded responsibilty for kidnapping, ambushes and bombing. 
The PULO used its office in Mecca as a 'policy-making headquarters' and that 
in Malaysia as an 'operations office'. Important decisions were conveyed from Mecca 
to Kota Bharu, about 30 kilometres from the Thai border, where instructions were 
given to leaders and guerrillas to carry them out. Another major office of PULO was 
in Damascus where selected guerrilla leaders were often sent for military training. In 
1981 the PULO claimed to have about 20,000 members who contributed US40 cents 
monthly. It was also acknowledged to have many units of guerrillas stationed 
throughout the three provinces. However, the PULO faced its worst crisis in 1984. 
Its headquarters in Mecca were raided by Saudi authorities. Many of the fronts' 
leaders were arrested or deported. More than seven hundred of its members were sent 
home (intervie~s, several informed Patani Muslims, Mecca, Saudi Arabia, April 1986; 
Centre for Administration of the Southern Border Provinces n.d.). Tengku Bira, 
secretary-general of PULO, escaped arrest but was forced to resign. Abdul Hadi Hajji 
Ghazali, Tengku Bira's deputy, assumed the leadership. The reason behind the 
Saudi's harsh action against the PULO was that the organization's activities had 
gone beyond the limit that the Saudi government could tolerate. For example, the 
PULO openly issued a 'Citizenship Identification Card of Patani Republic' to Patani 
Muslim worketsin-Saudi Arabia and colleetedtaxes from them (ibid.). Furthe:tmore, 
its' constant contact with the officials oT the Baath Party of Syria and the opening of 
its_ new office in !tan irritated the Saudi government. The crisis has undoubtedly 
crippled the PULO, and it may take several years before it can revive its activities in 
Saudi Arabia. The difficult task of restoring the organization to its orginal strength is 
now in the hands of younger generation leaders headed by Abdul Hadi. 
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Finally, internal cleavages have weakened each front in recent years. Of the 
three fronts, the BNPP seems to be least affected by such cleavages, though some of 
its leaders have joined the BBMP. The front's political and military training 
programmes, initiated in 1979, have continued with little interuption. More 
importantly, the BNPP has recently received increased financial assistance from 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In contrast, the BRN has split into three groups. The 
present leadership of Che Muda-Cikgu Peng faces a difficult task in reconciling these 
factions. While Che Muda and Cikgu Peng still advocate 'Islamic socialism', Ustaz 
Karim's group now advocates pure Islam (interviews, Ustaz Karim, Kuala Lumpur, 
12 June 1985). Reconciliation with the Hajji M. faction is also difficult because Che 
Muda and Cikgu Peng incline toward military action whereas the former emphasizes 
political organization. In the case of PULO, the organization has not yet recovered 
from its crisis in 1984. It remains to be seen whether Abdul Hadi and his group are 
capable of repairing the damage that has put the front on the verge of disintegration. 
At the moment, therefore, the BNPP seems to be the only organization that can keep 
the Malay liberation struggle going. 
Field Studies 
In 1985-86 I visited the offices of the BNPP in Malaysia and Saudi Arabia. The 
visits were confined to the BNPP because it was the only front accessible at the time. 
Moreover, as argued above, the BNPP is more powerful and less fragmented than the 
other fronts. The following paragraphs give some account of these visits. 
In mid June 1985, I made a seven-day visit to the BNPP headquarters located 
within the Malaysian border. The -visit was possible because some of the BNPP 
-leaders including the chairman, Ustaz Badri Hamdan, were my school-mates during 
---
our years in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. For a headquarters of an underground front, I 
was surprised to see that the office was furnished with relatively expensive furniture 
arid office facilities such as telephones, typewriters and copying machines. Several of 
the front's leaders, such as the chairman, vice-chairman, secretary and heads of the 
political and interior sections, come to the office regularly. When the chairman is at 
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his desk, he is usually busy with paper work and long-distance telephone calls. The 
vice-chairman spends much of his time writing pamµhlets and propaganda, both in 
Malay and Arabic. The head of the political section concentrates his daily work on 
analysing local and international political developments. He is regarded as the 
organization's theoretician. The secretary and head of the interior section, on the 
other hand, are responsible for the management of guests and visitors who come and 
go regularly. Most of them are local leaders who visit the headquarters for different 
purposes. Among regular visitors to the headquarters, for example, is a group of 
du-ah whose purpose is to collect their pay cheques. Apparently, certain Islamic call 
centres have channelled their payments to some of their du-ah in Patani through the 
BNPP. This is logical because the front under Badri Hamdan has had cordial 
relations with different Islamic call centres. Despite the fact that communication 
between the headquarters and local leaders is relatively well established, leaders from 
the headquarters occasionally cross to the other side of the border to supervise the 
local leaders. 
Apart fr_om office work, the chairman and other leaders are engaged in carrying 
out political orientation and military training. I was permitted to observe a lecture 
given by the chairman to a group of about fifteen selected recruits who were 
attending a two-week orientation programme. The lecture essentially revolved 
around a Quranic verse (VIII:60) which states: 
Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, 
including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies, of 
God and your enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but 
whom God doth know. Whatever ye shall spend in the Cause of God, shall 
be repaid unto you, and ye shall not be treated unjustly. 
Sucli lectures are given- on different topics by other leaders and invited 'lecturers' 
· iii:itil the programme is completed. 
During the week of my visit, the chairman and several leaders in the Military 
Section were absent from the office for two days. I was told that they went to a 
camp where a group of twelve recruits undertook a two-week guerrilla training 
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programme. The programme was initiated in 1984 m an attempt to familiarize 
selected members with conventional and homemade weapons. These political and 
military trainees will be regarded as active members of the BNPP when they return 
to their respective villages. However, they are seldom promoted to high echelon 
positions because the BNPP prefers its policy-making leaders to be drawn from 
university graduates. To some extent this has moved the front away from the 
grass-root supporters. 
Besides dedication to their office work, leaders and members of the front at its 
headquarters are also devoted to pious duties (ibadat). They spend considerable time 
each day performing religious rituals. 'Only by being close to God', said one leader, 
'the objectives of our struggle can be fulfilled'. To be close to God, they further 
assemble at least once a week to discuss different aspects of Islam. By doing so, they 
hope to increase their Islamic knowledge and more importantly to gain enlightment 
from God. At the end of weeklong activities, a meeting of members of the Central 
Committee is called. Decisions made at this meeting are final. Orders are conveyed 
to the concerped parties in the provinces and abroad for implementation. 
No fire-arms are allowed at the headquarters of the BNPP. Guerrillas visiting 
the office must leave their weapons inside the Thai border. This is to comply with 
the Malaysian laws which prohibit its citizens carrying and possessing fire-arms. To 
the outsiders, the headquarters of the BNPP is seen more as a business office than an 
underground organization aimed at separating the southern border provinces of 
Thailand. 
In April 1986, I made a visit to Saudi Arabia for a periOd.ofone month. The 
trip was an attempt to look at the activities of different fronts in the kingdom. Saudi 
Arabia has always been regarded as a centre of religious education and employment 
for the Patani Muslims. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the immigration 
laws of Saudi Arabia were still relaxed, there were as many as 30,000 Patani Muslims 
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living legally and illegally in different cities of that country. At least a third of that 
number still remains, and most of them are involved in the activities of the fronts 
(interviews, several informed Patani Muslims in Mecca and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, 
April 1986). My trip was sponsored mainly by the World Muslim League, Mecca. 
While in Mecca, however, I was provided with lodging and transportation by the 
BNPP leaders.~ trip to Jeddah, Madina and Taif also was facilitated by them. 
In 1984 the BNPP built a permanent office in Mecca, at a cost of US$70,000. 
The BNPP branch in Saudi Arabia is governed by a seventeen-member working 
committee (Majlis Kerja), seven of whom are holding portfolios as shown in table 
4.3. The front draws its members from Patani Muslim intellectuals, businessmen and 
workers living mainly in the cities of Mecca, Madina, Jeddah and Taif. They make 
financial and other contributions to the organization according to their capacities. 
Through their generous contributions, the BNPP in Mecca has persisted and even 
grown. It has also provided financial and material support to the front's headquarters 
(interviews, Amin Hamdi, chairman of the working committee of the BNPP, Mecca, 
Apr.il 1986) ... 
Like the headquarters in Malaysia, the BNPP office in Mecca is well equipped. 
Amin Hamdi, chairman of the working committee, and Khairullah Bakri, officer in 
charge of the office, come to the office daily. The primary job of the former, apart 
from administrative matters, is to collect monthly dues from members and to raise 
alms from Arab sympathizers. The responsibility of the latter, in addition to office 
maintenance, is to arrange official meetings, circulate information among the 
members and to lead prayers. A meeting of the working committee takes place once a 
week -to ·evalu~-te overall perfc)rmance -and to discuss -the Ia.test developments in the 
-homeland. Moreover, the BNPP holds two classes every week on different religious 
subjects;- from Islamic jurisprudence to Quranic interpretation. They are given by 
senior religious teachers. Participants in these classes are mostly leaders and members 
of the front. They participate not only to widen their horizon of Islamic knowledge 
Table 4-3: Members of the Working Committee of the BNPP in Mecca 
Who were Holding Portfolios in 1986 
Portfolio Classification 
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Amin Hamdi Chairman Religious teacher 
Abu Iman Secretary Religious teacher 
Khalid Abdullah Registrar Businessman 
Fathulmubeen Omar Treasurer Businessman 
Khairullah Bakri Officer in Charge of Office Religious teacher 
Jamal Abdul Nassir Education Officer Religious teacher 
Hamdi Khalid Information Officer Religious teacher 
Source: Information from the office of the BNPP 
in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, April 1986. 
* All names mentioned in this table are pseudonyms 
used by the individuals concerned. 
but also to attain enlightment from God. Some senior religious teachers have, since 
1984, been meeting at least once a week in an effort to complete a dictionary of 
Patani-Mal~y language. Another function of these senior religious teachers is to 
provide fatwa (religious ruling) for the BNPP when required. 
During my stay in Mecca, the BNPP called special meetings of different groups 
of its members to discuss the current situation in the Patani region. It also invited 
Salamat Hashim, chairman of the MILF, to brief them on the Moro struggle after 
Marcos. At one of these special meetings, the working committee members made a 
-decision __ to buy B piece of.land in Patani valued about US$ 65,000, to be donated. to 
the BNPP. The land is intended for growing crops to provide additional income to 
the front-in the -future.· 
The activities of the BNPP in Mecca are intensified when its chairman or 
vice-chairman from the headquarters makes his yearly visit to the Mecca office. 
During his visit the chairman will travel to major cities of Saudi Arabia to seek 
support from different government agencies and groups of Arab sympathizers. He will 
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also visit several other Arab countries, such as Kuwait and Egypt. Before returning 
to the headquarters, a general meeting at the Mecca office will normally be called to 
discuss the outcome of his tour and to hear opinions and suggestions not only from 
leaders and members of the front in Saudi Arabia but also from the invited 
representatives of other BNPP foreign branches (Egypt, Kuwait, Sudan and 
Pakistan). 
I also interviewed some leaders of the BRN and several former PULO leaders. 
The activities of the BRN in Saudi Arabia are similar to those of the BNPP. Both 
are active fund raisers. Because of their financial contributions to their respective 
fronts, they also play an important role in shaping the policies of the organizations. 
However, the two are different in that the BNPP seems to have gained more support 
from Patani Muslims and Arab sympathizers in the kingdom. This is due mainly to 
the fact that conservative Arabs and religious-educated Patani Muslims are less 
attracted to the socialistic inclination of the BRN ideology. PULO is no longer active 
in Saudi Arabia, after the events of 1984. 
Concludi.Bg Remarks 
-Longstanding resistance and resentment against Thai assimilationist policies 
contributed to the emergence of the Malay liberation movement, which in turn gave 
rise to organized fronts with a broad base of popular support. Along with this 
transformation, a transfer of leadership from former aristocrats to the religious elite 
occurred as the prestige of the former in Patani society declined. The involvement of 
the Muslim religious elite in the liberation struggle has been crucial. The religious 
elite, especially religious teachers, plays an important role and participates 
. ~" . -. '.;.. ; - . 
extensively in all fronts. Indeed, religious -educated leaders form the backbone of 
separatist politics in Patani today. 
Although the fronts have been weakened in recent years by factional conflicts 
and international cleavages, they have conducted occasional armed insurgence in the 
four Muslim provinces to remind the government as well as villagers of their 
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existence. More significanly, all fronts assume that popular support is always 
potentially present, and therefore their relatively weak resources are concentrated 
more on external activities, to obtain international support and recognition. This 
external emphasis has further lessened local activities. Nonetheless, the separatist 
movement persists. Its strength, like that of the Moros, lies l;n the fact that it is 
ethnically-based, religiously motivated (see Aruri 1977; Snow and Marshall 1984) and 
led by a leadership group that dominates the Patani society. 
The Moro and the Malay Separatisms Compared 
The Moro and the Malay separatist movements have more similarities than 
differences. The outbreak of the present separatist conflicts in Mindanao-Sulu and 
Patani are but the latest chapter in the centuries-old history of Muslim resistance 
against alien domination. The contemporary struggles were also triggered by the 
governments' acceleration of integration efforts and by the specific immediate cases of 
maltreatment that characterized the 'internal colonialism' of the existing 
socio-economic and political structure of the Muslim communities. To the Muslims, 
the central governments had proved to be insensitive to their demands and needs. 
The search for alternatives to secure the integrity of their communities became 
inescapable. 
Both movements consist of loosely organized fronts whose strengths depend less 
on the principles of effective organization than on the fact that they are 
ethnically-based, religiously motivated and led by leadership groups that dominate 
their respective communities. The Moro fronts are led primarily by traditional 
aristocratic and secular-educated elites; the Malay fronts are led mainly by the 
religious elite which likewise dominates the leadership of Malay-Muslims in Patani 
society. In addition, the two struggles are supported, though in different degrees, by 
some sympathetic Muslim states. Such support has had significant effects on the 
separatist conflicts: the external supporters 'help to keep a conflict between a 
minority group and the majority-dominated government it challenges within the 
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bounds of total defeat and total victory' (Suhrke and Noble 1977:209). More 
importantly, all fronts, except the Communist-influenced MORO, are founded on 
Islamic ideology, though each has its own colouration. Islam has become the fronts' 
most powerful symbolic means of mobilizing support and of legitimizing sanctions for 
revolutionary action. Yet, despite the bond of Islam, both movements have become 
factionalized. Factional conflicts have been one of the major sources of past and 
present weaknesses of the Muslim struggles in confronting external threats. In the 
case of the Moros, ethno-cultural splits and family backgrounds have been major 
causes of factional conflicts. Although the Malays have no ethn"ic divisions, their 
conflicts derive primarily from differences in ideological inclinations and educational 
and family backgrounds. Disunity among the Muslim states has further strengthened 
factional battles in both movements. 
Despite their differences, the fundamental concern of the Moros and the Malays 
is to seek their survival as Muslim peoples. They believe that the preservation of their 
Islamic communities requires freedom from domination by Christians and Buddhists, 
respectiv~!y-,- in matters -that most impinge on their identity as Muslims. These 
include such matters as religious activities, family life, education, and jurisdiction 
over land and economic resources. However, there can be no freedom until there are 
changes in the structure of their relationships to their respective governments. To 
obtain these changes, both movements have devised a two-pronged strategy: 
attracting international attention to their dilemmas as oppressed Muslim minorities 
and employing guerrilla-style wars against the central governments. 
The fundamental difference between the two struggles is the intensity of the 
conflicts. The Moros have been able to stage a 'war of attrition' that not only stands 
-a.s orie of the Philippines' most -serious internal conflicts; but also led the Marcos 
government to sign the Tripoli Agreement and, more recently, President Aquino to 
meet some of their leaders in an attempt to initiate a negotiation settlement. In 
contrast, the Malays have been able to achieve only a low level of violence in southern 
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Thailand. This is for several reasons. One is that the Thai government's policies of 
assimilation and suppression have in the last two decades been restrained by 
anticipated strong reaction from the neighbouring Malaysian government. Secondly, 
the Malays are less willing or able to develop international contacts (i"bid.:209-210). 
Thirdly, the Malays lack charismatic and aggressive leaders capable of providing a 
serious challenge to the Bangkok government. 
CHAPTERS 
LEADERSHIP IN THE MORO 
AND THE MALAY SOCIETIES 
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In chapter 2 we have discussed the broad historical, economic and social 
outlines of Moro and Malay societies. Particular mention has been made of the place 
of traditional, religious and secular elites. From the dtscription of the separatist 
movements in chapter 4, it will be clear that the traditional and religious elites in 
particular played important--but varying--roles in the establishment and development 
of the separatist movements in the two countries. In the Philippines, the traditional 
elite played an important part in the early stages of the separatist movement and in 
establishing overseas linkages with the Muslim world. Leadership of the MNLF later 
became divided between members of the traditional and secular elites, a division 
which became significant in the light of later splits within the movement. In Thailand 
on the other hand leadership passed quickly to the religious elite. This chapter looks 
more closely at the question of leadership-the changing and contrasting roles played 
by traditional, religious and secular elites in the Moro and Malay struggles--and seeks 
to relate the issue of leadership to broader aspects of stability and change in the Moro 
and Malay societies. 
Elite theorists believe that concentration of power in a small group of elite is 
inevitable in modern society (Michels 1915; Mosca 1939; Bottomore 1964; Pareto 
1966; Olsen 1970). The population of every modern society is differentiated according 
to status, wealth and power. The majority of any given population may be thought of 
as the base of a steep pyramid. If social class is defined as the measure of one's 
position along the vertical slope of the pyramid, the higher the class-standing of any 
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individual, the smaller the percentage of the population that belongs to his social 
class. In other words, the elite and the rich are few, while the commoner and the poor 
are many (Greene 1974:16). Despite their small numbers, the elite influences many 
aspects of social life and provides leadership in shaping the structure of society. 'Most 
simply', notes Lasswell, 'the elite are the influential' (Lasswell and Lerner 1965:4). 
They include not only leaders or those who engage in socio-political activities, but 
also the strata of society from which they are generally drawn (ibid.:4-12). 
According to the 14th century Muslim thinker, lbn Taymiyyah, leadership or 
authority is indispensable in the social structure of human life. Prophet Muhammad 
(peace be upon him) had charted the pattern of even the smallest organization by 
instructing that one among three who may be travelling be designated leader (Makari 
1983:135; Khan 1973). This illustrates that Islam affirms the necessity and the 
inevitability of a leadership structure in society. 
Leadership in the Moro Society 
Despite decades under the rule of the Filipino Christian government, Moro 
society has remained unintegrated. It has retained most of its traditional features and 
institutions, though in modified form. With respect to leadership, there exist three 
categories of Moro elite: traditional, secular and religious. These leadership groups 
play various roles in contemporary Moro society. 
The Role of Traditional, Secular and Religious Elites in the Moro Society 
A social system consists of sets of patterned and related activities. These 
activities may be termed roles. Roles are '(1) units of conduct which by their 
recurrence stand otit as regularities and (2) which are oriented to the conduct of other 
actors' (Gerth-and Mills 1953:13). An organization of roles, one or more of which is 
uiideisto()d to serve- the maintenance of the total sets of roles, is called an institution 
(ibid.). Politieal order comprises those institutions within which men attain, wield, or 
influence the distribution of power within social structures (ibid.:26). Leadership, 
therefore, can be measured primarily in terms of roles which individuals or groups of 
individuals play in such institutions. 
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Members of the Moro traditional elite are the aristocrats: the sultans, the 
datus, their descendants, and those who attain aristocratic status by their own 
personal achievements {see chapter 2). Traditionally, the pervasive influence of the 
sultans and the datus extended to virtually all spheres of life (Stewart 1977:66). They 
were also regarded by the villagers as charismatic leaders whose charismatic 
grace(barakat) adhered in them and could be passed on hereditarily {Kiefer 
1981:7 4-75).1 
Despite the imposition of the Western political structure on top of the 
traditional system, Moro social activities continue to revolve around the aristocrats 
{Giang 1974:282). Members of different ethno-cultural groups still recognize the 
existence of their respective royal houses~ Even though the sultans and the datus no 
longer have temporal power, they remain an influential and powerful elite group 
within the Muslim community. Three basic factors contribute to the survival of the 
traditional leaders. First, they have been able to adapt themselves to the political 
machinery of the modern Philippine state. Their traditional ranks and roles were 
legitimi~ed and institutionalized with the introduction of popular elections: with their 
influence and accumulation of wealth, they easily won in elections {Madale 1984:180; 
a list of some Moro aristocrats holding government offices is provided in Appendix 
B). Secondly, the aristocratic institutions (sultanate and datuship) have always been 
looked upon as representing the authority of Islam and adat (customary law) which 
constitute the major points of reference in terms of which the Moros define their 
society and their place within it (Kiefer 1972b:90-91 ). Thirdly, the traditional elite 
belongs to an institution that fortified the Moros through centuries of struggle 
against for~ign domination {Giang 1969:S6). 
·· ·· · The· second category :of Moro leaders belongs to the secular elite. They are the 
professi-Onals: who '(a) perform an activity on the basis of specialized training and, 
1Max Weber described charisma. as 'a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue 
of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, super-
human, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities' (quoted in Smelser 1963:355). 
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usually, higher education; (b) work full-time for (c) a remuneration which is their 
main source of income' (Pusic 1969:108). They are people in a special social role such 
as lawyers, doctors, engineers, businessmen, lecturers, etc. The Moro professionals are 
the product of local and foreign secular colleges and universities. 
The secular elite gain leadership status not only through their special social 
role, but also through what Lynch terms the 'alliance system' (1959:49-43). Alliances 
are made between professionals, such as lawyers, and individuals of lower 
socio-economic status, such as ordinary villagers. For example, a powerful lawyer 
may, out of a conscious feeling of professional responsibilty or of charity, provide 
assistance to a poor villager who needs his professional help. In such a case a dyadic 
relationship may grow, with the villager becoming a dependent partner, reciprocating 
the lawyer's help through small gifts or by providing certain services (Arce 1983:59). 
While they are still comparatively small in number, members of the secular elite 
increasingly play an active leadership role in the Muslim community. Some of the 
Moro secular elite were the product of the Commission on National Integration 
Colleg~ Scholarship Programme which provided college scholarships to members of 
minority. Table 5.1 shows the number of scholarships and gradutes during the years 
1958-1967~ Some of these graduates emerged as leaders of the separatist struggle, 
notably Misuari and his associates. 
The third group of Moro leaders is the religious elite. Members of the religious 
elite are men who engage in religious works and activities. They include three main 
groups: mosque personnel {officials), such as imam, khatib and bilal; religious 
. . -. - - . . . . . . . . . . 
teachers, ustaz (pandita or guru) and preachers (du-ah or Muslim missionary); and 
pious men, alim (plural--u/ama) 2and hajji (see chapter 3). 
2 Alim {learned man) is an honorary title given to a person knowledgeable in religious mat-
ters. The ulama are active participants in the village religious activities and ritual ceremonies. 
They did their best to maintain the Islamic integrity of their communities (Majul n.d.: 35-36). 
An alim may not have a formal religious educational background, but his knowledge, ritual 
experience and piety command respect from the villagers. Since the criteria of measuring alim 
are relative and informal, it is difficult to estimate how many ulama are in the Moro com-
munity. 
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Table 5-1: Number of the CNI Scholars and Graduates, 1958-1967 
Year Scholar Graduate 
1958 109 20 
1959 460 60 
1960 610 110 
1961 620 110 
1962 930 180 
1963 1,020 130 
1964 930 150 
1965 960 170 
1966 1,460 250 
1967 1,210 211 
Total 8,309 1,391 
Source: (Filipinas Foundation 1971:163). 
It should be noted, however, that membership of these leadership groups is not 
mutually exclusive. Depending on individual qualifications, a member of one elite 
group can· at· the same time be classified as a member of the other elite groups. For 
example, a datu who is also a hajji and a businessman can be identified as a member 
of all three groups. On the other hand, a haJ)"i or a businessman who is not a. datu 
does not qualify to become a member of traditional elite because he is not an 
aristocrat. Table 5.2 indicates leadership group combinations that are possible for a 
member of each elite group. 
····-·- ... -
· ·· lri the five "provinces (Basilan, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and 
Tawi-Tawi) where the Muslims constitute the majority, the Moro political and social 
activities revolve around the local governmental and religious institutions. There 
exist three main levels of local government in the Moro provinces: regional, 
provincial, and municipal. As a measure of the extent to which each elite group 
participates in the local governmental institutions, Appendix B lists 125 elected and 
Table 5-2: Leadership Group Combinations 
Leadership group 
Traditional elite 
Secular elite 
Religious elite 
T=Traditional elite 
S=Secula.r elite 
R=Religious elite 
Possible leadership group 
combinations 
T T+R T+S T+R+S 
s S+R 
R R+S 
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appointed contemporary Moro leaders of various capacities--senators, congressmen, 
governors, mayors, assemblymen, and regional directors. By examining their family 
names, royal titles, and professional and religious qualifications, I have identified 
their respective leadership group classifications. 
At regional level, Autonomous Governments in Central and Western Mindanao 
(Regions IX and XII) came into existence as a result of the Tripoli Agreement. Table 
5.3 shows the distribution of leadership groups among the elected and. appointed 
Muslim officials of Autonomous Region XII as listed in Appendix B. The majority of 
the elected Muslim officials of Autonomous Region XII, as illustrated in table 5.3, are 
members of the traditional elite. This suggests that the traditional leadership group is 
still influential among the Moro voters. One may argue, however, that the voters 
were also influenced by the then goverment-controlled political party, Kilusang 
Bagong Lipunan (KBL). But those candidates who were supported by the KBL were 
usually already influential leaders who commanded support among the villagers. In 
fact, most of the traditional leaders who were elected were, in the words of Michael 
Mastura, 'predetermined leaders' (see George 1980:99). In the case of the appointed 
regional directors, the majority of them are members of the secular elite, for 
professional tasks' require professionals.--Rowever, almost one third of the regional 
directors are members of the traditional elit~. Thus, the traditional and secular elites 
play an important leadership role in governmental institutions at regional level. 
Table 5-3: Leadership Group Distribution among Muslim 
Officials, Autonomous Region XII 
Leadership group 
classification 
Assemblymen and Members 
of Executive Council 
(per cent) 
T 
s 
T+S 
T+R 
Total number of leaders 
computed in each column 
T=Traditional elite 
S=Secular elite 
R=Religious elite 
62.5 
18.8 
12.5 
6.2 
16 
Regional 
Directors 
(per cent) 
28.6 
61.9 
9.5 
21 
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At the provincial and municipal levels, the distribution of leadership groups 
among the elected Muslim leaders as listed in Appendix B is demonstrated in table 
5.4. From this table it is clear that a significant majority of the elected provincial and 
municipal Muslim leaders are members of the traditional elite. The secular elite, on 
the '!~her hand, is in a relatively impressive second position, while the religious elite 
comprises only a small percentage of the municipal mayors. This again illustrates the 
dominant leadership role of the traditional elite at the grass-root as well as the 
provincial levels. Table 5.5 indicates the distributions of leadership groups among the 
elected and appointed Muslim leaders at all three local levels. As demonstrated in 
table 5.5, members of the traditional elite dominate the elected Muslim leadership at 
all levels of local government. They also represent the majority of the overall elected 
and appointed contemporary Muslim leaders listed in Appendix B. 
In addition to governmental institutions, religious institutions, such as mosques, 
_"!a<!a!i~, and Muslim associations and organizations are important in Moro society. 
There are many hundreds of mosques in the Mindanao-Sulu region (Majul 
1977:779-784; Madale 1976:12-14). Many, if not most, of these were erected through 
the efforts of the traditional elite, especially in areas where there is a profusion of 
Table 5-4: Leadership Group Distribution among the Elected 
Muslim Leaders at Provincial and Municipal Level 
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Leadership group 
classification 
Senators and 
congressmen 
(per cent) 
Governors and 
vice-governors 
(per cent) 
City and municipal 
mayors 
T 
s 
R 
T+S 
T+R 
T+S+R 
Total number of leaders 
computed in each column 
T=Traditional elite 
S=Secular elite 
R=Religious elite 
57.1 
14.3 
14.3 
14.3 
14 
(per cent) 
52.9 45.6 
29.4 21.1 
14.0 
11.8 3.5 
5.9 15.8 
17 57 
Table 5-5: Leadership Group Distribution among 
the Elected and Appointed Muslim Leaders at 
Regional, Provincial and Municipal Levels 
Leadership group 
classification 
--T 
s 
R 
T+S 
T+R 
T+S+R 
Elected 
leaders 
(per cent) 
50.0. 
21.6 
7.8 
7.8 
10.8 
2.0 
Total number of_ leaders 
computed in each column 102 
T=Traditional elite 
S=Secular elite 
R=Religious elite 
Appointed 
leaders 
(per cent) 
34;5 
56.5 
8.7 
23 
Elected and appointed 
leaders 
(per cent) 
47.2 
28.0 
6.4 
8.0 
8.8 
1.6 
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sultans and datus, as in Lanao del Sur (interviews, several ustaz in Marawi City, 14 
November 1984). This is not unusual practice in a Muslim community, for in the 
early days of Islam the building of a mosque was an obligation on the rulers, and it 
became a pious work, 'according to which the Prophet said: "for him who builds a 
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mosque, God will build a home in Paradise'" (Gibb and Kramers 1953:335). 
Prominent leaders also built mosques which were the centres of their activitiei::. Such 
traditions have been followed consciously or unconsciously by the Moro traditional 
leaders. Nevertheless, the mosque officials remain dominant functionaries. In addition, 
preachers and ustaz, who teach or are involved in other religious activities, are also 
regarded as important leaders in the affairs of the mosque. 
The second group of religious institutions is religious schools or madaris. 
Madaris as parochial schools have been with the Moro community for centuries. As 
William Dampier, an English explorer who visited Mindanao in 1687 noted: 
in the city of Mindanao they speak two languages indifferently; their own 
Mindanao language, and the Malays .... They have schools, and instruct the 
children to read and write, and bring them up in Mahometan religion 
(quoted in Mastura 1982:6; cJ. Majul 1970:1). 
Indeed, madaris have been the Muslims' basic instrument in preserving and 
transmitting Islamic teachings, customs, traditions and beliefs (Pahm 1982:44). The 
Moro villagers acquire their religious knowledge, particularly about ibadat (pious 
duties), from madaris which offer classes not only in schools, but in mosques and 
private houses. During the American regime, the madrasa system was discouraged; 
it was not until after the Second World War that madaris reemerged, as a result of 
the resurgence of Islam (Gowing 1962:57-65). Today there are about 1,137 madaris 
in the Moro area (Ministry of Muslim Affairs 1983:34). They function as non-formal 
schools aimed at educating both youth and elders in the knowledge of Islam, the 
Arabic language and other subjects patterned after the curriculum taught in the 
Middle East--{Sarahahil 1982:26; Isidro 1979). Like the mosques, the madar£s are 
looked up to as a symbol of Islam and are regarded as essential to the lives and 
culture of the Moros. As Mercado (1981:52) suggests, the mosques and madaris are 
the only ones which remain the instruments whereby they can affirm their 
'Moro-ness'. 
Most of the madaris are organized and maintained by the united efforts of 
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ustaz or preachers and local leaders such as datu (Alonto 1982:32; Sarahabil 1982:26). 
Full-fledged madaris and Islamic institutes which combine some subjects of 
government-approved standard elementary and secondary curricula are normally 
managed by well-known religious or traditional leaders. For example, the Mindanao 
Arabic School and the Jamatul Philippine Al-Islamia· in Marawi City are run by 
Shiekh Ahmad Bashir, a religious teacher who spent many years in Mecca studying 
Islam, and by the Alontos, one of the oldest aristocratic families in Lanao del Sur. 
The Sulu Madrasa Al-Islamia was established by Major Berley Abubakar with 
Mohammad Taja Omar, a preacher, as its headmaster. Back in 1951 Congressman 
Datu Luminog Mangelen became the patron of the Madarasatul Rasheeda in 
Cotabato while Shiekh Omar Bajunaid was its first headmaster. The Motamar 
Islamiah in Bayang was founded by another religious teacher, Ustaz Kali sa Bayang 
Monir. The Maahad Marawi Al-Islamie is operated by Sultan Rashid Sampaco. In 
brief, the religious and traditional elite groups play a major leadership role m 
madari"s. Some of the madaris have managed to secure finacial assistance from 
different Muslim governments (Mastura 1982:10). 
A major problem facing madari"s as seen by some Muslim educators and 
Philippine government authorities is that they generally do not prepare their 
graduates for higher education and professional training in the Philippine educational 
system. Only a few graduates can look forward to further education in Islamic 
institutes abroad; most graduates find themselves educationally unprepared for full 
participation in Philippine socio-economic and political life outside their immediate 
~communities (Guwing 1979:71 ). ' ·To- -solve the problem, these educators and the 
government authorities;'sorhe of whoin see madari"s as a training ground for militant 
Muslims, feel that madari"s should be integrated into the public school system under 
such schemes as the Fund for Assistance to Provide Education (F APE) and the 
Educational Development Implementing Project3 Task Force (EDIPTAF). This 
means that the madrasa administrators must be prepared to accept the direction of 
the education authorities in the matter of accreditation, educational management and 
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administration (Mastura 1982:11). For some religious teachers who view education 
as a medium for Islamic da'wah (the call of faith), however, the introduction of the 
government's secular curriculnm into madaris, as the Malay-Muslims in southern 
Thailand have experienced, would not lead to a constructive result. As Pitsuwan has 
observed, 'since the introduction of secular education into its curriculum, the 
products of the pondoks have become mediocre and, in some cases, valueless' (quoted 
in Mastura 1982:11). 
The last category of religious institutions is Muslim associations and 
organizations, such as the Ansar El-Islam, the Muslim Association of the Philippines 
and the Agama Islam Society. They were formed for a mixture of religious and social 
as well as political purposes. The combination of such purposes was inherent in the 
character of Islam, that religion and politics could not be separated. Through their 
activities, the Muslim associations and organizations have helped enhance the sense of 
Islamic consciousness and of Muslim identity and solidarity across Moro 
ethnic-cultural group lines (Gowing 1979:187). The building of mosques and madaris 
w4_ich is part of their efforts, for instance, strengthens the religious consciuosness and 
solidarity of the Muslims. 
The first all-Muslim organization, the Sarikatul Islam Association, was formed 
m Zamboanga in 1924. In the same decade, the Muslim Association of the 
Philippines (MUSAPHIL) was organized by Indian Muslim businessmen in Manila. 
Later, it became the hub of Muslim affairs. Some of its achievements benefited 
Muslim education, including the establishment ofma,daris in the provinces and 
- - . . . • - .. : : .•. : .·- : ·- .! ':. .- ~- • ;: '... ;:_ . - • - • • 
seeming. fin11.pci,~. assi_stance and scholarships from Muslim governments such as 
.Egypt, Pakistan and Indonesia (Mastura 1982:10). In 1936 a group of Moro leaders 
iJ1 Marawi City formed the Kamilol Islam Society with the purpose of promoting 
Islamic education. The Society then founded the Madrasah Islamiah Kamilol Islam 
under the direction of Sheikh Muhammad Siddiq, Guru sa Marawi. Several other 
associations of similar purpose also emerged in different parts of the Moro areas. In 
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1969 the Ansar El-Islam was organized under the leadership of Senator Domocao 
Alonto. Its stated objective was 'the complete establishment of Islam in all aspects of 
their way of life' (Ansar El-Islam 1974:1). It struggled to achieve, among other 
things: '(a) a defined and guarenteed territorial jurisdiction; and (b) a legislative 
power to adopt local laws based on the Holy Quran and the Sunnah of the Holy 
Prophet' (ibid.). It was also an attempt to find a 'workable' solution to the demand 
for complete independence of Mindanao made by Datu Matalam's Muslim 
Independence Movement organized a year earlier. Other Muslim organizations 
include the Union of Islamic Force and Organizations, the Muslim Lawyers' League, 
the Muslim Progress Movement, the Sulu Islamic Congress, the Muslim Youth 
National Assembly, the Supreme Islamic Council of the Philippines, the Muslim 
Alliance of the Philippines, the Muslim Students' Association of the Philippines, and 
Sulu Muslim League. All are generally aimed at promoting the interest of the Moros 
and preserving the ummah. However, there are associations that are personalistic, 
forming and dissolving around particular groups of communal leaders in efforts to 
promote or preserve their socio-political positions (Noble 1976:407). 
The extent to which different elite groups are involved within each organization 
is dependent upon its orientation. For instance, if the organization is oriented toward 
the promotion of Islamic education and consciouness, such as the Kamilol Islam 
Society, the religious and traditional elites play major roles. On the other hand, if 
the main purpose is to strengthen the sense of national identity and Muslim 
solidarity, as with the Ansar El-Islam, the traditional and secular elites are more 
extensively involved. Iii both cases; the· traditional -elite- performs· an important 
leadership role. 
-- ' -- In"the final analysis,- the -traditional elite is a dominant group in both local 
governmental and religious institutions. The group dominates many aspects of Moro 
social life and provides leadership in directing Moro society. The traditional elite is 
in fact still the most powerful and influential leadership group in the Moro 
community. As Gowing wrote, 
Power in the present-day Moro society is largely in the hands of those 
who combine both traditional authority of their group and the 
constitutional authority of civil government (1979:55; cf. Alonto 1983:92). 
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In the case of the religious elite, its leadership role is prevalent in religious 
institutions such as madaris and mosques. Its influence in the rural areas ranks 
second only to the traditional leaders. The religious elite play a valuable role in the 
attempts to keep the Islamic integrity of the community. Similarly, the secular elite 
has its own area of influence. But, because its number is still limited, particularly the 
non-aristocratic secular elite, the momentum of its influence and power remains 
restricted to certain areas only. 
The Status of Traditional, Secular and Religious Elites in the 
Filipino-Dominated State 
Rupert Emerson (1960) once observed that the end of colonialism by itself only 
removes problems that arise directly from foreign rule; but the oppression of some 
groups over others continues. In the case of the Moros, the domination of the 
Christian Filipinos . over them began as the American colonial control of the 
Archipelago ended. The structure of social relations between the two groups of 
--
peoples has been characterized as 'internal colonialism', the domination and 
exploitation of natives by natives. 
The internal colonial system foments social dichotomy and deprives the 
minorities of their rights (Casanova 1963; Hechter 1975). The minorities are excluded 
from economic, social, and political opportunities and are held in low regard. They 
are usually the objects of contempt, hatred and violence (Israeli 1978:13). In addition, 
. the. mino~itie~ -t~-rid to develop a set of attitudes. and other behaviours that further 
differentiate them from the dominant group. For example, a significant majority of 
the Moros view themselves as 'Muslims', despite the prevalent feeling among 
Christians that this minority group consider themselves to be 'Filipinos' (Filipinas 
Foundation 1971:116-117). 
As we have seen in chapters 2 and 3, the under-priviledged status of the Moros 
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takes various forms, extending from socio-economic discrimination to a sense of not 
being treated decently. The Moro elites too are in a subordinate position in the 
Filipino-dominated state. The traditional elite, the sultans and the datus, is no longer 
recognized and given temporal power. In 1938 in a Memorandum to the Secretary of 
the Interior, President Quezon gave the following instructions: 
These datus and sultans should never be allowed to have anything to do 
with functions that are official. They should be heard exactly and precisely 
as every citizen has the right to be heard on matters affecting the nation, his 
province, his municipality, or his district (quoted in Gowing 1979:55). 
These instructions have become the guidelines of Philippine government policy 
toward the traditional elites to this day. Even though the traditional elites found it 
expedient to seek public office in the Philippine political system, the openings were 
sparse. Many of the responsible offices in the Muslim provinces were reserved for 
Christians. The dissatisfaction toward the government's treatment of the traditional 
elites was expressed by Sultan Alaoya Alonto as follows: 
The Moro. people want to set their house in order but how can they when 
the very key to their own house is not in their possession and perhaps the 
Moro may be locked in or locked out because the key to their own doors is 
not in their hands. This is indeed a sad tragedy (quoted in Thomas 
. 1971:269-27_0). 
In 1974 the Marcos government gave formal attention to the Moro traditional elite by 
acknowledging the existence of the 'Nineteen Royal Houses of Mindanao and Sulu'. 
However, many Muslims believe that this official attention to the Moro sultanates 
was part of the Marcos goverment's attempt to enlist the support of the Muslim 
aristocrats in its campaign against the Moro struggle. Nevertheless, this official 
attention to the Moro sultanates had two significant results. First, it drew the 
traditional elite closer to the government, and thus made it more willing to get 
involved in government efforts to find a solution to Muslim problems. For example, 
barely a month-after the sultans were invited to Malacanang Palace, the 'Federation 
of the Royal Houses of Mindanao and Sulu' sponsored the 'Muslim Conference on 
Government Policies and Programs for Muslim Mindanao', a.s discussed in chapter 4. 
Secondly, it gave those younger generation revolutionary leaders, such as Misuari, 
Asani, Hassan and others who were in defiance against the traditional leadership, a 
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basis for accusing many of the sultans and datus as 'collaborators' of the Marcos 
regime. 
Although certain members of the traditional leadership group have benefited from particular 
government policies which favour appeasement of a few Muslim leaders, many of them are no 
longer wealthy or powerful or distinguishable from the ordinary villagers, except by their honorific 
royal ranks. In fact, the traditional aristocratic elite which once established an efficient government 
and contributed to the progress of the Moro people, is now reduced to a mere symbol of its past 
existence. 
Like the traditional elite, the Moro secular elite also is dissatisfied with its 
situation. Despite their professional and educational qualifications, most of the 
secular elite find it difficult to secure a responsible job in the public or private sector 
and believe that in part this is due to a common 
preconception that the Moros cannot be trusted (Tongson 1973:20). Furthermore, 
very few of the non-aristocratic secular elite have occupied important elective 
political offices, such as governors and city mayors, because such offices are 
dominated either by Christians or by the traditional elite. Many of the secular elite, 
particularly businessmen and other professional groups, are constantly experiencing 
economic difficulties. Some have left the provinces in pursuit of employment 
opportunities in different Muslim countries such as Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and 
Libya. Each year a number of the Moro graduates of various universities in the 
Middle East have remained abroad to obtain employment. 
The status of the Muslim religious elite ranks last in the Filipino Christian 
society. This is not surprising because Islamic religion has very little value in the view 
of the Christian Filipinos. In a letter to Senator Domocao Alonto, a Christian 
Filipino wrote, 'If the Muslims in the Philippines are poor and backward, it is because 
of their wrong religion and ideology, Islam .... You and your people should not 
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compound your grievous historical mistake by clinging on to a religion that has only 
brought poverty, ignorance, and darkness to you and your communities' (Alonto 
1979:61). The religious elite is excluded from the mainstream of Philippine social 
mobility. Although members of the religious elite are among the educated in Moro 
society,· their religious education or degrees are not recognized. Their occupational 
options are limited mainly to teaching posts in madaris and mosque functionaries. 
Being dependent on very low tuition fees and donations, the salaries of the religious 
elite are below subsistence level. Some religious teachers must teach in several 
madaris in different places to earn a living; many are unemployed. 
Politically, the religious elite is isolated from the Philippine political arena. Its 
members have no political power and seldom stand for election in public office. The 
lack of political participation by the religious elite is due to many factors, including 
limited economic capacity, lack of fluency in English, and lack of knowledge of the Philippine poli~cal 
system. But the main cause is that the Philippine government and the political 
parties do not make any efforts to recruit them into the national political orbit or to 
.. convince them that the Philippine political system could also serve their interest. On 
the contrary, the religious elite is peceived as representing an undesirable culture and 
a barrier to national development and progress. 
In sum, Moro society has been transformed from the Islamic-oriented 
community of pre-colonial times to one of subordination under the rule of the 
Christian secular government. Accordingly, a sense of distress and alienation and of 
anticipated insult has been part of the Muslim :relationship with the ruling Filipinos. 
In this relationship, the inevitable outcome has been liberation struggle. 
The Role of Traditional, Secular and Religious Elites in the Moro 
Liberation Struggle 
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Revolutionary leaders do not make a revolution. At best, they choose the means 
of revolutionary action and determine the movement's tactics and the timing of their 
implementation; the movement's ends and general direction are largely beyond their 
control. Part of the leaders' role, therefore, is to concentrate on issues and problems 
that effect cross-cutting alliances among various groups and sectors of the society 
(Greene 1974:26-27). Thus, the genius of Ho Chi Minh and Castro was their ability to 
mobilize broad support from among the diverse sectors of their respective 
populations. Similarly, the Moro's liberation struggle is the product of major events 
and problems that affected a large cross-section of the Muslim population. 
Early in the struggle, the different leadership groups in the movement seemed 
to be dominated by members of the traditional elite. The top echelon leaders, who 
held important positions such as chairmen and heads of committees, comprised 
mainly the traditional elite. On the other hand, many of the middle level leaders, 
__ such as field commanders and officers, came from the secular elite group. Though 
members of the religious elite seldom appeared on the movement's top leadership list, 
they played an important leadership role in promoting the villagers' awareness of 
their role in the struggle as mujahideen (participants in the holy war). Table 5.6 lists 
some of the more active Moro leaders in the early underground movement as 
discussed in chapter 4. 
· - - Be that as it-may-, the composition of core leaders of the movement changed 
dramatically after the MNLF formed its official Central Committee in Tripoli in 
1974. The Committee, known as the Committee of Thirteen, was organized by Nur 
Misuari and Salamat Hashim with another three Moro students in Arab universities, 
namely Yusuf Abbas, Abdul Baki Abubakar, and Giapur Ali. Many members of the 
Central Committee were recruited from among Moro students who were studying in 
various Arab universities at the time. They were given specific portfolios in 
Table 5-6: Some Active Moro Leaders in the Early Movement, 
1970-1972 
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Na.me Leadership group 
classification 
Name Leadership group 
classification 
Udtog Matalam 
Salipada Pendatun 
Hacapanton Abbas 
Sala.mat Hashim 
Udtog Matala.m Jr. 
Nur Misuari 
Abdul Ba.Id Abuba.kar 
Abdurasa.d Asani 
Musib Buat 
Abdul Karim Sidri 
T=Traditional elite 
S=Secular elite 
R=Religious elite 
T 
T+S 
T+S 
T+R 
T 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
Domocao Alonto 
Rashid Lucman 
Abul Khayr Alonto 
Yusuf Luc man 
Yahya Sheikh Mon er 
Saleh Loong 
Usman Imam 
Ibn Al-Adil 
Farouk Carpizo 
Source: (MNLF 1982; George 1980). 
T+S+T 
T 
T 
T+R 
T 
s 
s 
s 
s 
shadow-c_abinet style (George 1980:227-231). The names of the thirteen members of 
the Central Committee are shown in table 5. 7. 
As table 5. 7 indicates, the secular elite dominated the top leadership echelon of 
the MNLF. The religious elite comprised twenty-three per cent of the Committee 
members, whereas the traditional elite constituted only fifteen per cent. Moreover, 
many members of the Philippine Student Union in Cairo and Moro students in 
differe~t Arab __ countries gravitated _toward the MNLF. These students were mostly 
potential members of the religious and secular elites. Thus, the MNLF, unlike the 
BMLO or MIM, was le~ mainly by young members of the secular elite who struggled 
not merely against Filipino Christian domination in order to preserve the ummah, 
but also to remove the domination of their own aristocratic class so that power 
relations within the Muslim community could be altered (£bid.:201-202; cf. Glang 
1969:38). 
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Table 5-7: Members of the Central Committee of the MNLF, 1974 
Name Leadership group 
classification 
Nur Misuari S 
Sala.mat Hashim T+R 
Abdul Baki Abuba.kar S 
Giapur Ali R• 
Yusuf Abbas R• 
Abul Khayr Alonto T 
Hatimil Hassan S 
Abdurrasad Asani S 
Abdul Hamid Lukman S 
Hajji Hassan Jamil S+R 
Ustaz Abijari R 
Usman Sali S 
Al Caluang S 
T=Traditional elite 
S=Secular elite 
R=Religious elite 
•=Students of theology or Islamic jurisprudence 
Source: (George 1980; MNLF 1982). 
Since the Tripoli Agreement, however, the MNLF has become factionalized. 
Each group has developed its own pattern of leadership. On the basis of my field 
observations (October 1984 to April 1985), I am of the opinion that the leadership of 
-Salamat Hashim,.s group has been influenced increasingly by the religious elite group. 
In 1984 it de-clared itself a separate orga:riiiatio:ii known a.S Moro Islamic Liberation 
·Fronf (MILF)~ Ori the«>tner·hand, the faction led by Dimas Pundato (a member of 
the traditional elite) has moved closer towards the leadership of the traditional elite 
- - - -
group, while Nur Misuari's group continues to be dominated by the secular leaders. 
The role of different leadership groups m the Moro liberation movement can 
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thus be summarized as follows. The traditional elite played a crucial leadership role 
during the beginning of the struggle. Their leadership activities helped to promote 
unity among the Moros and to secure support from different Muslim countries. This 
was accomplished through the efforts of different organizations such as the UIFO, 
MIM, Ansar El-Islam, BMLO and IDP. When the MNLF dominated the theatre of 
the Moro struggle, the top echelon leaders changed from the traditional elite group to 
the secular elite. As the MNLF broke into three major factions, each of the three 
elite groups seems to have been attracted to a different faction. 
Leadership in the Malay Society 
The Malay society, like that of the Moros, has retained most of its traditional 
characteristics and institutions. Despite continuous efforts by the Thais to assimilate 
them, the Malays still revolve around their own Muslim leaders. These leaders may 
also be divided into traditional, secular and religious elites. Each elite group performs 
its respective role in the society. 
The Role of Traditional, Secular and Religious Elites in the Malay Society 
~s discussed in chapters 2 and 3, Muslim society in Patani is a close and 
well-knit community with much activity revolving around mosques and pondoks (see 
Table 3.3).3 Nearly all aspects of villagers' affairs assume a religious significance and 
thus involve the religious elite. 
The religious elite in Patani society can be divided into three categories: 
members of the Provincial Councils for Islamic Affairs (PCIA); members of the 
-Councils_ for Mosque (CM); and religious teachers. There are fifteen elected members 
for each of the PCIA, totalling sixty in the four Muslim provinces. They are elected 
for life by imams (heads of the CM). In addition, there are two qadis (Islamic judges) 
in each province who are also elected by imams and hold office until the age of sixty. 
Thus, there are sixty-eight such members of the Malay religious elite in the region. 
3 A pondok is a traditional private Islamic school, offering both basic and advanced Islamic 
studies. Instruction in all pondoks is in Malay and, for advanced courses, in Arabic. A pondok 
is normally owned and administered by a well-versed and respected local religious teacher. 
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Seven to fifteen members are elected for each Council for Mosque by adult 
Muslims in the communities. The head of the CM (imam) and two of his deputies 
(khatib and bilal) fill the lifetime positions while the other twelve regular members 
serve a four-year term. There are 15,660 members of the CM in the Muslim provinces. 
The third category of the religious elite is religious teachers. They are to'gurus 
(traditional religious teachers) and ustaz (non-traditional religious teachers) who 
perform the role of religious educators at pondoks, mosques and balaisa(prayer 
house) in the Malay community. As indicated in Table 3.3, there are 1,215 to'gurus 
and ustaz teaching in 202 Islamic schools in the Patani area. 
The religious elite plays a leading role in most community activities, ranging 
from prayers to festivals. In most villages, imam, khatib and bilal lead the Muslim 
villagers in their daily prayers in mosques and balaisa. Important religious occasions 
such as hari" raya (Muslim festive day), maulud (occasion to commemorate the birth 
of the Prophet) and other ceremonies to mark special events such as kenduri 
(communal feast), marriage, birth and death always involve religious leaders. 
Aside from the above functions, some of the religious elite who obtained degrees 
from Arab universities also work as du-ah. There are about eighty du-ah who receive 
monthly salaries and allowances from different Islamic call centres in the Middle East 
(interview, several du-ah in Narathiwat, 21 May 1985). The religious elite also act as 
the highest level of mediation within the community (Fraser 1960:164). Its members 
function as intermediaries between_ the people and the government. They are. _often 
:~_alle~ upon t_o present community matters to government authorities. Furthermore, 
t}iey are normally active organizers of different community activities. As a result, 
reljgiou!3_leaders are treated with respect and are given positions of status and ~ower 
in the society. 
The most important group among the religious elite are religious teachers. 
They gain elite status because of their religious knowledge and teaching. Religious 
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teachers are differentiated into to'gurus and ustaz. Most to'gurus are educated in the 
local pondoks and mosques and in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and Malaysia. To'gurus 
and ustaz are considered the most authoritative source in matters pertaining to 
Islam. In addition, a few of them have the reputation of being berkat (blessed) who, 
many villagers believe, possess mystical powers. Hence, they also play the role of 
mystical figures. whom villagers resort to for various types of assistance and curing. It 
should be noted, however, that the religious elite, especially religious teachers, are not 
an economic elite. The roles of the religious elite do not include that of employer, 
landlord or middleman. Muslim villagers do not expect the religious elite to play 
economic roles. Those who do are often viewed as greedy and selfish. Because of this, 
to'gurus and ustaz become closely related to the people and accordingly are highly 
respected and influentiat. 
The Provincial Council for Islamic Affairs is a government Islamic institution at 
provincial level under the Department of Local Administration, Ministry of Interior 
and the Department of Religious Affairs, Ministry of Education. In theory, members 
of the PCIA are 'learned men' in different fields of Islam. They are elected to advise 
the provincial governors in matters concerning Islam and the welfare of the Muslims 
(Farouk 1981:113). In practice, however, not all members of the PCIA are learned 
men, religiously or otherwise. It is estimated that not more than thirty per cent of the 
PCIA members are capable of giving advice to the Thai authorities in matters 
regarding Islam (Che Man 1983:87). In fact, many Malay-Muslims regard members of 
the PCIA in the four provinces as 'second rate' religious leaders and rarely seek their 
religious advice and fatwa. They also feel that religious advice given by the PCIA 
may not be completely without the influence of Thai authority. 
· - -Similarly, the Islamic judges who assist and advise civil judges m cases 
involvlrig Muslims in matters regarding marriage and inheritarice, are not always 
turned to. This is due to the fact that disputes involving family and inheritance can 
be settled by £mams or by religious teachers. Besides, bringing the case to court 
would require both plaintiff and defendant to pay costly lawyer's fees. 
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The Council for Mosque is also a government Islamic institution which is 
directly under the authority of the PCIA. Members of the CM, imams, khati"b and 
bilal are leaders in prayers and other religious rituals. They command respect from 
members of the community. If they are persons with additional leadership quality, 
such as to'guru, ustaz or du-ah, they are highly respected and influential. The 
remaining twelve regular members of the CM are not necessarily religious individuals; 
they are men of different backgrounds who gain CM membership through their 
merits, reputations and activities within the community. As members of the CM, 
they work with the imam and his assistants in matters pertaining to activities of the 
mosque. Unlike members of the PCIA, they are more in tune with the villagers' 
interests and the welfare of the community. 
The secular elite in Malay-Muslim society comprises mainly local Muslim 
government functionaries, such '¥1 school teachers (khru), commune headmen 
(kamnan), and village headmen (phuyaiban). These low ranking local civil servants 
gain elite status because they are members of the local government bureaucracy and 
earn coinp-aratively substantial incomes. They are Malays with Thai educational 
backgrounds whom the villagers, due to their language barrier, resort to for help and 
advice in secular and government matters. Over the last decade, the influence of 
Muslim local government officials has increased substantially due to an increase m 
their participation in community and religious activities, while the reputation of 
religious leaders has decreased because the Thai government has been able to increase 
its control over two important Malay-Muslim institutions--pondok and mosque. 
· NevertheleSs~ -the local Muslim government servants do not command as much 
·influence as the religious elite do, for they are seen by some Malays as government 
servants whose main duties are to protect government interests. A small group of 
Malay businessmen who play the roles of middlemen, traders, and contractors can 
also be regarded as part of the secular elite due to their professionalism and 
well-to-do status. This small group, however, is unable to lead the villagers because 
they lack prestige in a society where money-making does not provide high status. 
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The third leadership group is the Patani-Malay traditional aristocratic elite. Its 
members are the descendants of Malay rajas (rulers) or chaomuang (head of state) 
who were appointed by the Thai government as rulers of the seven Malay provinces of 
the conquered and divided Patani kingdom. During the era of the seven provinces 
(1816-1906), there existed a total of twenty-nine Malay rajas: seven in Patani; five in 
Yaring; four in Raman; four in Ra-gae; four in Yala; three in Saiburi; and two in 
Nhongchik (Bangnara 1976:68-80; Bunnag 1971; Shukri n.d.). They were ancestors of 
the contemporary Patani aristocrats. 
After the Malay ra1as were replaced by Thai governors and the traditional 
system with the Thai secular political structure in the beginning of this century, the 
Malay aristocrats remained the dominant political force in Patani society. They led 
most of the earlier resistance because they wanted to regain their power. Because they 
had failed to recapture political authority and had lost much of their wealth, many of 
the royal families left the region to seek refuge with their relatives in neighbouring 
states of Malaya. In other words, the Patani-Muslim aristocrats lost both their 
political and economic bases. They are no longer as powerful and wealthy as they 
used, to.be .. In .addition,-some of the-royal houses-have given their loyalty to the Thai 
government. For example, the royal families of Yaring district in Patani province are 
well-known as loyal supporters of Bangkok--which is not surprising because their 
ancestors were appointed as rulers by Bangkok. As a result, the Malay traditional 
aristocratic elite is no longer perceived by many Malay-Muslims to be their legitimate 
leaders. More importantly, the aristocrats themselves have no intimate relationship 
witfr the common ·people: Most of them view themselves as of royal blood and feel 
that they should behave and be treated differently. This attitude creates a gap 
between them and the villagers, and thus diminishes their influence, ~riters such as 
Pareto and Mosca observed that elite status declines if elites_faiLto identify with the 
interests of the masses (Bottomor-e 1964). 
Thus, while the secular elite, the local Muslim government functionaries, are 
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respected for their association with state authority and while the traditional 
aristocratic elite, the descendants of the deposed Patani-Malay royal houses, are seen 
as representing the Malays of the glorious past, the most honoured and influential 
among the Malay-Muslims are men of religious reverence such as to'guru, ustaz and 
imam. They are sources of religious education and spiritual guidance. The villagers, 
young and old, regard themselves, with varying degrees of explicitness, as the 
students or followers of these religious leaders. After all, the ultimate objective in life 
is to become orang beriman (pious man). As in the past, religion and religious leaders 
dominate present-day Patani society. They constitute an important element which 
perpetuates the social isolation of the Malay-Muslims. 
The Status of Traditional, Secular and Religious Elites in the 
Thai-Dominated State 
The Patani region was conquered and incorporated into the Thai nation-state. 
The structure of social relations between the ruling Thais and the ruled Malays, like 
that of the Moros, is based on domination and exploitation. All the phenomena found 
in internal colonial societies exist in Patani. The economy of the region is in an 
unsatisfactory condition as compared to other sections of the nation. Most of the 
wealth in the provinces is in the possession not of the Muslims but of the Thais and 
Chinese. The Malays are the rural dwellers and are at a level little more than 
subsistence. Furthermore, they are viewed with the typical colonial stereotype: 
Malay-Muslims are 'unreasonable' and 'good for nothing'. 
Though the Thai government has established goverment Islamic institutions, 
such as the Provincial Council for IslainiC Affairs, the Council for Mosque and the 
office of Islamic judge in the four provinces, these institutions, especially the former, 
do not represent the interests of the Malays. They serve neither as the intermediary 
'nor- as the linkage between the pe~ple and the government.- For many Muslims, they 
are essentially instruments of control and means of disseminating Thai government 
policies. 
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In the context of the larger Thai society, the different Malay elite groups are 
also subordinate in almost every aspect. They are excluded from the mainstream of 
Thai social mobility. Although the traditional and secular elites are mostly 
Thai-educated, they have never been appointed to responsible government positions 
such as governor (except for the late Governor Termsak Semantarat, an aristocrat 
from Satun, who was appointed governor to appease the Malay people after the so 
called Patani Massacre in 1975). Of twenty-eight district officers in the four Muslim 
provinces, only two are Malay-Muslims. In the case of the religious elite, religious 
education and degrees are not recognized. They are unable to gain employment in the 
Thai system; their occupational options are limited to teaching in pondoks. 
In terms of political power, all Muslim elite groups are isolated from the 
political arena and have very little power in Thai politics. Religious leaders seldom 
stand for political elections, locally or nationally. There are many reasons for this, 
ranging from the language barrier to limited economic capacity. But the real cause is 
that while members of the religious elite do not believe that participation in the Thai 
political system could serve their interests, the government and Thai political parties 
are also not interested in recruiting them into the political orbit. On the contrary, the 
Thai government regards religious leaders, especially religious teachers, as a source of 
political resistance and treats them all as potential rebels. Hitchner and Levine 
(1973:80) also suggest that the traditional elite (including religious elite) m 
modernizing countries has tended to support regionalism against national unity. 
In contrast to religious leaders, s~cular ~nd traditional leaders are active in 
' . . - -- --- - -
Thai politics, particularly since the birth of a short-lived democracy in Thailand in 
1973. For example, of nine national parliament~)'. __ seats contested in the four 
provinces in July 1986, seven were won by Muslims. Table 5.8 lists members of 
. . -. . . . 
parliament in the four Muslim provinces following the 1986 general elections. 
However, these Muslim congressmen gain no real power in Thai politics, for they hold 
only 7 seats out of 324. Moreover, they are not considered 'trusted' members of their 
respective Thai political parties. 
195 
Table 5-8: Members of Parliament in 
the Four Muslim Provinces, 1986 
Name Province Religious 
affiliation 
Den To'mina Patani Muslim 
Sud in Phujutthanon Patani Muslim 
Pree cha Bunmi Patani Buddhist 
Say-nee Mada.ka.kul Narathiwat Muslim 
Areephen Uttrasin Narathiwat Muslim 
Phi bun Phongthanet Narathiwat Buddhist 
Adul Phuminarong Yala Muslim 
Wan Mohammad Noor 
Mattha Yala Muslim 
Chirayut Nao-wa.ket Sa tun Muslim 
S=Secular elite 
Source: (Town Hall of Narathiwat Province, 
Narathiwat, Thailand, 29 July, 1986). 
Leadership group 
classification 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
s 
The Muslim elites are also discriminated against culturally. They are perceived 
·by fuaily Thais as representing a foreign and undesirable culture. The Islamic religion 
particularly is looked upon as some sort of pantomime and regarded as a barrier to 
development and progress. This is because the religious elite symbolizes Malay 
identity and is well-known as a stronghold of cultural resistance. The Muslim elites 
are aware of their subordinate status in the Thai-dominated state. Some of them feel 
that it is their religious duty to strive for better alternatives, for the Holy Quran 
(XII:fi) admonishes, 'Verily never will God change- the condition of a people until 
they change it themselves'. 
The Role of Traditional, Secular and Religious Elites in the Malay 
Liberation Struggle 
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As discussed in chapter 3, the early Muslim resistance to Thai domination was 
characterized by uprisings led by the deposed indigenous rulers of the seven Malay 
provinces in their attempts to regain their power. As the effect of Thai control over 
Malay society increased during the reign of King Wachiravut (1910-1925), religious 
leaders like To' Tae and Hajji Bula who feared their religion and culture would be 
stamped out joined the aristocrats in resisting Thai rule. However, the leadership of 
the resistance movements at this stage was still confined to the former Malay ruling 
elites and their relatives. 
The period under the ultra-nationalist government of Phibun (1938-1944) had 
been full of political protests and resistance that raised the political consciousness and 
sharpened the skills of the religious elite in mass mobilization. 'Slowly', writes 
Pitsuwan (1982:115), 'the ulama had been transformed from the role of "power 
brokers" to political activists'. This, in a way, was a matter of filling a power 
vacuum left vacant by the former rajas and aristocrats who, by the end of the Second 
World War, were exhausted and were in a state of political incapacity due to Thai 
government antagonism. Many of them moved to Malaya to continue their struggle 
there. 
While GAMPAR was formed in Kelantan by a son of a former Patani raJa, 
members of the religious elite headed by Hajji Sulong and some secular nationalist 
leaders like Wae Samae Muhammad and Wae Useng Wae Deng organized the PPM 
that turned the religious leaders into 'active seekers of power, which was deemed 
necessary for shaping and moulding of the community' (ibid.). It was the first time 
that the leadership of the Muslim resistance movement was dominated by the 
religious elite group. The PPM in turn stimulated the outbreak in Kampung Belukar 
Samok in 1947 and the Dusun Nyor Revolt in the following year. The unrest was 
instigated by religious leaders such as Hajji Abdul Rahman (To' Perak) and Hajji 
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Mat Karang, and secular nationalist leaders such as Che Senik Wan Matseng and 
Zakaria Lalo. Along with this transition of leadership from the traditional 
aristocratic elite to the religious and secular leaders, the liberation movement also 
transformed itself from one whose base was restricted (comprising mainly members of 
the ruling elite whose major objective was to restore their authority) to one with a 
broad base of popular support aimed at either irridentism with the Federation of 
Malaya or independence for the Patani people. 
When the formal liberation fronts, the BNPP, BRN, and PULO, were organized 
at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, the religious and secular elite 
groups played major leadership roles, despite the fact that the chairmanship of BNPP 
and PULO still remained in the hands of the aristocrats. In 1977 Tengku Abdul Jalal, 
chairman of the BNPP, died and was replaced by Badri Hamdan, a member of the 
religious elite. In 1984 Tengku Bira Kutanila (Kabir Abdul Rahman) was forced to 
resign as chairman of PULO; Hajji Abdul Hadi Hajji Ghazali, a religious leader, 
assumed its chairmanship. 
My investigation of the BNPP's leadership in 1981 revealed that there were 
thirty-seven top leaders who held forty-one different positions in the front's Central 
Working Committee (CWC), Working Committee (WC) of the Mecca branch and 
Heads of Province. Of these leaders 62.2 per cent were members of the religious elite; 
29.7 per cent members of the secular elite; 5.4 per cent of the traditional elite; and 2.7 
per cent others. In addition, there were forty-four Muslim students who were 
members. of five different .Working Committees of the BNPP's overseas branches. 
Thirty-one· of them7 pursued' religious education or were potential religious elite 
(BNPP 1981b:l4-15; Che Man 1983:163). In 1986 thirteen of the seventeen-member 
·Working Committee of BNPP's Mecca branch were from the religious elite; the rest 
were secular leaders (interview, Amin Hamdi, chairman of the Working Committee of 
BNPP's Mecca branch, Mecca, Saudi Arabia, 15 April 1986). 
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If one examines the holders of the most powerful positions in the BNPP, such as 
chairman, deputy-chairman, secretary, section heads of the CWC and of CW of 
Mecca branch, heads of province, members of military committee, and commander of 
the National Liberation Army of the Patani People {NLAPP), it can be shown that 
these portfolios were held by: 
Religious elite 61.2 per cent 
Secular elite 24.5 per cent 
Traditional elite 6.1 per cent 
Others 8.2 per cent 
The dominant leadership role of the religious elite group is also true for the 
remaining fronts. This finding is consistent with the assessment of the Thai 
authorities who have always regarded religious leaders as among the Muslim 
'anti-government' activists. Indeed, the religious elite forms the backbone of the 
present-day Malay liberation struggle and are 'keepers of the community's trust m 
the fulfillment of its political aspirations' {Pitsuwan 1982:115-116). 
Leadership in the Moro and the Malay Societies Compared 
Among various minority groups in Southeast Asia, the Moros in the southern 
Philippines and the Malays in southern Thailand seem to have the most in common. 
They share similar leadership structures. However, the two societies are dominated 
by different categories of elite group: the former by a traditional elite; the latter by a 
religious elite. This difference can be explained by the fact that the religious elite in 
PatanLso.ciety,_ r.ose, to_ fill_ t_h~ _ !'oles l_eft va<:a11t by the ra1'as and their ruling 
ftristocrats who--were. deposed and dispossessed by Thai authorities. Moreover, 
Thailand provided no--political machinery to enable the Malay --aristocrats to ada-pt to 
the new political system. By the time Thailand held its first national elections in 
1933, the former Malay ruling elites were already in a state of political incapacity. On 
the other hand members of the traditional elite in the Philippines found it expedient 
to seek public office in the Philippine political system. Perhaps, the rapidly 
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diminishing influence of the former Patani rajas was also because they became rulers 
by virtue of Bangkok appointment. Their family trees were not identical to those of 
dynasties who reigned in the Patani kingdom in the past. 
Another contrast is that the influence of the Moro religious leadership in the 
southern Philippines is increasing while the authority of the Malay religious elite in 
southern Thailand is declining. This is because the power base of the latter, pondoks 
and mosque, was tempered by the government's successful attempt to increase its 
control over these two Malay institutions through the General Education Department 
and government Islamic institutions. In contrast, madar£s, mosques and Muslim 
associations in the Philippines are still comparatively free from the control of the 
government. 
The vigour of the secular elite group in the two societies is also slightly 
different, despite the fact that it has been gaining momentum in both societies. For 
instance, the Malay secular leaders are mainly low ranking local government 
functionaries, whereas the Moro secular elite includes middle-rank government 
officials such as ambassadors and commissioners. Additionally, the Moro secular elite 
is able to use various Muslim associations and organizations to extend its boundaries 
of influence. The Malay secular leaders have been unable to do so due to the strict 
control of the Thai government over such activities. 
One major parallel between these different leadership groups is that they are in 
:var.ious degrees tre.ated as under-privileged rnin()rities rather than as privileged elites 
in their respective countries; the religious elites, especially, are seen as obstacles to 
social development and progress. 
The most significant similarity between the Moro _ai:id the Malay peop~es is that 
most of the elite groups are to a certain extent involved in the respective liberation 
struggles. However, the dominant leadership group is different. The Moros have been 
led by various elite groups since the movement divided into four major factions: the 
200 
Misuari faction is dominated by the secular elite, and the Pundato group by the 
4-v-.... .(,.J\Q..-..J ov-t. 
aristocratic leaders. The Hashim and Lucman groups are led by the"'religious elite\.ln 
the case of the Malays, all four major fronts seem to be dominated by the religious 
elite. Nevertheless, all are motivated in different degrees by the desire to recover and 
preserve those aspects of their identity and way of life as ummah which they believe 
they have lost in the process of nation-building and integration. This desire has been 
expressed through the liberation fronts. 
CHAPTER6 
EXTERNAL INFLUENCES AND 
GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO 
THE MUSLIM SEPARATIST CONFLICTS 
201 
As has been evident from earlier chapters, the Muslim separatist conflicts in the 
southern Philippines and southern Thailand have in recent times been sustained in 
large part by the support of the overseas Muslim community. Indeed, at least in the 
Philippines, the external pressure which has been exerted on behalf of the Muslim 
minorities has been a significant force behind the central governments' efforts at 
solving the separatist problem by other than military means. This chapter reviews 
the external dimension of the Moro and the Malay struggles and looks at the means 
by which the Philippines and Thai governments have attempted to deal with the 
problems of Muslim separatism. 
The Philippines 
External Influences 
Ethnic separatist conflicts have a tendency to attract external involvement. 
According to Suhrke and Noble (1977:3-5), an internal conflict that explicitly raises 
the question of national self-determination stimulates international response. 'Like 
revolution ... ethnic conflicts raise an ideological issue with international implications'. 
Secondly, while separatist activities are intermittent, the conflict persists. This 
persistent quality provides opportunity for external parties to interfere for their own 
purposes. Thirdly, separatist conflict is sometimes vicious and intense. It is likely to 
involve a degree of violence that attracts outside attention and demands that 
'something be done' about the situation. Finally, because ethnic identities seldom 
coincide completely with state boundaries, separatist conflict in one state has 
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implications in other states where there are ethnic kin. It motivates external kin to 
become involved ( ibid.:5-7). 
In the case of the Moros, external involvement began with the resurgence of ' 
Islam and the rise of nationalism in the Muslim World after the Second World War. 
As discussed in chapter 3, this resulted in a deepening of the Moro Islamic 
consciousness and strenthened Moro nationalist sentiment. This in turn enhanced the 
sense of Muslim identity across the Moro ethno-cultural groups. Hence, the Moros 
emerged as a strong political force. 
More importantly, the involvement of Muslim states such as Malaysia and 
Libya enabled the Moros to elevate the level of conflict froll'!· fighting for equality and 
justice to a war of liberation demanding self-determination. Malaysia's involvement 
at the beginning of the conflict served to lay a foundation for the Moro separatist 
movement. As mentioned earlier, Malaysia trained and provided logistical support to 
Moro fighters. The support was not so much based on Malaysia's commitment to 
religious duty, as on reaction to the Philippine secret military plan against Sabah (see 
chapter 4}. As the Strai'ts Times (11 March 1974) reported: 
The Malaysians were extending support to the rebels to pressure the 
Philippine government to drop its claim on Sabah. Starting with a total of 
90 men in five batches in early 1969 Malaysia provided guerrilla training to 
Muslims from Mindanao and Sulu .... Muslim rebels in the Philippines 
received from Malaysian sources at lea.st 200,000 rounds of ammunition and 
5,407 weapons ranging from hand grenades to machine-guns, anti-aircraft 
guns and a 52-inch tube-like device firing ammunition 30 inches long. 
Though the Malaysian government later began to move toward cooperation in 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN}, the Tunku continued to play 
an important role in promoting international support for the Moro cause. As 
secretary-general of the OIC; in 1972 he endorsed the Moro case submitted to him 
and asked King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and President Qadhafi of Libya to help in 
persuading other OIC member states to support it (MNLF 1982:7). For the first time 
the case of the Muslims in the Philippines was taken up by the OIC. 
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At the state level, Tun Mustapha, chief minister of Sabah (1968-1976), played a 
dominant role in assisting the Moro struggle. During 1972-1976 Tun Mustapha 
allowed Sabah to be used as a training camp, supply depot, communications centre 
and sanctuary (Noble 1983:46). The Philippine government accused Sabah of allowing 
the Moro rebels to acquire about 100 motor boats in Sabah to be used to smuggle 
arms and ammunition to the rebels in Mindanao and to take rebel casualties back to 
Sabah for treatment (Sunday Mail, 23 December 1979). Furthermore, Sabah became 
a place of refuge for the displaced Moros. In 1983 it was estimated that between 
160,000 and 200,000 evacuees were living in Sabah (Bahrin and Rachagan 1984:196; 
Straits Times, 31 October 1983). 
Several explanations have been given as to why Tun Mustapha played an active 
role in accommodating the Moro struggle. First, he was committed to the cause and 
propagation of Islam. Under his leadership important Islamic institutions such as the 
Majlis Ugama Islam (Islamic Religious Council), Office of Mufti (Office of Chief 
Judge) and United Sabah Islamic Association were created. More importantly, he 
believed that it was a duty of individual Muslims and Muslim states to help 
-oppressed fellow Muslims, as enjoined by the Quran in surah IV, verse 75. The 
acceptance of large numbers of Moros in Sabah by Tun Mustapha was also · 
determined by an economic factor. Sabah was facing severe manpower and labour 
problems. The arrival of the Moro trainees and refugees helped to ease these 
problems. Finally, Tun Mustapha had his own political antipathy towards the 
Philippine government. He claimed to have paternal linage from the Sultan of Sulu 
and was-always-against Manila's treatment of the-Moro people. -He-w-as also alienated 
by the-Philippine-claim:to-Sabah. 
However, Tun Mustapha's United Sabah National Organization (USNO) was 
defeated in the April 1976 elections. This was partly because Sabahans, especially 
non-Muslims, felt that the presence of large numbers of Moros in Sabah, as a result of 
Tun Mustapha's policy of accommodation, had adverse political and social 
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implications. The predominantly non-Muslim Kadazans feared that the influx of the 
Moros would jeopadize their political and cultural status in Sabah (Bahrin and 
Rachagan 1984:210). They perceived the tolerance shown to the Moros as part of a 
policy aimed at restructuring the communal balance in Malaysia. In addition, 
Philippines-Malaysia relations (cf. Noble 1975) had suffered because of the 'Moro 
problem'; careful avoidance of such conflictual issues was needed to sustain the 
apparent calm in bilateral relations and the unity of ASEAN (ibid.:210-211). Tun 
Fuad Stephens, Tun Mustapha's successor, therefore indicated that he would not 
follow his predecessor's policy with respect to the Moros. Datuk Harris Salleh, Tun 
Stephen's successor, and the present chief minister Datuk Joseph Pairin Kitingan 
have likewise not continued Tun Mustapha's accommodation policy. Nevertheless, the 
Moro separatists remain active in Sabah, and some groups such as the Pundato 
faction are still using Sabah as their base of operations. The Malaysian government 
has never publicly admitted its involvement in the Moro struggle. No one, except 
those who were actually involved, could evaluate the amount of assistance given. But 
one thing is certain: Malaysian assistance gave the essential incentive to the Moro 
separatists and exposed their issue to the international community. 
The second Muslim state to assist the Moro separatist movement was Libya. 
Libya's involvement was motivated partly by the dictates of Islamic brotherhood and 
the Quranic obligation to relieve the persecution of the ummah. Libyan assistance 
began in 1971 when Saleh Bouyasser (Information and Foreign Minister of Libya) 
came to the Philippines during the World Assembly of University Presidents and met 
the Moro leaders to discuss Moro problems as ·reports of massacres 3.nd violence 
increased in the Muslim areas. According to separatist sources, Libya donated one 
million dollars to cover the expenses of 300 Moro recruits who were undertaking 
guerrilla trafoing "in Malaysia during 1971~1972; After a meeting in Tripoli between 
President Qadha.£i and Sultan· Rashid Lu.cmari~ Domocao · Alonto ami ·-Salipada 
Pendatun, Libya agreed to provide assistance to the Moro struggle. When martial law 
was declared in September 1972, Libya started to deliver funds, weapons and other 
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equipment to the MNLF under Misuari's leadership. Tun Mustapha allowed Sabah to 
be used for transactions and as a supply depot. From 1972 to 1975 weapons and other 
defence supplies worth millions of dollars were delivered to the MNLF camp in Sabah. 
About $35 million was contributed to the MNLF by Libya and the OIC during this 
period (Lucman 1982:5; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1980a:8-9). In addition, Libya 
made vigorous attempts, though without success, to exert its influence upon the OIC 
member states to impose economic sanctions against the Philippines. Despite the fact 
that the impact of Libya's support was moderate, because of Qadhafi's limited 
popularity among the Muslim heads of state, it was significant in that it kept the 
struggle alive and motivated members of the OIC to deal with the MNLF (Noble 
1983:47). Subsequently, falling into line with the position of other Muslim heads of 
state, Qadhafi's stance was changed from total backing of the MNLF to exerting 
pressure on both sides to make concessions. The shift was not solely to take heed of 
the OIC preference for peaceful solution to the Moro problepi, but reflected a 
realization that ihe Moro war against the Marcos regime was stalemated. The move 
coincided with the downfall of Tun Mustapha in Sabah. The change in Libya's 
position led to the meetings in Tripoli between the Philippine government and the 
MNLF panels which resulted in the Tripoli Agreement. 
Libya continued to play the role of mediator in an attempt to 'put an end ... to 
the war and leave no chance to those who are opposing the reaching of a solution' 
(Qadhafi 1977). Even after the collapse of negotiations on details of the Tripoli 
Agreement in April 1977, Qadhafi still expressed his hope for peace. To this end, 
Libya refrained from- campaigning for economic sanctions against the Philippines 
when the Marcos government appeared to begin to implement the terms of the 
Tripoli Agreement. However, Libya insisted on maintaining its assistance to the 
-Moro- struggle in -order- to pressure Manila to fulfil the obligation of the Tripoli 
·accord. This was evident from the communique of the ICMF in Tripoli in May 1977 
which called on the OIC countries to support the MNLF and to continue their efforts 
to mediate between the two parties. When the Aquino government replaced the 
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Marcos regime in February 1986 and expressed its willingness to negotiate with the 
Moro separatists, the Muslim states, especial!y Libya, welcomed the gesture and 
promised to help in persuading the MNLF to come to the negotiating table (Far 
' Eastern Economic &view, 11 September 1986). As a result, a meeting between 
President Aquino and Nur Misuari took place in September 1986 and an 'autonomy 
agreement' was signed in Jeddah between Misuari and the government's negotiator, 
National Affairs Minister Pimentel, in January 1987 (Far Eastern Economic Review, 
15 January 1987). 
Another Muslim state that has played a significant role in efforts to bring about 
settlement of the Moro problem is Saudi Arabia. It has been an active participant in 
the OIC Ministerial Committee of Four (Quadripartite Ministerial Commision) that 
has played a mediating role in the conflict since 1973. Through agencies such as the 
Muslim World League and Darul lfta, Saudi Arabia has provided funds and sanctuary 
to different Moro fronts, including the MILF and BMILO. These agencies have also 
given assistance to a variety of projects in Moroland. In 1980 Saudi Arabia 
temporarily stopped its oil supply to the Philippines because of the Marcos 
government's failure to implement the Tripoli agreement in good faith. Since 40 per 
cent of Philippine oil imports are from Saudi Arabia, such action matters (Noble 
1983:48; Wurfel 1985:223). Iran, another supporter of the Moro struggle, cut off its 
oil shipments entirely, though it was for only a short period. 
Unlike Malaysia, Indonesia did not support the Moro separatist movements 
aga.inst_ the Marcos regime, though it tried to.put a stop to the conflict. Indonesian 
leaders have been concerned with their own internal and regional stability. Their 
hesitation to support the Moro rebels was largely due to their own experience with 
militant movements in the 1950s and 1960s. Furthermore, Indonesia does not 
_(;Ollf!Wer itself a Muslim state in the sense that Islam is not constitutionally regarded 
as a religion that provides the ruling principles for state policy. Hence, though it is. a 
member of the OIC, Indonesia's foreign policies are not dictated by feelings of Islamic 
brotherhood and Quranic obligation. 
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In the interest of regional stability, Indonesia played a role as mediator between 
Malaysia and the Philippines. At the height of the Moro conflict, it attempted to 
initiate a deal by which Manila would renounce its claim to Sabah in exchange for 
' Malaysia's agreement to suppress Tun Mustapha. In 1974 Tun Mustapha was 
reportedly warned by Jakarta's leaders about his cooperation with Qadhafi who was 
calling for sanctions against the Philippines (Suhrke and Noble 1977:190). But 
Indonesia's efforts to persuade the concerned parties to negotiate for a reasonable 
settlement failed. This was not only because of the complexity of the problem, but 
also because Indonesia -had frequently supported the Philippine government, 
emphasizing the danger of intervening in the internal affairs of other states. In his 
speech at the sixth ICFM in Jeddah in July 1975, the Indonesian foreign minister, 
Adam Malik, asserted, 'To insist on a prior public declaration agreeing to the 
creation of an autonomous region, with a separate government and army, as a 
condition for the success of those talks, we believe, cannot be accepted by any 
sovereign government worthy of its name' (quoted in Department of Public 
Information 1976:29). In recent negotiations between the Aquino government and the 
MNLF, Indonesia was again involved in behind-the-scenes manoeuvering (Far 
Eastern Econom£c Review, 11 September 1986). It was motivated mainly by the 
desire to preserve regional stability. 
Apart from the involvement of individual Muslim countries, the Organization of 
the Islamic Conference (OIC) has played a dominant role in the efforts to solve the 
Muslim problem in the Philippines. One of the aims of the OIC, as set out in its 
'charter of 1972, is 'to strengthen the struggle of all Muslim people with a view to 
safegarding their dignity, independence and national rights' (Europa· Publications 
1985:229). The OIC, founded in May -1971, consists of-the Conference of Heads of 
State_ as fts supreme body and- the fsfa.inic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM). 
The ICFM meets annually to consider the means for implementing the general policy 
of the organization. Table 6.1 shows the current members of the OIC. 
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Table 6-1: Members of the OIC, 1985 
.Muslim States 
Afghanistan• Gabon .Malaysia Senegal 
Algeria The gambia .Maldives Sierra Leone 
Bahrain Guinea Iraq .Mali Somalia 
Bangladesh Guinea-Bissau .Mauritania Sudan 
Benin Indonesia .Morocco Syria 
Brunei Iran Niger Tunisia 
Burkina Faso Iraq Oman Turkey 
Cameroon Jordan Pakistan Uganda 
Chad Kuwait PLO United Arab Emirates 
The Comoros Lebanon Qatar Yemen Arab Republic 
Djibanti Libya Saudi Arabia Yemen, People's 
Democratic Republic 
Egypt• 
• Egypt's membership was suspended in .May 1979 and restored 
in .March 1984. Afghanistan's membership was suspended in 
January 1980. 
Note: Observer status has been granted to Nigeria and to the 
'Turkish Republic of Cyprus' which declared independence 
in November 1983. 
Source: (Europa Publications 1985:228). 
The struggle of the Moro people attracted the attention of the OIC and in 
February 1972 the Third Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, in Jeddah, 
_ r~_vie~ed. th~ situaticm oL the Muslims in the Philippines and expressed serious 
concern about it. In 1973 in Benghazi, the ICMF passed a resolution calling for the 
investigation of the 'plight of Muslims living in the Philippines' and formed a 
ministerial committee of four, namely Libya, Saudi Arabia, Senegal and Somalia, to 
vis~t _ t.P,e _ J:>.h.Uippine.s __ and _ look in.to the Muslim situation. It also established a 
voluntary fund to help Muslims in the Philippines, to be financed by Muslim 
governments as they saw fit. The ICMF also requested the governments of Indonesia 
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and Malaysia in 1973 to exert their good offices within the framework of ASEAN for 
the same purpose. 
In August 1973, the delegates of foreign ministers of the four nations visited 
Mindanao and Sulu. They were followed by a group of diplomats from predominantly 
Muslim countries and a special mission from Libya and Egypt. The Philippine 
government reported that the delegates were convinced that no persecution or 
genocide was being committed on the Muslims (Department of Public Information 
1976:28). Nevertheless, the ICMF meeting held in Kuala Lumpur in June 1974 
adopted Resolution No 18 (Appendix J}, calling upon the Philippine government to 
cease all measures that resulted in the killing of Muslims and the destruction of their 
property and places of worship. It urged the Marcos regime 'to find a political and 
peaceful solution through negotiation with Muslim leaders, particularly with the 
representatives of the Moro National Liberation Front in order to arrive at a just 
solution to the plight of the Filipino Muslims within the framework of the national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines' (ICFM 1974). The ICFM 
appealed to peace-loving states, while recognizing the Moro problem as an internal 
problem of the Philippines, to ensure the safety of the Muslims and the preservation 
of their liberties. In addition, the conference decided to create an agency called 
Filipino Muslim Welfare and Relief Agency to aid the Moros so as to ameliorate their 
plight and improve their socio-economic well-being. This was to be financed and 
controlled by the Islamic Solidarity Fund (£bid.). 
-- Hence; the-Kuafa Lumpur conf-erence.gave both the Philippine government and 
the -MNLF leaders- a, clear sign- of-the purpose an_d extent of the OIC involvement. 
While the MNLF leaders consolidated their strength and extended the scope of their 
.military operations against the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the OIC continued 
to work for a solution to the conflict (Noble 1984:8}. At the invitation of the 
Philippine government, the secretary-general of the OIC, Dr. Mohammad Hassan 
Al-Tohamy, visited the Philippines to discuss matters in connection with the 
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Resolution No 18 adopted in Kuala Lumpur. He succeeded in persuading both sides to 
meet in Jeddah in January 1975. The MNLF agreed to give up independence as a 
go3l, but it demanded an internally sovereign Bangsa Moro State that would have its 
' 
own security force for maintaining internal order. The Philippine Panel which 
comprised Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor, Admiral Romulo Espaldon, 
Ambassador Lininding Pangandaman, Ambassador Pacifico Castro, Chancellor 
Ruben Cuyugan, Dean Cesar Majul, Colonel Jose Almonte and Economist Gary 
Makasiar met the MNLF Panel which consisted of Nur Misuari, Salamat Hashim, 
Abdul Baki Abubakar, Hamid Lukman and Abdurrasad Asani. The meetings were 
conducted from 18 to 29 June 1975 in the presence of the OIC secretary-general. The 
talks failed, however. The Philippine government did not agree with the MNLF 
leaders who insisted on the creation of an autonomous region as a pre-condition for 
negotiations. In rejecting the MNLF demand, the head of the Philippine Panel, 
Alejandro Melchor, informed the OIC secretary-general: 
In categorical terms, what Mr. Nur Misuari and his group vaguely have in 
mind is not basically oriented toward the welfare of the Islamic 
Communities in the Philippines; it is, instead, designed to establish a new 
power structure and system which did not, and does not, exist, and which 
they hope to establish by fiat of an agreement .... Actually, Mr. Misuari and 
his associates have no grounds to stand on as far as their claim to having 
created what they like to call a 'Bangsa Moro State' is concerned (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs 1980a:13-14). 
The Jeddah talks which were scheduled to commence on 7 April 1975 did not 
occur. In the same month, President Marcos appointed a panel of Muslim leaders 
(Ambassador Lininding Pangandaman, Commissioner Simeon Datumanong, 
Brigadier- ..Ceneral- Mamarita. Lao . .and. Shiekh Abdul Hamid Camlian) to conduct 
dialogues with rebel leaders in the field. Meetings with some 500 rebels were held in 
Zamboanga City on 17 April and 30 June 1975 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1980a:9). 
-At-the same. time,-the-OIC-ministerial·-committee of four approved- a nine point 
agenda (Appendix K) to be used as a basis for the resumption of negotiations. This 
draft agenda was accepted by the MNLF, but was rejected by some 215 Muslim 
leaders, government officials and rebels whom Marcos assembled in Zamboanga City 
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for the second time. They argued that 'the agenda approved by the committee of four 
violates the sanction of the Constitution, impugns national sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, and insults national pride' (Department of ~ublic Information 1976:58). 
Instead, the group endorsed a Marcos plan to create four 'autonomous' regions in the 
. southern Philippines that would be headed by appointees responsible directly to the 
president. Nevertheless, the ICFM which convened in Jeddah on 10 July 1975 
approved the draft of the committee of four and recommended that negotiations 
between the two parties be arranged as soon as possible. 
The newly installed secretary-general of the OIC, Dr. Ahmadu Karim Gaye of 
Senegal, met President Marcos at the United Nations Commission on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) in Nairobi on 6 May 1976. He informed President Marcos 
that 'the members of the committee felt that the outright rejection by local Muslim 
leaders of the Draft Agreement ... was ill-advised' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
1980a:12). A week later the ICFM conference in Istanbul passed a resolution which 
called for the resumption of negotiations between the Philippine government and the 
MNLF based on Resolution No 10 (Appendix L) adopted by the Jeddah conference in 
1975. In August 1976, Secretary-General Gaye, Foreign Minister Asane of Senegal, 
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Abdussalam Ali Treki of Libya and Director 
Darman of Somalia met President Marcos who agreed to resume negotiations with 
the MNLF on the following conditions: 
(1) It would be part of the continuing peaceful efforts of the Philippines 
government in negotiating with MNLF members as Filipino nationals; (2) 
that the meeting would not confer belligerency status on the MNLF; (3) 
that the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the 
· · Philippine~ ~e non-negotiable; and, ( 4) that the Islamic Conference and the 
MNLF, should not impose any prior conditions as advanced by Misuari 
during the 1975 Jeddah conversations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
1980a:14). 
In October, $1 million was donated by the Islamic Solidarity Fund to the Agency for 
Development and Welfare of the Muslims in the Philippines (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 1980b:l 79). 
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Meanwhile, the Philippine government began to strengthen its diplomatic 
relations with West Asia and Muslim countries. The campaign to maintain ties with 
Muslim states was many-faceted: it included the 'opening of formal relations with a 
number of Islamic countries, exchange of special high-level missions, intensified 
information programmes, and the crystalization of a completely new policy on the 
entire Middle East issue' (Department of Public Information 1976:31). The 
realignment of foreign policy was expressed following the outbreak of the Arab-Israel 
conflict in 1973, when the Philippines condemned Israel's occupation of Arab 
territories as an act of aggression and called for the withdrawal of its forces from all 
occupied Arab lands in accordance with the resolution of the Security Council 
adopted in 1967. The Philippine government then signed a common declaration with 
other ASEAN countries deploring Israel's 'territorial expansion by force'. The 
Philippines has also recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people. In November 1973, Philippine Foreign Secretary Carlos Romulo 
presented the message of President Marcos to King Faisal of Saudi Arabia assuring 
him of the Philippines' continued support of the Arab cause in the Middle East 
conflict. Meanwhile diplomatic. reiations· between the two countries were formalized 
by the appointment of Lininding Pangandaman, a Maranao Muslim, as the 
Philippines' first Ambassador to Saudi Arabia. Subsequently, diplomatic ties were 
arranged with United Arab Emirates and embassies were opened in Iran and Algeria, 
with concurrent accredition in Lebanon, Kuwait and Abu Dhabi. Efforts were made 
to strengthen existing relations with Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Maldives, Pakistan, 
Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Somalia 
( ibid;:31-32). 
At the height of the separatist conflict in 1975, the First Lady, Mrs. Imelda 
Marcos~·-had played-an-important role in strengthening- Philippine relatioIIB with the 
Arab world. Acting a.S special representative of President Marcos; the Ffrst Lady's 
Middle East diplomacy took her first to Egypt where she had talks with President 
Sadat and laid groundwork for social and cultural exchanges as well as strengthening 
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the understanding between the leaderships of the two countries. In Algeria, Mrs. 
Marcos met President Boumedienne, who expressed the hope that the Muslim 
problem in Mindanao would be solved through peaceful means. On the suggestion of 
' President Boumedienne, Imelda proceeded to New York to seek the help of Algerian 
Foreign Minister Bouteflika (then President of the General Assembly of UN) in 
presenting the Philippines' case before Arab delegates to the UN. From New York, 
the First Lady went to Riyadz to convey the condolences of President Marcos to the 
government of Saudi Arabia when King Faisal was assassinated. Such high level 
diplomatic contacts opened the way for substantive demonstrations of goodwill from 
Arab leaders, including visits to the Philippines by King Hussein lbn Talal of Jordan, 
Madame Jehan Sadat, wife of President Sadat of Egypt, President Omar Bongo of 
Gabon, and Sheikh Abdullah Al-Sheikh, Minister of Education in Saudi Arabia. In 
Tunisia, President Bourguiba told Information Secretary Tatad of the Philippines 
that Tunisia would not support any move to dismember the Philippines. 
Within that framework, Mrs. Marcos visited Libya. The meeting between her 
and President Qadhafi resulted in a series of talks in Tripoli on 15 to 23 December 
1976 between the Philippine government panel and the MNLF. The government 
panel consisted of Undersecretary Carmelo Barbero, Ambassador Lininding 
Pangandaman, Commissioner Simeon Datumanong, Ambassador Karim Sidri, 
Ambassador Pacifico Castro and Colonel Eduardo Ermita, and the MNLF panel 
comprised Nur Misuari, Salamat Hashim, Abdul Baki and Abdurrasad Asani. Libya 
Foreign Minister Ali Treki presided over the talks which were conducted in the 
{)_r~~I_lc-e of the committee of four including the secretary-general of the OIC. The 
negotiations culminated in the signing of the Tripoli Agreement, which provided for a 
cease-fire and tentative terms for a settlement (see Appendix A). 
The cease-fire, which was to be supervised by a committee representing the 
Philippine government, the MNLF and the quadripartite ministerial commission, was 
signed between the two parties on 20 January 1977 in Zamboanga City. Although 
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fighting continued m some areas, the cease-fire was generally successful until it 
collapsed in late 1977. To finalize the terms of the Tripoli Agreement, the 
government panel and the MNLF met again in Libya from 9 February to 3 March 
' 1977. This time the negotiations wete stalemated because of differences over the 
degree of autonomy and the role of the MNLF in its administration. Mrs. Marcos was 
again sent to Tripoli to talk with President Qadhafi in an effort to break the 
deadlock. The talks resulted in the Qadhafi-Marcos understanding which covered the 
following points: 
(1) A decree proclaiming autonomy in thirteen provinces be issued by 
President Marcos; (2) a provisional government be set-up; and (3) this 
provisional government to hold a referendum in the area of autonomy 
concerning the administration of the government (Qadhafi 1977). 
As a consequence, President Marcos issued Presidential Proclamation No 1628 
declaring autonomy in the thirteen provinces. Nur Misuari was offered the 
chairmanship of the newly organized provisional government, but he refused because 
the substance of autonomy proposed was unacceptable. Marcos then appointed six 
Muslim and seven Christian governors and Regional Commissioner Datumanong as 
the provisional government. 
After having been postponed three times, the referendum was held on 17 April 
1977. The Muslims generally boycotted it because Marcos proceeded to hold a 
referendum on critical provisions of the agreement itself (Noble 1984:9). The military 
forces were placed on combat readiness while the MNLF insisted on the creation of an 
autonomous region under their control (Abbas 1979:116-117). On 22 April, a 
17-rnember delegation of the OIC, including Secretary-General Gaye and Libyan 
Foreign- Minister, Ali .Treki, and the MNLF-leaders resumed negotiations with the 
Philippine government in Manila in the hope of resolving their differences. However, 
each side refused to accept the other's compromise proposals and the talks collapsed. 
A communique issued by the OIC delegatiori declared that the negotiations failed 
because of the negative attitude of the Philippine government and the violations of 
the previous agreements (ibid.:118). It warned that resumption of hostilities seemed 
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inevitable. The Philippine government attributed the failure to reach a settlement to 
the unacceptable demands and the intransigent stand adopted by the MNLF. It sent 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos Romulo to clarify the Philippine stance in several 
' 
member states of the OIC. Nevertheless, Resolution No 7 /8-P adopted by the ICFM 
in May 1977 considered the Philippine government responsible for the failure of the 
negotiations both in Tripoli in February and in Manila in April 1977. The Resolution 
requested the Muslim states to support the MNLF 'by all ways and means for 
achieving all demands of Muslims in South Philippines' (ICFM 1977a). 
Thereafter, the OIC continued to denounce the Philippine government for 
avoiding its international obligations. As the cease-fire ended in late 1977, the ICFM 
meeting in Dakar in 1978 called on both parties to end all fighting, respect the 
cease-fire agreement and resume negotiations. However, the Marcos regime no longer 
paid much attention to the call of the OIC; its bargaining position had been 
strengthened by favourable international circumstances and a marked decline in the 
strength of the MNLF. 
To keep the Moro struggle alive, the OIC decided in 1977 to give the MNLF 
observer status within the Conference (ICFM 1977b). From then on the annual 
meetings of the OIC have essentially reiterated the Organization's calls for 
negotiations to implement the Tripoli Agreement. At the same time, the Islamic 
Solidarity Fund, a subsidiary organ of the OIC, continued to provide financial 
support to the MNLF in order to keep the Moro struggle going. Thus, when the 
Aquino government expressed its willingness to meet with the MNLF leaders, the 
OIC _was more than willing to assist·-in. ending the 14-year old hostilities. The 
-Philippine's neighbours, Indonesia, Malaysia and to some extent Singapore also used 
their influence in persuading the two parties to come to the new negotiating table 
(Far Eastern Economic R.eview, 11 September 1986). 
In the final analysis, external involvement by Muslim states and the OIC had a 
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significant effect on the Moro separatist struggle. Notwithstanding the ideological 
differences which have led Islamic states such as Libya, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to 
direct their support to different factions of the movement, the support of the 
' 
worldwide Muslim countries has sharpened self-confidence and increased the level of 
fighting that culminated in the Tripoli Agreement on terms much more favourable to 
the Moros than their leadership ever would have gained without outside assistance. 
Furthermore, external help had kept the movement alive at least at its minimum 
capacity. On the other hand, outside factors shaped the goals and tactics of both 
conflicting parties and persuaded them to enter peace negotiations. 
Government Responses 
In response to the separatist threat posed by the Muslims in the south, the 
central government in Manila employed both military and non-military measures. 
Like other governments, the Marcos administration believed that such a threat could 
not be permanently quelled without addressing successfully some of the 
socio-economic and political dimensions from which it sprang. 
In general, the Moros in Mindanao were seen by the Philippine government as a 
problem because they were 'backward' and 'unwilling' to accept changes. The 
problem, however, was regarded as manageable. A multifaceted policy was devised in 
an attempt to promote Moro integration, primarily through socio-economic 
development programmes, and to maintain peace and order in the region through the 
use of coercive measures. But the latter was pursued with far more vigour than the 
former. 
·The tiise of· coerGive. measures ··oy the government began when the Philippine 
Constabulary (PC) started to support the 'Ilaga terrorist squads' fighting against the 
Moros in 1968. By the middle· of the 1970, the PC-became very active ori the side of 
·the Ilagas;· in September 1971 ma:ny- Moro villaiers in the island of Mindanao were 
subjected to the PC's 'search and destroy' missions; and by March 1972, 12 out of 35 
municipalities in Cotabato province alone were under the PC control, causing 
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thousands of Muslim villagers to flee the areas (Ahmad 1980:32; Manila Times, 21 
March 1972). After the declaration of martial law in 1972, full.scale military 
operations to suppress the Moro resistance movement were initiated. The main 
' 
objectives of the campaigns were to conduct 'search and destroy operations against 
defiant rebel groups, to impose the government's will in the affected areas ... and in the 
process ~sist in the restoration of local governments' (Department of National 
Defense n.d.:4). Among the more important military operations documented by the 
Department of National Defense were 'Operation Sibalo', 'Operation Reina Regente', 
'Operation Pamukpok', 'Operation Lebak', 'Operation Batikus', and 'Operation 
Bagsik'. 
Operation Sibalo on the island of Jolo was a campaign to control Sibalo Hill 
which was considered tactically vital to military operations as it commands the 
surrounding areas. The control of the hill would furthermore divided the rebels into 
two separate groups. The forces participating in this operation comprised two marine 
companies, one infantry company, two mortar platoons and two Air Force helicopter 
units; totaling about 500 military.men. The campaign lasted two days from 28 to 30 
December 1972. No significant resistance was made· by Moro separatists. The 
government viewed Operation Sibalo as a major psychological gain for the AFP 
troops, because it revived the offensive spirit and demonstrated to the populace the 
serious intention of the government to assert its authority (ibid.: 95·109). 
Operation Reina Regente was launched by the Central Mindanao Command 
( CEMCOM) under Brig. Gen. Fortuna Abat. Its aim was to 'flush out all the 
insurgents .. Jrom their bases of operation' (ibid.:84), especially at Reina Regente 
Mountains, Datu Piang, Cotabato. To insure success of this campaign, General Abat 
employed a -force· of more than 2,000 men, comprising the 6th Infantry Brigade, Army 
Artillery Group, Combat Air Strike Force, a PC company and all Civilian Home 
Defense Forces in the area. The operation began on 28 January and ended on 5 April 
197 4. The main effort of the operation was to decimate some 800 armed separatists 
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under several leaders, including Abdulatip Mohammed, Santiago Kadatuang, Ustaz 
Daudayuan, Subo Dalamdas, Duskan Talipasan and Kinok Dundling (ibid.:75-94). 
The campaign was reported by the CEMCOM as successful. 
Operation Pamukpok was a campaign which attempted to capture barrio 
Tuburan in the Lamitan district, Basilan, a stronghold of an undetermined number of 
Moro rebels. Several operations by government ground troops had been launched ·but 
Tuburan remained under control of the rebels. In vie~ of the threat posed by the 
separatists, an amphibious operation was decided upon. The main forces that 
participated in the campaign were Amphibious Task Force 32, 2nd Battalion Landing 
Team, Naval Attack Force 32, Mortar Platoon and Naval Gunfire Support Group. 
The ten-day operation, from 5 to 14 July 1973, accounted for about 200 rebels killed 
and many casualties and homeless. The capture of Tuburan -was considered highly 
successful, preventing Muslim separatists from turning it into an almost impregnable 
bastion where they could offer strong opposition (ibid.:57-74). 
Operation Lebak was a campaign to destroy insurgent forces in Tran and 
Lebak, Cotabato. The group was under the command of Datu Sangki Koran, former 
council man of Lebak, and Pendi Koran Omar, Koran's deputy. The operation lasted 
six months, from March to August 1973. It comprised Task Forces 'Cosmos' and 
'Sarsi' which were composed of the 1st Composite Infantry Battalion, the 21st and 
22nd Infantry Battalions, three Constabulary Companies and the Civilian Home 
Defense Forces. The six-month battles between the AFP and the separatist cost 
hundreds of life and thousands became homeless (ibid.:45-56). 
Operation Batikus was a campaign at Siasi island in an attempt to prevent 
se~~ratist guerrillas capturing Siasi town, the only remaining government strong 
position in the island at the time. The operation was composed of Naval Task force 
32, Marine Landing Force 33 and Tactical Air Support Units. A three-day operation, 
from 14 to 16 August 1973, destroyed many villagers' houses and boats; the 
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separatists suffered at least eighty-five killed in action and an undetermined number 
were wounded. The government casualties were counted at only two killed and six 
wounded (ibid.:19-44). 
Operation Bagsik was an operation to recapture the city of Jolo from the 
MNLF. The city of Jolo was under the control of Muslim separatists for three days 
before Operation Bagsik was launched. More than 2,000 AFP troops, including air 
and naval support attacked the city from 4 February to 10 April 1974. The mission 
was accomplished, but the toll was heavy. The government recorded 99 AFP troops 
killed in action and 22 wounded, while separatist casualties stood at 516 killed and 
224 wounded (ibid.:1-18). The city centre was almost entirely destroyed. 
These operations give an idea of the nature and extent of the armed conflict, 
which had developed into a conventional war between the Marcos regime and Moro 
separatists under the leadership of the MNLF. The war reached its peak and became 
stalemated in 1975. As discussed in chapter 4, the costs of the war were considerable 
and attracted sympathetic attentio_n f!"om the international community. In 1976 the 
two parties signed the Tripoli Agreement. 
With respect to socio-economic development, several steps had been taken from 
as early as the 1950s. A Commission on National Integration (CNI) was created in 
1957 which was designed to foster 'the moral, material and political advancement' of 
the non-Christian Filipinos. The Mindanao State University (MSU) at Marawi City 
was established in 1955 to promote education among the peoples of the south, 
particularly the Moros. And in 1961 the Mindanao Development Authority (MDA) 
was formed to accelerate the development of the region. However, these programmes 
fall far short of their o!Jjectives due to the complexity of the problem and because of 
financial and management difficultiea. The notable accomplishment was the CNl's 
scholarship programme for members of the minorities. Between 1958 and 1967, for 
example, about 8,300 scholarships were awarded (see Table 5.1). Following the 
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reports of a senate committee on national minorities in 1963 and 1971, which 
identified resettlement and land-grabbing as the major sources of conflict in 
Mindanao, the Marcos government announced a number of social and economic 
' programmes as part of a package intended to win over dissident Moros (May 
1985:113-114; Mastura 1980). 
As Moro-Christian relations deteriorated in the early 1970s, the armed forces 
were sent in to quell the situation. But the military became a catalyst for further 
violence because of their bias against Muslims and their indiscipline. Along with 
coercive measures, President Marcos had also issued a series of decrees, orders, 
proclamations, and letters of instruction aimed at ending the conflict. Some of the 
early decrees were intended to remove the restrictions on the traditional barter trade 
(Presidential Decree 93, 1973); to grant amnesty to persons who had committed any 
act penalized by the existing laws in Muslim areas (PD 95, 1973); to authorize the 
use of Arabic language as a medium of instruction in madaris (Letter Of Instructions 
71-A, 1973); to declare Muslim holidays as legal Philippine holidays (Proclamations 
1198~· 1973);--to direct the Universty of the Philippines Board of Regents to establish 
an Institute of Islamic Studies (LOT 82~ 1973); and to declare ancestral lands occupied 
and cultivated by national cultural minorities as alienable and disposable in 26 
provinces throughout the country (PD 410, 1974). More significantly, the government 
claimed to have allocated about 818 million pesos tor development programmes aimed 
at creating conditions for closer national integration and at securing lasting peace in 
the area (PTF-RDM 1973:5-6). 
""" Toward this end, the Rehabilitation and Deloptnent · Programme (RAD) for 
I\ 
Mindanao was formed. It covered the provinces in which the majority of Muslims 
·reside. · The · RAD comprised ·three ·broad·· types of activities: · rehabilitation, 
reconstruction and development. The first two included those activities required to 
restore normalcy in the region, such as assistance to evacuees and repair of damaged 
infrastructure, while the third covered such activities as expansion of agricultural and 
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industrial production and improvement of education and health services (Melchor 
1973:66). 
To implement this programme, the Marcos regime created the Presidential 
Task Force for Reconstruction and Development of Mindanao (PTF-RDM) headed 
by Executive Secretary Alejadro Melchor. The objectives of the PTF-RDM, as 
defined by Executive Order No 411 of 1973, were 'the assesment of damage on private 
property, mobilization of funds and preparation of an integrated programme of full 
reconstruction, and restoration of peace and order' (PTF-RDM 1973:5). 
The first of the RAD's rehabilitation programmes, LOI 30 of 1972, coordinated 
through the Special Programme of Assistance for the Rehabilitation of Evacuees 
(SPARE), was to assist displaced families from areas of disturbance. The affected 
villagers were to be resettled in their homes as soon as peace and order were restored. 
The projects pursued under LOI 30 were for housing, extension of agricultural credit, 
and provision of technical assistance to farmers and evacuees. 
With respect to reconstruction and development, the mam focus was on 
reconstructing damaged facilities such as roads, bridges and ports and restoring 
production to pre-crisis levels. Efforts were made to increase vegetable, rice and corn 
production to meet the needs of the region. Small-scale industries were encouraged 
through financial assistance from such institutions as the Development Bank of the 
Philippines and the Private Development Corporation of the Philippines. Meanwhile, 
the educational system was being re-oriented to develop skills to enable people to 
exploit the natural resources of the region; attempts were also made to increase 
health services through rural health and disease control programmes. 
These RAD programmes exemplified the government's conception of the 
problems and its attempts to solve them along socio-economic-cultural lines. 
Unfortunately, while the policy was well-conceived, its implementation was not 
sufficient to redress the social and economic imbalances resulting from long neglect 
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and discrimination against the Muslims. The PTF-RDM was later incorporated into 
the Southern Philippines Development Authority (SPDA) together with such other 
programmes as the SP ARE, CNI and MDA. 
At the height of the armed confrontation, when at least one third of the entire 
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) was operating in Moroland, the national 
government set up the Southern Philippines Development Administration (SPDA) 
(PD 690, 1975). The SPDA was charged with 'the main responsibility of promoting 
economic development and social stability through corporation and non-corporation 
ventures' (Department of Public Information 1976:8). The corporate projects were 
essentially profit-oriented, aimed at generating funds that would directly or indirectly 
benefit the population through job opportunities and taxes for local governments in 
the region. The non-corporate programmes were public-service-oriented, designed to 
enhance social development. 
The administration of the SPDA, which was headed by a board of directors 
appointed by President Marcos, was involved in a four-pronged development effort: 
resource development, socio-oriented activities, financial investments and technical 
assistance. Resource development involved the use of the region's natural resources 
for profit-oriented projects. The socio-oriented activities included projects in 
education, land reform, human settlements and health which were implemented 
jointly by different government agencies. The last two became operable when the 
SPDA entered into joint ventures with public or private institutions (ibid.). 
In addition, the SPDA was entrusted with the responsibility of operating the 
relief and rehabilitation of Muslim ex-rebels and evacuees in Mindanao. In 1980, for 
instance, a special fund of 25 million pesos was to be administered through the SPDA 
for a rehabilitation programme for the MNLF and other groups working with the 
government development effort (May 1985:114). 
Other major programmes designed to promote and accelerate the 
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socio-economic growth and development of the Muslims in Mindanao included the 
creation of the Philippine Amanah Bank (PAB), the codification of Muslim laws and 
the establishment of the Ministry of Muslim Affairs (MMA). The PAB was founded 
' 
to meet the banking, credit and finacial requirements of Muslims. As a specialized 
bank, it operated on a dualistic basis: conventional and Islamic. With respect to the 
latter, the PAB developed the Islamic concept of banking which is based on 
no-interest and partnership principles. In Islam, interest (riba) is not permissible; it 
should be waived in favour of profit sharing. As a consequence, the P AB included in 
its organizational structure a Muslim Development Fund (MDF) where the waived 
savings interest would be paid and in turn be used for various projects geared towards 
developing Muslim areas and promoting the welfare of the Muslims (PTF-RDM 
1973:48-51). Another direct service of the bank to the Muslim community was the 
Pilgrims Special Saving Deposit (PSSD). The PSSD was designed to provide a safety 
deposit to potential Muslim pilgrims and to give them an opportunity to increase 
their savings thr~ugh PAB's Islamic investment scheme (Mastura 1984:266). 
The codification of Muslim Personal Laws (PD 1083, 1977) was an outcome of 
the integration strategies that the Marcos administration had pursued in an attempt 
to incorporate some aspects of Islamic law (e.g., marriage, divorce, personal status, 
property relations, will succession and inheritance, gifts, wage and endowments) into 
the civil laws of the Philippines. As President Marcos stated, 'the Muslim heritage is 
part of the heritage of the nation. Their laws should be part of the law of the land' 
(PTF-RDM 1973:32-33). Thus, Presidential Decree No 1618 was promulgated m 
1979 to establish, inter alia, sharia courts in the Autonomous Governments of 
Regions IX and XII (see below). Four years later, the Philippine Supreme Court 
issued rules of procedure for these courts and for a bar examination to provide them 
with qualified personnel. The courts were expressedly made applicable only to 
Muslims (see Ministry of Muslim Affairs n.d.; Mastura 1984:199-212). Unfortunately, 
the courts have not yet become organized and operative. 
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In 1981 the special status of the Muslims was recognized by the national 
government with the creation of a Ministry of Muslim Affairs (Executive Order 697} 
'to insure the integration of Muslim Filipinos into the mainstream Filipino society 
' 
with due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions and institutions' (Wurfel 
1985:225). However, the appointment of Admiral Romulo Espaldon, who was a recent 
convert to Islam, as head of this new ministry was not acceptable to many Muslims, 
who did not regard Espaldon as their leader. This made the ministry less effective as 
an integrating mechanism than it might have been. In 1985 Espaldon was replaced by 
a Maguindanao traditional leader and politician, Simeon Datumanong. After the 
Aquino government came to power in 1986, the head of the ministry was given to 
another Muslim politician, Condu Muarip from Basilan. It has been suggested that 
the creation of such agencies by the Marcos regime was aimed not so much at 
socio-economic reforms beneficial to the Moro masses, but at offering the traditional 
Moro leaders 'a share in the spoils of martial law' and so inducing some traditional 
elites and their followers who had joined the separatist movement to surrender 
(Nemenzo 1985:240-246). 
In addition to these projects, the Marcos administration declared that 'all 
unappropriated agricultural lands of the public domain being occupied and cultivated 
by Muslims and other national cultural minorities as ancestral lands and therefore 
alienable and disposable' (Department of Public Information 1976:20). These 
ancestral lands, located in twenty-six provinces (eleven in Muslim provinces), were 
subdivided into farm lots not exceeding five hectares and allocated to members of the 
national cultural communities who had been cultivating them at the time of the 
issuance of Presidential Decree No 410 in 197 4. 
This land reform was intended to appease Muslims and other cultural minorities 
-who. resented the detachment of their lands from the traditional pattern of 
community and clan ownership. However, the weakness of the land decree was that 
its implementing order created bureaucratic procedures which ironically made it more 
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difficult for cultural minorities to secure land titles. As Lynch has suggested, efforts 
to preserve ancestral land have proved inadequate, and the land continues to be 
usurped at an increasing rate (quoted in Wurfel 1985:226; see Dumarpa 1983). 
' Government projects and large corporations have managed to gain access to public 
land, regardless of ancestral occupancy. For instance, dam projects in Mindanao are 
expected to consume about 126,000 hectares of land and displace nearly half a million 
people (Silva 1979; Mercado 1981; Wurfel 1985:226). Furthermore, Presidential 
Decree No. 1559 issued in 1979 directed that squatters, cultural minorities and other 
occupants of forest and unclassified public land shall be ejected and relocated if the 
land is to be used for other purposes as determined by the Bureau of Forests. 
Another major response of the Marcos administration was the creation of local 
autonomy based on the Tripoli Agreement. The establishment of the Autonomous 
Governments of Regions IX and XII was an effort by the central government to find a 
solution to the separatist conflict within the context of national sovereignty and the 
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. Under the Tripoli Agreement 
certain rights and prerogatives were granted to the thirteen Muslim-populated 
provinces in the south. Among them· .. were the .. rights to have their own 
administrative, financial and economic system in accordance with the objectives of 
the autonomy, to set up their own sharia courts, and to have Special Security Forces 
in the region (see Appendix A). A Legislative Assembly and an Executive Council 
were to be formed in the autonomous regions. 
However1 President Marcos implemented the agreement on his own terms. In 
May 1977, Presidential Proclamation No. 1628-A was issued, proclaiming the 
adoption of the outcomes of a controversial referendum-plebiscite of April 1977. In 
July 1979; the Legislative Assembly (Sangguniang Pampook) and Executive Council 
(Lupong Tagapagpaganap Ng Pook) were created by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 
1618. The decree was widely protested by the MNLF because it departed from the 
Tripoli Agreement and did not grant the autonomy which the MNLF claimed had 
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been agreed. For example, two autonomous governments had been established, 
instead of one, and the exclusion of the provinces of Davau del Sur, Palawan and 
South CGtabato from the atonomous regions violated the accord. Moreover, the 
' legislative powers granted to the autonomous governments were negated by Section 4 
of PD 1618 which prevented them from acting on matters that were within the 
jurisdiction and competence of the national government; Section 35 of the decree 
stated that 'with respect to legislation, national laws shall be supreme vis-a-vis 
regional laws enacted by the Sangguniang Pampook'. The decree empowered regional 
assemblies to impose taxes and fees, but the Ministry of Finance guidelines limited 
the revenue-raising powers of the regional governments to inconsequential matters, 
such as signboards, secretary's fees, etc., which if imposed would not have 
accumulated tax revenues of more than one hundred thousand pesos annually. This 
was not the financial system laid down by the Tripoli Agreement. Not surprisingly, 
Nur Misuari boycotted the regional assembly elections, despite the invitation by 
President Marco~ to lead the restructured regional autonomous government. Salamat 
Hashim also refused to accept the government offer to take Misuari's place (May 
1985:116). In 1982 Abul Khayr Alonto (former vice-chairman of the MNLF), who 
became the speaker of the Region XII assembly, published a booklet, addressed to 
President Marcos, which criticized the operation of the autonomous governments and 
called for the merger of the two regions and the granting of 'a meaningful autonomy'. 
Alonto was dropped from the Marcos KBL ticket for the 1982 regional assembly 
elections (ibid.). 
The Autonomous Governments of Regions IX and XII, in fact, did not have any 
real legislative powers; they could 'only pass resolutions addressed to the President or 
the· respective heads of ministries, bureaux, and other national offices requesting 
adion' or appealing- for aid 'without ariy legal" sanction to enforce its measures' 
(Pangarungan n.d.:6). Some Muslims observed with sarcasm that a town or even a 
barangay council possessed more power than the Regional Assemblies in that the 
former could enact ordinances with the force of law carrying penalties in case of 
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violation. Many concluded that the terms of the Tripoli Agreement had not been fully 
implemented. 
Despite a claim by President Marcos that his policies hao 'effectively 
terminated' the MNLF and that more than 26,000 rebels had returned to the folds of 
the law, the separatist struggle persisted. The use of military forces to suppress the 
movement, as described above, remained the preferred method. 
The failure of the Marcos administration to solve the Moro problem through 
non-military measures can be attributed to a number of factors. It has been alleged 
that while, nominally, government programmes were mostly aimed at socio-economic 
reforms that would benefit the Moro masses, in practice they were promoting the 
interests of those Moro leaders who were pro-government. Commenting on the 
government's socio-economic development programmes, Muslimin Serna, a 
Maguindanao rebel leader, said that 'the government may build golden bridges to 
span the rivers of Mindanao and Sulu, cement roads to criss-cross their forests and 
plains, but what good are these roads and bridges if the Muslim people cannot use 
such roads and bridges freely because of their being Muslims' (quoted in Giang 
1973:39). 
Secondly, most government policies with respect to minority communities are 
perceived by the Muslims as instruments of assimilation. Assimilation into a 
'monolithic Filipino nationhood' is what the Moros have been trying to avoid for 
centuries, fearing the loss of their identity as the Muslim ummah. 
In spite of all efforts to advance the socio-economic and political status of the 
Moros (no less than sixty Presidential Decrees, Executive Orders and Proclamations 
had been declared from 1972 ~o 1982), the separatist conflict remains. Since the 
Aquino government replaced the Marcos regime, negotiations with the MNLF have 
been initiated in an attempt to end the conflict. Moreover, the Constitution of the 
Republic of the Philippines, which was ratified by referendum in February 1987, has 
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adopted general provisions for the creation of autonomous regions m Muslim 
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras. However, what kind of autonomy is intended by the 
new constitu~ion remains to be seen. Section 17 of the autonomous provisions states, 
' 
'All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or by law 
to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government' (Constitution 
of the Philippines 1986, Article X). 
Be that as it may, one of the major causes of the separatist movement has been 
the Moro,)1 desire to preserve their identity based on Islam. Over a period of time, 
Moro identification has evolved to a point where rectification of the socicreconomic 
and political ills is no longer sufficient as a basis for accommodation. This is because 
'the Islamic identity itself has taken on a life of its own' (Ayoob 1984:266-268). 
Concluding Remarks 
The involvement of Muslim states and organizations in the Moro liberation 
struggle helped to strengthen its military and political capabilities to the extent that 
it was able to put pressure on the central government to make some concessions and 
~estrain its policies. The creation of the autonomous governments and other 
governmental agencies was part of the Manila responses to such pressures. Suhrke 
and Noble {1977:18), however, suggested that external involvement was 'sufficient to 
have a nuisance value but insufficient to compel a settlement satisfactory to one or all 
of the local protagonists'. Their involvement has been limited by concern over their 
own interests. 
External involvement has been differently motivated. Malaysia's involvement, 
for instance, was a direct reaction to Philippine policies related to the claim to Sabah. 
It was supplemented by the Islamic fervour of the Sabah government under Tun 
Mustapha and the Sabahans' ethnic link with the Moros. Libya's support was 
originally motivated by Qadhafi's Islamic revolutionary zeal and his anti-
establishment inclination. As the consequences of the conflict became apparent, Libya 
changed its position from military assistance to diplomatic efforts that, through the 
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cooperation of other states, led to the signing of the Tripoli Agreement. In the case of 
Muslim international organizations, such as the OIC and the Muslim World League, 
their involvement was motivated by a concern over the welfare of Muslim brethren, 
especially those who were considered mistreated by non-Muslims. These Muslim 
organizations attempted to find a settlement favourable to the Muslims. Since the 
demand involved separation, touching one of the most sensitive issues facing the 
modern nation-state, they hesitated to employ all measures possible for the 
settlement. 
The Philippine government, on the other hand, responded to external 
involvement by broadening its diplomatic relations with the Muslim states to win 
their goodwill, while initiating various development programmes in Mindanao. 
However, the government responses have not been sufficient to unravel the 'Moro 
problem'. The roots of the problem are not only socio-economic but also 
ethno-cultural. Indeed, the Moro struggle has always been a struggle to defend Islam, 
a basic foundation of the Moro ethno-cultural identity. Such strife is regarded by the 
.Moros as~ to ~~e Darwin's words, 'the struggle for existence'. 
Thailand 
External Influences 
The separatist struggle of the Malay-Muslims in southern Thailand has, since 
its inception, involved neighbouring Malaysia. The Malays in Patani expect their kin 
across the border, who share a common culture, religion and history, to come to their 
rescue. But their expectations have not been realized because Malaysia has had to 
- - . ·- .. 
face its own internal problems. As Suhrke and Noble (1977:15) wrote, 'ethnic ties--
however strong-,,-are likely to. be subordinated . to other considerations'. And 
geograp~ical . proxim_ity · paradoxically ~as · restrained J\1alaysia_ from providing 
meaningful support to the Patani separatist effort. 
At the beginning of this century, the royalty of the Muslim provinces solicited 
the British authority in Malaya to assist Patani's attempt to free itself from Thai 
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domination {see chapter 3). As a result, the governor of the Straits Settlements, Sir 
Frank Swettenham, initiated in 1901 a move to incorporate Pa.tani into British 
Malaya. However, it was aborted by London (Koch 1977:74-81). The Patani issue 
' 
re-emerged as the British were planning post-war security arrangements for Southeast 
Asia. ~ir George Maxwell of the Colonial Office even suggested the annexation of the 
region. Tengku Mahmud Mahyuddin was said to have been assured by the British of 
their intention to incorporate Patani into British Malaya {see Farouk 1984:243-244). 
But the hope of the Patani people was shattered {Thompson and Adloff 
1955:161) when an Anglo-Siamese agreement for joint control of the border was 
signed in January 1949. With this agreement, it became clear that the people of 
Patani had overestimated the capacity and willingness of British Malaya to help 
them liberate themselves from Thailand. Even after this, Muslim leaders of Patani 
remained optimistic that the authorities in Malaya would eventually intervene and 
support their cause. Indeed, the Malay media gave wide and sympathetic coverage to 
the Patani plight while certain Malay political parties and personalities expressed 
their support {see Sopiee n.d.:10-34, 44-78). These gestures were taken seriously by 
the Thai authorities, who saw it necessary to invite an Alliance Party delegation to 
Bangkok to obtain promises of non-interference in Patani in return for· funding 
assistance to the Party (Farouk 1984:244). 
When independence was finally granted to the Federation of Malaya without 
any reference to Patani, many Muslim leaders in the region realized that hopes of 
irredentism had come to an end .. Some of them began to prepare·cthemselves for 
integration into the Thai nation by changing their Malay names to Thai and sending 
·their children-to Thai schools . .At the same time; a large number of Patani Muslims 
. moved to Malaya, especially to the northern states of Kedah, Kelantan, Perak and 
Trengganu, while others sought refuge in Saudi Arabia. These overseas Patani 
Muslims later provided valuable support for the separatist fronts organized to 
challenge the Thai authorities. 
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The support of some Malay political parties for the Muslim struggle in Patani 
continued after independence. When the formation of Malaysia was being discussed 
in the early 1960s, Partai Socialis Rakyat Malaya (PSRM) took the view that the 
' 
four Muslim provinces of southern Thailand should be included in the new proposal. 
Another strong supporter has been the Partai Islam se-Malaysia (PAS). PAS leaders, 
some of whom are familiar with the separatist movement through their association 
with Patani leaders from the different fronts, have often expressed support in their 
individual capacity to their preferred separatist organizations. Likewise, some Patani 
Muslim leaders who hold Malaysian citizenship joined PAS. The PAS interest in 
Patani was evident when the issue was raised several times in the Malayan 
Parliament by PAS members. At an election rally in Kelantan in 1969, Dato 
Mohammad Asri Hajji Muda, PAS 'President, 'openly discussed the prospect of an 
alternative Malay nation--comprising the Malay states of Malaya and those of South 
Thailand--should Malaysia collapse as a country' (Farouk 1984:245). In June 1974, 
Dato Asri, then a cabinet member in Tun Razak's administration, was accussed by 
the Thai authorities of supporting the separatist movement and interfering in the 
internal affairs of Thailand when at the PAS annual congress he declared: 
In our considered opinion, the demand for autonomy subject to certain 
conditions, for the southern Thai provinces, which the liberation front has 
put forward, deserves to be given a favourable reception. It could constitute 
a sensible step towards peace and tranquility (Berita Harian, 14 June 1974; 
Kershaw 1985:2). 
This statement brought a swift and strong response by the Thai government. Almost 
immediately after a Thai newspaper (Prachatipatai 15 June 1974) reported the 
incident, the Malaysian Ambassador to Thailand was asked to clarify the situation to 
the Forei~n Ministry. A protest to the Malaysian Embassy in Bangkok was organized 
and a rally was staged in the border province of Narathiwat. All sorts of allegations 
agai11st _ _Malaysia wen~ made. Fo~. in~ta,nce, Daw Siam (26 June 1974) accused the 
Mala_ysi;i11 government of encouraging the Muslims in the four provinces to assume 
-- -- - ... - ·-- - --- ... -· ··-. 
dual citizenship for political purposes. On 20 June 197 4, Thai legislative leaders called 
an emergency meeting to discuss the incident and condemned Asri as supporting the 
separatist aspiration of the Muslims (see Kershaw 1985). 
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Apart from political parties, the Malay villagers, especially in Kedah, Kelantan, 
Perlis, Perak and Trengganu, have always been strong supporters of the Patani 
struggle. In 1977 a survey of Malaysian attitudes towards the Muslim problem in 
' 
Patani found that 46 out of 56 respondents (82.1 per cent) would support a policy of 
Malaysian government intervention in favour of the Patani Muslims in south 
Thailand. Five (non-Malay) respondents (8.9 per cent) were opposed to any 
interference by the Malaysian government, while the other five (non-Malay) 
respondents held neither view (Farouk 1984:255). This indicates that many Malays 
in Malaysia remain concerned with the fate of their ethnic brethren across the border. 
Paradoxically, while many of the Malay population are sympathetic to the 
Muslim struggle in Patani, the Malaysian government has in many ways cooperated 
with the Thai government to suppress it. For example, when PAS members in the 
Parliament attempted to condemn the Thai government's repressive actions against 
Muslims in the four provinces, government authorities and parliamentarians defended 
Thailand, placing the blame on the communists for creating unrest in the area 
(Farouk 1984:241). In an effort to relieve pressure on Thailand, the government of 
Malaysia in 1961 encouraged those Patani Muslim leaders who were dissatisfied with 
the Thai government to settle in Malaya. Similar policies have been pursued by 
successive Malaysian governments, resulting in thousands of Muslims migrating from 
Patani to Malaysia. 
Malaysia has always retained good relations with its northern neighbour. The 
two countrl.es claim 'to uphold the principles of peaceful co-existence and mutual 
respect for each other's sovereignty. There has -been a degree of bilateral 
co-operation, including limited military operations along the 600 kilometres border. 
In 1977, for example, a series of co-ordinated Combinea Military Operations was 
carried out by the armed forces of both countries: 'Operation Daoyai-Musnah' in the 
Sadao area in Songkhla province and 'Operation Cahaya Bena' in the east of the 
Betong Salient in Yala province. The establishment of the Thai-Malaysia General 
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Border Committee, which functions as a forum to discuss security and related 
problems in the border area, has served to promote contact and communication 
between Thai and Malaysian officials. Official and unofficial visits by leaders from 
both sides have strengthened the bilateral ties and cordial relations have been further 
cemented by the ASEAN spirit of solidarity. 
Nevertheless, the underlying suspicions that have arisen from the ethnic unrest 
m the Muslim provinces have not been removed. The Thai authorities are not 
convinced that the Malaysian government does not assist the Muslim separatist 
struggle. Malaysian authorities, on the other hand, believe that Thailand has not 
done all it can to help suppress the CPM guerrillas of different factions who use 
Thailand as their sanctuary. In fact, the presence of the CPM in the four border 
provinces of southern Thailand is seen by the Thai authorities as politically useful as 
a countervailing force or bargaining chip to balance the presence of the Muslim 
separatist fronts in Malaysia. As Suhrke (1975:197) observed, 'the intergovernmental 
solidarity reflected a simple trade-off pattern whereby support for, or acquiesence in 
_the existence of, one rebel group was incompatible with a similar attitude toward the 
other rebel group'. In other words, the Malaysian government has no choice but to 
restrict its involvement in the Patani movement; on the other hand, it has 
considerable incentive to keep the conflict from being settled. 
Other external factors helped to promote separatist conflict in Patani. The 
resurgence of Islam on the international scene, which resulted in the emergence of a 
Muslim bloc _and the establishment of various Muslim ins.titutions-and- organizations, 
•has' -undoubtedly encouraged, the- Muslims in--Patani to carry on -'their liberation 
struggle. Leaders of the different fronts have lobbied the Islamic Conference of 
Foreign Ministers {ICFM) at various meetings since the first, held in Jeddah in 1970 
(BNPP.1976). In Kuala Lumpur in 1974, the BNPP under the leadership of Tengku 
Abdul Jalal called on the ICFM to help secure Patani independence and to effect an 
oil embargo against Thailand (Bangkok World, 26 June 1974; Farouk 1984:250; 
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1986). At the seventh ICFM in Istanbul, the BNPP (1976) and other fronts were 
allowed to attend the conference as unofficial observers; the problems of Patani and 
of other Muslim mi;:iorities were discussed behind closed doors. They were 
subsequently discussed at other international Islamic forums such as the Islamic 
Council of Europe in 1978. In 1980 the BNPP (1980) also submitted a memorandum 
on the Patani case to the eleventh ICFM in Islamabad. International commissions, 
often with the consent of the Thai government, visited the Muslim provinces for 
fact-finding tours (Farouk 1984:250) and certain countries of the OIC promised to 
provide funds for the development of the Muslims in the south (see Bangkok Post, 3 
August 1974; Nation, 23 August 1974). Contacts with the Muslim World League 
were made. In 1977 a letter of complaint was submitted by the BNPP to the United 
Nations Office in Geneva through the league (BNPP 1977). Through these external 
contacts, the Patani issue began to be heard among the Muslim states, though it 
gained no official recognition. 
As a result of these representations, different forms of assistance have been 
given to the fronts. Several Muslim states, including Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Libya 
and Syria provide sanctuary and/or training. Funds are sometimes given by the 
various governmental and private institutions and individuals to different separatist 
groups. These institutions include the Muslim World League in Mecca, Darul lfta in 
Riyadz, the Islamic Solidarity Fund in Jeddah, Al-Auqaf in Kuwait, Islamic Call 
Society in Libya, and the Baath Party in Syria. The Muslim World League has 
assisted the fronts several times in their drive for unity and in 1979 was able to 
persuade the' BNPP ·and PULO to sign a temporary agreement to co-ordinate their 
military operations. 
::- · --- -- Apart ··from direc-t assistance to- -the fronts, Muslim countries have provided 
scholarships and places for tertiary education to the Malay-Muslims. Many young 
Muslims prefer to study abroad, particularly in Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Egypt, 
Libya, Pakistan, Indonesia, Kuwait, Syria, Sudan and Iraq. This is contrary to 
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common assumptions among the Thais that the Malay-Muslims generally lack 
educational motivation. Most of these overseas students are sympathetic to or are 
members of different separatist organizations whose activities help to expose the 
' Malay-Muslim grievances to other sympathetic Muslim organizations abroad. Even 
for those basically apolitical students, their perceived status as 'second class citizens' 
causes them to resent the Thai authorities. In addition, the existence of a large 
community of Malay-Muslims in Saudi Arabia and Malaysia who continue to 
maintain an interest in the affairs of their homeland has been a source of finance and 
manpower for the separatist activities abroad. 
When Malay-Muslims from the four provinces come to Mecca during the haj 
season, attempts are made to recruit and indoctrinate them, and programmes of 
action are formulated during this period. Thai authorities are aware of such activities, 
and since the second half of the 1970s the Thai government has attached an 
intelligence section to the Thai Embassy in Jeddah specially to monitor the activities 
of the separatist fronts in Saudi Arabia and neighbouring Arab countries. The Thai 
government has also-- imposed strict clearance procedures for Muslims from the 
southern provinces who want to perform haj. 
With finance, educational facilities, and political and military training available 
to them, the Patani community and students overseas continue to conduct their 
political and diplomatic campaign against Thailand. Despite the fact that most of 
the Muslim states and organizations do not condone the avowed separatist objective 
ofthe Patani movement, thei~ tacit support is motivated by the desire to_preserve the 
ummah and to see that their Muslim brethren are properly treated. The OIC 
seminar on Muslim minorities in Perth, Australia in September 1984, for instance, 
recoffir9.ended that the OIC give full .moraL and financial support to rehabilitate the 
indigenous __ Malay~Muslim-lang-uage and- culture and-to- initiat·e- and support economic 
development projects for the long term well-being of the Patani Muslims {OIC 
1984:7). 
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It is important to note that there is no official cooperation between the Moro 
and the Malay movements, despite the fact that they have received support from the 
same sources overseas. The links between them seem to be confined to formal visits 
' 
and invitations to one another's offices abroad, during which they exchange ideas and 
information. However, no leaders of either movement ever pay official visits to each 
other's homeland, let alone help one another in combat. This lack of cooperation can 
only be explained by the fact that both movements prefer to concentrate their weak 
resources on obtaining assistance from the Muslim community overseas rather than 
on seeking to help each other. 
Government Responses 
The Malay-Muslim armed separatist movement in the four border provinces is 
regarded by the Thai central government as a threat to national integrity and not to 
be tolerated. The response of the government is essentially one of continuing efforts 
to assimilate Malay-Muslims into the Thai-Buddhist polity. This policy has been 
carried out more actively by the Thai bureaucratic polity that emerged following the 
1932 revolution {see Mokarapong 1972). As discussed in the previous chapters, the 
-··. 
'forced assimilation policy', which was pursued during the Phibun government 
. . . 
{1938-1944), achieved adverse results and left a legacy of even deeper resentment 
against Bangkok {Pitsuwan 1982:167; Snitwongse 1985:263). Of particular 
significance was the establishment of the sharia courts in the four Muslim provinces 
in 1946 where Muslim judges were appointed to sit alongside Thai judges to 
deliberate on cases concerning Muslim inheritance and marriage. This was considered 
by many Muslims as government intrusion on Muslim legal domain because prior to 
the establishment of the sharfo courts, Islamic laws in the Patani region were 
enforced by religious teachers ( ulama) without any institutional arrangement {for a 
detailed account on the establishment of the shar£a courts in the four provinces, see 
Pitsuwan 1982:119-141). 
Since the Sarit administration, socio-economic development has been employed 
as an instrument of national integration. It was believed that improving the 
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socio-economic welfare of the people would reduce the level of social conflict and 
lessen the 'social distance' between the central government and the peripheries. In the 
case of the Malay-Muslims, however, this policy was complicated by religious and 
' 
cultural differences: Muslims perceived the government's development efforts as an 
intrusion of colonial power which threatened their identity and socio-cultural values 
(Pitsuwan 1982:167-168). 
Since the mid 1960s, the main thrust of the new integration strategy has been 
on education: government expenditures for primary education in the three southern -
provinces where little Thai is spoken increased at an average annual rate of 40 per 
cent during 1972-1976 (Thomas 1982:171). Nearly every village now has a four-year 
primary school and village kindergartens are rapidly being established to provide a 
foundation in Thai language for Muslim children. Secondary schools, which are 
divided into lower and higher sequences, have also received attention. Each district 
will soon have one secondary school of lower sequence. Vocational secondary schools 
has been built in each provincial capital. Teacher training colleges as well as technical 
schools in the area are expanding their facilities. A university, Prince of Songkhla 
University, has been established with one campus in Patani province. There has also 
been a steady increase in the number of adult education programmes. The General 
Education Centre in the provincial capital of Vala has helped to improve primary and 
secondary schools in the Muslim provinces; it has been experimenting with new 
methods for teaching Thai language to the Muslim students and has designed 
teaching techniques and textbook materials, and held various conferences on ways of 
resolving difficulties in teaching Muslim students (ibid.:171-172). 
Through Thai education, the government hopes to accomplish two objectives: 
to achieve greater communication and understanding between Muslims and Thai 
government officials and to create a body of Muslims in Thai bureaucracy. The 
ultimate aim is to make the Muslim population accept the authority of the Thai 
state. 'With the Malays themselves serving the state power structure', noted 
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Pitsuwan (1982:174), 'no matter how little power they actually hold in it, the 
appearance of being represented and of self-goverment would help narrow the gap 
between the Thai rulers and the Malay ruled'. 
The Malay traditional system of education, pondok system, has gradually been 
transformed into a system of government-sponsored private religious schools with a 
secular curriculum and Thai language as the medium of instruction (for an account of 
pondok and its transformation, see ibid.:175-204). Such transformation is regarded by 
the Muslims as a frontal attack on their Islamic institution, which has caused its 
religious quality to deteriorate. To some Muslims, this is a serious threat to the 
Muslim community. While a growing number of Malay-Muslims are accepting Thai 
education, others feel obliged to send their children abroad for religious education. 
The transformed pondok has not only reduced the quality of religious education; 
it also has a secular curriculum inferior to that of the purely secular school. Not 
surprisingly, many Muslim villagers who have graduated from the converted pondok 
have failed to qualify for higher education. Consequently, in 1970 the government 
decided to set a quota for Malay-Muslim student admissions to the nation's 
educational institutions, without having to go through the normal entrance 
examinations. Through this quota programme hundreds of young Malays have 
graduated from universities and other institutions and have since been recruited by 
different branches of the Thai bureaucracy. These Thai-educated Muslims have 
gradually been integrated into the Thai nation and are referred to by the Thais as 
'Thai-Muslims'._ -They become the counterbalance to the foreign-educated Muslims 
who have been leading the community in other directions . 
. However, Thai-Buddhists and other minority groups are not happy with the 
special privilege accorded to the Malays. They coI1~_i_d~r that_ ~igh~r -~4ucation, which 
is a 'passport' to a better life, should not favour any specific group, and view the 
quota programme as a 'reverse discrimination'. The strongest criticism of the 
239 
programme has come from Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj himself. During his 
administration (1975-1976), Kukrit proposed to abolish the whole scheme. He argued 
that the special privilege granted to the Muslims would develop an inferiority 
' 
complex among them. Their peers would regard them as being unqualified students 
admitted to the institutions without the rigorous entrance examinations. Some would 
turn out to be weak students and be forced to retire; psychologically, they would 
suffer even more, and in the end would join the opposition (Suthasasana 1976:164). 
Kukrit also opposed government interference in pondok education. He preferred 
improved secular education for Malay-Muslim students. Kukrit, however, lasted only 
ten months as prime minister and was unable to implement his education policy, so 
the programme continues. 
Closely related to educational measures w~ a decision of the central 
government to recruit Malay-Muslims into the bureaucracy. By doing so the 
government sought to achieve the closer cooperation between Muslim villagers and 
goverment officials deemed necessary to the success of its integration efforts. 
However, the Muslim ·officials are caught between -two contradictory demands: the 
demand of the bureaucracy for their assimilation and total loyalty to the 
Buddhist-oriented state,and that of their own people who expect better treatment 
from them. Once they change their Malay names and adjust themselves to fit Thai 
officialdom, they are viewed as having rejected their own culture and lose the trust of 
their own people (Thomas 1975:5; Suhrke 1977:241; Pitsuwan 1982:210-211). On the 
other hand, if Muslim officials develop close relationships with the people of their 
constituencies, and refuse to bow to Thai -bureaucratic pressure, they -a.re- labelled 
disloyal- and" their- '"future m the bureaucracy is at stake. Thus, while increasing 
numbers of Malay-Muslims have been recruited into the bureaucracy, they have done 
very little to bridge the gap between the Muslim villagers and the state. 
Along with the recruitment of Muslims into the bureaucracy, attempts have 
been made to promote closer relations between Muslim leadership and the central 
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government. The hierarchical structure of the official Islamic institutions, i.e; the 
national and provincial councils for Islamic affairs and the council for mosque (Royal 
Decrees of 1945, 1947 and 1948), reflect such attempts. Chularajmontri or State 
' Councillor for Islamic Affairs, who is the ex-officio head of the national council for 
Islamic affairs, is elected by a 25-member committee of the national council and 26 
presidents of the provincial councils and then appointed by the King. 
Chularajmontri serves as an advisor on Islamic matters to the Interior and the 
Education ministries as well as being a religious head of the Muslim community who 
issues fatwa (religious rulings) to the Muslims. The position of Chularajmontri, 
which is considered equivalent to the Buddhist Patriarch of Thailand, is highly 
respected by Muslims in Bangkok and the central plain. In contrast, the 
Malay-Muslims in the south respect Chularajmontri only in his own private capacity 
as a religious leader. They do not view him as a leader who has their interest to 
protect and promote. In fact, Chularajmontri was refused the customary reception 
ceremony by the Malay-Muslim leaders on his visit to Patani during the Muslim 
demonstration against the goverment in December 1975 (To' mina 1981:32; Pitsuwan 
1982:212). 
More significantly, the religious rulings (fatwa) issued by the office of 
Chularajmontri in Bangkok have little effect on the Malay-Muslims in the four 
provinces, who seek religious advice and fatwa from religious teachers and learned 
men in their own community. Besides, some Malay villagers feel that religious advice 
and fatwa g~ven by the office of Chularajmontri might not be completely without the 
influence of the Thai authority .. The extent of the villagers' preference for the fatwa 
of their own religious teachers is illustrated by the fact that some Malay-Muslims are 
always reli.Ictant to observe Hari llaya {Muslim annual feast) on the day confirmed 
by the office in Bangkok unless it conforms with the opinion of the religious teachers 
in their community. In 1981, for example, about half of the Malay-Muslim population 
in the four provinces observed their Hari llaya Aidil Adha a day earlier than that 
officially announced (Che Man 1983:89). 
241 
Several other schemes designed to secure the allegiance of the Malay villagers 
have been devised. At the end of 1960s the Ministry of the Interior initiated an 
intensive programme of Islamic preaching called thammacharik (pilgrims of dharma), 
' following the Buddhist model of thammathut (ambassador of dharma) (Pitsuwa.n 
1982:213). Members of thammacharik consisted of several members from the 
National Council for Islamic Affairs and religious and other leaders from Bangkok 
and (a few) from the Muslim provinces. Most of the thammacharik preachers could 
not speak the local Malay language, and the content of their preaching was also seen 
by most villagers to be very basic; the programme was ridiculed by the villagers as 
'selling coconuts to the coconut farmers'. More seriously, some M~slims alleged that 
the thammacharik was intended to undermine Islam: they detected many serious 
errors in the Thai translation of the Quran distributed to villagers by the 
thammacharik delegation, and ordered villagers to destroy them. The thammacharik 
programme was stopped; having failed to achieve its objective. 
Another scheme devised by the government to improve relations with Muslim 
community leaders is the 'study tours' programme. Since the mid 1960s, groups of 
Malay-Muslim leaders from the four provinces, including religious teachers, members 
of the local government Islamic institutions and other community leaders, have been 
selected to visit Bangkok for 'study tours' at the government's expense. During their 
visit, their opm10ns are elicited in meetings with various government leaders 
(Haemindra 1976-77:104). By 1985 more than 3,000 Muslim community leaders, 
mostly £mams and religious teachers, had visited Bangkok under this programme 
(interviews, members-of the Provincial Council for Islamic Affairs, Narathiawt, June 
1985). 
Apart. from the above programmes, it has been the policy of the Thai 
government to emphasize the acceptance of religious plurality. The Thai monarch 
must be the patron of all religions (sasanupathampok) (Constitution of Tha£land 
1978, Article VII). Under this policy, which can be seen as a measure aimed at 
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preventing the exploitation of religious issues by the separatist fronts, the central 
government has sponsored the building of mosques, especially the central mosques of 
the four provinces. The mosque, as discussed in chapter 3, is the qmtre of all 
' 
activities of the ummah and it stands as the most visible symbol of Islam. However, 
Thai government-sponsored mosques in the Muslim region are viewed by some 
Muslim critics as belonging to the category of Ibn Ubaiya's mosque. Many Muslim 
villagers hesitate to pray in the central mosques built for them by the central 
goverment for the same reason. In Narathiwat, for instance, many Muslims prefer to 
pray in the old Al-Jamik Mosque, while in Patani they favour Chabangtiga Mosque. 
In Yala, the newly constructed central mosque was designed rather differently by the 
government architects: the main dome of the mosque is in the form of lotus bud, a 
Buddhist symbol of the heart; the front stairs of the mosque resemble the structural 
characteristic of a Buddhist temple. Such symbols are seen by Muslims as the 
government's heavy-handedness rather than its respect for Islam. As Pitsuwan 
(1985:8-9) writes, 'the construction of the Yala mosque has back fired. It has not 
served to create an atmosphere of mutual respect and friendship. It has generated a 
communal tension and mutual suspicion in that province and beyond'. 
Based on the same principle of religious patronage, Thai authorities exploit 
religious and cultural activities of the Malay-Muslims to promote closer relations 
between Muslim leaders and government officials. For example, the Maulud 
(Prophet Mohammad's birthday celebration), which was normally c~lebrated by 
Muslims at family and community level, has been upgraded by the Thai provincial 
authorities to an annual festival of the provinces. The governors and the district 
officers usually became hosts of the Mualud ceremonies. Some Muslim leaders, 
however, interpret the government's involvement as an attempt to manipulate their 
religiou~I activities for political ,.purposes 'and: believe th.at the Maii.lud celebration is 
being spoiled and belittled. by. the. partidpatfon of. non..:Musliins. ·liioeed; ·Islam does 
not approve the involvement of non-believers in the performance of Islamic pious 
duties. 
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With respect to economic measures, there are nationwide economic development 
programmes directed towards improving economic conditions throughout Thailand. 
There are no programmes exclusive to the Muslim provinces, and economic 
' programmes in the four provinces have often received less attention and funding from 
Bangkok than those of other regions. However, the construction of roads and 
replanting of rubber seem to be greater in the Muslim areas. Roads in the Muslim 
provinces had long been either non-existent or very poor compared to the network of 
roads across the border in Malaysia. Malay-Muslims were prone to view this as the 
most concrete evidence of Bangkok's neglect of the area. In the mid 1960s, the 
government began to allocate funds for road construction in the border provinces. 
With financial and technical assistance from abroad, the government has been able to 
build and repair roads throughout the region {Thomas 1982:166). National and 
provincial highways are now paved and many other main roads have been either 
paved or given a laterite surface. One can now drive, with only a few exceptions, 
between district centres throughout the provinces whatever the season. 
Most of Thailand's rubber plantations are in the Muslim provinces. The rubber 
replantation scheme, which was also initiated in the mid 1960s, aims at the eventual 
replacement of most rubber trees with more productive strains to increase the 
earnings of the villagers. The government subsidizes plantation owners who replace 
old rubber trees with improved strains. The subsidy covers the major costs of clearing 
out old trees and replanting; it does not compensate for losses of earnings while new 
trees reach their production stage. Funds for this purpose come from a special tax on 
rubber exports and, a loan,of about US $50 million from the World Bank (ibid.:169). 
The plantation owners who want to participate in the programme apply to the 
Rubber Replantation Board in the provinces. They must indicate the area of land 
they wish to cultivate. The Rubber Replantation Board at the provincial level 
administers the payment of subsidies, but each application must be approved by the 
Board in Bangkok. Experts at the Rubber Reaserch Centre in Had Yai, Songkhla 
estimated that a plantation owner who replanted with the most improved strains and 
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followed the most modern methods of processing rubber would be able to earn 
fourteen times as much per tree. Yet, many Muslim rubber smallholders hesitate to 
seize the opportunity. One reason is that for the small plantation owners, who are 
' 
mostly Malays, it is financially not feasible to cut down old rubber trees and lose 
their only source of income during the replantation period. Secondly, bureaucratic 
red tape in processing applications makes Malay-Muslims who cannot speak Thai 
reluctant to participate. Thirdly, many Malay-Muslims do not have clear title to 
their land. They fear that the government might raise the issue of legal ownership of 
their land, or that they might have to pay an expensive fee for land survey if they 
apply for a subsidy (£bid.:170). Finally, the usual mistrust between the Malay 
villagers and Thai officials causes this very ambitious scheme to fall short of its 
objective. 
Efforts have also been made to correct the inadequacies of administration in the 
Muslim provinces. The central government has taken greater care in choosing Thai 
officials for the region. Some Malay language training and limited orientation in 
Malay customs and religion are given to Thai officials. Furthermore, in the late 1970s 
the government authorized General Harn Leenanon, then Commander of the Fourth 
Army Region to remove corrupt senior officials, known as 'dark influence', in the 
south (Leenanon 1984:25-39; Snitwongse 1985:265). Several regional centres were 
created in Yala province to improve administrative efficiency, such as the Centre for 
the Administration of the Southern Border Provinces, the Community Development 
Centre, and the General Educational Centre. Nevertheless, corruption and other 
.administrative problems remain unsolved. · Ther-e is a feeling that the government 
needs to involve more local people in helping to deal with the problem. 
Finally, the Thai government has responded to the Muslim separatist problem 
by suppression. As discussed in chapter 4, large-scale military and police operations 
had been carried out against the various fronts as they increased their guerrilla 
activities at the end of the 1960s. This heavy-handed military response, which lasted 
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seven years from 1968 to 1975 (Megarat 1977:21-22), created more grievances among 
the Malay-Muslim population. The largest demonstration in Patani in 1975 caused 
the Thai government to re-evaluate its policy (Snitwongse 1985:266) and in 1980 it 
' initiated its first long-term 'policy of attraction'. The result was that some 450 
separatists from different fronts surrendered during the period September 1982 to 
October 1983 (Star, 7 October and 3 November 1983). Along with the policy of 
attraction, diplomatic efforts have been made with OIC member states to discourage 
certain countries from providing assistance as well as trying to keep the movements 
from having representation in the international Islamic forums. The various forms of 
cooperation with the goverment of Malaysia, particularly in suppressing the CPM 
(see Bangkok Post 18 March and 1 May 1987), can be seen partly as an attempt to 
gain a quid pro quo in its refraining from assisting the Muslim separatist fronts. 
Concluding Remarks 
The involvement of external parties m the Malay-Muslim's struggle against 
Thai domination since the beginning of this century has helped to raise their 
consciousness and produce demands for autonomy and independence. This stimulus, 
-consisting of expressfons of sympathy and material assistance, has come principally 
from neighbouring Malaysia. The concern of the Malaysian government for the 
welfare of the Malay-Muslims in Patani helped to restrain the Thai government from 
employing a rigid assimilationist policy or sharpening its military suppression of 
Muslims. But external support from Malaysia as well as from other Muslim countries 
has been insufficient to achieve the major objective of the separatists. The Malaysian 
government could not commit itself to total support of the struggle without 
J~~p~di~i~g' ·its '~atlonal iiiterests. The purpose of Malaysian involvement, then, has 
been to prevent the Thai goverment from taking action that might yield results 
undesirable to Malaysia and to its ethnic brethren across the border. 
Along with military operations, the Thai government has since the mid 1960s 
initiated socio-economic and political development programmes aimed at preventing 
the separatist movement from gaining wider support within the Muslim community. 
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Among these programmes, two areas have been emphasized: economic development 
and Thai education. The assumption is that the former is necessary to stop the 
economic deterioration of the Muslim region which is susceptible to separatist 
' 
arguments. The latter is crucial for political integration of the Malay-Muslim 
community. However, few of the economic programmes have been carried out with a 
_commitment consistent with Bangkok's expressions of concern. The economic 
problems of the rural Muslims remain unsolved. On the other hand, the education 
programmes have proved to be successful. Most of the new generation Malay children 
and youths attend schools that offer a Thai secular curriculum. Their numbers in 
Thai secondary and tertiary institutions have increased markedly. And the traditional 
pondok system of education has been almost completely destroyed. 
It remains to be seen, however, whether the government's successful penetration 
of education can be translated into greater loyalty to and identification with the Thai 
nation. If the economy and bureaucracy cannot absorb these Thai-educated 
Malay-Muslims, they might well be recruited by the separatist leadership. 
External Influences and Government Responses to the Moro and the Malay 
Separatist Conflicts Compared 
The external factors that effect m the Moro and the Malay struggles are in 
some aspects difficult to distinguish. The resurgence of Islam, for instance, helps to 
raise the consciousness of both groups as distinct communities. The involvement of 
certain Muslim states and organizations serves to strengthen the demands for 
autonomy and independence and to help curb the actions of the Philippine and Thai 
governments against the minority populations. In the case of Thailand, the 
expectation of a strong reaction from Malaysian and other Muslim governments has 
restrained Bangkok from pursuing a policy of suppression; in the Philippines, the 
intervention of the OIC has restrained Manila in its conduct of the war against the 
MNLF (Suhrke and Noble 1977:209). 
External support for both movements is based mainly on ethnic affinity or 
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Islamic brotherhood. The Moros in Mindanao and the Malays in Patani are parts of 
the 200 million people of the Malay race in Southeast Asia, and the Islamic bond 
links them with the wider world of Islam. The ultimate aim of the external supporters 
of the two movements (apart from Malaysian assistance to the Moros in direct 
reaction to the Philippine claim to Sabah), is essentially to prevent actions that 
might result in the destruction of these Muslim communities, as occurred historically 
to the Muslims in the Iberian peninsula (711-1614) and in Sicily (827-1246) (see 
Kettani 1986). Nevertheless, they do not support the separatist objective of the 
movements, which undermines the sovereignty of the nation-state. 
The major difference between the Moro and the Malay struggles is in the extent 
of the conflict, which has been more vicious and intense in the the Philippines than in 
Thailand. This is in part the reason why Muslim states and organizations have been 
more concerned ~ith and involved in the Moro conflict. Indonesia, the most 
populated Malay state in the region, for example, defends its non-involvement in the 
Malay separatist struggle by denying the validity of ethnic self-determination as a 
general principle; but, in a limited capacity, it has been involved in the Moro 
struggle. 
The Philippine and Thai governments respond to their respective separatist 
threats by employing socio-economic measures along with military suppressive 
operations. Both Manila and Bangkok have accelerated programmes of 
socio-economic and educational upliftment in the Muslim regions. Special provisions 
for the partial application of Islamic law for Muslims are provided in both countries. 
Attempts -have been made by both governments to deal with shortcomings in the 
local administration by ·orleritafion training for non-Muslim government officials 
assigned for duty in Muslim areas. 
However, the governments' measures in both cases appear to have come in part 
from external pressures and from a desperate desire to restore order in deteriorating 
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situations rather than on a genume respect for and understanding of the Muslim 
ummah. In other words, the negative attitudes of the Philippine and Thai 
governments have prevented them from responding adequately to the needs and 
' 
aspirations of the Muslim minorities, in turn limiting their success at penetrating the 
Muslim communities. 
In the final analysis, the persistence of the separatist movements in the 
southern regions of the Philippines and Thailand will depend largely on the 
involvement of Muslim states and on the manner in which Manila and Bangkok 
respond to the separatists. While the governments regard cultural autonomy as a 
threat to national integrity, Muslim identity has evolved to a point where 
rectification of socio-economic ills is no longer a sufficient method of accomodation. 
Unless some sort of meaningful 'cultural autonomy' is granted to the Muslims of 
Mindanao and Patani, the separatist struggles in the two countries will persist. 
CHAPTER7 
CONCLUSION 
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In the introductory chapter we noted the persistence of ethnicity. This has been 
viewed not only in the context of a broader ethnic revival, which, under the banner of 
national self-determination, has been developing since the late 18th century, but also 
as the recent phase of a long historical cycle of ethnic resurgence and decline which 
has been occurring since the dawn of recorded history (Smith 1982:86; cf. Calvert 
1970). Various explanations have been suggested for the persistence of ethnic 
community. The central argument, however, has been that ethnic community has 
long been a socio-cultural 'pattern' for human organization and communication. It 
holds in common a set of traditions not shared by others. Such traditions include 
common myths of descent or place of origin, distinct cultural practices,and a sense of 
historical continuity. These 'primordial' ties produce a strong sense of ethnic identity 
and solidarity, which in time of threat or outside pressure can override class, faction 
and other divisions within the community. At times ethnic group cohesion may be 
overlaid by other types of allegiance but from time to time, particularly in the face of 
external encroachments, it will re-emerge in sufficient force to override other kinds of 
loyalties. 
We have distinguished three types of ethnic minority community: minority 
immigrant populations, normally a by-product of labour recruiting policies during a 
colonial era; indigenous peoples who have become a minority as an outcome of a 
colonial settlement; and minority groups which result from incorporating hitherto 
autonomous peoples or tribes under an alien authority. This study has examined 
separatist movements of the Moros and the Malays, the third category of minority 
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communities, who regard separatism as a political possibility because of a 
socio-historical logic, the coincidence of geography and cultural plurality, distance 
from the centre of authority, and the support of an external community. 
We have traced the origins and evolution of Muslim sultanates m Mindanao 
and Patani, as a root cause of centuries of resistance struggles against foreign 
domination. The sultanates were also the foundation of social and political structures 
of contemporary Moro and Malay societies, where Islamic principles and pre-Islamic 
Malay traditions and customs remain strong. Both communities perceived their 
resistance efforts as both political and religious, and political and religious leaders 
were often involved. More importantly, both leadership groups saw their involvement 
as a religious obligation, to comply with the teachings of the Quran and Hadith; and 
thus Islam became the primary rationale for their struggles. But the ability of the 
two Muslim communities to resist Philippine and Thai domination was affected 
substantially by external intervention. Failure to prevent incorporation of their 
communities into the larger Philippine and Thai political systems was influenced, to a 
great extent,, hy--tne--fot"ervention of the Western colonial powers: without the 
interference of the United States in Mindanao and of Great Britain in Patani, the 
Moros and the Malays might not have been set upon their present course of history. 
t.c:>"' ~ e.-""'fO'""'" 'f 
The resistance struggles began when the Moro and the Malay communities were 
A.. 
subjected to American and Thai rule at the beginning of this century. In Mindanao, 
armed resistance movements, ranging from full-scale battles to minor incidents, 
occurred during the American and Commonwealth regimes (1899-1946), motivated by 
the de~ire to preserve the autonomy ot the Muslim community. The Moro movement 
persisted after Moroland was structurally integrated into the Republic of the 
Philippines. The Moros, who constituted a nationality distinct from, and older than, 
that-- of Christian Filipinos, possessed a strong sense of group consciousness and 
continued to assert their identity as Muslims. As Manila pressed for national 
integration, Moro e_xpectations about the benefits of participating in Philippine 
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society were shattered by socio-economic deprivation, increasing political 
disadvantage, competition with Christian migrants for land, and government 
interference in local affairs of Muslims. Their sense of deprivation and conflicting 
, f'..o......., ~ \ak.. 
loyalties was further compounded by the resurgence of Islam. ~~1960s, the Moro 
!..~-to ba... 
resistance movement"'-was transformed from intermittent rebellions to organized 
liberation fronts demanding independence. 
In Patani, a series of resistance movements and uprisings broke out after the 
region was incorporated into the Thai kingdom at the beginning of the century. The 
leadership of these early rebellions comprised mainly the former royal families and 
religious leaders who were motivated primarily by the desire to recapture the 
authority of the deposed Malay sultans. From 1922 to 1947, the resistance struggle of 
the Malay-Muslims was largely a response to events connected with the Thai 
assimilationist policy. Bangkok was accused of 'Siamifying' the Malay community 
and of stamping out their religion and customs. Resistance and resentment against 
Thai efforts of assimilation were further aggravated by nationalistic aspirations 
among the Muslims which were stimulated by the success of independence movements 
elsewhere in Southeast Asia. As a result, the period between 1947 and 1959 saw 
Patani struggle for autonomy or irredentism with Malaya. GAMPAR and the PPM 
were organized to carry out such struggle. This period also witnessed the transfer of 
leadership from former aristocrats to religious leaders. From the late 1950s, the Thai 
government moved aggressively to consolidate its control over the socio-economic and 
religious affairs of the Malay-Muslims. Especially sensitive was government 
interference in religious institutions such as the pondok, at a time when Islamic 
awareness among the Malay-Muslims was increasing with the general resurgence of 
·Islam. In the 1970s the three major liberation fronts flourished. 
The outbreak of separatist conflict in Mindanao and Patani in the 1970s was 
but the continuation of the centuries-old history of Muslim struggles against foreign 
rule. The fact that the Moros and the Malays are conscious of their historically and 
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culturally coherent communities as sovereign states has provided them with the 
legitimating principle and inspiration to carry on their separatist struggles. Moreover, 
the movements have enjoyed persistent local support. In the process of 
' 
nation-building certain minority groups become anomalies, without the same trust or 
benefits enjoyed by members of the national majority. As Ruth Mc Vey (1984:12) has 
explained, 'Nationality is conceived in the modern nation-state as a kind of 
super-ethnicity .... around which a national cultural boundary is created, with minority 
groups tending to fall outside'. Filipino nationalism, for example, regards Christianity 
as an essential ingredient; Muslims, therefore, are an anomaly. 
As mentioned above, more particular factors triggered the separatist conflicts. 
First, the governments' acceleration of integration attempts and the specific cases of 
maltreatment that characterized the 'internal colonialism' of the socio-economic and 
political situation of the Muslim communities deepened the sense of deprivation and 
broadened ethnic solidarity. Michael Hannan ( 1979) has observed that the 
penetration of the centre, through economic and political developments, creates the 
conditions tinder which ethnicity is considered as the most viable and effective 
political instrumen.t...for_ the periphery to oppose the centre. And Michael Hechter 
(1975) has noted that the extent of overlap between minority and low-reward 
occupations produces ethnic solidarity. In other words, modernization, in the form of 
increases in social mobilization, intensifies ethnic tension and fosters ethnic 
competition which can be conducive to separatist demands. 
Secondly, _the general resurgence of Islam since the end of the Second World 
War has raised Islamic consciouness among the Moros and the Malays. It has 
. . ' . 
widened the gap between Moros and Filipino-Christians in the Philippines and 
between Malays and Thai-Buddhists in Thailand. At the same time, it has bridged 
the relations of Moros and Malays with the outside Muslim world and thus 
strengthened their identity as Muslims. More importantly, Islam, as a political 
ideology, has been used to provide legitimacy and inspiration and for mass 
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mobilization. Both separatist movements are, therefore, legitimated and inspired in 
religious terms; all the existing liberation fronts have employed the same motto-
Allahu Akbar! (God is most great!). Through its institutions and rituals such as 
mosque and Friday prayers, Islam mobilizes people for collective action. Throughout 
the history. of Islam, as recently in the Iranian revolution, the mosque has provided a 
place for people to assemble and to discuss grievances and revolutionary ideas. The 
imam and other mosque functionaries often become a source of active opposition to 
secular rulers (Siddiqui 1982:142). 
Together with the general resurgence of Islam, the increase in oil price in the 
1970s brought a growth in the economic power of the Arab World. As a result, 
Islamic institutions such as Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Islamic 
Development Bank, Islamic Solidarity Fund, the Muslim World League, the World 
Muslim Congress, and the Islamic Call Society of Libya, increased their activities 
throughout the Muslim World in an attempt to preserve and strengthen the ummah 
(Kettani 1986). These institutions have assisted or influenced in varying degrees the 
struggles of Muslims in Mindanao and in Patani. 
A question remains as to whether the emergence and expansion of the Moro and 
the Malay separatist movements in the 1970s were primarily attributable to economic 
exploitation, as suggested by some writers, or mainly a response to cultural 
degradation. We have noted that relative economic deprivation has been an element 
of the situation of the Muslim communities in Southern Philippines and Southern 
Thailand, but what seems to be at issue primarily is a conflict of cultures which is 
seen as the continuation of centuries of confrontation between Muslims and foreign 
intrusion. Moreover, since there is no clear distinction between economics, politics 
and culture in the eyes of Muslims, the two separatist conflicts are sustained by the 
belief that the continued efforts of the centres to consolidate their control over the 
socio-economic and cultural affairs of the Muslim communities, will 'eventually lead 
to the erosion of their cultural and religious life and the disappearance of their 
communities' (Abubakar 1984:78; cf. Kettani 1986). 
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Certain notable features of the Moro and the Malay separatist movements can 
be observed. In the case of a conventional revolutionary front, such as the NLF, the 
effectiveness of the organization is measured m part by the degree of 
institutionalization of its organizational machinery, including a clearly established 
chain of command. The Muslim movements, however, consist of loosely organized 
liberation fronts; their stret,\gth depends less on conventional principles of effective 
organization than on the fact that they are ethnically-based, religiously-motivated 
and led by elite groups that dominate their respective communities. The MNLF and 
the BNPP, for instance, are loosely-knit fronts, unable to control the behaviour of the 
various factions or to establish a clear chain of command. The fronts' policy-making 
bodies, the central committtees, satisfy themselves with furnishing broad policy 
outlines, giving the local leaders the power to make their own decisions. There are no 
specific criteria of membership; admissions are accompanied by no official formalities. 
Only the adherent's activity within the fronts can determine the degree of 
participation. One cannot, therefore, measure the strength of the movements by 
simply counting the number of existing armed guerrilla units or present clashes with 
government forces. The strength and activities of this kind of underground 
movements are difficult to predict; they depend on various internal and external 
situations and stimuli that can either trigger or retard their development. The 
'Jabidah Massacre' that led to the emergence of the MNLF in the Philippines and the 
'Patani Massacre' that triggered the largest and longest Muslim demonstration 
against the Thai government were cases in point. 
Also, the movements are characterized by broadly defined aims. Depending on 
internal and external circumstances, the objectives of the fronts change from 
independence to autonomy or irredentism or qualified participation. This suggests 
that the movements do not actually seek national sovereignty, but rather respond to 
integration attempts by the centre. The extent of their response often corresponds to 
the degree of repressiveness of government policies. In a sense, the movements 
essentially represent struggles for survival, for preservation of Muslim identity and 
way of life. 
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In addition to its role as a mobilizing force and in legitimizing revolutionary 
action, Islam is also regarded as the ideological foundation of the movements. But 
although all major fronts are founded on Islamic ideology, each has its own 
colouration and despite the bond of Islam the movements have become factionalized. 
In the case of the Moros, ethno-cultural divisions, differences in ideological inclination 
and family backgrounds have been the primary cause of factional cleavages. Even 
though the Malays have no ethno-cultural splits, their factional battles derive mainly 
from conflicting ideological preferences and educational and family backgrounds. 
Disunity among the Muslim states further reinforces factional conflicts in both 
movements. Factionalism has indeed become one of the dominant features of ethnic 
minority separatist struggles. Apart from its negative side, factionalism, however, 
seems to have helped to keep the conflicts alive; for instance, the refusal of the MILF 
to give up its armed resistance against the Aquino government, while the MNLF has 
agreed to negotiate for autonomy, has kept the movement in Mindanao going. 
Another notable feature of the Moro and the Malay movements is that they are 
organized and led by dominant leadership groups in their respective communities ... 
They are, therefore, not insignificant and isolated affairs of the communities. The 
traditional aristocratic elite, which dominates the Moro community, has played a 
major leadership role. Of the four separatist groups only the Misuari faction of the 
MNLF has been led by the secular elite group; the Hashim and Lucman groups are 
dominated by traditional and religious elites, whereas the Pundato faction of the 
MNLF is largely controlled by traditional and secular leaders. In the case of the 
Malays, the four existing fronts have been led primarily by religious leaders who are 
the influential elite group in Patani society. Other Muslim leadership groups in 
Mindanao and Patani have also been involved in various capacities in the separatist 
struggles to protect their identity as the ummah. 
The fact that the Moros and the Malays are a part of the Muslim ummah, and 
of the Malay world which constitutes the largest group of Muslim population of a 
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single race, renders the movements even more significant. The involvement of certain 
Islamic institutions and Muslim states in these struggles was based prec;.i<Jely on the 
ummah identification and ethnic affiliation with a view to safeguarding dignity and 
national rights and to relieve the persecution of the Muslims. However, external 
participation was also motivated by the national interest of the individual state. 
Malaysia's involvement in the Moro st~uggle, for instance, was a direct reaction to 
the Philippines' claim to Sabah and a consequence of the Islamic fervour of Tun 
Mustapha. External assistance helped to strengthen the military and political 
capabilities of the Moro movement to the extent that it was able to put pressure on 
Manila to make some concessions and restrain its more repressive policies. External 
support from Malaysia and other Muslim communities to the Malays in Patani was 
not sufficient to achieve the main objectives of the separatists, but it restrained the 
Thai government from intensifying its military suppression and assimilationist policy. 
Despite these similarities, the Moro and Malay movements differ in a number of 
respects. Differences in leadership and ethno-cultural composition have been discussed 
earlier, but the fundamental dj_fference is that the Moro movement was able to stage 
a more serious challenge to Manila than the Patani movement was able to pose to 
Bangkok. There are several reasons for this. While repression was pursued aggressively by the 
Philippines during the Marcos era, the Thai assimilation policies towards the Malays in Patani during 
the same period were restrained by anticipated strong reaction from the neighbouring Malaysian 
government. More specifically, Christian migration, resulting in shifts in economic and political 
power from Muslim to Christian predominance, and military involvement in violence resulting from 
this, not only provoked a strong response from the Moro people, but also attracted involvement and 
sympathy from the overseas Muslim community. This external fctor helped to intensify the Moro 
conflict to the extent that a protracted war forced the Marcos government so sign the Tripoli Agreement. 
Secondly, the Moro struggle, which was led by different categories of Muslim leadership - traditional, 
secular and religious - benefited from having strong charismatic leaders who were able to develop 
effective international contacts. In constrast, the Malay movement, which was dominated primarily by 
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the religious elite, appeared to be less willing or less able to expand its external contacts and lacked 
charismatic leaders capable of providing a serious threat to Thai government. 
As a consequence, the two movements obtained different degrees of success. 
The Moros succeeded in getting some concessions--whether real or nominal--from 
Manila. These included the establishment of Autonomous Regions IX and XII, the 
formulation of a number of development programmes in Mindanao and the 
recognition of some customary aspects of Moro society. The constitution of 1987, 
moreover, makes provision for the creation of a Muslim autonomous region. These 
concessions suggest that the Philippine government has finally recognized the Moro 
people as a historically and culturally distinct community. Nevertheless, the basic 
goal of the struggle, to gain meaningful autonomy, remains unrealized. The Malay 
movement in Patani, on the other hand, has received neither direct concessions nor 
recognition from Bangkok, though its separatist activities P,robably helped to restrain 
the Thai government from pursuing coercive policies of assimilation. 
Even a superficial examination of separatist. movements elsewhere in the world 
suggests a number of common features between the Moro and Patani movements and 
other ethnic separatist movements: in their persistence; their tendency to respond to 
perceived threats from centrali~g states or dominant ethnic groups; the looseness of 
o\ 
their organizational structures and ideologies, and even their apparent tendency to 
factionalize, while at the same time commanding the often unarticulated loyalty and 
potential political and military threat of ethnic mobilization. What perhaps 
distinguishes these Muslim separatist movements from the rest, however, is that they 
have integrated Islamic concepts and symbols into a nationalist dogma, and that 
Islam and nationalism reinforce each other in their struggles against foreign rulers, 
while .at the same time linking them with the wider Islamic ummah. 
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No multi-ethnic state has proven immune to the surge of ethnicity. 
Authoritarian, democratic, federative and unitary have all been affected. Nor does 
the proliferation of international organizations and alliances decrease the significance 
of ethnic nationalism. On the contrary, the postwar international economic and 
political organizations, which emphasize membership, negotiation and power only 
among nation-states, appear to have encouraged minority communities to think in 
nationalistic terms {Connor 1967, 1969, 1972; Birch 1978). More importantly, no 
government of a multi-ethnic state has found the solution to the problem posed by 
the demands for modernization on the one hand and the tendencies of growing ethnic 
nationalism on the other. Determined to prevent secession and to achieve national 
integration, many governments tend to resist separatist movements with coercive 
methods, while simultaneously promoting assimilation. Such policies have proved 
remarkably unsuccessful. 
Thus, while some Moro and Malay elites are gradually absorbed into the 
Philippine and Thai systems through the process of national integration and 
development, policies which seek _to redress the separatist problem through 
socio-economic measures designed to lift the living standards of the ethnic minorities 
fail to recognize that the ethnic protagonists perceive their conflict not in 
socio-economic terms but as ethnic, religious and nationalist. 
Muslim armed separatist movements in the Philippines and Thailand are likely 
to persist in the future. As historically autonomous and distinct peoples, the 
resistance of the Moros and the Malay-Muslims Will- be: directed -at government 
policies of assimilation and bureaucratic exploitation or maltreatment. The 
persistence of the movements will reflect their will to survive, and their struggles will 
likely-be characterized by periodic resurgence and-recedenee depending· on the internal 
and external factors which trigger or retard them. There is no reason to expect their 
secular decline. While Manila and Bangkok consider cultural autonomy for the 
Muslim communities as a threat to national territorial integrity, the Moros and the 
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Malays regard the concept of 'national self-determination' as a fundamental right of 
every people, believing, with Woodrow Wilson (quoted in Connor 1967:31), that 
'every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live'. 
God knows best. 
(Qura.n XVI:lOi) 
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Appendix A 
The Tripoli Agreement 
IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE OMNIPOTENT, THE MERCIFUL. 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
THE PHILIPPINES AND MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT WITH THE 
PARTICIPATION OF THE QUADRIPARTITE MINISTERIAL COMMISSION 
MEMBERS OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE AND THE SECRETARY 
GENERAL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. 
In accordance with the Regulation No. 4 Para. 5 adopted by the Council of 
Ministers of the Islamic Conference in its Fourth Session held in Benghazi, Libyan 
Arab Republic during the month of Safar 1393 H. corresponding to March 1973, 
calling for the formation of Quadripatite Ministerial Commission representing the 
Libyan Arab Republic, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Republic of Senegal and the 
Republic of the Philippines concerning the situation of the Muslims in the South of 
the Philippines. 
And in accordance with the Resolution No. (18) adopted by the Islamic 
Conference held m Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia m Jumada Alakhir 1393 
H. corresponding to June 197 4 A.D. which recommends the searching for a just and 
peaceful political solution to the problem of the Muslims in the South of the 
Philippines through negotiations. 
And in accordance with the Resolution No. 12/7 /S adopted by the Islamic 
Conference held in Istanbul in Jumada El-Ula 1396 H. corresponding to May 1976 
A.D. empowering the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission and the Secretary 
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General of the Islamic Conference to take the necessary steps for the resumption of 
negotiations. 
And following the task undertaken by the Quadripartite Ministerial 
Commission and the Secretary General of the Islamic Conference and the discussions 
held with H.E. President Marcos, President of the Republic of the Philippines. 
And in realization of the contents of Para. 6 of the joint Communique issued in 
Tripoli on the 25th Zulgeda 1396 H. corresponding to 17th November 1976 A.D. 
following the official visit paid by the delegation of the Government of the Philippines 
headed by the First Lady of the Philippines, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos to the 
Libyan Arab Republic and which calls for the resumption of negotiations between the 
two parties concerned in Tripoli on the 15th of December 1976 A.D. 
Negotiations were held in the City of Tripoli during the period between 24th 
Zulhija 1396 H. to 2nd Moharram 1397 H. corresponding to the period from 15th to 
23rd December 1976 A.D. at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs presided over by Dr. Ali 
Abdussalam Treki, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Libyan Arab Republic, 
and comprising the Delegations of: 
1 Government of the Republic of the Philippines, led by Honorable Carmelo 
Z. Barbero, Undersecretary of National Defence for Civilian Relations. 
2 Moro National Liberation Front, led by Mr. Nur Misuari, Chief of the Front. 
And with the participation of the representatives of the Quadripartite 
Ministerial Commission. 
The Libyan Arab Republic represented by Dr. Ali Abdussalam Treki, Minister 
of State for Foreign Affairs. 
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The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia--H.E. Salah Abdulla El-Fadl, Ambassador of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Libyan Arab Republic. 
The Republic of Senegal--Mr. Abubakar Othman Si, Representative of the 
Republic of Senegal and Charge d'Affairs of Senegal in Cairo. 
Democratic Republic of Somalia--H.E. Bazi Mohamed Sufi, Ambassador of the 
Democratic Republic of Somalia, Libyan Arab Republic. 
With the aid of H.E. Dr. Ahmad Karim Gai, Secretary General of the 
Organization of Islamic Conference and a delegation from the Secretariat General of 
the Conference composed of Mr. Qasim Zuheri, Assistant Secretary General, and Mr. 
Aref Ben Musa, Director of Political Department. 
During these negotiations which were marked by a spirit of conciliation and 
understanding, it has been agreed on the following: 
First: The establishment of Autonomy in the Southern Philippines within the 
realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. 
Second: The areas of the autonomy for the Muslims in the Southern Philippines 
shall comprise the following: 
1 Basilan 8 Sultan Kudarat 
2 Sulu 9 Lanao del Norte 
3 Tawi-Tawi 10 Lanao del Sur 
4 Za.mboanga del Sur 11 Davao del Sur 
5 Za.mboanga del Norte 12 South Cotabato 
6 North Cotabato 13 Palawan 
7 Maguindanao 14 All the cities and villages 
situated in the above-
mentioned areas. 
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Third: 
1 Foreign policy shall be of the competence of the Central Government of the 
Philippines. 
2 The National Defense Affairs shall be the concern of the Central Authority 
provided that the arrangements for the joining of the forces of the Moro National 
Liberation Front with the Philippine Armed Forces be discussed later. 
3 In the areas of the autonomy, the Muslims shall have the right to set up their 
own Courts which implement the Islamic Sharia's laws. The Muslims shall be 
represented in all Courts including the Supreme Court. The representation of the 
Muslims in the Supreme Court shall be upon the recommendation from the 
authorities of the Autonomy and the Supreme Court. Decrees will be issued by the 
President of the Republic for their appointment taking into consideration all 
necessary qualifications of the candidates. 
4 Authorities of the autonomy in the South of the Philippines shall have the 
right to set up schools, colleges and universities, provided that matters pertaining to 
the relationship between these educational and scientific organs and the general 
education system in the State shall be subject of discussion later on. 
5 The Muslim shall have their own administrative system in compliance with 
the objectives of the autonomy and its institutions. The relationship between this 
administrative system and the central administrative system to be discussed later. 
6 The authorities of the autonomy in the South of the Philippines shall have 
their own economic and financial system. The relationship between this system and 
the central economic and financial system of the State shall be discussed later. 
7 The authorities of the autonomy in the South of the Philippines shall enjoy 
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the right of representation and participation in the Central Government and in all 
other organs of the State. The number of representatives and ways of participation 
shall be fixed later. 
8 Special regional Security Forces are to be set up in the area of the autonomy 
for the Muslims in the South of the Philippines. The relationship between these 
forces and the central security forces shall be fixed later. 
9 A Legislative Assembly and an Executive Council shall be formed in the areas 
of the Autonomy of the Muslims. The setting up of the Legislative Assembly shall be 
constituted through a direct action, and the formation of the Executive Council shall 
take place through appointments by the Legislative Assembly. A decree for their 
formation shall be enacted by the President of the Republic respectively. The 
number of members of each assembly shall be determined later on. 
10 Mines and mineral resources fall within the competence of the Central 
Government, and a reasonable percentage deriving from the revenues of the mines 
and minerals be fixed for the benefit of the areas of the autonomy. 
11 A mixed Committee shall be composed of representatives of the Central 
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the representatives of the Moro 
National Liberation Front. The mixed Committee shall be charged to study in detail 
the points left for discussions of this agreement. 
12 Ceasefire shall- be declared immediately after the signature of this agreement, 
provided that its coming into effect should not exceed the 20th January 1977. A 
Joint Committee shall be composed of the two parties with the help of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference represented by the Quadripartite Ministerial 
Commission to supervise the implementation of the ceasefire. 
The said Joint Committee shall also be charged with supervising the following: 
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a A complete amnesty in the areas of the autonomy and the renunciation of all 
legal claims and codes resulting from events which took place in the South of the 
Philippines. 
b The release of all political prisoners who had relations with the events in the 
South of the Philippines. 
c The return of all refugees who have abandoned their areas in the South of the 
Philippines. 
13 A joint meeting be held in Jeddah during the first week of the month of 
March 1977 to initial what has been concluded by the Committee referred to in Para. 
11. 
14 The final agreement concerning the setting up of the autonomy referred to in 
the first and second paragraphs shall be signed in the City of Manila, Republic of the 
Philippines, between the Government of the Philippines and Moro National 
Liberation Front, and the Islamic Conference represented by the Quadripartite 
Ministerial Commission and the Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference. 
15 Immediately after the signature of the Agreement in Manila, a Provisional 
Government shall be established in the areas of the autonomy to be appointed by the 
President of the Philippines; and be charged with the task of preparing for the 
elections of the Legislative Assembly in the territories- ofc the - autonomy~ a.nd-
administer the areas in accordance with the provisions of this agreement until a 
Government is formed by the elected Legislative Assembly. 
16 The Government of the Philippines shall take all necessary constitutional 
process for the implementation of the entire Agreement. 
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Fourth: This Agreement shall come into force with effect from the date of its 
signature. 
Done in' the City of Tripoli on 2nd Muharram 1397 H. corresponding to 23rd 
December 1976 A.D. in three original copies in Arabic, English, French languages, all 
equal in legal power. 
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC 
OF THE PHILIPPINES: 
Hon. CARMELO Z. BARBERO 
Undersecretary of National 
Defense for Civilian Relations 
Dr. ALI ABDUSSAL.AM TREK! 
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, 
Libyan Arab Republic and Chairman of 
the Negotiations 
FOR THE MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT: 
Mr. NUR MISUARI 
Chairman of the Negotiations 
Dr . .AMADOU KARIM GAYE 
Secretary General of the Organization 
of the Islamic Conference 
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AppendixB 
List of Some Contemporary Moro Leaders 
Name Province or position 
SENATORS 
Alonto, Alawiya Lanae del Sur 
Alonto, Domacao Lanae del Sur 
Balabaran, Sinsuat Cotabato 
Pendatun. Salipada Cotabato 
Tamano, Mamintal Lanae del Sur 
CONGRESSMEN 
Alonto, Domacao Lanae del Sur 
Amilbangsa. Ombra Sulu 
Anni, Indanan Uttah Sulu 
Dimaporo, Ali Lanae del Norte 
Lucman, Rashid Lanae del Sur 
Mangelen, Luminog Cotabato 
Pendatun, Salipada Cotabato 
Sinsuat, Blah Cotabato 
Sinsuat, Duma Cotabato 
GOVERNORS 
Abubakar, Benjamin Sulu 
Amilbangsa, Ombra Sulu 
Camilian, Asan Basil an 
Candao. Zacaria Maguindanao 
Datumanong, Simeon Cotabato 
Dimaporo, Ali Lanae del Sur 
Leadership group 
classification 
T 
T+S+R 
T 
T+S 
T+S 
T+S+R 
T 
s 
T 
T 
T 
T+S 
T 
T 
T+S 
T 
s 
s 
T+S 
T 
Jaafar, Nur Tawi-Tawi 
Lucman, Tarhata Alonto Lanao del Sur 
Mandangan, Linang Lanao del Sur 
Matalam, Udtog Cotabato 
Sambolawan, Sandiale Maguindanao 
Sangula, Murphy Sulu 
VICE-GOVERNORS 
Baraguir, Kha.mis Maguindanao 
Disumimba, Palawan Lanao del Sur 
Lucman, Rashid Lanao del Sur 
Marohombsar, Abdul Lanao del Sur 
Tamano, Mamintal Lanao del Sur 
ASSEMBLYMEN, 
AUTONOMOUS REGION XII (1979-1982) 
Alonto, Abul Khayr (Speaker) Lanao del Sur 
Artuc , Bangon · 
Datumanong, Simeon 
Lanto, Macabangkit 
Mabang, Nur 
Macarampat, Raki-in 
Mandangan, Linang 
Mangelen, Conte 
Marohombsar, Abdul 
Matalam, Guinnid 
Sinsuat, Bimbo 
Umpa, Masaranga 
Maguindanao 
Maguindanao 
Lanao del Sur 
Maguindanao 
Lanao del Sur 
Lanao del Sur 
Maguindanao 
Lanao del Sur 
Maguindanao 
Maguindanao 
Lanao del Norte 
MEMBERS OF EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, 
AUTONOMOUS REGION XII(l979-1982) 
Datumanong, Simeon(Chairman) Maguindanao 
Lucman, Jamil La.nao del Sur 
Kalaguiok, Amilil Maguindanao 
Mandangan, Linang Lanao del Sur 
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s 
T 
T 
T+R 
T 
s 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T+S 
T 
T 
T+S 
s 
s 
T+R 
T 
T 
T 
T 
T 
s 
T+S 
T 
T 
T 
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REGIONAL DIRECTORS, REGION XII 
Abdua, Abdulgafor Bureau of Fisheries S 
and Agricultural Resources 
Aguam, Mamasapunod Commission on Elections S 
Cosain, Usman Ministry of Social Services T 
and Development 
Dataya, Abdul Bureau of Intelligence S 
and Investigation 
Dimaporo, Monib Ministry of Agrarian Reform T 
Ibrahim, Dipandian National Irrigation S 
Administration 
Ibrahim, Mastor Ministry of Public Highways S 
Limbona, Alimbusar Bureau of Lands T 
Limpao, Ibrahim Bureau of Treasury S 
Macabangkit, Pundoma Bureau of Agricultural Economics T 
Mastura, Michael Office of the Commission T+S 
on Islamic Affairs 
Mira-ato, Camid Bureau of Land Transportation S 
Mohammad, Usop Philippine Coconut Authority S 
Omar, Arabia Bureau of Posts T+S 
Pangcoga, Pangaga Bureau of Forest Development T 
Pahm, Kundo Bureau of Soils S 
Pahm, Nuggo Ministry of Education S 
and Culture 
Pendaliday, Usop Philippine Pilgrimage Authority S 
Pinagayao, Sansaluna Trade Assistance Centre S 
Umpong,Samsa Ministry of Local Government T 
and City Development 
Usman, Dibulaweg .. Philippine Tobacco Administration S 
CITY AND MUNICIPAL MAYORS, REGION XII 
Adiong, Datu Lacsasa Butig, Lanao del Sur T 
Ali, Hajji Druz Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat R 
Ampang, Mito-on Balio, Lanao del Norte s 
Ampatuan, Datu Akilan Maganoy, Kaguindanao T 
Aratuc, Datu Bagon Buldon, Maguindanao T 
Balindong, Hajji Alim 
Balindong, Hajji Amer 
Balindong, Datu Nasser 
Balut, Hajji Dianalan 
· Baraguir, Datu Sangacala 
Benito, Pangadapun 
Biruar, Datu Sansaluna 
Cali, Omar 
Condalo, Kacaan D. 
Cornell, Sultan Cota 
Dagalangit, Datu Gumbai R. 
Datumanong, Hajji Copang 
Dia.mbangan, Quirmin 
Dianalan, Sultan Omar K. 
Dimacaling, Hajj-i Salacop 
Dimaporo, Kulidoda M. 
Dimaporo, Hajji Naga 
Ganassi, Lanao del Sur 
Malabang, Lanao del Sur 
Pualas, Lanao del Sur 
Bayang, Lanao del Sur 
Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao 
Balabagan, Lanao del Sur 
Parang, Maguindanao 
Tangkal, Lanao del Norte 
Munai, Lanao del Norte 
Karantao, Lanao del Sur 
Lumba-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur 
Mulondo, Lanao del Sur 
Nunungan, Lanao del Norte 
Marawi City, Lanao del Sur 
Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur 
Binidayan, Lanao del Sur 
Karomatan, Lanao del Norte 
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T+R 
T+R 
T 
R 
T 
s 
T 
s 
s 
T 
T 
T+R 
s 
T 
T+R 
T 
T+R 
Dipatuan, Sultan Rasuman Bacolod Grande, Lanao del Sur T .. 
Disomimba, Hajji Palawan Ta.mparan, Lanao del Sur T+R 
Dumamba, Datu Carpenter Tumbao, Maguindanao T 
Ka.msa, Datu Kudanding Sultan sa Barongis, Maguindanao T 
Lantud, Inorac Pantao-Rangat, Lanao del Norte S 
Lucman, Hajji Palawan Poona-Bayabao, Lanao del Sur T+R 
Macabuat, Maj. Disomnong B&lindong, Lanao del Sur S 
Kacadatu, Hajji Kacabayao Butig, Lanao del Sur T+R 
Kacapeges, Datu Kahir Matanog, Maguindanao T 
Kacara.mbon, Hajji Benasing Kola.mbogan, Lanao del Norte T+R 
Magumpara, Col. Ka.ma Salvador, Lanao del Norte S 
Ma.ma, Datu Blah Dinaig, Kaguindanao T 
Kangelen, Datu Samad Buluan, Kaguindanao T 
Kangelen, Solilang Lutayan, Sultan Kudarat T+S 
Kangerun, Hajji Abdullah E. Kapai, Lanao del Sur R 
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Mangondato, Col. Dia.mongan Magsaysay, Lanae del Norte T+S 
Ma.rhom, Datu Abdulmadid P. Tuba.ran, Lanae del Sur T 
Matalam, Datu Malunsing Pagalungan, Ma.guindanao T 
Mautante, Sul tan Lumna B. Ta.ra.ka, Lanao del Sur T 
Mindalano, Datu Guina.r Madamba, Lanae del Sur T 
Munder, Ali K.B. Bubong, Lanae del Sur S 
Naga, Somerado B. Pagayawan, Lanae del Sur S 
Omar, Hajji Raguib A. Madalum, Lanao del Sur R 
Orangot, Sultan Masiu Piagapo, Lanae del Sur T 
Paglas, Datu Ibrahim Datu Paglas, Maguindanao T 
Pascan, Hajji Pundato Tagoloan, Lanae del Nor.te R 
Paudac, Hajji Ali Saud Tugaya, Lanao del Sur R 
Sa.mama, Datu Mentang Datu Piang, Maguindanao T 
Sanginis, Sultan Ditangogen Masiu, Lanae del Sur T 
Sanki, Datu Abdullah Ampatuan, Maguindanao T 
Sa.ranggani, Col. Luba M. Sapad, Lanao del Norte S 
Sinsuat, Datu Michael Up.i, .Maguindanoa T 
Tangoti, Sebo Matungao, Lanae del Norte S 
Ta.rotocan, Hajji Rasol Poona-Piagapo, Lanae del Norte R 
Umpa.ra, Hajji Tago Lumbatan, Lanae del Sur R 
T=Traditional elite 
S=Secular elite 
R=Religious elite 
Each leader is classified into traditional, secular and religious 
elite groups according to whether he holds a royal title, important 
family name, or highly respected professional or religious 
qualif !cation. 
Source: (Arce 1983; Autonomous Region XII 1980; Department 
of Public Information 1976;- Glang 1969; Bruno 
1973; National Economics and Development 
Authority 1983b). 
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Appendix C 
MANIFESTO 
In the name of Allah, most gracious, most merciful. 
PREAMBLE 
The Muslim inhabitants of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan, invoking the grace of 
the almighty Allah, most gracous, most merciful, on whom all praise is due and 
whom all creation depends for sustenance, make manifestation to the whole world its 
desire to secede from the Republic of the Philippines, in order to establish an Islamic 
state that shall embody their ideals and aspirations, conserve and develop their 
patrimony, their Islamic heritage, under the blessings of Islamic Universal 
Brotherhood and the regime of law, justice and democracy and the recognized 
principles of the law of nations, do promulgate and make known the declaration of its 
independence from the mother country, the Republic of the Philippines. 
TERRITORIES 
The Islamic state shall comprise the contiguous southern portion of the 
Philippine Archipelago inhabited by the Muslims, such as, Cotabato, Davao, 
Zamboanga · and- Zamboanga City, · Basilan City, Lanao, Sulu, Pala wan, and the 
adjoining areas or islands ·which are inhabited by the Muslims or being under their 
sphere of influence, including the maritime areas therein. 
PEOPLES 
The Muslim inhabitants of the Republic of the Philippines, numbering some 
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four millions ( 4,000,000) with culture and history of their own are distinct from the 
affluent Christian majority, and for the reasons abovementioned, its integration into 
the Philippines body politics being impossible. 
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES 
1 That it is a recognized principle underlying the Charter of the United Nations 
and the Declaration of Human Rights of the rights of all people constituting the 
minority in a given state for self-determination; 
2 That the Islamic World Congress has affirmed the above principles, 
particularly on the rights of the Muslims who are in the minority in non-Muslim 
states for self-determination; 
3 That the systematic extermination of the Muslim youth--like the Corregidor 
Fiasco--the policy of isolation and dispersal of the Muslim communities have been 
pursued vigorously by the government to the detriment of the Muslims; 
4 That Islam, being a communal religion--an ideology and a way of life, must 
have a definite territory for the exercise of its tenets and teachings, and for the 
observance of its laws; 
5 That economic progress, social development, and political independence are 
the cherished and inviolable dreams and aspirations of the Muslims, and the 
realization of which can better be served and promted by and among themselves; and 
6 That under the present state of things, the Muslims are capable of 
self-government or political independence they being endowed with sufficient number 
of professionals with academic, technical and legal training. 
Now, therefore, it was decided that a government shall be organized and 
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established for the Muslims inhabiting the aforesaid particular areas of Islands of 
Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan, and the outlying territories which are all under the 
sway of the Muslims, said government to be independent from all states and be equal 
with all others under the laws of civilized nations; and 
Be it further known that said government for the Muslims shall be known and 
referred to as--
THE REPUBLIC OF MINDANAO AND SULU. 
Pagalungan darul Islam, Cotabato, Philippines, May 1, 1968. 
PRINCIPAL SIGNATORY: 
(Sgd.) EX-GOVERNOR DATU UDTOG MATALAM 
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AppendixD 
THE MANIFESTO OF THE MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT 
Estabishment of the Bangsa Moro Republik 
We, the five million oppressed Bangsa Moro people, wishing to free ourselves 
form the terro, oppression and tyranny of Filipino colonialism which has caused us 
untold sufferings and miseries by criminally usurping our land, by threatening Islam 
through wholesale destruction and desecration of its places of worship and its Holy 
Book, and murdering our innocent brothers, sisters and folks in a genocidal campaign 
of terrifying mag_nitude; 
Aspiring to have the sole prerogative of defending and chartering our own 
national destiny in accordance with our own free will in order to ensure our future 
and that of our children; 
Having evolved an appropriate form of ideology with which the unity of our 
people has been firmly established and their national identity and character 
strengthened; 
Having established the Moro National Liberation Front and its military arm, 
the Bangsa Moro Army, as our principal instrument for achieving our primary goals 
and objectives with the unanimous support of the great mass of our people; and 
finally 
Being now in firm control of a great portion of our national homeland through 
successive and crushing victories of our Bangsa Moro Army in battle against the 
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Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Marcos military dictatorship, hereby 
declare: 
1 That henceforth the Bangsa Moro people and Revolution having established 
their Bangsa Moro Republik, are throwing off all their political, economic and other 
bonds with the oppressive government of the Philippines under the dictatorial regime 
of President Ferdinand E. Marcos to secure a free and independent state for the 
Bangsa Moro people; 
2 That we believe armed struggle is the only means by which we can achieve 
the complete freedom and independence of our people, since Marcos and his 
goverment will never dismantal the edifice of Philippine colonial rule in our national 
homeland of their own accord; 
3 That the Moro National Liberation Front and its military arm, the Bangsa 
Moro Army, shall not agree to any form of settlement or accord short of achieving 
total freedom and independence for our oppressed Bangsa Moro people; 
4 That the Revolution of the Bangsa Moro people is a revolution with a social 
conscience. As such it is committed to the principle of establishing a democratic 
system of government which shall never allow or tolerate any form of exploitation 
and oppression of any human being by another or of one nation by another; 
5 That those Filipinos who may wish to remain in the Bangsa Moro national 
homeland even after independence, shall be welcomed and entitled to equal rights and 
protection with all other citizens of the Bangsa Moro Republik, provided that they 
formaliy renounce their Filipino Citizenship and wholeheartedly accept Bangsa Moro 
citizenship; their property rights shall be fully respected and the free exercise of their 
political, cultural and religious rights shall be guaranteed; 
6 That the Bangsa Moro people and Revolution are committed to the 
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preservation and growth of Islamic culture among our people, without prejudice to 
the development and growth of other religious and indigenous cultures in out' 
homeland; 
7 That our people and Revolution recognise and adhere to the Charter of the 
United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and, in addition, 
they shall respect and adhere to all laws binding upon the nations of the world; 
8 That the Bangsa Moro people and Revolution are committed to the 
preservation and enhancement of world peace through mutual cooperation among 
nations and common progress of the peoples of the world. Accordingly, they are 
committed to the principJ-e of mutual respect and friendship among nations 
irrespective of their ideological and religious creed; 
9 That our people and the Revolution, upholding the principle of 
self-determination, support the 'right of all peoples of all nations in their legitimate 
and just struggle for national survival, freedom and independence; 
10 That the Bangsa Moro people and the Revolution shall, m the interest of 
truth, guarantee the freedom of the press; 
11 That, m order to accelerate the economic progress of our war ravaged 
Bangsa Moro homeland, our people and Revolution shall encourage foreign 
investment under terms and conditions beneficial to our people and the investors. 
Accordingly, those foreign investors in the Bangsa Moro homeland who may decide to 
continue their economic activities under the revolutionary regime shall be welcomed; 
12 The Bangsa Moro people and the Revolution are committed to the principles 
that they are a part of the Islamic World as well as of the Third World and of the 
oppressed colonised humanity everywhere in the world. 
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Therefore, we hereby appeal to the conscience of all men everywhere and the 
sympathy of all the nations of the world to help accelerate the pace of our people's 
Revolution by formally and unequivocably recognizing and supporting our people's 
legitimate right to obtain their national freedom and independence. Such recognition 
and support must be concretised by accepting the Bangsa Moro Republik as one of 
the members of the family of independent and sovereign nations in the world and 
giving official recognition to the Moro National Liberation Front. 
Done in the Bangsa Moro Homeland, this 28th day of April 1974. 
Hajji Nur Misuari, 
Chairman, 
Central Committee, 
Moro National Liberation Front. 
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AppendixE 
Structure of the Moro Organizations 
It should be noted at the outset that all the organizational structures described 
below are constructed on the basis of organization charts depicted on paper by the 
respective fronts. Figures E-1 to E-4 show the basic structure of the MNLF faction of 
Misuari as revealed by Hatimil Hassan, Director of MNLF Foreign Relations Office in 
Syria and by Commander Solitario, Chairman of Ranao Norte Revolutionary 
Committee (interview, Commander Solitario, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, 17-20 
February 1985). According to Hassan (1981:253-256) the MNLF is a democratic 
people's organization which functions on a committee system. It is governed by a 
Central Committee headed by a chairman who in theory is elected by a group of 
delegates chosen at the provincial level. The Central Committee members are selected 
and appointed by the chairman. Since its official formation in 1974, members of the 
Central Committee have been subject to constant changes due to individuals 
surrendering, defection to other factions, and termination. The Central Committee 
has a secretariat that serves as executive and administrative body of the organization; 
it consists of different bureaux or committees which perform various functions 
indicated in Figure E-1. Each bureau is headed by a chairman or a director who is 
ex-officio member of the Central Committee. 
The MNLF comprises a Congress and Revolutionary Tribunal which serve as 
legislative and judicial bodies, respectively. In practice, the National Congress is held 
irregularly, when consultations are needed to ratify or make important decisions. The 
MNLF has held only two national congresses since its formation. The first National 
Congress was convened in Zamboanga in 1974 to ratify the Front's manifesto. The 
Figure E-1: Structure of the MNLF Organization (A) 
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Figure E-2: Structure of the MNLF Organization (B) 
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second was held on the island of Jolo on 2-6 September 1986 on the occasion of a 
historic meeting between the president of the Philippines, Mrs. Corazon Aquino, and 
the chairman of the MNLF, Mr. Nur Misuari. The Provincial Congresses, which are 
I 
Figure E-3: Structure of the MNLF Organization (C) 
Bangsa Moro Army 
(BMA) 
I 
I 
General Staff 
I 
I I 
National Mobile Force Provincial Army 
I I 
Zone Force 
I 
1-- 1st Army 
I 
3rd Army --1 Municipali~y Force 
I I I 
2nd Army 4th Army Barrio Defence Force 
Figure E-4: Structure of the MNLF Organization (D) 
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held by the Provincial revolutionary Committees have convened from time to time. 
The Revolutionary Tribunal, consisting of the Supreme Revolutionary Tribunal and 
Provincial and Municipal Courts, assumes primarily civil functions. The Military 
Tribunal is created on an ad hoc basis by the General Staff of the Bangsa Moro Army 
(BMA), the military force of the MNLF. In 1986, it is estimated that the MNLF had 
about 10,000 regular BMA members of which about fifty per cent were heavily armed 
(As£aweek, 14 September 1986). They are organized into ten provincial armies and a 
number of zones in each army (Hassan 1981:255-256). The BMA also provides the 
National Mobile Forces, divided into four armies, which occupy at least thirteen 
permanent camps throughout the region (Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 
September 1986). In addition, some Moro villagers are armed and function as barrio 
defence forces. 
The structural organization of the MNLF may be regarded as a 
'secular-orientation'. Another slightly different structural emphasis is the 
'Islamic-oriented' one. This is not to suggest that the former is less 'Islamic' than the 
latter, for Islam does not restrict a Muslim in doing what he pleases as long as he 
does not contradict Islamic teachings. The MNLF-Reformist (Pundato) faction 
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employs the former, while the BMLO (BMILO) and the MILF use the latter. Since 
the MNLF-Reformist still uses basically the same structural pattern as that of the 
Misuari faction, except for those reforms made in accordance with the Nine Point 
Proposal (Appendix F), is not necessary to elaborate its structural organization. 
The BMLO was first to emphasize the 'Islamic-oriented' organization. In its 
policy statement issued in May 1978, the BMLO outlined the structure shown in 
Figure E-5 (BMLO 1978:2-3). 
Figure E-5: Structure of the BMLO Organization 
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Like the MNLF, the BMLO is governed by a Supreme Executive Council (SEC) 
headed by a chairman. Unlike the MNLF, a chairman of the BMLO is agreed upon by 
its members through shura (Islamic-oriented meeting). Membership of the SEC is 
based on merit and on regional and ethnic representation. The SEC operates through 
different committees of the secretariat which functions as executive and 
administrative body. The Consultative Assembly of the Moro People (CAMP) is the 
highest policy-making body of the BMLO. All members of the SEC, and the high 
ranking members of other organs of the BMLO, are provisional members of CAMP. 
The CAMP holds a congress yearly to approve policies and . budget for each fiscal 
year. Special meetings of CAMP may be held when needtd but not more than once 
per month. The significant organ that makes the BMLO an 'Islamic-oriented' Front is 
the Majles Islam of MINSUPALA (MIM). It consists of ulama headed by a mufti 
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(chief judge). The MIM acts as Supreme Judicial Tribunal and has power to repeal or 
amend any orders that do not conform to Islam. It is also responsible for the 
enforcement of the sharia on members cf the BMLO and on Muslims under its 
jurisdiction. In fact, the mufti is considered one of the most powerful leaders of the 
BMLO. The Bangsa Moro Army (BMA) is the kampilan (sword) of the BMLO. The 
mujahideen (fighters) of the BMA fig~t only in the name of Islam and for the Moro 
homeland. Able Muslims who are willing to join the struggle are trained for 
membership in the BMA. The High Political Council (HPC) consists of leaders of 
different elite groups, such as sultans, datus, ulama and professionals who are 
committed to the Islamic struggle of the Moro people. The HPC, with the approval of 
SEC, conducts the political affairs and formulates the ideology of the BMLO (ibid.). 
During my visit to the MILF camps (Camp Busrah in Lanao del Sur, Camp 
Abubakar in North Cotabato, and Camp Omar in Maguindanao), certain field 
commanders constructed the MILF organization, as illustrated in Figures E-6 to E-7. 
Like the BMLO, the MILF is an Islamic-oriented organization. The Supreme 
Islamic Revolutionary Tribunal and the Majles Shura of the MILF, corresponding to 
the Majles Islam of MINSUP ALA and the Consultative Assembly of the Moro People 
of the BMLO, respectively, are organs that differentiate the Islamic from 
secular-oriented fronts. That is, the MILF and the BMLO use Islamic court and 
shura, whereas the MNLF employs civil or military courts and its congress functions 
like a Western body. Furthermore, the MILF and BMLO consider themselves as 
vehicles of jihad for Muslims in Mindanao (Hashim 1985:24; BMILO 1984a:l). They 
regard jihad as a collective duty for which every Muslim has a responsibility--an 
obligation that accepts no exception. To stress the necessity of organization in waging 
a jihad, Hashim (ibid.:25) writes, 'the wisdom and lesson we can imbibe from the 
Prophet's experience is clear--that to fight alone is not Jihad, to fight in a 
disorganized fashion is neither Jihad'. More importantly, the Islamic-oriented Fronts 
categorically reject the concept that jihad can be fought under a non-Islamic group or 
Figure E-6: Structure of the MILF Organization (A) 
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Figure E-7: Structure of the MILF Organization (B) 
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state (ibid.). This is the underlying reason why the MILF and BMLO advocate an 
Islamic line. 
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The fifth group is the Moro Revolutionary Organization (MORO). 'Mike', one 
of the MORO's leaders, indicates that the group adheres to the structural pattern of 
the CPP. It includes the basic units as demonstrated in Figure E-8. 
Figure E-8: Structure of the MORO Organization 
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According to the constitution of the CPP, the Central Committee is the highest 
authority of the organization when the Congress is not in session. However, when it 
is, the Congress dictates the overall work of the organization and defines its 
programmes, including the election procedure of the Central Committee. All members 
of the Central Committee are delegates to the Congress, which convenes yearly. The 
Provincial Committee, whose members are elected during the Provincial Convention, 
functions as the central committee at the provincial level, and the Provincial 
Convention as that of the Congress. The Section Committee (Seccom) comprises the 
nuclei organized within one specified section of the city or town. The Seccom 
Convention, which meets once a year, makes final decisions concerning the work and 
plans of the Seccom. The lowest organ of the organization is the Executive 
Committee, which runs the nucleus established in particular places {CPP 1969:74-81). 
Appendix-F 
THE NINE-POINT PROPOSAL OF THE REFORMIST GROUP 
Brothers et al: 
'BISMILL.AAHIR RABlCA.ANIR RAHIIM' 
. MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT 
General Headquarters 
(REFORMIST) 
OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN 
Assalamu alaikum wa rahmatullahi wa barakatuh! 
7 March 1982 
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In this letter, please find out the Nine (9) Point proposals that the Reformist 
Group submitted to Nur Misuari for consideration for the progress and liberation of 
our oppressed people from the clutches of oppression, suppression, exploitation and 
other ills of the Bangsa Moro Revolution, To Wit: 
1. Real, functional and representative Central Committee. This means that 
the Central Committee of the MNLF shall be represented by every tribe of the 
province of origin. It must be working and functional as a body in laying down the 
National Policies, Principles, Guidlines and Programs of the Islamic Revolution. 
2. Creation of the Executive Committee to implement the policies and 
programs of the Central Committee on the ground. This Committee shall be 
responsible to administer and supervise the policies and programs of the MNLF. It 
shall compose of responsible leaders of the Islamic Revolution. 
3. Creation and/or implementation of the Steering Committee. This 
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Committee shall be composed of the Provincial Chairmen, Vice-Chairmen, Provincial 
Commanders and mass leaders in the promulgation of the policies and programs of 
the province. 
4. Strenthening and revitalization of all the branches and organs at the 
national level. It means that all national organs shall be defined and manned by 
dedicated and qualified personnel/members of the MNLF. 
5. Strenthening of the Foreign Committee shall be encouraged to accommodate 
more qualified personnel from different provinces to render services abroad. 
6. Implementation of the Central Committee Resolution in the Tripoli Meeting 
to last letter. 
7. Sincere efforts in forging unity with other organizations. It means that all 
efforts shall be exhausted in seeking unity with the BMLO, MNLF Salamat Faction 
and other organizations interested to the liberation of our people, homeland and 
Islam. 
8. Localization of leaders in all levels and commands in the province. It means 
that the natives of every province shall have the first priority to handle the affairs of 
the province. 
9. Promulgation/implementation of the Constitution and By-Laws of the 
Islamic Revolution. In order to run the Revolution, there must be a constitution and 
By-Laws for the direction and proper course of the Islamic Revolution. This is to 
safeguard the interest of the Islamic Revolution. 
{Signed) 
The Reformist Group 
in the 13 Provinces 
Appendix G 
RESOLUTIONS OF THE REFORMIST GROUP: Rejection 
of Misuari's Leadership and Acceptance of Autonomy 
MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT 
RESOLUTION NO. A-2 
National People's Congress 
3rd Session 
CONFIRMATION OF THE OUSTER OF NUR MISUARI 
AS CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE 
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WHEREAS Nur Misuari's betrayal to the cause of the Bangsa Moro people 
homeland and Islam caused untold sufferings and sacrifices to millions of the Bangsa 
Moro people and spilt the blood of the Mujahideen infavour of his personal glory, 
selfish motives and evil designs; 
WHEREAS the leftist leanings of Misuari which der~iled the direction of the 
Revolution towards its real objective of defending the cause of Islam is not acceptable 
to the great masses of our people and repugnant to the senses of the Mujahideen; 
WHEREAS the refusal of Misuari to recognize the Tripoli Agreement 
preventing it from being implemented to the prejudice of the Bang:sa Moro people and 
in defiance of the Organization of the Islamic Conference Resolutions and the advice 
of the friendly countries caused the unpopularity of the MNLF to such bodies; 
WHEREAS his failure to unify and accommodate all sectors of the Moro 
society, the professionals, farmers, workers, students, intellectuals, politicians and 
traditional leaders prevented the clinching of the Revolutionary victory and have 
dragged the Revolution to factionalism; 
289 
WHEREAS his failure to consult the leaders on the Ground on major decisions 
such as the Tripoli Agreement, reverting it to Independence, his maladministration, 
corruption, one-man rule, and other malpractices destroyed the morale of the 
Fighting Forces which sapped the trust and confidence of its leaders and commanders 
on the Ground; 
WHEREAS the presentative members of the Central Committee have decided 
and did oust Misuari from the present position in the proper Resolution on the same; 
THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED that the National People's 
Congress hereby confirmed the OUSTER of Misuari from the Chairmanship of the 
Moro National Liberation Front Central Committee and all the powers, functions, 
privileges and rights inherent or attendant thereto is hereby stripped and he be 
further advised to cease and desist to function as such; 
RESOLVED FINALLY that this Resolution be submitted to the Organization 
of the Islamic Conference and its member States be furnished a copy. 
RESOLUTION NO. A-6 
ACCEPTANCE OF THE AUTONOMOUS STATE 
WHEREAS the Tripoli Agreement forged between the Moro National 
Liberation Front and the Philippine Government signed on December 23, 1976 
creating the autonomous State within the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of 
the Republic of the Philippines; 
WHEREAS both Signatories to the said Agreement have in one way or the 
other become apathetic and evaded to negotiate to its final stage thereby preventing 
the implementation of the Agreement in its real form and purpose; 
WHEREAS the Bangsa Moro people are suffering and shouldering the brunt of 
the war as a result of the genocidal campaign waged by the colonial forces of the 
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Morcos regime and the irresponsible reaction of the parties resulted to the 
non-implementation and the violation of the Tripoli Agreement; 
WHEREAS it is the wishes of the great majority of the Bangsa Moro people to 
accept the autonomous State as envisioned under the Tripoli Agreement through a 
negotiation under the auspices of the Organization of the Islamic Conference to be 
represented by their real leaders contrary to the stand of Misuari in reverting his 
stand to independence; 
WHEREAS it is the position of the majority of the leadership of the Bangsa 
Moro Revolution including the real Mujahideen and their commanders in the Field 
that the Tripoli Agreement is an international covenant that must be respected and 
regnized by the real parties; 
NOW THEREFORE, FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION OF THE ABOVE, IT 
IS HEREBY RESOLVED that the Organization of the Islamic Conference be 
informed of the wishes of the majority of the Leadership of the Revolution and the 
great majority of our people to accept the Autonomous State envisioned under the 
Tripoli Agreement. 
RESOLVED FURTHER that the Organization of the Islamic Conference be 
requested to continue its role in seeking ways to bring the real parties to the 
negotiating table in order to put an end to the conflict in South Philippines. 
RESOLVED FURTHERMORE that the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
be reminded of the change of leadership in the Moro National Liberation Front so 
that the proper parties be represented by the proper representatives to finally resolve 
the issue. 
RESOLVED LASTLY that copies of this Resolution be furnished to the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference and its member States and the Philippine 
Government for proper information. 
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IN ATTESTATION THEREOF, we hereunto affixed our signature this 10th of 
June 1982 in mainland Mindanao. 
MOH. JEBREL RIDHA 
Chairman, South Kutawato 
USTADZ AIDlAD SAL.AMAT 
Member, Basilan 
USTADZ SARABUDDIN SAMAMA 
Member, North Kutawato 
MUSTAPHA PLANG PENDATIJN 
Member, North Kutawato 
AMER PAPAS 
Ranao Norte 
USTADZ ELIAS ABDUSAL.All 
member, Ranao Sur 
HARON TAN 
Member, South Kutawato 
RUHILA AKIP 
Member, Tawi-Tawi 
DATU NORA MOHAMMAD 
Member, Zamboanga Sur 
ABDULLAH SHARIEF 
Member, Ranao Norte 
IMAM JAYLAN ALTAWAN 
Member, Zamboa.nga Norte 
DITGUAN BATINGULO 
Member, Ranao Norte 
ESMAIL DIMALAPANG 
Member, Lupah Sug 
SAKANDAL J.AMANG 
Member, Lupah Sug 
MOHADAD KHALID MAROHOM 
Member, Ranao Sur 
USTADZ ISMIE MUBARAK 
Member, Ranao Sur 
ABDUL RAHMAN MOKAIR 
Member, Basilan 
SIDDIK SANN.All 
Member, Tawi-Tawi 
IMAM HUSSEIN SANSAWI 
Member, Basilan 
IMAM MULOK SANGGUYONG 
Member, Zamboanga Sur 
NAPIS BIDIN 
Vice-Chairman, Tawi-Tawi 
IBRAHIM KARON SILONGAN 
Member, North Kutawato 
USTADZ MOSANNIP I1LAN 
Member, North Kutawato 
AIDlAD MADANI 
Member, Ranao Norte 
LAMA MACAPA-AR 
Ranao Norte 
USTADZ ABDULMAJID GOLING 
Member, Ranao Sur 
ABDUR.A.mlAN HARRID 
Member, South Kutawato 
SAMA WAHE 
Member, Zamboa.nga Norte 
IMAM BAKILAN 
Member, Zamboanga Norte 
GUIAMALUDDIN ADANG 
Member, North Kutawato 
LACSAMANA ATTIP 
Member, Tawi-Tawi 
IMAM DUA DAMSIK 
Member, Zamboabga Norte 
TAJI JAIYARI 
Member, Lupah Sug 
JALA JULAIN 
Member, Lupah Sug 
MUSA MONAD! 
Member, Ranao Sur 
AHMAD MUTLAH 
Member, Ranao Sur 
NURUDIN SALAM 
Member, South Kutawato 
IMAM HASHIM SANSAWI 
Member, Basilan 
DATU A. 1LANGODA SARIF 
Member, Ranao Sur 
MOSHIB TUDO 
Member, Ranao Sur 
HADJI ABDUL RAHIM WALID 
Member, Ranae Sur 
ABDUL AZIZ MOH.AMMAD 
Member, Professional Group 
USTADZ JAINUDDIN BATIJ 
Member, Ranae Norte 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT. 
This Resolution had been deliberated on the floor during the Third Session of the 
Moro Congress from June 8, 9 and 10, 1982. 
KIRAM HADJI KAMAI.UDDIN 
Secretary-General 
Member, Moro Congress 
Tawi-Tawi 
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AppendixH 
THE MORO MANIFESTO 
We, the Moro Revolutionary Organization (MORO), hereby declare our basic 
principles and general program. 
1. Un£ty of the Moro People for Nat£onal 
Self-Determination and Democracy 
The broad masses of the Moro people must be united in the revolutionary 
struggle for national self-determination and democracy against U.S. imperialism, 
feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism. Our main enemy now is the fascist dictatorial 
regime of the U:S.-Marcos clique which is the concentrated expression of the three 
aforementioned evils. 
The Moro people include the ethno-linguistic groups of the Maranaos, 
Maguindanaos, Tausugs, Samals, Yakans, Iranuns, Kalagans, Badjaos, Palawanis, 
Jama Mapuns, Kalebugans, Sangils and other such people who have intimate 
historical bonds with the foregoing and are willing to be integrated with the Moro 
people in any area (province, municipality, city or barrio) where the Moro people are 
the majority nationality. 
Since the Spanish colonial times, the foreign rulers and domestic ruling classes 
of the Philippines have always sought to subject the Moro people to national 
oppression and exploitation. The Moro people have always put up a heroic resistance 
in accordance with their just interests. 
In the period of its direct colonial rule and in the current period of its indirect 
semicolonial rule over the Philippines, U.S. imperialism has carried out a policy of 
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subjecting the Moro people to national oppression and exploitation. Not only the 
domestic ruling classes of the Philippines but also of the Moro areas have been the 
willing tools of U.S. imperialism. 
National exploitation is the reason behind national oppression and the 
chauvinism. U.S. imperialism and the Filipino and the Moro ruling classes are 
selfishly interested in the exploitation of the broad masses of the Moro and Filipino 
people and in the plunder of the rich natural resources of the Minsupala region. 
In upholding the right to national self-determination, the Moro people can go to 
the extent of fighting for secession from the present reactionary semicolonial and 
semifeudal Philippine state. They can opt for regional autonomy only in a people's 
democratic state which can guarentee the quality of nations in the Philippine 
archipelago. 
The development of the Philippine revolution cannot but be uneven. The Moro 
people can go at their own rate in seeking to establish a people's democratic state. If 
they can, they can go ahead of the rest of the Filipino people in establishing such a 
state. At the same time, they should always be willing to unite, cooperate and 
coordinate with the Filipino people in fighting for common interests and aspirations 
against the same enemies. 
The struggle for national self-determination must be linked to the struggle for 
democracy. Among the broad masses of the Moro people, especially among the 
working class and the peasantry, there is no point in struggling for national 
self-determination if this is not substantiated by a democratic revolution. 
Otherwise, the domestic ruling classes in the Moro areas will continue to be in a 
position to make deals with the enemy in the manner of the Bates Treaty and sell out 
the interests of the people. Colonial domination is not possible without the 
collaboration of the capitulationists, renegades and traitors. 
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A democratic revolution must serve as the main content of the struggle for 
national self-determination. This does not simply mean the restoration of formal 
bourgeois democratic rights and procedures. Essentially, it means the solution of the 
land problem of the peasant majority of the Moro and non-Moro people in the Moro 
areas. 
This problem has been aggravated by wonton landgrabbing by the foreign 
monopoly capitalists and by such local exploiters as the big compradors, the big 
landlords and the big bureaucrats of the reactionary state. Plantations, logging, 
mines and industrial estates have been established on Moro land to exploit the Moro 
and non-Moro people. 
The big traitors to the revolutionary cause of the Moro people also participate 
m grabbing land, in titling land to themselves economically and are thus willing to 
become running dogs of the Manila government and the foreign monopoly capitalists. 
The seas of the Moro people are also being encroached upon by foreign 
petroleum mining companies and fishing companies. Thus, the foreign monopoly 
capitalists and their local stooges are extremely antagonistic to the Moro people's 
revolutionary cause. 
A national democratic revolution must strike at the roots of national oppression 
and exploitation. It is the sacred duty of the Moro Revolutionary Organization to 
arouse, organize and mobilize the broad masses of the Moro people along the general 
line of the national democratic revolution. 
The toiling masses of workers and peasants (including the fishermen and 
farmworkers) must first of all be united to serve as the basic solid foundation of the 
great national unity and revolutionary struggle of the Moro people against their 
oppressors and exploiters. 
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The petty bourgeoisie (the self-sufficient owners of some property and the 
intelligentsia including the students, teachers and professionals) are also an important 
part of the Moro people's revolutionary unity and struggle. So are the national 
bourgeoisie or the middle bourgeoisie which should be attracted to the 
worker-peasant-petty bourgeois revolutionary alliance. 
The lower and enlightened sections or elements of the exploiting classes may be 
allowed a positive role in the struggle. Moreover, the split among the reactionaries 
can be taken advantage of by the revolutionaries. It is possible to have unstable, 
temporary and indirect allies in the struggle. 
The revolutionary struggle of the Moro people must be comprehensively 
national democratic in character. It is anti-fascist, anti-imperialist and anti-feudal. 
At the vanguard of the revolutionary movement of the Moro people, it should be the 
Moro cadres who grasp the ideas of the most advanced revolutionary class and 
implement them. 
The perspective of this movement is socialist. Therefore, it is absolutely 
necessary that the revolutionary proletariat is the leading class in the Moro 
revolution not only for the purpose of winning victory in the present national 
democratic stage but also consequently for moving on to the socialist stage of the 
revolution. 
We, the Moro Revolutionary Organization, are dedicated to promoting the 
general line of the national democratic revolution among the Moro people and 
developing the core of proletarian revolutionary cadres among the Moro people. 
Militant revolutionary political and organizational work must be done for the 
purpose. 
The Moro Revolutionary Organization must build and strengthen itself 
ideologically, politically and organizationally. It should create and strengthen mass 
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organizations, people's armed defense units and organs of democratic power so as to 
carry forward the revolutionary struggle of the Moro people. MORO groups are to be 
formed within these to serve as the revolutionary hard core. 
Our association is interested in developing unity, cooperation and coordination 
with the Moro National Liberation Front, the Bangsa Moro Army and all other 
organizations and individuals which are interested in advancing the revolutionary 
cause of the Moro people. 
2. People's War as the Main Form of the Moro 
People's Revolutionary Struggle 
People's war, wherein the revolutionary political struggle is coordinated with 
the revolutionary armed struggle, is the main form of _the revolutionary struggle of 
the Moro people for national self-determination and democracy. The Moro people 
must consistently wage revolutionary armed struggle for so long as they are subjected 
to national oppression and exploitation by U.S. imperialism, feudalism and 
bureaucrat capitalism. 
At the same time, various forms of revolutionary political struggle must be 
employed, developed and put into coordination with the revolutionary armed 
struggle. By using all possible forms of struggle, the people can undermine the 
anti-Moro and anti-democratic state. In the final analysis, however, it is the people's 
armed power that can overthrow the rule of this state over the Moro people. 
Because their revolutionary cause is just, the Moro people are always ready to 
fight until total victory is won. Otherwise, they can only be subjected to the peace of 
slaves imposed by the perpetrators of national oppression-the fascist, the big foreign 
and domestic capitalists and the big landlords. 
So many lives of the Moro people have been sacrificed and so much blood of the 
Moro people has been shed in brutal massacres and murder campaigns waged by the 
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present reactionary state of the Philippines. In countless acts of pillage and plunder, 
the enemy has destroyed the homes and livelihood of the people, created multitudes 
of war refugees, subjected so many women to rape and rounded up so many people on 
whom torture and other indignities are applied. 
It is a grievous sin not to avenge these crimes and render justice to the victims. 
Without asserting and fighting for revolutionary justice, the Moro people will 
continue to be subjected to a daily life of national oppression and exploitation, no less 
brutal and even worse than the massacres used to impose the unjust rule of the 
enemy. 
The heroic Moro people are ready to wage revolutionary armed struggle no 
matter how long this shall take. It is because they fight for national 
self-determination and democracy. They can rely on themselves. They have more 
than enough arms to start with and pursue a self-reliant struggle. 
The people's war cannot but be protracted. It takes time to change the balance 
of forces between us and the enemy. The enemy starts with a military strength 
superior to ours. On our part, we seek to strengthen ourselves by defeating his forces 
piece by piece and seizing more and more arms from them. 
Our people's war may take three strategic stages. The first stage is that we are 
on the defensive while the enemy on is on the offensive. The second stage is that we 
have achieved a stalemate with the enemy. The third and final stage is that we are 
the ones on the offensive while the enemy is on the defensive. We shall certainly 
reach this final stage, the stage of completely liberating ourselves and completely 
ridding the Moro areas of the hated reactionary armed forces of the Philippines. 
Even as we are on the strategic defensive now, we can and must launch tactical 
offensives. Citing the heroic feats of many armed units of the Bangsa Moro Army 
and the New People's Army, we can see that it is possible to launch tactical offensives 
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m the form of guerrilla warfare and at certain times m the form of regular mobile 
warfare. 
With the people's support, the revolutionary armed forces can force the enemy 
to spread out his forces thinly over wide areas. And in launching tactical offensives, 
we raise a large armed force superior to that enemy unit which we choose to strike at. 
Thus, we can defeat and wipe out enemy units repeatedly, accumulate strength after 
every battle and change the balance of forces step by step. 
Our style of fighting should be charaterized by surprise and mobilty and 
flexibilty of tactics. We should fight only battles that we are sure of winning. These 
are battles where we have the initiative, where our strength is superior to the enemy's 
and where we can annihilate units of the enemy and seize arms. 
The tactics of guerrilla warfare include: dispersal of the guerrilla units for the 
purpose of developing a wide mass base and consequently forcing the enemy to spread 
his forces, concentration of forces for the purpose of launching tactical offensives 
against the enemy; and shifting for the purpose of avoiding encirclement by a superior 
enemy force. 
Guerrilla forces or regular mobile forces should lure enemy units deep into the 
rural areas where they have the political and military advantages or where they can 
gain the upperhand. At the present stage, it is best to maintain mobility to be able 
to destroy one enemy unit after another. 
At the present level of armed strength of the Bangsa Moro Army, its fighting 
units can besiege or prick one enemy post to destroy enemy reinforcements at an 
unexpected point along the way or strike at another enemy post which can be 
destroyed easily as a result. The use of feints can lead the enemy to commit mistakes 
and enhance the initiative of the revolutionary armed forces. 
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People's war is not only a question of military strategy and tactics. It is also a 
question of laying down the political foundation for the success of the military 
strategy and tactics. The best military commander could be defeated if his unit is 
lacking in support from the people. His unit could be easily isolated and turn into a 
bandit unit if it has no popular support and no correct political direction. 
In a people's war that is being carried out in the Moro areas, it is fundamental 
to arouse, organize and mobilize the masses, carry out land reform step by step and 
exert efforts to transform the backward villages into politically, economically, 
militarily and culturally advanced villages. 
The people's army can get the support of the people only if the people are 
convinced that this army is working and fighting for their interests. The people 
themselves are the endless source of military personnel, intelligence, logistics and 
other requirements of revolutionary war. 
We, the Moro Revolutionary Organization, are determined to create and 
develop people's armed defense units. We are willing to coordinate these units with 
other units devoted to the revolutionary cause of the Moro people. We are also 
willing to help develop those armed units established outside of our initiative in the 
Moro areas. 
In the Moro areas, the armed units of non-Moro people should unite, cooperate 
and coordinate with the armed units of the Moro people. We should also encourage 
thP. development of the people's armed units in which Moro and non-Moro fighters are 
integrated. In this way, we can defeat the enemy's policy of dividing and ruling the 
people of the Moro areas. 
In the establishment of mass organizations, local armed units and organs of 
democratic power, our policy is likewise to encourage the integration of the Moro and 
non-Moro people so as to give the broadest possible support to the people's armed 
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units and so as to defeat the enemy's policy of making the Moro and non-Moro people 
suspect and fight each other. 
The Moro revolutionary Organization is wholehartedly devoted to the 
revolutionary cause of the Moro people. An integral part of this devotion is to help 
integrate well the non-Moro people with the Moro people in Moro areas and 
elsewhere. 
3. Unity of the Moro People with the non-Moro People 
£n the Moro Areas, Minsupala and the Ph£lippines 
The Moro people must be united with the non-Moro people in the Moro areas, 
m the whole Minsupala and in the entire Philippine archipelago. On the three 
aforesaid scales, the Moro and the non-Moro people have a common interest in the 
national democratic revolution and are faced in common with the same enemies-U.S. 
imperialism, fuedalism and bureaucratic capitalism. 
The Moro people are in the overwhelming majority in Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, 
Basilan, Lanao del Sur and Maguiiidanao and many municipalities and barrios in 
North Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, Lanao del Norte, Zamboanga del 
Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, the Davoa provinces, Bukidnon, Palawan and Cagayan de 
Sulu. 
But in many of these areas, there are considerable numbers of people belonging 
to other nationalities, including settlers and native inhabitants who are also 
non-Moro. Also adjacent to the areas where the Moro people prevail in number are 
greater masses of non-Moro people whose lives cannot but be related to those of the 
Moro people. 
It is to the interest of the Moro people to unite and cooperate with the 
non-Moro people in the Moro areas and at the same time give due respect to their 
national peculiarities. At the base of the broad unity and cooperation to be fostered 
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should be the unity and cooperation of the oppressed and exploited classes of workers 
and peasants. 
The Moro and the non-Moro people should participate in the same mass 
organizations, armed units and organs of democratic power and in the activities 
thereof. The rule of proportionate representation in the organs of leadership should 
be applied as far as possible as a safeguard against chuavinism and discrimination. 
Membership in our association, the Moro Revolutionary Organization, is open 
not only to Moros but also to non-Moros who adhere to the basic principles and 
general program as laid down in this Moro Manifesto and who pledge to work and 
fight for the revolutionary interests of the Moro people. 
The same rules and procedures for enhancing harmony between the Moro and 
non-Moro people should be followed in the areas of Minsupala where the Moro people 
are in the minority and the non-Moro people are in the majority. Always, the 
overriding guide should be to advance the revolutionary struggle along the national 
democratic line. 
Of the total population of Minsupala, the Moro people comprise about one-third 
and the non-Moro people, two-thirds. It is absolutely necessary for the Moro and 
non-Moro people in Minsupala to unite, cooperate and coordinate their revolutionary 
efforts and frustrate all schemes to divide and rule them. 
It is adverse to the interest of the Moro people to allow or promote any 
sectarianism o-r narrowmindedness that would tend to divide them from the non-Moro 
people. Only the enemy and his instrumentalities are interested in fomenting 
chauvinism, sectarianism and communal conflicts so as to prevent the people, 
especially the exploited and oppressed masses, from uniting against him and for 
national democratic revolution. 
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As far as the entire Philippine archipelago is concerned, it is a clear objective 
fact that the revolutionary struggles of the Moro people and the Filipino people 
support each other. We also learn from history that Spanish colonialism collapsed 
and the Japanese fascist invasion failed as soon as the common armed resistance of 
the Moro and non-Moro people in the Philippines reached a high level development. 
It is politically wise and necessary to enhance the unity, cooperation and 
coordination between the revolutionary forces of the Moro people, including the Moro 
National Liberation Front and the Bangsa Moro Army, on the one hand, and those of 
the Filipino people, including the Communist Party of the Philippines and the New 
People's Army, on the other. To do so is to strengthen all revolutionary forces in the 
Philippines and hasten the downfall not only of the fascist dictatorial regime of the 
U .S.-Marcos clique but also of the entire reactionary state oppressing and exploiting 
the people. 
So long as the reactionary state and ruling class can dominate the greater part 
of the archipelago, they are in a position to prolong their rule over the Moro people. 
It is to the interest of the Moro people to extend support to the Filipino people, just 
as it is to the interest of the latter to do likewise to the former. 
Because of the continued and rising revolutionary struggles of the Filipino and 
Moro people, the enemy is forced to divide his forces and spread them thinly all over 
the archipelago. His ability to concentrate the reactionary armed forces anywhere is 
lessened. In the years to come, the enemy will find himself more and more 
overextended, more and more exhausted and more and more vulnerable to the deadly 
blows of revolutionary forces throughout the archipelago. 
In the Moro areas, the Moro people have long given due respect and 
encouragement to various forms of organizations and institutions initiated by 
non-Moro people. We are glad to acknowledge that in all non-Moro areas, where 
there are Moro communities, students and others, the Filipino people accord due 
respect and encouragement to Moro organizations and institutions. 
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It is only the foreign and domestic oppressors and exploiters of the Filipino 
people and the Moro people who are interested in national oppression, chauvinism 
and discrimination. 
We, the Moro Revolutionary Organization, are committed to promoting in 
every possible way the common understanding and common courses of action between 
the Moro people and other people in the Philippine archipelago so that revolution can 
triumph along the national democratic line. 
4. All-Round Progress and Religious Freedom 
The broad masses of the Moro people demand all-round progress. They seek 
progress in the political, socio-economic and cultural fields. They are opposed to the 
misrepresentation of the enemy that they could be appeased if only tokens of respect 
were given to the "cultural autonomy" and religion. 
As they engage in the revolutionary struggle for national self-determination and 
democracy, they can achieve all-round progress to an extent as would enable them to 
defeat the enemy. The national democratic revolution which they must complete 
entails political, socio-economic and cultural requirements, aside from military. 
By fulfilling all requirements of the revolutionary struggle in order to wm 
victory, they strengthen themselves and lay the foundation for greater progress in all 
fields. The competition of the national democratic revolution means the beginning of 
socialist revolution and construction. 
In the course of the national democratic revolution, the leadership of the most 
advanced class is realized and the broad masses of the people, mainly the workers and 
peasants, liberate themselves from national and class oppression and exploitation. 
Not just in the form but more importantly in substance, democracy is achieved and 
enjoyed by the people. 
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It means a gigantic progress to put a stop to national oppression and the 
unbridled plunder of human and natural resources by the foreign monopoly capitalist 
and the local exploiting classes. Only in the course of the revolutionary armed 
resistance, liberated areas arise and restraints as well as taxation can be increasingly 
imposed on the exploiters. Thus, the Moro people and their revolutionary 
government increasingly get a share of the social wealth. 
The worker masses can demand better working and living conditions. And in 
the countryside, where the people's army is based, land reform is undertaken by 
peasant masses and their associations as a step towards a throughgoing agrarian 
revolution. The backward villages can be transformed step by step into advanced 
bulwarks of the revolution. 
The petty bourgeoisie also widen their opportunities against national 
discrimination, oppression and exploitation. The legitimate interests of the national 
bourgeoisie and the enlightened sections of the exploiting classes are protected. 
In line with the political and socio-economic progress that they demand, the 
broad masses of the Moro people are profoundly interested in the development of a 
national, scientific and mass culture. 
The past, including the revolutionary tradition and cultural heritage of the 
Moro people, is used to serve present-day revolutionary needs. And foreign things, 
especially in the scientific achievements of mandkind, are used to serve the Moro 
people and land. The main consideration in any kind of progress is the progress that 
redounds to the toiling masses of workers and peasants. 
We recognize that Islam has been a major factor in the historical development 
of the Moro people as a nation, especially in resisting the aggression of Spanish 
colonialism and of American imperialism and in the current struggle for 
self-determination. At the same time, we also recognize the democratic requirements 
fostered by contemporary realities and ideologies in the era of modern imperialism. 
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U.S. imperialism and the Philippine ruling classes have been able to lay effective 
control on the Moro people and land for several decades already. We must recognize 
our historical and national bonds with the broad masses of the Filipino people and 
the ever pressing necessity to unite, cooperate and coordinate with them in opposing 
U.S. imperialism and the ruling classes. 
Cultural autonomism and religious sectarianism are tools of reaction. U.S. 
imperialism and the local reactionaries have used to lull one people to cultural 
autonomism and religious sectarianism so that they can continue to divide and rule 
the people, preoccupy them with communal conflicts and give U.S. imperialism and 
the local reactionaries plenty of ground for manoeuvre against the entire people. 
Notwithstanding all sectarian schemes of the chauvinists, both the Moro and 
non-Moro people in the Moro areas and the whole of Mindanao have shown the 
utmost tolerance for the diversity of faiths and have been averse to any religious 
persecution. There is a greater need and more progressive basis for the freedom of 
religious belief than religious sectarianism. 
By and large, the fascist dictatorial regime of the U.S.-Marcos clique has failed 
to arouse the Filipino people against the Moro people on the basis of religious 
sectarianism despite the most desperate attempts to do so. It is necessary for the 
Moro and Filipino people to continue defeating the fascist regime and any succeeding 
reactionary regime in this regard. 
We are for a secular.democratic type of people's government, whether for the 
Moro areas or for the entire Philippine archipelago.- It is a people's coalition 
government representing the interests of both the Moro people and the Filipino 
people. It is a government that guarantees the enjoyment of all democratic rights by 
the people. Among these rights is the freedom of religious belief. 
Even before Philippine-wide or Moro-wide victory, when a significant part of 
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the Philippines and the Moro areas shall have been liberated from enemy rule, the 
MORO can join hands with other revolutionary groups in establishing a provisional 
revolutionary coalition government, which can include even those serving under the 
present government who choose to serve the people. 
5. Revolutionary Internationalism Against Imperialism 
The Moro people's struggle for national self-determination and democracy must 
be guided by the principle of revolutionary internationalism. Under this principle, 
the Moro people can grasp fully the new democratic character of their revolution and 
the relation of this revolution to other revolutions in the world. 
It is revolutionary internationalism for the Moro people to recognize that they 
have a share in the struggle of mankind for emancipation from imperialism, 
colonialism and all reaction and also for them to recognize t~t they draw support 
and learn from other people's revolutionary struggles. 
To know the international context of their revolutionary struggle, the Moro 
people can grasp comprehensively not only the character of this struggle but also its 
strategic and tactical requirements. In the era of imperialism, no people waging a 
revolution can dispense with correct and appropriate international relations. 
The Moro people must deal with U.S. imperialism as presently their No. 1 
enemy among the foreign exploiters of their land and the entire Philippines. It is 
after all the No. 1 military supporter of the Marcos fascist gang. 
The Moro people, together with the entire Filipino people, must count 
themselves among the people of the third world and oppose imperialism. The people 
of Asia, Africa and -Latin America have a common revolutionary cause with the Moro 
and Filipino people. They must support each other. The Moro people must also 
develop revolutionary unity and cooperation with the people of the world. There 
should be no restrictions in extending as well as seeking support from the people of 
the world. 
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In Southeast Asia, the Moro people have one of the biggest armed forces still 
fighting for national and social liberation. They are duty-bound to fight U.S. 
imperialism and the local reactionaries effectively until victory is won. The people in 
the unliberated countries of Southeast Asia continue to wage revolutionary armed 
struggle. The peoples of Southeast Asia must support each other. 
We are opposed to the schemes of U.S. imperialism and the reactionaries of 
Southeast Asia to use bilateral agreements between the Philippines and neighboring 
countries and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) against the 
revolutionary people. It is correct and appropriate for the Moro people to call on the 
other peoples of Southeast Asia to frustrate these schemes and resort to common 
efforts to frustrate them. 
The Moro people have close bonds with the people of all Islamic countries and 
with the Arab and Palestinian peoples. We make special mention of our unity with 
them in seeking liberation from imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism and in 
achieving a world of justice, peace, progress and prosperity. 
The Moro people support the revolutionary struggles of the Arab and 
Palestinian peoples against Islaeli Zionism and the superpowers which give direct or 
indirect support to it. The national rights of the Palestinian people must be restored 
to them. And the territories seized from the Arab people by Israeli Zionism should be 
likewise restored. 
The Moro people are fortunate that many Islamic and Arab organizations are 
extending support and assistance to their revolutionary struggles. The best way to 
reciprocate these is to fight the enemy firmly and effectively and develop further our 
self-reliance in the revolutionary struggle. 
The Moro people welcome the moral and material support of all peoples. This 
is an important part of the struggle against imperialism and the local reactionaries. 
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At the same time, the Moro people stand for independence and self-reliance in 
international affairs. 
Should the Moro people be able to establish a people's democratic state ahead' 
of the rest of the Filipino people, they shall develop a foreign policy imbued with the 
principle of revolutionary internationalism. At the same time, they shall carry out a 
policy of peaceful co-existence whereby diplomatic trade relations shall be undertaken 
on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. 
Should the Moro people accept regional autonomy in a people's democratic 
state covering the entire Philippine archipelago, they shall demand a foreign policy no 
different from what is aforestated. 
Mindanao 
December 1982 
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Appendix I 
STRUCTURE OF THE MALAY ORGANIZATIONS 
The organizational structures described below are constructed on the basis of 
organization outlines depicted on paper by the respective fronts. Figures 1-1 to 1-2 
illustrate the basic structure of the BNPP as specified in its constitution and other 
documents. The Central Working Committee (Majlis Kerja Tertinggi) of the BNPP 
is the highest decision-making body when Congress (Majlis Syura) is not in session. 
It consists of a secretariat which comprises different sections as shown in Figure 1-1. 
The central committee is headed by an elected chairman and vice-chairman and 
consists of appointed members who hold different portfolios. The BNPP constitution 
gives power to the chairman and vice-chairman to dissolve the central committee and 
to appoint and dismiss its members. However, they can also be dismissed by a 
two-thirds majority of the committee members. Both chairman and vice-chairman are 
elected by a congress which convenes every five years for the purpose. The congress 
comprises all members of the central committee and two representatives from each 
local committee and foreign branch (BNPP 1981a:12-35; 1981b:l4-15). The BNPP 
Congress assembles in an Islamic-oriented fashion. For instance, the congress which 
was held in August 1981 was saturated with religious rituals. Despite employing a 
secret ballot, the election result was compromised; one candidate who was elected as 
vice-chairman withdrew from the position in favour of a more suitable individual (I 
observed the BNPP Congress held on 4-6 August 1981). Such compromise is said to 
be characteristic of Islamic-oriented meetings or syura. Unlike its counterparts, the 
BNPP established no permanent tribunal. The tribunal will be created by the central 
committee for a specific case when required (BNPP 1981a:14). This suggests that the 
front favours self-discipline and believes that those who break the rules are 
answerable to God. 
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Figure 1-1: Structure of the BNPP Organization {A) 
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Figure 1-2: Structure of the BNPP Organization {B) 
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Some sections of the secretariat consist of several hierarchical units. The 
Military Section, for instance, extends its authority over the Military Committee 
which operates the armed mujahideen of the BNPP or the National Liberation Army 
of the Patani People (NLAPP). The NLAPP presently comprises several small units 
of guerrillas. The Interior Section exercises its jurisdiction over the existing 
Provincial, District and Commune Committees in Patani, Yala and Narathiwat. 
There is no committee established in Satun province. The hierarchy of the Foreign 
Section is over foreign branches including those in Mecca, Cairo, Karachi, Kartum 
and Kuwait. The jurisdiction of these three sections over their lower units, however, 
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applies only in theory. In practice, the chairman with a few of his close associates 
dominates the overall management of the front. The concentration of power into the 
hands of a few leaders is one of the characteristics of the Malay fronts. 
Figure I-3 demonstrates the organizational structure of the BBMP as depicted 
in its constitution. Unless the Majlis Syura (Congress) is in session, the Presidium is 
the highest policy-making body of the organization. It can also abrogate decisions of 
the congress with the consent of a two-third majority of its members. The Presidium 
consists of the chairmen of the various committees established within the secretariat 
(BBMP n.d.:4). It appoints and dismisses its own members and all members of the 
front. Unlike other fronts, the BBMP has neither elected nor appointed a head of the 
Presidium; it employs collective leadership. The BBMP consists of a secretariat, 
Dewan Mujahideen, which comprises different administrative committees that 
perform various functions. In addition, there are local administrative committees that 
serve to implement policies and orders of the Presidium. The Majlis Syura (Congress) 
of the BBMP, which is composed of the chairmen of the various committees of the 
secertariat and heads of local committees, functions as both policy-making body and 
supreme tribunal. It convenes e~ery four months (BBMP n.d.:7). 
According to its constitution (PULO n.d.:3-5), the PULO employs a system of 
secretariat with the Secretary-General serving as head of the organization. The 
Central Committee, which comprises heads of different committees of the secretariat, 
constitutes the highest policy-making body. It elects the secretary-general, chief of the 
supreme tribunal and heads of various committees as indicated in Figure I-4. The 
secretary-general appoints and dismisses members of the organization, including 
heads of local committees and foreign branches. The constitution, moreover, 
authorizes the secretary-g~meral to dissolve the Central Committee provided that a 
general election is held within four months. On the other hand, the secretary-general 
cannot dismiss those elected members and he can also be dismissed by a two-thirds 
majority of the Central Committee members. 
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Figure I-3: Structure of the BBMP Organization 
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The essential difference between these organizations is that the BNPP and 
BBMP are regarded as 'religious-oriented' organizations; both employ Majlis Syura 
which suggests an Islamic inclination. The PULO, on the other hand, prefers 
'secular-orientation'. The BBMP also differs from the rest in that it exercises, at 
least in theory, collective leadership of a group of chairmen. In the case of the BRN, 
there are no documents distributed by the front on the structure of its organization. 
Its leaders -also hesitate to reveal it when asked. This is partly because the BRN had, 
in the late 1970s, experienced several arrests of its active leaders, some of whom are 
still serving their thirty-year sentence in Bangkok. Due to the lack of information, 
this appendix·.does not provide the organizational strudure of the BRN. 
Figure 1-4: Structure of the PULO Organization 
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AppendixJ 
RESOLUTION NO. 18 
RESOLUTION NO. 18 OF THE POLITICAL 
COMMITTEE AT THE FIFTH ISL.AllIC 
CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS 
HELD AT KUALA LUMPUR ON 
JUNE 21-25, 1974 
RESOLUTION ON THE FLIGHTOFTHE FILIPINO MUSLIMS 
PRE.AMBULAR 
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The Fifth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held m Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia from 21-25 June 1974: 
2. RECALLING Resolution No. 4 adopted by the Fourth Islamic Conference of 
Foreign.Ministers at Benghazi in March 1973; 
3. HA YING CONSIDERED the report submitted by the Special Mission 
composed of the Foreign Ministers of Libya, Saudi Arabia, Senegal and Somalia 
pursuant to Resolution No. 4 adopted by the Fourth Islamic Conference of Foreign 
Ministers at Benghazi; 
4. EXPRESSING deep appreciation of the efforts of the above-mentioned 
Special Mission; 
5. CONSCIOUS of the complexity of the problem as it relates to an 
independent and sovereign state but at the same t£me concerned at the tragic plight 
of the Filipino Muslims; 
OPERATIVE 
1. EXPRESSES its deep and continuing anxiety over the situation prevailing among 
the Filipino Muslims and the Southern Philippines; 
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2. CALLS upon the Philippine Government to desist from all means which 
result in the killing of Muslims and the destruction of their properties and places of 
worship in the Southern Philippines; 
3. TAKES NOTE of the steps taken by the Philippine Government to improve 
the condition of the Muslims, but is convinced that the socio-economic measures 
proposed by the Philippine Government will not by themselves solve the problems; 
4. URGES the Philippine Government to find a political and peaceful solution 
through negotiations with Muslim leaders, particularly with representatives of the 
Moro National Liberation Front in order to arrive at a just solution to the plight of 
the Filipino Muslims within the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the Philippines; 
5. CALLS ON THE Philippine Government to bring about the necessary 
climate of confidence for a real and just solution by immediately desisting from 
military operations, providing protection and security for the Muslims, repatriating 
refugees to their homes and halting organized Christian migration from the North; 
6. APPEALS to peace-loving states and religious international authorities, 
while recognizing the problem as an internal problem of the Philippines, to use their 
good offices with the Philippine Government to ensure the safety of Filipino Muslims 
and the preservation of their liberties in accordance with the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights; 
7. DECIDES to establish a body to be called the Filipino Muslim Welfare and 
Relief Agency for the purpose of extending welfare and relief aid direct to Muslims in 
the Southern Philippines so as to ameliorate their plight and raise social and 
economic well-being provided the Agency is being financed from the Islamic Fund and 
is controlled by the Committee of the Solidarity Fund; 
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8. APPEALS to member countries and others to contribute generously in cash 
or in kind to the agency for immediate relief purposes; 
9. REQUESTS the secretary-General in consultation with the four (4) Foreign 
Ministers to take steps to discuss with the Philippine Government the modalities and 
terms of cooperation in the work of the Agency; 
10. DECIDES that the Special Mission of the Foreign Ministers established in 
pursuance of Resolution No. 4 of the Fourth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers 
will remain in being to pursue this matter; 
11. DECIDES tO review this subject again at the next Islamic Conference of 
Foreign Ministers; 
12. REQUESTS the Secretary-General to transmit this Resolution to the 
Philippine Government. 
AppendixK 
WORKING PAPER FOR THE MEETING OF THE MINISTERIAL 
FOUR-MEMBER COMMITTEE 
FIRST--SELF GOVERNMENT 
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1 (a) In the framework of the national sovereignty of the Philippines and the 
integrity of its homeland. 
Self-government is to be set up in the South in Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu and 
Palawan. In determining this it was taken into consideration the necessity that the 
Government of the Philippines put into effect its previous commitments regarding 
restoring the Southern territories taken away from Muslims after the aggressions 
which had taken pl_ace since war broke out, and land expropraited without any legal 
right. Territories owned by Muslim ancestors should also be added. Muslims should 
also go back to the Islamic territories which were owned by Muslims until 1944 the 
year of the evacuation of Japanese and American Imperialism. All of these territories 
are to be the geographical area on which Islamic self-government is to be set up. 
1 (b) Christian and non-Christian minorities which have a historical presence 
on Islamic territories shall remain within the territories under local Islamic 
Self-Government and shall be considered a Christian minority within Islamic land. 
2 When a peace agreement m the Islamic South is concluded, the Muslim 
Self-Government, which will be the object of this agreement, shall be set up from 
among good Muslim leaders in the Islamic South, especially the Liberation Front. 
Other minorities have the right to participate in the Self-Government in the 
democratic way on the basis of the principle of similar treatment for Muslims living 
in other territories in the Republic of the Philippines. 
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SECOND--AFF AIRS OF INTERNAL SECURITY IN THE ISLAMIC 
TERRITORIES 
Units of local security, defense and militia shall be set up basically from among 
good elements of the Liberation Front and Muslim leaderships in the South, also with 
the part~cipation of other minorities. 
THIRD--DEFENSE AND FOREIGN POLICY 
1 National Security and central defense are the concern of the Central 
Government and the Muslims through participation in the central Armed Forces and 
in Foreign policy as a national duty. 
2 Dissolving all units of the special force of the Philippine Army and their bases 
as well as armed units set up on the account of the war in the South. 
FOURTH-ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 
The government of the Muslim territory undertake all internal administrative 
matters. The Central Government shall supervise all national administrative matters 
in the territory and co-ordinate the efforts of the two authorities in matters of 
common interest as well as matters which are an object of conflict. 
FIFTH--SYSTEM OF COURTS 
1 Local and central courts shall be set up. In case of conflict in specialization 
the matter shall be referred to the Supreme Legal Authority. 
2 Local law courts shall hav_e jurisdiction in local cases related to the territory 
in accordance with the principles of Islamic Sharia. 
3 A Supreme Court shall be set up from Eight neutral judges characterized by 
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their integrity, four of whom shall be selected by the Central Authority and the other 
four by the local authority. Chairmanship of the Court shall be alternate by a 
member of any of the two sides. Their appointments shall be by a Presidential 
decree. This Court shall be concerned with: 
{a) Law suits related to adnministrative matters in case of conflict of 
terms of reference; {b) conflict of terms of reference between the Central law 
court and local law courts; ( c) any conflict referred to it by local or central 
government. 
SIXTH--SYSTEM OF EDUCATION 
1 Educational institutions up to the secondary schools shall be controlled by the 
self-government of the territory. Co-ordination of higher and university education 
shall take place with the Central Geovernment. 
2 Rebuilding the Islamic educational system ID the territory ID co-ordination 
with the general national educational system. 
SEVENTH--ESTABLISHMENT OF ISLAMIC LIFE AND SOCIETY IN THE 
SOUTH 
The practice of Muslim religious rites including pilgrimage, and the supervision 
and administration of mosques, places of worship and Islamic institutions shall fall 
within the jurisdiction of the territory's government. 
EIGHTH-FINANCIAL AND ECONOMICAL AFFAIRS 
1 The territory shall have the right to run internal economic affairs and to set 
up the financial sources of the territory. The territory's government shall have the 
right to impose and collect taxes. Its tax commitments shall be paid directly to the 
Central Government in return for the latter's undertaking of its duty towards 
development projec~s in the territory for the realization of the rebuilding of the South 
and cultural and economic development. 
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2 The Central Government shall extend the necessary financial support to the 
territory's government to enable it to shoulder its responsibilities in public services 
within the general budget with special emphasis on the territory due to the 
destruction to which it was exposed. 
3 Finances devoted to development projects which are received by the territory 
from Islamic states shall be invested and managed through co-ordination between the 
two authorities. A joint council shall be set up which shall submit periodical progress 
reports to the Secretary General of the Islamic Conference on projects financed by 
Islamic states. 
NINTH--Inhabitants of the territory, in their capacity as Philippine citizens, 
shall have the right to participate in the Central Government and all organs of the 
state. 
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AppendixL 
RESOLUTION NO. 10 OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE AT 
THE SIXTH ISLAMIC CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS 
RESOLUTION ON THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE MORO LIBERATION 
FRONT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES 
The Sixth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers meeting in Jeddah from 3 to 
7 Rajah 1395 H. corresponding to 12 t~ 15 July 1975. 
HAVING examined the plan of action prepared by the Committee of Four 
which composed of the Foreign Ministers of the Republic of Senegal, the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, the Libyan Arab Republic and Democratic Republic of Somalia, in 
accordance with Resolution 4 of the Fourth Islamic Conference and in pursuance of 
Resolution 5 of the Fifth Islamic Conference; 
EXPRESSES its satisfaction at the effort of the Ministerial Committee of Four 
and decides that the Committee should pursue its appointed tasks in accordance with 
its terms of reference until such time as complete agreement is reached between the 
Government of the Philippines and the Moro Liberation Fronts; 
APPROVES the plan of action prepared by the Ministerial Committee of Four 
and considers that this plan is the fundamental basis for any settlement of the 
problem, in such manner as would be in keeping with Muslim objectives for autonomy 
within the territorial integrity of the Philippines, in accordance with Resolution 18 of 
the Fifth Islamic Conference of Kuala Lumpur; 
NOTES with satisfaction that the Moro Liberation Front has agreed to the 
plan of action submitted as the fundamental basis for negotiations and expresses 
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satisfaction at the initiative of the Government of the Philippines to accept autonomy 
for Muslims in Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu and Palawan; 
ENTRUSTS the Ministerial Committee of Four a.Ild the Secretary-General with 
the task of contacting the Government of the Philippines to invite them to the 
negotiations as a basis of the afore-mentioned plan of action, in a manner designed to 
achieve agreement on all aspects of self-government for the Muslims in the South of 
the Philippines, ensuring peace and security to them and guaranteeing all their 
legitimate rights, while at the same time preserving the territorial integrity of the 
Philippines, thus enabling the Government of the latter to exert all their efforts in the 
service of the people as a whole; 
REQUESTS the Secretary-General in consultation with the Foreign Ministers, 
to take all necessary steps for holding such negotiations within the shortest possible 
time at the Headquarters of the General Secretariat in Jeddah; 
DECIDES to review the results achieved so far by the two parties during the 
next Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers; 
REQUESTS the Secretary-General to communicate this resolution to the 
Government of the Philippines and to the Moro Liberation Front. 
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GLOSSARY 
adat customary law 
agama religion, socio-religious community 
aka/ rationality 
alim learned man, religious learned man 
anting-anting charms 
balaisa prayer house 
bangsa nation 
baniaga slave 
barakat charismatic grace 
barangay community, boat 
bendahara prime minister 
bendahari treasurer 
berkat blessed 
bilal prayer caller 
bintala district supervisor of priests 
Bunga Mas Flowers of Gold 
cedula head tax 
chaomuang head of state 
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Chularajmontri State Councilor for Islamic Affairs 
conquistadores conquerors 
cot a fort 
daerah territorial district 
dar al-Islam territory of Islam 
datu traditional leader 
da 'wah call of faith 
deen wa dawla religion and socio-political order 
du-ah Muslim preacher, Muslim missionary 
dumatu lesser noble 
fatwa religious ruling 
guru teacher, religious teacher 
Hadith Prophetic traditions 
hajji Muslim who has fulfilled pilgrimage duty 
hamba slave 
hari raya Muslim festive day 
ibadat pious duties 
imam prayer leader 
jihad holy war 
kafir al-harb non.;.believers of first category 
kamnan commune headman 
kampilan sword 
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kampung village 
kenduri communal feast 
khaek alien, visitor 
khatib sermon's conveyor, preacher 
khru school teacher 
khutba sermon 
kuffar infidels 
laksamana admiral 
laksmanna panglima's messenger 
madaris religious schools 
madrasa religious school 
mahatthai ministry of interior 
Maj/is Agama Islam 
Provincial Council for Islamic Affairs 
maj/is bechara Assembly of Discussion 
maratabat honour 
masjid mosque 
mau/ud occasion of commemorating the Prophet birthday 
muazzin prayer caller 
mudarris teacher 
mufti chief judge 
mujahideen participants in the holy war 
nafsu irrationality 
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nakib officer in charge of military matters 
nakuda leader of trading expedition 
negeri state 
nikhom sangton-eng 
self-help colony 
orang alim learned man, religious learned man 
orang berhutang debt-bondsman 
orang beriman pious man 
orang kaya rich man, successful trader 
orang sakai aborigines 
· pangl£ma sultan's personal representative, district chief 
parkasa pangl£ma's aid-de-camp 
patthanakorn community development officer 
pend£ta learned man, religious learned man 
perahu kolek small fishing boat 
perlembagaan constitution 
phuyaiban village headman 
pondok Islamic religious school 
pusaka inherited property, inheritance 
qadi Muslim judge 
Quran Muslim Holy Book 
ra 'ayat subjects 
ra3a ruler 
rakrat subjects 
rasa race 
rongrian aekachon sornsasana Islam 
private Islamic school 
rongrian sornsasana Islam 
Islamic religious school 
rumah bechara House of Discussion 
sabilillah struggle in the name of Allah 
sakop follower 
salat prayer 
sasanupathampok patron of all religions 
shahbandar harbour master 
sharia Islamic law 
shura Islamic-oriented meeting 
sultan traditional leader, ruler 
syura Islamic-oriented meeting 
tanah Melayu lands of the Malays 
tarsi la genealogy 
temenggong minister of war 
Thai R.atthaniyom 
Thai Custom Decree 
thammacharik pilgrims of faith 
thammathut ambassador of faith 
timuway headman 
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to'guru traditional religious teacher 
to'khru religious teacher 
to'na master 
ulama learned men, religious learned men 
ul£pun debt-bondsman 
um mah Muslim community 
ustaz religious teacher 
zakat alms 
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